The two largest parties followed: the centrist People’s Party (ÖVP) with 26.2% and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) with 21.1%. The results mark a seismic shift in voter preferences. The ÖVP suffered the biggest loss for a governing party in history, dropping 11.2 points. The SPÖ saw their worst-ever vote since World War II.

The liberal NEOS, the only party without prior government experience, achieved its best result with 9.1%, gaining 1.0 point over its last showing. Meanwhile, the Green Party, which had served as the junior coalition partner over the past four years, secured just 8.2% of the vote, a loss of 5.7 points. The results are widely seen as a protest against the ruling coalition between the People’s Party and the Greens. Their shared 51% in the 2019 elections plummeted to only 36.6%.

The ÖVP-Green tenure faced undeniable challenges. Issues including the COVID-19 pandemic, high inflation and the Russian war in Ukraine plagued the partnership. The FPÖ capitalized on these crises by positioning itself as a vocal critic and, at times, leaning on conspiracy theories. In contrast, other parties aimed to cooperate with the government and avoided polarizing the public further. The FPÖ used its own platforms, such as YouTube and social media, to spread messages that would not appear in mainstream media. Voters viewing themselves as disaffected resonated with these messages.

When no one wants to govern with the populists

The FPÖ won the election, but just with a plurality of seats. Only the ÖVP sees a possible coalition with the FPÖ. However, they attached a significant condition. Karl Nehammer, the ÖVP chairman and current Austrian Chancellor, demanded that Herbert Kickl, the FPÖ leader, not be part of a coalition. This demand is unacceptable to the FPÖ. Kickl’s leadership was central to their record-breaking electoral success.

Winning the battle but not the war is a familiar scenario in elections across the region. Just a year earlier, Poland’s right-wing populist Law and Justice (PiS) party won an election by a narrow margin after governing for eight consecutive years. Although it was clear they would be unable to form a government, President Andrzej Duda still entrusted them with the task. Two valuable months were ultimately lost in negotiations destined to fail. In contrast, Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen took a different approach. He first met with all parties that passed the electoral threshold to discuss potential coalition intentions. Following these discussions, he confirmed what had already been stated publicly: No party was willing to form a coalition with the FPÖ.

As a result, Van der Bellen encouraged the three largest parties to explore coalition options among themselves. After both the ÖVP and SPÖ confirmed they had no interest in allying with the FPÖ but would consider working together, Van der Bellen formally tasked Nehammer with forming a new government. Unlike in Germany, where parties commonly work together to isolate the far-right Alternative for Germany, a cordon sanitaire has not been the norm in Austria. The FPÖ has previously served as a junior coalition partner on three occasions.

Austria’s future government

Currently, the ÖVP and SPÖ are negotiating with each other and seeking a third coalition partner. They hold exactly the 92 seats that are necessary for a majority. In reality, this is a tight bind. Potential illnesses or absences among MPs limit political maneuvering and efficiency. Therefore, a third partner is necessary. This too brings its own issues. Challenges arise between governing with either the liberal NEOS or the Greens. To reach a broad consensus, each party may have to compromise on key issues. The Social Democrats advocate for new taxes on businesses and inheritance, which the liberal NEOS oppose. A continued coalition with the Greens may be less advantageous politically for the People’s Party (ÖVP), as it has not been popular with voters.

The election result is a clear signal that change is needed in Austrian politics. Due to these policy differences, negotiations may take time, and a government might not even be formed before Christmas. Although the chances of a new election are low, they cannot be entirely ruled out. Electoral results in the federal state of Vorarlberg and upcoming elections in Styria put extra pressure on party leaders to come up with a solution. Vorarlberg has already shown the continuation of the good results for the FPÖ, although the ÖVP was able to keep their first place. In Styria, the situation could be reversed in the upcoming vote, which might undermine Nehammer’s refusal to work with Kickl. At the least, a strong FPÖ showing in Styria could spark a debate about his leadership within the ÖVP. SPÖ leader Andreas Babler is internally contested, leaving the third largest party with little breathing room. The FPÖ is already labeling the negotiations as being run by a “coalition of losers,” noting their decreased popularity from past elections.

One of the primary challenges facing the new government will be Austria’s struggling economy, which is projected to be in recession for the second consecutive year. National debt is also surpassing acceptable levels under the Maastricht criteria set by the EU. In these already unfavorable circumstances, there will be the task of proving that the new coalition can work credibly together for the future of the country. There have not been any experiences with three parties in Austria, unlike neighboring Germany. The German government proves the difficulty of balancing multiple parties’ interests. The recent collapse of the coalition does certainly not advocate for such a model. In any case, failure only benefits the FPÖ. Despite his loud protesting, Kickl most likely prefers the role of opposition leader to continue feeding his victim narrative and build on his election result. 

Austria’s international position

No matter what the next coalition in Austria looks like, we can already draw some conclusions: The far-right in the EU continues its success throughout the latest elections. The Patriots for Europe faction in the European Parliament has now received the most votes in national elections in France, the Netherlands, Hungary and Austria. The Czech Republic will likely follow next year.

Even if they are not part of the government in all of these nations, the far right is shaping the political discourse. This can already be felt on the European level. One issue is migration. Border controls have been reintroduced in Germany, where state elections have seen the rise of the far-right, even if they are not (yet) polling at the first place nationally. Another possibility is the emergence of a nationalist, anti-migration, anti-transatlantic party on the left side of the spectrum taking part of some of these state governments. Despite only being founded earlier this year, a party with similar policies joined the government in Slovakia.

What unites both left and right-wing extremists is their pro-Russian narratives. This is bad news for Ukraine, as they are losing support in Central Europe, a region that has mostly experienced Soviet occupation. Seemingly, everyone has forgotten their historical experiences. Pertinently, Austria lies only about 430 kilometers (267 miles) from Ukraine. With US President Donald Trump now returning to the White House, this might even result in abandoning support for Kyiv, coupled with shattering the security architecture in Europe. The external and internal threat coming from the Kremlin has the possibility to further erode democracy within Europe and the European Union, bringing it to the brink of collapse

Austria might just have been another piece in the puzzle if they cannot counter appropriately as mentioned above. A phrase from Karl Kraus comes to mind, who called Austria in the interwar period the “experimental station of the end of the world.” However, this has already been used to describe the inauguration of a new government a decade ago. But then there is another (most likely wrongly ascribed) quote from Kraus: “if the end of the world comes, I will go to Vienna, because everything happens there ten years later.”

[Stephen Chilimidos edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Austria’s Arduous Path to a New Government: Without the Far-Right appeared first on Fair Observer.

Don’t run under one banner

The democratic opposition often comprises parties with conflicting views. Forming a unified front may be tempting when confronting a common opponent with disproportionate media and institutional advantages. However, recent elections in Hungary and Turkey suggest this is not necessarily a blueprint for victory.

In Poland, the liberal-conservative Civic Coalition (KO) party initially insisted on a united front approach. KO leader Donald Tusk, like PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński, was perceived as a polarizing figure. Other parties were hesitant about being perceived as close to either of them. They feared losing electoral support by making an alliance and rejected the proposal. PiS exploited this, portraying the opposition as divided and unable to govern.

Eventually, the opposition learned to refrain from mutual attacks, opting for an informal united front without a joint election list. Two parties formed a coalition (Third Way) to present a conservative alternative to the KO-PiS duopoly. This approach allowed parties to maintain authenticity, providing a broader range of options and reaching specific target groups.
While KO and the New Left rallied hundreds of thousands in Warsaw, the Third Way concentrated on engaging voters in rural areas and small cities. This approach also conveyed a sense that the parties’ objectives extended beyond simply ousting PiS from power.

Mobilize undecided and apolitical voters

In the face of a seemingly inevitable PiS victory, the Polish opposition was concerned that widespread apathy could deter many from voting. Recognizing a substantial number of disillusioned and undecided voters opposing PiS, both KO and the New Left specifically targeted them. Their focus extended to young women, who, affected by PiS’s restrictive abortion and contraception policies, felt the consequences of political decisions on their lives. Non-governmental organizations, human rights institutions and public figures launched multiple campaigns to boost turnout, particularly targeting women. Their objective was to underscore the consequences of abstaining from voting, convey frustration and emphasize the significance of each vote.

The turnout exceeded expectations at over 74%. Women voted in greater numbers, and there was increased participation across all age groups. Interestingly, this heightened political interest may continue beyond the elections, with the new government’s proceedings, humorously dubbed “Sejmflix,” becoming the second most-watched video on Polish YouTube.

Campaigns involve more than just programs; emotions play a pivotal role. Initially, the opposition struggled to craft a compelling narrative, but a breakthrough occurred after the pro-European rally in Warsaw on June 4, 2023. Half a million people took to the streets in outrage over PiS’s proposed law, “Lex Tusk,” which would have hindered Tusk from running in elections. The symbolism of the anniversary of Poland’s first partially-free elections on June 4, 1989, accentuated the fight against non-democratic regimes and tapped into the legend of Solidarity, a movement that put an end to communism. The rally’s immense popularity surprised the opposition, paralyzing PiS and instilling hope in the public that mobilized voters could change the election outcome.

“The March of a Million Hearts,” with white-red hearts emblem, held two weeks before the elections, again gathered hundreds of thousands. Emphasizing respect for PiS voters despite differences, in contrast to PiS labeling the opposition as “Poles of the worse sort,” resonated well with moderates.

Despite being de facto anti-government, both rallies fostered a positive, joyful atmosphere, conveying message of a progressive, inclusive and democratic Poland within the EU. This approach helped instill a winning mindset in society and break apathy.

How PiS overplayed its hand

PiS also made its fair share of mistakes. It underestimated social discontent amid ongoing democratic backsliding. PiS also eroded its popularity by engaging in disputes with the EU — a risky strategy in a notably pro-EU society.

Moreover, tightening an already restrictive abortion law into a near-total abortion ban, coupled with subsequent maternal deaths, not only undermined PiS support among women but also mobilized previously apolitical people.

In the campaign itself, PiS made three major mistakes. Firstly, it relied heavily on fierce attacks and almost grotesque fear-mongering, particularly targeting Tusk, whom PiS labeled as a “personification of evil” and “the biggest security threat to Poland.” While this may have mobilized PiS’s own electoral base, it led to irritation among opponents and undecideds.

Secondly, the party distanced itself from crucial voter concerns, such as high inflation and housing shortages. This was a break from PiS’s success in other elections, when it understood voter sentiments well and won with popular proposals like child benefits.

Lastly, PiS underestimated the impact of corruption scandals, which seemed to have little effect until the visa scandal broke out during the campaign, catching the party off guard.

Is Poland’s case a blueprint for stopping authoritarians?

We must be cautious when drawing conclusions from to other nations. Each political system has its own local factors. Yet the Polish case illustrates how adapting existing tactics to the specific context and learning from the mistakes of others can enable David to triumph against Goliath.

Poland now serves as a laboratory for navigating a post-illiberal period. The challenge for the current government is to succeed in this taxing endeavor without paving the way for a return of PiS to power.

[The Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe produced this piece and is a partner of Fair Observer.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How to Beat Authoritarian Parties, Polish-Style appeared first on Fair Observer.

On the same day, Sunday, October 15, they will also cast their votes in the general elections. Playing the migration card has previously aided the ruling Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, or PiS) in winning elections. Can it pave the way for their victory again?

Politicization of migration and asylum

In the last few decades, Poland has not been a magnet for immigration, except for a brief period when it hosted Chechen refugees. Poland has had a relatively low asylum acceptance rate.

The “refugee crisis” of 2015 shifted European politics: Migration became a central theme in political campaigns, as seen in the Brexit “Leave” campaign. In Poland, it played a vital role in the rise of PiS to power. It was used to instill fear, shape public attitudes and discredit aid to migrants. 

After coming to power in 2015, PiS reversed the previous government’s decision to accept 7,000 refugees. Poland’s government and state-controlled media have maintained a negative narrative about migration, portraying refugees and migrants from the Global South as threats to safety, identity and Christianity. This narrative was evident during the 2021 humanitarian crisis on the Poland-Belarus border.

However, the Polish response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine showed that countries with hostile asylum policies can be welcoming to refugees from neighboring states with shared cultural or religious backgrounds.

Referendum as a supporting campaign tool

PiS had been publicly considering a referendum on migration for months, even though its outcome would not influence EU policies. Referenda are rare in Poland, with only four held since 1989. The most recent binding referendum was in 2003 (EU accession). 

The timing and the wording of the questions are not accidental. Let us call a spade a spade. The claim about the “imposed” relocation scheme is a false and repeatedly propagated assertion. The PiS party deliberately misrepresents the European Pact on Asylum, which stipulates that if a country refuses to accept refugees from member states facing an excessive burden, they must contribute €20,000 for each person.

Given that Poland currently hosts one of the highest numbers of refugees from Ukraine within the EU, it is highly unlikely to become a target for relocations. European Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson has reaffirmed this. The primary aim of the referendum seems to be to provide a platform to reiterate the ruling party’s slogans and revive old arguments, even if they do not align with the current context. 

“Safe future for Poles” or a campaign of fear? 

The third question of the referendum asks, “Do you support the removal of the barrier at the border between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus?”

This barrier was constructed to hinder refugees and other migrants from the Global South. Those who managed to cross were often pushed back, despite this being in violation of international law. In Poland, these pushbacks have been legalized. PiS has exploited the issue in political campaigns, and those opposing such practices have been labelled Putin’s sympathizers.

The film Green Border by Agnieszka Holland, depicting the plight of people in the border zone between Poland and Belarus, became the target of political attacks and smear campaigns, with some politicians comparing the acclaimed Polish director to Nazi propagandists.

When an Afghan refugee sexually assaulted a young Polish man in Germany, Prime Minister Morawiecki promptly tweeted about it, blaming “open border policies” and emphasizing his party’s commitment to safety. “Safe Future for Poles” became the campaign slogan for PiS. Multiple ministers and candidates visited the Belarus border to deliver speeches about the perceived threat posed by “violent illegal migrants.”

Political struggles did not spare refugees from Ukraine either. The far-right party Konfederacja was the first to exploit the discontent of some Poles and talked about the “Ukrainization of Poland.”

PiS also criticized Ukraine, although to a lesser extent than Konfederacja, alleging ingratitude. They aimed to secure the votes of farmers who feared that cheaper Ukrainian grain would depress prices in Poland and threaten their livelihoods. The goal was to manufacture a sense of exaggerated fear, even where it did not exist, and then present their own party as the sole solution.

Can the migration issue secure victory for PiS? The party currently holds a slight advantage over its main rival, the Civic Coalition led by Donald Tusk, former Polish prime minister and President of the European Council. Konfederacja poses a threat in attracting more radical voters. This may explain why PiS is using various methods and resorting to aggressive tactics in its campaign to maintain its hold on power. 

Double standards: visa scandal

However, luck has not been on PiS’s side. It was recently revealed that Polish consulates granted work visas to people from Muslim countries on a mass scale, despite PiS’s anti-migrant rhetoric being directed specifically against them.

This is only the tip of the iceberg, as new revelations indicate a complex corruption case at high levels of power. Polish consulates issued Schengen visas in thousands of questionable cases under pressure from higher authorities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A “sped-up process” reportedly cost about five thousand dollars. Poland served only as a transit country on the way to the USA. Opposition parties immediately highlighted these double standards, and the EU demanded explanations from PiS. It remains to be seen, though, if this scandal will affect electoral preferences.

When the electoral dust settles … 

Electoral victory is a short-term goal, and easy solutions are frequently employed to secure it. However, the consequences of harmful narratives do not dissipate once the campaign dust settles. In the long term, they can lead to increased discrimination, double standards and unconscious biases.

If politicians want to make migration a centerpiece of their campaigns, they should focus on topics of real importance: how to build a diverse society and create an environment conducive to integration. These issues require far-reaching efforts and cannot be resolved with a single suggestive referendum question.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is the Polish Government’s Provocative Immigration Rhetoric Going To Work? appeared first on Fair Observer.

A country transformed into an NGO 

In the first month following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Warsaw’s population has grown by 17%, whereas Poland has become a country with the second-largest refugee population in the world. Approximately 2.6 million out of 4.6 million people fleeing Ukraine in the first two months of the war found shelter in Poland; currently, 1.5 million remain there. 

This sudden influx of refugees caught Polish authorities by surprise even though since 2015, they had rejected relocation of refugees from the Middle East under the claim that Poland had to be ready to escalate the war in Ukraine. Despite the unpreparedness, the Polish government quickly lent a helping hand to Ukrainians by simplifying border crossing procedures, offering free transportation, and enabling them to receive a Polish personal identification number (PESEL) which provided access to education, health care, labor market, and financial assistance. 

However, the secret of why Poland stood up to the challenge has much more to do with the exceptional commitment of civil society and grassroots activism. Poles from all over Poland picked up refugees from the border, provided them with rooms in their own houses, helped with bureaucracy, organized crowdfunding, cooked meals, and opened free “shops.” According to Karolina Jeznach and Steffen Lüdke: “The feeling that Poland might be the next victim of Russian imperialism has transformed the country into something like a giant NGO.”

Good will may not be enough 

So far, Poland seems to have passed the “solidarity test.” Still, there have been fears that even the best intentions and open doors might not be enough to assist Ukrainian refugees in the long term perspective and considering that Russian disinformation on Polish social media has not said the last word yet, Ukrainians arriving in Poland belong to particularly vulnerable groups: they are predominantly women, children and the elderly. 

The need for assistance is enormous, but among volunteers, there might also be people with ill intentions. Therefore, they should be verified to exclude those sentenced for various forms of abuse. This is one of the cases where state coordination is crucial. 

Many refugees express interest in staying and working in Poland due to its geographical, cultural, and linguistic proximity to Ukraine. But although the country has one of the lowest unemployment rates in the EU, the market can absorb only every fifth Ukrainian willing to work.

The Polish government does not consider relocation of refugees to other EU countries, but it expects EU financial aid in return. NGOs warn that more funding should be transferred to the local actors and organizations on the front lines rather than the government.

There is also a risk that populists could exploit challenges stemming from a sudden wave of refugees (and some groups already do) to stir up hatred since Poland is facing some critical burning issues: galloping inflation, underfinanced public services, the lowest number of medical personnel in the EU and the lowest expenditure on health care, soaring rents and flat shortage. The grievances about the “privileges” of Ukrainians seem relatively isolated, but the support has decreased. 

Whereas 90% of Poles felt optimistic about Ukrainian refugees in April 2022, 71% favored taking up refugees in Poland. Some surveys paint a gloomier picture: they show that although the Poles support the Ukrainian cause, they harbor grievances against Ukrainian refugees for – amongst others – the reasons mentioned above.  Therefore this issue should be addressed timely to avoid social tensions and being turned into a political weapon in the parliamentary elections in 2023.

Refugees welcome 

The underlying reasons for the warm welcome of Ukrainians are manifold. As neighboring Slavic countries, Ukraine and Poland share many cultural, linguistic, and historical ties (although history often proved to be the bone of contention). 

On the eve of the war Ukrainian diaspora in Poland amounted to about a million, and Ukrainians also constituted more than 50% of international students.  Therefore, the first wave of refugees fled predominantly to their relatives and friends. Many Poles know someone from Ukraine. This does not mean that the relationship was free of discrimination: cases of abusing Ukrainian workers or politically incorrect remarks were many.

Another factor that unites both countries is the common enemy. Unlike Hungary, Poland has been strongly resenting Russian political elites for decades, if not centuries. Poles fear that their country could become the next target of Russian aggression and identify themselves strongly with the plight of Ukraine. In the days following the Russian attack, shelves in many shops in eastern Poland turned empty, and long lines were built in front of ATMs and petrol stations.

People all over Poland applied for new passports in masses. Most Poles know of war from history, but the memory of World War II is still very vivid in the collective memory. To many, the unjustified Russian aggression against Ukraine echoes Poland’s fate: the attack by Nazi Germany and the subsequent charge of the Soviet Union under the guise of “brotherly help” against the Nazis.

Last but not least, refugees from Ukraine fit well in the “romantic” perception: they are predominantly women and children, in the eyes of many, “the proper refugees.” This is mainly because Ukrainian men between 18 and 60 are not allowed to leave Ukraine.  

Refugees unwelcome 

The warm welcome of Ukrainians is in stark contrast with the treatment of refugees on the Poland-Belarus border, where many people are still trapped. Polish Border Security Guard regularly informs about push backs and “illegal crossings to Poland” on the Poland-Belarus border by people from Yemen, Ethiopia, Syria, and Afghanistan – countries torn by conflicts or in dire humanitarian situations. 

From the beginning of 2021 until Dec. 19, approximately 15,000 people tried to enter Polish territory over the Poland-Belarus border. For many, deportations would equal death. Their plight did not go unnoticed among Ukrainian organizations, which wrote an open letter to the Polish government and Border Security Guard pledging equal treatment of all refugees.

A decisive factor differentiating the treatment of refugees is the intervention of authorities and politicization of the issue. On the border with Ukraine, the government did not erect walls or penalize any attempt to help by the locals, media, doctors, or volunteers. NGOs were not banned from the border area. But this has been common practice just a hundred kilometers up north. 

The government and the public broadcaster quickly labeled refugees from the Global South as “dangerous,” “illegal,” or “economic” migrants sent by the much-scorned Belarussian dictator Alexander Lukashenko to destabilize Poland. The last argument is true, which is why many EU countries supported Poland. Still, less attention was given to the fact that those people were deceived and involuntarily turned into pawns in Lukashenko’s vendetta.   

Many helped refugees despite legal consequences and the“criminalization of solidarity.” Some locals fed or allowed them in their homes, volunteers from all over Poland searched for them in forests close to the special emergency zone to help them apply for asylum and offer warm clothing and food, and some also cut the barbed wire on the border. 

Numerous demonstrations in large Polish cities and small towns close to the special emergency zone took place. Polls published in early January 2022 indicated that 72% of Poles supported the “illegal” assistance to refugees. 

This is not to say that the hostile policies of the Polish government do not enjoy the support of some groups in Polish society. Poland is one of the most ethnically and religiously homogeneous countries in Europe. Few people know a Muslim or someone from a Middle Eastern country. All information they receive comes from media and history textbooks. 

In this overwhelmingly Catholic country, one of the most commemorated historical events is the Battle of Vienna 1683 against the Ottoman Empire, which perpetuates the self-perception of many Polish nationalists as Antemurale Christianitatis (Bulwark of Christendom). Even if widely reported, wars in Syria, Yemen, or Afghanistan are distant and incomprehensible to an average Pole. 

However, it might be worth noting that in previous decades Poland accepted many Chechen refugees who were Muslims, and religion did not play a significant role in public discourse back then. It has become politicized in the last decade.   

Poland as an immigration country

In the past decades, Poland used to be a country that people would migrate from or through rather than to. The last few years have shown that this trend has changed. However, the authorities and society might not be aware of and ready to embrace the ongoing changes. 

Poland’s ethnic, cultural, and religious homogeneity is not necessarily an advantage. Unfortunately, the topic of refugees has too often been weaponized for political gains, affecting societal attitudes. 

This can be illustrated by the year 2015 when most Poles initially stood behind the idea of supporting refugees but changed their approach radically when the issue became a leitmotif of the electoral campaign of the Law and Justice Party. Let us hope that the Polish parliamentary elections in 2023 will not follow the same pattern.

[Conner Tighe edited this piece.]

[Fair Observer is a media partner of Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe.] 

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Exploring Poland’s Refugee Crisis: Uncovering the Reasons for Neglect appeared first on Fair Observer.

Since 2015, when the Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in Poland, the government has carried out broadly criticized reforms, which have deteriorated the quality of democracy, undermined the independence of the judiciary, and infringed upon media freedom. In response, the EU launched legal procedures against Warsaw, a first since the bloc’s inception.

What Poland’s Court Ruling Means for Europe

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The subsequent and long-lasting feud over the country’s controversial judicial reforms escalated further when Poland’s constitutional tribunal ruled in October that the Polish Constitution takes primacy over EU legislation. By doing so, the tribunal has challenged the European legal order and the foundations of European integration, giving Poland a carte blanche to ignore unfavorable decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 

The move brought more than 100,000 Poles, encouraged by the opposition leader and former President of the European Council Donald Tusk, to the streets of Warsaw and over 100 cities around the country in protest against what they fear may lead to a “Polexit.”

Polexit or PiS-Exit? 

Although the ruling has led some to speculate whether this could lead to Poland’s exit from the EU, it is important to note that the circumstances differ significantly from those that led to Brexit. The United Kingdom’s departure was the result of many factors that built up over many years. The UK was the second-largest net contributor to EU funds, while Poland is the single largest net receiver. For the UK, EU membership was almost purely based on economic pragmatism, and London persistently hindered deeper political unification. Notions of a common European identity simply did not resonate among the majority of the British public. Polish society, in contrast, is very pro-European.

Officially, not many Poles want a Polexit, not even the ruling conservative PiS. Over 80% believe that the country should remain in the EU, while only 7% want an exit. Paradoxically, the same society keeps electing a government that repeatedly drags it into conflicts with Brussels. PiS insists, however, that it has no such intentions and that it just wants to reduce the EU’s “interference” in the country’s affairs.

But not all MPs in the ruling coalition share this stance. Janusz Kowalski, a member of a junior coalition party, spoke openly about the possibility of a referendum in 2027, when the current EU budget will end and, with it, Poland’s favorable status. In his view, living costs and prices will become too high, making it too costly to remain in the EU. His statement was met with decisive and immediate criticism from PiS. After all, at the moment, no party that wants to win elections in Poland can support leaving the EU. If the referendum were held today, it would most probably result in PiS-Exit rather than Polexit.  

Perhaps the only real similarity to Brexit that can be drawn here is that of the question of sovereignty. The British are acutely aware of the issue of parliamentary sovereignty, a concept stretching back many centuries whereupon the foundations of the British state were built. EU membership led to severe contentions as a result of the UK Parliament no longer being sovereign in all areas.

In Poland, on the other hand, the government seeks to distinguish itself from Brussels by its conservative position on a number of contentious social issues, namely abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, and migration. In doing so, Warsaw now draws upon its constitutional sovereignty as a bulwark against “interference.”

Why Leave?

When Poland joined the EU, it wanted to “return to Europe.” The bloc was considered a promise of peace and additional protection from a potential Russian attempt to bring Poland back into its post-Soviet orbit. On its own, Poland would be too weak to counter Moscow’s attempts. This geopolitical factor is fundamental to EU membership, and it differs significantly between Poland and the UK. Poland’s proximity to Russia and its determination not to return to its sphere of influence largely ensures that it would never leave the EU by its own volition.

The UK, at the other end of Europe, is not confronted by such dilemmas. Unbound by land borders, Winston Churchill once said, “If Britain must choose between Europe and the open sea, she must always choose the open sea.” For Poland, the choice lies between Europe and an economic and political purgatory, somewhere between the EU and Russia, perhaps like Ukraine. Who would vote for that?

But by undermining EU law and its regulations, refusing to respect decisions of the ECJ, PiS may lead to a “legal Polexit” and a situation in which EU funds will be halted. Poland may become a passive member state: still in the union, but without voting rights and excluded from decision-making processes. Even if PiS is really against Polexit, it may be unintentionally preparing a favorable ground for it. 

Brexit did not happen overnight. It was a sum of small steps, and Polexit, understood as a gradual process, cannot be ruled out completely. Hundreds of thousands go to pro-EU protests, but it is millions who vote, and PiS has many means to influence social attitudes at its disposal. 

In the aftermath of government capture of public and regional media, information spread in these outlets has glorified the ruling coalition and fiercely attacked its critics, be they political opponents or the EU. The language used by some key representatives of PiS and its coalition partners does not leave any doubt about their stance toward the European Community.

The EU is a “Brussels occupant,” according to Marek Suski, head of the prime ministers’ cabinet. It imposes a “dictatorship of Brussels bureaucracy,” says Ryszard Terlecki, PiS parliamentary leader. It “wages a hybrid war against Poland” and “in its growing aggression aims at treating Poland like its colony,” according to Zbigniew Ziobro, the minister of justice. Just recently, Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki claimed that the EU “puts a gun against our heads” and warned that if Brussels puts pressure on Poland and resorts to withholding EU funds, it will inevitably lead to a “third world war.” 

Moreover, the government makes use of populist rhetoric to further consolidate its power. It has weaponized migration crises, especially the current one on the border with Belarus, to incite fear, present itself as a defender of Europe and claim that the Western multiculturality has caused a rise of crime and terrorism. Even high-ranking politicians, including President Andrzej Duda, do not shy from using homophobic language and have turned a blind eye to the controversial “LGBT-free zones” to gain the support of the most conservative voters and representatives of the Catholic Church in Poland. 

The EU’s protestation and pressure against the exclusion zones were interpreted as interference in “Polish traditions and value system.” In this context, the EU is regarded as a threat to traditional marriage between a man and a woman, and to children, whom it allegedly wants to “sexualize” during sexual education classes. Polish society is highly polarized, and PiS knows how to play that card to its advantage. 

In the long-term, some conservative parties may change their discourse and, like the UK Independence Party, unabashedly and openly campaign for leaving the EU. This will be more probable when Polish citizens forget or have no personal experience of the times before the EU and are lured by the nostalgia of the proud history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the fight for national independence against the Brussels occupier. 

Lessons Learned From Brexit 

If there are any lessons to be drawn from Brexit, it is that the EU must be seen to hear the concerns of the Polish government and people. Although it could be argued that Brexit was an inevitability, negative perceptions of Brussels among the British public made it easier to make their choice.

Geopolitics and economics ensure Poland’s continued EU membership, but the historical experience of the Polish people makes them extremely defensive and protective of their country, culture and borders. If the EU values Poland’s membership, it should continue to direct its efforts at addressing the Polish people in the language of support and friendship. This would strengthen the existing bond and reassure Poles that the EU does not work against them.

Brussels should also call out disinformation that drives anti-EU behavior — something it failed to do during the Brexit campaign. The EU did not convey clearly enough to the British people what advantages it brings and allowed itself to be perceived as an elitist political project.

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Since attempts at dialogue by the EU have failed, a stronger reaction to the Polish government’s grandstanding may be necessary. If PiS gets away with its politics of undermining the EU, it will continue cementing its power and act even more audaciously. This time, the EU started acting more decisively by threatening to withhold EU funds.

The risk remains that PiS will repurpose this threat for the domestic audience to show how Brussels excludes Poland, which may, in turn, instigate anti-EU sentiment. The debate on the rule of law in Poland was held in the European Parliament to approach this challenge, concluding the need to draw a clear line between the Poles and their government, emphasizing support for Polish civil society. 

Can the EU stand the test of another exit? Is it not the common interest of Poland and the EU that history does not repeat itself? The answer is yes, and the ball is in the Polish court. 

*[Fair Observer is a media partner of Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Polexit: Is Poland on the Way Out of the EU? appeared first on Fair Observer.

This is a scene from the border between Belarus and Poland, the EU’s eastern frontier, on November 8. People who are trapped between security forces pushing them back and forth had been flying from the Middle East to Belarus in the past weeks, unaware that they were being used by President Alexander Lukashenko for his personal vendetta against the European Union.

One Step Further

The current crisis has its roots in the aftermath of a highly contested election in August 2020 when Lukashenko was proclaimed president of Belarus for the sixth consecutive time since 1994. Neither the EU nor the US recognized the result because the vote, like almost all preceding ones, was assessed as neither free nor fair by the international observers. Electoral fraud triggered widespread demonstrations across the country that were brutally suppressed by the regime. By November, some 25,000 have been arrested, including 477 journalists, with widespread allegations of torture in detention.

What Poland’s Court Ruling Means for Europe

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In response, the EU imposed sanctions that include a travel ban and an asset freeze against those associated with the regime and which, as of June this year, extend to 166 individuals and 15 entities. Relations became further strained in May when Belarus used a false pretext to intercept a plane flying from Greece to Lithuania and arrested a dissident journalist who was onboard.

Consequently, sanctions were tightened, and an infuriated Lukashenko threatened with reprisal: “We were stopping drugs and migrants on our Western border. Now you will eat drugs and chase people. … Because of your sanctions, we have no money to take care of this.”

Lukashenko had seen how the migration crisis of 2015 polarized EU member states, with Visegrad Group countries — Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland — opposing non-EU migration and refusing relocation of asylum seekers. From Turkey, the Belarusian president may have learned how to use refugees to put pressure on the EU. But Lukashenko, whose authoritarian rule earned him the moniker “the last dictator of Europe,” went one step further, intentionally flying in thousands of people to Belarus to use them in his game against the EU.

Already in June, Lithuanian border guards observed a sudden surge in illegal crossings by people from Africa and the Middle East. Until early July, 938 migrants tried to enter Lithuania’s territory illegally — 12 times as many as in the whole of 2020. Soon it became obvious that it was no coincidence: The number of flights from Middle Eastern countries to Minsk, the capital of Belarus, had intensified. Passengers were taken by buses and taxis to the border and assisted by Belarusian border guards; local travel agencies were also apparently involved.

It is estimated that at the moment, between 800 and 1,000 people from the Middle East land in Belarus every day, with German media reporting up to 40 flights a week from Istanbul, Damascus and Dubai planned by March next year.

Lukashenko’s regime targeted people from fragile countries and lured them with a prospect of easy and legal entry to the EU. This was a costly endeavor. Depending on the port of departure and destination, the price per person amounted from $6,000 to $15,000. Many migrants seem to have believed that Minsk was just a layover and that they would soon board a plane to Germany. They traveled with their entire families.

Hybrid Threat

As the number of attempts to cross the border illegally was increasing disproportionally fast, Lithuania declared a state of emergency on July 2. Lithuania and neighboring Latvia, with populations of 2.8 million and 1.9 million respectively, feared that they would not be able to cope with a sudden influx of migrants. In mid-July, Lithuania’s foreign minister asked the EU to take more decisive steps against Lukashenko, invoking a “hybrid threat” and suggesting refugees being used as a “political weapon.”

Latvia declared a state of emergency on August 10; Poland, with a population of 38 million, on September 2. All three states began building fences along their borders.

But all these measures did not halt the pace of illegal crossings. The statistics published by the Polish Border Guard Office show that in August, nearly 2,900 people tried to cross the border; between early August and November 4, the attempts numbered 30,000.

On November 8, as the situation at the Poland-Belarus border escalated, an estimated 3,000-4,000 people were in the vicinity of the border. A column of hundreds of people marched toward an official border crossing in Kuznica, but most were diverted by Belarusian forces to the nearby forest.

Polish forces used tear gas to stop some of the migrants from cutting the fence. As passing was impossible, hundreds set up makeshift camps along the border. Polish official sources estimated that there may currently be as many as 15,000 migrants in Belarus — the same as the number of Polish troops deployed to protect the border.  

No Media, No Frontex

Although all affected countries implemented similar measures, Lithuania and Latvia allowed the media to enter emergency zones, under certain restrictions. Poland barred non-resident civilians, including journalists, from the zone and restricted access to public information, a move criticized by Reporters Without Borders and other press freedom organizations.

All information from the Polish state of emergency zone (SEZ) is provided by the authorities, local residents or, perhaps ironically, the Belarusian regime. Considering that journalists are almost always present in most active war zones and conflict areas, this is quite an unusual situation.

From the outset of the crisis, Poland has been carrying out pushbacks, a practice of forcing migrants to return to Belarus. According to UNHCR, pushbacks are a breach of international law, but the Polish parliament legalized them in October. Lithuania initially placed migrants in detention centers but soon then followed Poland’s example. In mid-August, more than 4,000 people were in Lithuanian detention centers, with 1,500 people were in detention in early October in Poland.

The affected countries differ in their cooperation with Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency headquartered in the Polish capital Warsaw, which controls borders in the Schengen Area. Frontex deployed its personnel to Lithuania and Latvia, but Poland repeatedly refused help because, as it claims, it had enough troops to protect the border. Polish officials emphasized that Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri was “impressed by the means deployed to secure the border” in Poland.

But Frontex does more than protect borders. It has developed a special code of conduct to protect human rights and created the role of a fundamental rights officer, who monitors border guards to reduce the potential for violations of the rights of migrants.

In their attempt to reach Poland, migrants often have to cross swamps and forests, facing adversarial weather conditions; temperatures in November drop below 0˚ Celsius (32˚ Fahrenheit). Most of them wander for days or weeks, pushed back and forth repeatedly. They cannot expect assistance from humanitarian organizations, NGOs or doctors because they are barred from the SEZ. Local residents are also prohibited from helping, but many admit that they do so regardless.

In order to offer assistance to the migrants, 14 Polish NGOs formed Grupa Granica — Border Group — to monitor the situation close to the SEZ. They have documented many pushbacks, with one case in particular resonating with the public. The incident involved a group of 20 migrants, among them eight children, who in late September managed to reach Michałowo, a small town outside of SEZ. They claimed that they wanted to seek asylum in Poland. Nevertheless, they were driven off to Belarus as the entire interaction was recorded by activists and journalists.

This led to protests in Warsaw and Michałowo, supported by three former Polish first ladies. The protesters chanted, “Where are the children?” and “The place for children is not in the forest.”

More Sanctions to Come

The EU unanimously condemned Belarus for “deliberately putting people’s lives and wellbeing in danger” and “gangster methods.” President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen declared that in response to the “hybrid conflict” sanctions on Belarus will be widened. However, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated that the EU should pay Belarus for stopping migrants.

Nevertheless, the EU is not open to such negotiation and relies on diplomatic international pressure and sanctions. Current attempts are directed at convincing the countries of origin to warn migrants against traveling to Belarus or to sanction the airlines who fly them. Turkish airlines already agreed to reduce flights to Belarus while Iraqi authorities offered to fly back people who agree to return.

Demands for harsher sanctions and complete closure of borders can also be heard. Such a move would paralyze international trade routes and have an impact on Russia and China — Belarus lies on China’s New Silk Road — that use Belarus for transit of its goods. But sanctions are a double-edged sword, having a detrimental impact on those who impose them.

Lukashenko seems to have fewer ways out of the crisis, and many point out that he will have to surrender as the cost of his political gambling is becoming too high. There are also concerns that, in desperation and given his unpredictability, the Belarusian president may start an armed border conflict.

If Lukashenko wanted to divert attention from Belarus’ domestic affairs, he succeeded. In the past weeks, reports on the crackdown against the opposition have disappeared from international debate. If sanctions are tightened and borders closed completely, not only the regime but also civil society will pay the price as Belarus becomes even more isolated.

The situation at the Poland-Belarus border is very dynamic and, in some respects, resembles a proxy war. It is where the EU and NATO encounter Russia’s sphere of influence, with Polish politicians openly accusing Russia of orchestrating the crisis.

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Whether legal or illegal, migrants should not be used as pawns or human shields in a geopolitical game. As desperate migrants look for other routes to enter the EU, the crisis may soon spill over into Ukraine, Belarus’ southern neighbor. Poland, Lithuania and Latvia have already joined Alexander Lukashenko as he plays with innocent lives.

But while the often-ridiculed Lukashenko managed to unsettle the EU, he has not so far succeeded in further polarizing it. Despite the breach of international law at its border, the EU stands firmly together behind Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. Time will tell if this unity remains as the crisis evolves.

*[Fair Observer is a media partner of Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Migrant Crisis on Poland-Belarus Border Is Lukashenko’s Revenge appeared first on Fair Observer.