Politics in France have been coming to a boil. The past elections symbolize the lessons people have drawn from the fact that there is a more substantial influence of the extreme right, including Germany and Austria. French President Emmanuel Macron called for snap elections after the European Union Parliament elections. This move concerned many, seemed counterintuitive and provided further momentum toward the National Rally candidate, Marine Le Pen. On the other hand, there is hope that the next election will be different.

Surging right wing

Germany and Austria are other countries where the extreme right surged in the most recent European parliamentary election. Right now, the Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats), a center-right political group, holds a majority of the seats with 188 out of 720 total seats. However, the far-right, represented in Germany by Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), has been on the rise. AfD is the strongest in East Germany and among new voters. It finished second, with 15.9% of the national vote, behind the Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CDU/CSU).

In Austria, the Freedom Party has seen a similar rise in popularity. Austria will hold its regular parliamentary elections in September.

It is helpful, however, to take a step back and avoid drawing strict comparisons between different nations’ political situations. The media has been permanently interested in the far right challenging the center. This obscured the meaning of the center, with the media distorting perceptions of political alignment. If Le Pen were an American, she would be to the left of the democratic party. She advocates for social programs and supports the working class, something that no accepted party in the US is willing to do. Yet the media creates the perception that she is far-right and that the far right is therefore on the rise in France.

Since World War II, France has had a very solid right wing which consolidated around Charles de Gaulle. Francois Mitterand emerged after World War II and formed France’s left wing. Mitterand increased greatly in electoral appeal. He nationalized all big banks and major industries. Until 2017, France expected either the socialist party or a rightwing party more or less in the Gaullist tradition to rule, but that is when France started shifting to legitimizing the far right as an alternative to the two establishment wings of the ruling political spectrum: the socialists and the traditional post-Gaullist right. 

How united is Europe?

The EU Parliament elections are not just a single election; they are 27 national parallel elections. A question that many may ask “Are people voting for the whole of Europe or just their country?” This is what makes elections so difficult on a European level. For example, people in Bratislava will not be interested in issues such as those of the Social Democratic Party in Austria. Voters will focus on the issues and problems of their own countries. This has created an identity problem in Europe.  Europeans are more focused on their national identity and national issues rather than being united as Europeans with European problems. 

The European project must move forward. Countries that trade with each other should not go to war. Europe has progressed in the past decades. When traveling in Europe, people once had to stop at border checkpoints, but now people can drive straight through. Europe also adopted the Euro in 1999, providing a universal currency for Europe. This has allowed for swift and easy transactions and removed the need to calculate exchange rates.

The gradual rise of far-right parties and the challenges to the political center have sparked intense debates about the nature of political alignment and the identity of the electorate. The issue of European unity remains a complex and pressing concern, as national interests often overshadow the broader European agenda. Despite the challenges, hope still exists for a more united and prosperous Europe. 

[Liam Roman wrote this first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Can Europe Vote Itself Out of Its Crisis? appeared first on Fair Observer.

This year, Schaffer returned by visiting the cities of Uzhhorod and Lviv. This trip was safer, yet more psychologically draining than the first. In 2023, morale was high. Ukrainians were confident. Now, the fatigue is palpable. Constant attacks on civilian infrastructure wound and kill people as Western support trickles in slowly . 

This is the Kremlin’s strategy, and it’s succeeding. Momentum is clearly on Russia’s side, and the longer the campaign lasts, the further Ukrainian morale sinks.

Will Russia win? What could this victory mean for Europe?

NATO vs. Russian expansionism

It’s unlikely Russia can fully occupy Ukraine. Russia can’t win by suffocating Ukrainian morale until they stop resisting — and Ukrainians know a loss would bring death, destruction and rape.

No one knows now exactly what a Russian victory could bring. Political scientist John Mearsheimer argues that Russia is not expansionist and it will stop after it secures the territory it now holds. Others say that Russia intends to overrun Ukraine entirely and that it will bring its conquest to other countries next. This would usher in a perilous era for Central and Eastern Europe.

Mearsheimer argues that Russia acted to achieve one political aim: preventing NATO from expanding further eastward. Russia sees its near abroad as a defensive bulwark against potential NATO military invasion. The United States reacted similarly in the 1960s when Soviet Union tried to advance into Cuba.

Hypothetically, Russia could achieve certain goals and then freeze the conflict. But to do that, it would have to control what it believes is now its sovereign territory, namely four Ukrainian oblasts of Kherson, Luhansk, Donetsk and Zaporizhia. Russia organized sham referenda to annex these areas. As long as these oblasts remain partly outside of Russia’s grasp, negotiation seems unlikely. Likewise, on the Ukrainian side, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy cannot negotiate a peace that would involve the surrender of national territory. This would violate Ukraine’s constitution.

Mearsheimer is right that the positioning of NATO missiles in Ukraine would be an existential threat to Russia that the federation would necessarily have to stop. But this could have been achieved through negotiation and reasonable planning. Instead, Russia denied Ukrainian statehood and began gobbing up pieces of it. Far from carrying out a defensive action, the Kremlin used the purported threat of NATO to justify its violation of international law.

The European divide

The Russia–Ukraine War is the first large-scale conflict in Europe since the fall of Berlin in 1945. French President Emmanuel Macron tried making peace with Putin in 2022, but now he’s asking for Western troops in -Ukraine. Once a dove, he’s now become a hawk. In his view, if Ukraine falls, others will follow.

Despite this, Europe will not get tougher with Russia. There are too many sovereign states with too many different approaches for that to happen. This is a hybrid war — a war that combines conventional and irregular warfare. A narrative battle rages inside each country in tandem with the deadly campaign in Ukraine.

Many countries are noticing this extra dimension. The last two years have brought a fundamental shift in thought: If Europe can’t defend the Ukrainians who are fighting for the EU’s values, how can it protect those principles? Europe’s security structure was destroyed on February 24, 2022; its freedom, values and democratic way of life are in jeopardy. Further, Europe cannot rely on NATO’s Article 5 to defend itself. The US will not necessarily interve to defend Europe in the event of a limited engagement in eastern Poland or the Baltics, which Russia could plausibly try. If Article 42.7 of the Treaty of Lisbon — the EU’s mutual defense clause — is not to be a dead letter, Europe must have an independent defensive capability.

This viewpoint has divided Europe. Many Europeans lack the will to fight, believing the threat to be exaggerated. Italy and Spain are far from Russia and protected by high mountains; the idea of Russian tanks threatening these southerly nations sounds like science fiction.

France and Germany have always shared the Great European Plain — easy to drive tanks across — with Russia and so perceive the possibility of war, however remote, as more realistic. Yet both nations are internally split on Russia. France has a semi-presidential system where Macron can dictate policy, but many in the National Assembly do not share his  hawkish views.

On the other side, Germany has a parliamentary system where three parties form the government coalition: the Social Democratic Party, the Green Party and the Liberals. There are hawkish Social Democrats, dovish Liberals and both tendencies in the Green Party. It’s difficult for these parties to compromise when debating a common policy.

On February 27, 2022, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz delivered the famous Zeitenwende (“Watershed”) speech in the Bundestag. He announced a change to the country’s security and foreign policy, upping defense spending significantly. Germany was to take an active role as a member of NATO. Yet Germany doesn’t want to get involved in this war. Unlike France, it has a large, resource-hungry manufacturing industry — and no nuclear plants to power it. This makes Germany much more dependant than France on Russian fossil fuels. War means that energy costs skyrocket, growth plummets and industry suffers. Already, Germans are saying that they’re the real losers of the war.

Danube regional affairs

Along with Ukraine and Germany, Europe’s Danube region consists of Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova. As Ukraine’s neighbors, these countries would be directly affected if Russia occupied its entirety.

In Hungary, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has taken a questionable, pro-Russian attitude. Traditionally, Hungarians are suspicious of Russia, with dark memories of Soviet tanks rolling into Budapest to crush the Hungarian uprising against Bolshevism in 1956. Yet Orbán’s social contract with the Hungarian people relies on growth that cheap Russian gas fuels. Hungary has notoriously made a long-term contract with Russia’s Gazprom energy corporation. Meanwhile, Budapest vetos EU measures to aid Ukraine. The country’s stance seems rooted in business, not ideology.

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico resigned from power in 2018 over a political crisis: Journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová, nearly exposed a financial flow running through the government, but were silenced mafia-style. Now, Fico regained the people’s favor by using their frustration with the war; he was re-elected in 2023. He blames his country’s high inflation on the war and the war on anti-Russian Western policy.

Just outside the Danube region, Poland is also divided on how to should position itself. Supporters of the nationalist Law and Justice party are less hawkish on Russia. Yet Law and Justice is no longer in power as of 2023. Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s new government marks a return to upholding European values and feels that, if Europe does not stop Russia at the Donets, they will soon have to do so at the Bug.

Poland is a hotspot because, if it feels threatened and insufficiently protected by NATO, it may decide to develop its own nuclear weapons. Indeed, Europe needs a nuclear deterrent independent from that of the US. This war has caused Europe to see that it must stand on its own two feet, invest in military production and prepare to defend itself. If Russia makes a move, the Yanks may not be coming.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Where Is Ukraine Headed Now? What Does Europe Think? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Once upon a time in 1956, Russian tanks rolled into Budapest to squash an anti-Soviet rebellion. Yet Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is now one of Russia’s only supporters within the EU. An opportunist, he intends to profit from the conflict.

Orbán has cooked up a new kind of authoritarianism and fascism, transforming Hungary into an illiberal state. Until 2020, no state had fallen from the democratic values necessary to be a member of the EU. Hungary is the first to break that norm. If the EU does not take steps to reform and discourage democratic backsliding, it may see a resurgence of politics that belong 100 years in the past.

Reformation is a necessity

The essence of EU integration is to overcome nationalist sentiment and dismantle barriers. Yet countries like Hungary are still a contributing part of the EU, and countries like Serbia are already in the queue to join. Serbia is a highly significant nation in the Balkans, but, like Hungary, it is regressing. The EU needs to respond by reforming its institutions so that a few bad apples do not spoil the bunch.

We can take an example from the history of the EU. Back in 2005, voters in France and the Netherlands rejected the proposed European Constitution. The constitution would have replaced the requirement for unanimity with a qualified majority process in many policy areas.

After some time of reflection, European leaders then introduced the Treaty of Lisbon. This treaty was less ambitious, dropping the project of establishing a new constitution for Europe and instead amending the pre-existing treaties. Still, it succeeded in introducing qualified majority voting in many areas. In order to pass a measure in these areas, a 55% majority of the member states representing at least 65% majority of the population of the union is needed, rather than a unanimous agreement of member states.

In 2005, European leaders listened to the concerns of citizens and sought ways to make the union work for them. That same response is needed now. In fact, it was needed as soon as Brexit happened in 2016. Clearly, the current EU framework is not supporting the needs of the member states.

A new EU reformation would bring enlargement of the union and a firmer foreign policy. It would also would reduce the ability for countries like Hungary to veto decisions.

Wrinkles within reformation

Many opponents of EU enlargement consider the union to be too large already. However, qualified majority makes it less problematic to bring in new members, as a single state could not veto European decisions in the relevant areas.

The EU is occupied, not merely with expansion, but with securing democracy in regions such as the Balkans which still follow WWII-era nationalism. 

Opponents citing possible fiscal problems follow the same line of thinking. They argue that bringing the Euro to new member states with lower GDP than others would cause major fiscal tensions. The EU, however, does not immediately introduce the Euro to new member states. There are established criteria that need to be reached. Expanding the Eurozone can wait; what is more important is supporting democracy by expanding the union.

Still, the EU does eventually need to expand fiscally. This brings with it the risk of centralizing too much decision-making power in Brussels, disconnected from the voters in member states. How will the union keep the administration in Brussels democratically accountable? 

There already is a body for holding executives accountable for every penny spent — the European Parliament. It is directly elected by European citizens. Yet citizens seem not to realize that this system of checks and balances is in place. Why? They don’t care about the parliamentary elections.

The problem doesn’t lie in disengagement or pure disinterest. The problem is that, currently, EU elections are flawed. At the time of voting, most countries are unaware of the number of seats they will receive in parliament. Therefore, the party already in power is the only candidate to vote for.

Voting reformation is absolutely necessary to keep member states working together to dismantle nationalism. Reformed European elections would involve not only methods ways of voting, but also transnational voting. Importance cannot be given to singular nations; voting reformation must stress the importance of supranationality with regional rather than national actors. Putting emphasis on regional actors and dismantling the idea of a nation-state is crucial in battling nationalism. 

With multilateralism on the rise, nation-states alone cannot play a decisive role in the world. Only on a supranational, regional level can multi-level governance have an impact. Despite the nation being the bedrock of personal identity for individuals for centuries, nation as identity is no longer responsive to the needs of people or the world in this modern age. 

Inactiveness and willingness to ignore integration cements populist views. Regional cooperation above strict-bordered nation-states is the answer to democratic regression. If we become tolerant of the intolerant, we will lose democracy.

[The Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe is a partner of Fair Observer.]

[Cheyenne Torres wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Make Sense of the New Central Europe and the EU appeared first on Fair Observer.

Ending the War in Ukraine

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Ridiculous as it might sound, it is my tiny attempt to act against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, to somehow fight this sense of helplessness, being forced to watch the events unfold, without being able to do much.

Building Up to War in Ukraine

It all started a couple of days before February 24, which is when Russia invaded Ukraine. I was preparing for a trip to Kyiv to check on my friends in the Ukrainian capital. Following the latest developments, I tried to find any information that would confirm what the Russian ambassador to the EU had stated on February 16. Vladimir Chizhov said there would “be no escalation in the coming week, or in the week after that, or in the coming month.” Saying one thing and doing another has long been part of the Russian political playbook. Yet the cynicism in saying that wars in Europe “rarely start on a Wednesday” — in reference to US intelligence reports — just to actually invade eight days later is unacceptable.

On Sunday, February 20 at around 10 pm, I ultimately decided not to set the alarm for later that night in order to arrive at the airport on time. I went to bed with a heavy heart and a sense of cowardice: I decided not to travel to Kyiv. I felt as if I had betrayed the Ukrainian people, especially my friend, who assured me that everything was fine and everyone was calm. Over the next few days, I tried to drown out the voice in the back of my head saying, “You should have gone” by repeating this mantra to myself: If you bring an umbrella, it will not rain.

And then we all heard the news. I can only imagine how it must have felt to be actually woken up by air raid sirens — it’s unfathomable. I saw a map of Ukraine showing where the Russian bombs hit. I reached out to friends and colleagues in these places. So far, they are fortunately all fine. I admire their strength and bravery for remaining in Ukraine.

Back in the office in Vienna, I sat with my colleagues. While we tried to at least grasp what this meant for all of us, we began to realize that this was not just another crisis; this was a decisive development in history. This is war in Europe. It is not the first conflict in Europe since the end of World War II. It is not even the first in Ukraine; the country has been at war since 2014. Back then, during the Revolution of Dignity, the Euromaidan, Ukrainians gave their lives for democracy, our democracy.

That is precisely why it is only logical for Ukraine to apply for membership in the European Union. Although there is no shortcut to joining the EU, under certain circumstances, it can become possible. Membership in the union should not only remain symbolic. I have written more about this here. In fact, I have been arguing with colleagues about granting such rights to all eastern partnership target countries since 2009. This would, of course, not have prevented anything today. Other actions might have, such as reducing the import dependency on natural resources after the Russia–Ukraine gas crisis of the same year.

But there is no use in dwelling on the past. Instead, I want to think about the future. Therefore, I have compiled five different scenarios about how the situation in Ukraine could develop. None of them must become a reality, and some of them, hopefully, will not.

1: All-out (Nuclear) War

Nuclear war is certainly the worst-case scenario for all sides. An increasingly frustrated and isolated Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, decides to use tactical nuclear weapons to submerge the Ukrainian resistance. Even if it will “only” involve non-nuclear attacks continuing the obliteration of whole cities and committing war crimes, the democratic international community seriously asks themselves if they can allow this to happen.

Even if they do, the probability that Putin will stop at the border with Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Baltics or Finland is delusional. Consequently, NATO, sooner or later, has to get involved, resulting in World War III.

I believe that we are actually already at war since February 24 but haven’t realized it yet. It might also continue as a war of attrition and continue indefinitely.

2: Novorossiya

This second scenario refers to what Putin himself mentioned in one of his infamous television Q&As in 2014. It has been used in various contexts, with reference to Alexander Dugin, but also as an idea raised by the so-called People’s Republics in Donetsk and Luhansk of the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine. The planned confederation was ultimately not implemented.

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The reference dates back to a more or less geographically same area referred to as “New Russia” during the Soviet era until the turn of the century. In any case, Putin mentioned the cities of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odessa — essentially the whole Black Sea coast of Ukraine, linking up the Russian Federation with Transnistria. Since the Transnistria War in 1992, Russian troops have been stationed in the breakaway territory, which is officially part of Moldova.

This scenario involves the creation of many more “people’s republics,” which are under the influence — politically and economically — of the Kremlin and dependent on it. Recognition of such republics by Moscow or even integration into the Russian Federation is also a possibility.

Further separatist regions beyond Ukraine are also declared, expanding Russian influence even more. This takes place mostly in the Caucasus, but also in the direction of the former spheres of influence of the Soviet Union.

3: Fragmentation

In a more hopeful scenario, Putin’s aggression leads to destabilization within the Russian Federation. While having to devote a majority of the country’s military capacities but also attention and political capital toward Ukraine, old separatist attempts resurface.

The control over Chechnya is substantially weakened due to the de-facto defeat of Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces. But also further disintegration occurs. Not necessarily violently, but more economic-based toward dependence of Siberia on China or Vladivostok on Japan. The resulting fragmentation and volatility have major consequences for the whole neighborhood but also geopolitically.

4: Coup d’état

There have been (too optimistic) rumors about a possible coup being planned by the Federal Security Service (FSB) of Russia. Leaks from the “Wind of Change” lead to an ousting of Putin and his closest circle.

While it cannot be ruled out, there should not be any false hope. If the security forces and/or the military carry out a coup d’état, we will not see any democratic regime change.

Most likely, the people belonging to the closest circle of power are replaced, but the mafia system continues with a new godfather who ends the war but distributes the spoils. It is also possible that we will see a military hard-liner taking charge, which could then end in scenario one.

5: Democratic Revolution

The most optimistic, but unfortunately most unlikely, scenario would foresee the sanctions against Russia and the isolation of the federation as leading to the people bringing regime change and possibly democratization.

In a Maidan-style occupation of the Red Square, Putin is unable to suppress the opposition any longer. It takes a lot of time to account for past actions, reconciliation and anti-corruption measures, but the missed opportunity of the 1990s is finally taken up. Coupled with the enlarged EU economic and security cooperation, there is now a counterpart to the geopolitical volatility caused by China’s ambitions and the political instability of the United States.

The Outlook

Regardless of which direction the situation takes (although I most certainly have a preference), it is necessary to be prepared for all eventualities. It is a good sign that there has been enough awareness for Ukraine as well as the necessity to think about the economic requirements to rebuild after the war.

Nevertheless, it is possible to achieve peace, especially with regard to the importing of oil and gas from Russia. Far too often, we are focused on the immediate costs and do not look at the possibilities. A transition to renewable energy is more necessary than ever, but the hesitancy has kept us dependent on Moscow. Just imagine what the situation would have looked like if a transition had been sped up in 2009.

Hopefully, we have finally learned the lesson. After all, the price we pay is just money. Ukraine is paying with its life, its infrastructure and, ultimately, its future.

*[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post What Is Vladimir Putin’s Endgame? appeared first on Fair Observer.

In Switzerland, the COVID-19 Certificate Divides Opinions

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Yet, unlike the author’s view, I was frustrated that it has gone this far and that we now need to use tough measures — which include mandatory vaccinations by February 2022 — to avoid a collapse of the health care system. The more I thought about the points raised in the article, the more I felt the urge to respond. I appreciate the policy of Fair Observer to publish those with differing opinions and I want to contribute to the discussion.

Poor Communication

First, you can and should criticize the Austrian government for how it has handled the COVID-19 crisis. In particular, its communication was flawed by prematurely lifting COVID-19 restrictions in July and promising there would be a “return to normal” by the summer. Criticism of the government is clearly allowed in Austria, otherwise protests against lockdowns and vaccines wouldn’t be taking place.

Yet what baffles me is that for some, there seems to be a complete ignorance over the reasons that many people participate in such demonstrations. This becomes dangerous if one is oblivious to messages used by populist and far-right groups — many of which organize and attend such protests — without questioning them.

For instance, the chant “Wir sind das Volk” (We are the people) can often be heard during protests today against lockdowns and vaccines. It was also used during demonstrations that led to German reunification in 1990 and was directed at the authoritarian German Democratic Republic (GDR), otherwise known as East Germany. The measures introduced to prevent the spread of COVID-19 are nowhere comparable to the GDR. But when populist politicians like the leader of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO), Herbert Kickl, state in press releases that from “today, Austria is a dictatorship,” it distracts people from the reasons for COVID restrictions and mocks victims of real dictatorships.

I am lucky to have never lived in an authoritarian state, but I do work with people who do and/or have. Therefore, I do not have apt words to respond to claims of “medical apartheid” to describe what is happening today with restrictions being dependent on one’s vaccination status. For example, unvaccinated people were first banned from visiting hospitality venues, hairdressers and cinemas, followed by a lockdown that was specifically for those who had not received a vaccine. It is also true that students and lecturers in Austria must be fully vaccinated in order to attend lectures, but this mainly applies to medical universities where first semesters involve working in hospitals; other universities were permitted to set their own rules. Requiring a negative PCR test would probably work best to help curb the spread of COVID-19 as breakthrough infections can occur among those vaccinated.

Here, the official communication should have been better. The mistake by the government was that being fully vaccinated implied that wearing a face covering and being regularly tested were no longer necessary. Scientific findings during a pandemic are fluid and new research might make adapting to the situation necessary. This should have been better relayed to the Austrian public not by researchers, but by politicians and journalists.

This situation contributed to the necessity of announcing another lockdown, which, in addition to vaccine mandates, led to the demonstrations in Austria last weekend. As is always the case, estimates vary to a great extent between official figures from the police (40,000 protesters in the capital Vienna) and the organizers (one of them being the far-right FPO, which said 100,000 attended).

Regardless of which source is more credible, let’s put this into perspective. On the same day, more than 87,100 people were vaccinated in Austria with either their first, second or third doses. In Vienna alone, over 32,300 received a jab, which was the third consecutive day with the highest number of vaccinations in the capital. In other words, nearly the same amount of people who showed their discontent with the vaccination mandate and lockdown actually received their jab. And the overwhelming majority clearly believe in the efficacy of the vaccines — more than two-thirds of Austrians are fully vaccinated.

The Far Right

Second, it is necessary to have a closer look at who has been organizing these protests, which have occurred throughout the year. (German-speaking readers can watch this documentary.) The Atlantic summed this up in an article on protests in Germany, which has similarities to Austria. In both countries, participants have included conspiracy theorists and members of both the far left and far right. For the record, not everyone who has attended such demonstrations falls into one of these categories. Khalifa points this out by saying he saw “people from all walks of life” at the protest in Vienna on November 20. However, one should be aware with whom they are assembling and the messaging of the main organizers.

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At protests in Germany and in Austria, an underlying issue is anti-Semitism. The crude comparison with the Holocaust by some protesters wearing a yellow Star of David with “unvaccinated” written instead of “Jew” leaves me again at a loss for words. There is a certain irony when people are protesting with signs that read “My Body, My Choice” next to groups that would deny a person this choice when it comes to abortion.

Shifts in the discourse and cries about a so-called dictatorship desensitize others when it comes to actual alarming developments. The aim is to create a sense of duty to participate in order to prevent greater harm. But why then has it been framed as “patriotic,” as Khalifa puts it, instead of a civic duty to act?

Ultimately, opposition to COVID measures plays into the hands of populists, who benefit and are driving this forward for their own political agenda. Criticizing the national public service broadcaster, ORF, is another one of these methods and has been used by the FPO for a long time.

Kickl has also praised the anti-parasitic drug ivermectin, amongst others, as a “Plan B” for the pandemic. One of his fellow party members even waved a leaflet of the drug in parliament. While there seems to be an indication for possibly using the drug to treat some cases of COVID-19, the European Medicines Agency has warned that the dosage to be effective is dangerous. Supplies of ivermectin are now low due to high demand in Austria, directly impacting the treatment of conditions the drug is traditionally used for. It has also led to at least one person ending up in the hospital.

Vaccine Mandate

Third, mandatory vaccinations would actually help to alleviate the situation in Austria, not only with the pandemic, but also with regard to divisions in society. If everybody is vaccinated, everybody has the same rights and obligations. In an interview with the BBC, Austrian Chancellor Alexander Schallenberg focused on the latter, stating that you “don’t only have rights, you have obligations.”

It would also help to get out of the loop of lockdowns, which are extremely expensive for any economy. Estimates for the latest lockdown are as high as €4 billion ($4.48 billion). This will ultimately lead to tax hikes in the next national budget and have an impact on future investments. Less pressure on hospitals would also lead to fewer burned-out staff members, who are quitting in desperation. But the most important point: Fewer people will die or suffer from long-term implications, which, due to the relatively short experience we have with COVID-19, still might be unknown.  

It is worth pointing out that vaccines were mandatory in post-war Austria and elsewhere, namely in order to eradicate smallpox. But it remains to be seen how the legal basis for this will look like today with legal challenges likely to take place. That is the beauty of living in a democratic country based on the rule of law.

In a democracy, that also includes the right to protest. But one should be cautious with whom they are protesting and find more suitable ways of voicing different opinions instead of assembling with a large group of people during a pandemic. Protesters are figuratively spitting into the face of health care professionals, something that has literally been done by some participants at demonstrations in Austria. Virtual town hall debates, signing petitions or engaging with your political representatives would be alternative possibilities.

What should be more sacred than personal health is the well-being of society. History is the progress of the consciousness of freedom, and individual freedom ends when it endangers the freedom of others.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Debate Over COVID-19 Continues in Austria appeared first on Fair Observer.

As a result, I only learned about the chosen title when I arrived at the venue. I was quite upset and told the audience that if they came here to listen to me blaming the Russian Federation, my suggestion was that they go home because I did not intend to do this.

My main argument was that even though there is of course the possibility to utilize the European Union’s high dependency on natural gas deliveries from Russia, which is still around 40% today, it is, in fact, an interdependence, as oil and gas exports constitute almost 40% of the Russian budget.

History Matters in How Russia Is Perceived in Europe

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For me, the reason for the halting of deliveries through Ukraine in 2009 could also be explained economically: Kyiv had been siphoning gas from the transit pipeline, unable to pay the price set by Gazprom. I was convinced that even though the Russian state is the biggest shareholder in Gazprom, it is still a company that needs to operate under predominantly market economy conditions. So if someone is not able to pay for your product, you do not continue to deliver.

Furthermore, even in the chilliest times of the Cold War, there has never been a disruption of gas deliveries to Western Europe. Why would Moscow endanger its reputation as a reliable supplier of energy? In retrospect, I was naïve.

Gas Crisis

My standpoint changed since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. At this point, one simply cannot deny that Moscow does use its natural resources as geopolitical leverage. However, as always in politics, the situation is much more complicated, and you won’t get answers to binary questions when it comes to the Kremlin, which is, incidentally, one of the 10 rules on how to work with Russia, according to Keir Giles.

So how did the recent gas crisis unfold and what are the (possible) reasons behind it?

In October, natural gas prices peaked at $1,200 per cubic meter due to a global energy shortage, especially in Asia. Preferential delivery of liquified natural gas (LNG) to this part of the world is adding to the problem, with countries like China willing to pay higher prices.

There is also low supply in Europe as a result of reduced production during the last decade and depletion of reserves due to an unusually cold winter and spring in 2020-21. Norway, the EU’s second-biggest supplier, has had to undertake long repair works on its pipelines, and alternative energy sources had been weak due to months-long calm winds. Additionally, while post-pandemic economic revival is slow, it is nevertheless causing higher demand, which renewables are unable to deliver.

All this means that Moscow is not, in fact, closing the tap but is just unwilling to open it up further. Interestingly, with the decision not to increase production respective to delivery, the Kremlin is relinquishing quite big profits. But why would it? The perspective has changed. While a decade ago there were limited ways to deliver natural resources to the East, and especially China, today LNG provides a viable alternative.

Alternative routes toward the West now also exist. Nord Stream 2 would further increase the pressure on Ukraine. Although potential economic (lost transit fees) and political (Donbas conflict escalation) challenges would not have direct consequences for Moscow’s delivery capabilities, certain legal challenges (including certification) remain regarding putting the pipeline into operation. The Kremlin might use the situation to get rid of the remaining obstacles, but it provides another opportunity, namely to thwart the EU’s ambition with regard to the Green Deal.

President Vladimir Putin has indicated that partners could hope for increased deliveries, by which he means countries that have long-term contracts with Gazprom. Hungary, for instance, has recently signed a 15-year deal. If other EU members join, this could undermine the efforts to become CO2 neutral by 2050 and even the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emission by 55% compared with 1990 levels by 2030.

Nord Stream 2 has already led to division within the European Union and also emasculates the responsibility Brussels has to the Eastern Partnership. Instead of a bilateral — or at least a regional, if not a European approach — should have been pursued from the beginning. This division could be further exacerbated by the current situation in the gas market.

Cold Feet

I still have the mug I received as a present after the event. It features a cartoon of a shivering Europa sitting on a bull. On top of it a shorter version of my presentation’s proposed title: “Is Russia turning the gas tap?” A young man in a stereotypical Russian hat has his hands on the valve of a pipeline.

The general answer to questions posed in headlines is usually no. But as mentioned above, when it comes to Russia, there are no simple answers. If we were left with a situation depicted on the mug, certainly the whole of Europe will not be freezing this winter. Some parts will receive preferential treatment; others will have to see. The bottom line is that the EU should not get cold feet when it comes to dealing with the Kremlin.

One point remains as valid today as it was more than a decade ago: There is a dire need for the EU to speak with one voice and to have a common approach in foreign policy. It is important to continue to engage with the Kremlin, especially as spaces for this are shrinking, as the recent announcement of Russia’s suspension of its mission to NATO shows.

We need to continue a dialogue, but we seem to have forgotten what dialogue means: to listen to each other; to try to understand; to enter into an argument with the principal assumption that the other person could be right; to not only to listen but to respond; to get the points out and across.

We must not forget that there is a Russian civil society. So it is not the Russians, but the Kremlin. It is not the EU, but the member states. Language matters. Words become actions. Actions have consequences, and this can be a very dangerous downward spiral.

But there must also be some clear lines established. The tit-for-tat blame game that is dominating the discourse has to stop. This is not a reasonable discussion. A coherent foreign and, in this case, energy policy would prevent the Kremlin from being able to exert its strategy of division not only in the shared neighborhood but also across the European Union. Qualified majority voting on an EU-level with regards to foreign policy should be low-hanging fruit.

At the same time, the EU Commission should think about possibilities to alleviate the situation for consumers by countering rising energy prices, at least temporarily. Trade on the spot market has basically collapsed. It will be necessary to learn lessons from this without providing Vladimir Putin another opportunity to create discord. Otherwise, the European Green Deal — a central effort of the commission — is deemed to fail.

*[Fair Observer is a media partner of Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is Moscow Turning Off the Gas Tap? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Nevertheless, the Russian Federation is following its usual scheme and is ready to seize any opportunity that arises. There may be three possible reasons behind these new developments: 1) Moscow wants to send a message to the US administration after recent statements regarding President Vladimir Putin; 2) the Russians are seeking a pretext to install their “peacekeepers” in Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine; or 3) the Kremlin wants to use the water crisis in Crimea to intervene and build a corridor through the Donbass region.

Assessing the Tensions Between Ukraine and Russia

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There might be other drivers, such as the ongoing power struggle inside the Russian administration, despite the fact that Putin signed a law that would allow him to stay in office until 2036. A manufactured external threat to Russian citizens — Russian passports have been issued to many Ukrainians living in the two self-declared people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk — would help deflect attention from internal economic problems, which have only worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In February, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky shut down three television channels linked to Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvedchuk, which may have contributed to the latest tension. Not only does Medvedchuk have personal ties to Putin, but the stations have also broadcast pro-Russian propaganda to the Ukrainian people.

In the end, the cause can be left to Kremlinologists to decipher. Yet what is clear is that Putin has proved to be ready to act whenever there is a chance, and he has plenty of opportunities to create an event to trigger action. Ultimately, it does not matter why. What matters is that other regional actors are now using peaceful means to prevent a further escalation between Russia and Ukraine.

Is Dialogue Enough?

The US and the European Union have declared their support for Kyiv. Josep Borrell, the EU foreign policy chief and vice-president of the European Commission, expressed concern over the latest developments. The European Parliament also released a statement in which it reiterates that Moscow must reduce tensions by ending its military buildup in and close to Ukrainian territory. This is certainly not enough, but what are the options?

Engaging in dialogue is fine, but it seems the meaning of it has been forgotten — that is, to listen to each other and try to understand. When there is an argument between parties, there should be a general assumption that the other person could be right. It is not sufficient to only listen in order to respond and get one’s own points across. It should also not be disregarded that there is a civil society in Russia. When there is a dispute with the Kremlin, it does not entail the whole population.

What is important is that language matters, words become actions, and actions have consequences — and this could lead to a dangerous downward spiral. Nevertheless, there must also be some clear lines established. This tit-for-tat blame game that has dominated the discourse for decades has to stop. This is not a reasonable discussion. The demands by Zelensky to accelerate Ukraine’s membership in NATO are not helpful, but nor is a meeting between Russia, Germany and France on the situation in Ukraine without including representatives from Kyiv.

Diplomatic relations among regional actors have been strained for years but deteriorated further over recent months. In February, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated in an interview about relations between Russia and the European Union that “if you want peace, be prepared for war.” In the current political climate, this sounds far more threatening than it might have a few months ago. At that time, the German Foreign Ministry rightly called the comments “disconcerting and incomprehensible,” though Lavrov is known for his controversial statements.

Nevertheless, this has marked a new low in the EU–Russia relations, and it seems that things could get worse. Expelling diplomats of EU member states while Borrell, the top European diplomat, was in Moscow is just power play. Despite Lavrov being in office for 17 years, the European Union has never found a way to reach a consensus on how to respond to his actions. In 2004, Central and Eastern European countries had just joined the EU, which was and still is a big success, but the necessary reforms in the institutional setup to be able to handle Lavrov have still not been implemented.

What is even worse, the lack of capabilities to anticipate consequences has forever been a weak point in Brussels. Negotiations for an association agreement between the EU and Ukraine effectively led to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Politics is much more complicated and one action does not necessarily lead to a specific outcome, but there is certainly a possibility of a butterfly effect.

Better Preparation

In order to be better prepared, member states need to pool resources together and ultimately transfer sovereignty to the EU when it comes to foreign policy. Otherwise, the divide-and-conquer approach by Russia will continue. After a rather humiliating meeting with Lavrov in February, Borrell said, “As ever, it will be for member states to decide the next steps, and yes, these could include sanctions.” This is not a language that the Kremlin understands.

The German government, for instance, has been reluctant when it comes to imposing sanctions. On the one hand, this is due to Berlin’s history with the Russian Federation, but to a lesser extent, it is because of the Nord Stream 2, a gas pipeline linking Russia and Germany via the Baltic Sea. Nevertheless, this would be an opportunity to act as the pipeline also threatens Ukraine’s energy supply and might open another opportunity to act for the Kremlin. Yet there is a very good argument against sanctions: They would hurt the general population in Russia, which would further alienate the people who, in turn, would rally around the flag.

Nevertheless, there are other ways to respond, ideally targeting the circles close to the Kremlin. Suspending Russia from the SWIFT global financial network could also be an option; calls to do so first emerged in 2014 after Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Yet this might lead to a fragmentation of the international financial system; Russian authorities have already backed international use of its alternative payment network.

The biggest danger for the Putin regime would be if the majority of Russians understood that it is possible to live in a liberal democracy. This is why a closer relationship between Ukraine and the EU is so dangerous for the Kremlin. The current escalation is not about the expansion of Russia’s borders or preserving traditional values, as often spun by Russian media and Moscow. This is a facade that masks the fact that if people were given the possibility of improving their lives without the strongman in the Kremlin, the Putin system would become irrelevant.

Sanctions on Russia will most likely not lead to this outcome. There will not be a democratic revolution on the streets — this can only be through a gradual process. The question is: Will Western democracy survive long enough to see that change coming in order to still be a model?

Therefore, the EU has to send a clear and unified message to prevent further escalation and not only react or be taken by surprise, as was the case in 2014. Ideally, this would also strengthen transatlantic relations by finding a common approach to the evolving situation. After the EU’s top representatives suffered political embarrassment in Moscow and Ankara, it would be even more necessary to send a strong signal to Russia.

Being concerned is not enough — neither by institutions in Brussels, nor by EU member states. There is a need to be better prepared for certain scenarios. Repeating the same mistakes will be unforgivable for the region and the future of the European Union itself.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post EU Concern Over Ukraine Is Not Enough appeared first on Fair Observer.

A Caucasus Border Dispute Brings Back Memories of War

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Following the charges being brought against Melia, Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia resigned in protest. This has led to a situation now being described by people in Georgia as “hate being in the air,” drawing protesters into the streets in support of the opposition. While this has been a gradual development over the past decade, penetrating deep into the social fabric of Georgia, there is a looming danger of escalation today.

Turbulent Road to Democracy

Since the Rose Revolution in 2003, Georgia has been on a road to real reform and European integration. In January 2004, Mikheil Saakashvili became president and initiated, among other things, significant and wide-ranging reforms in justice and policing. Real change was visible and also felt by the population. Saakashvili’s UNM stayed in power until 2012, when it was voted out and replaced by the populist billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream coalition, which continues to run the country. Even though Ivanishvili withdrew from politics last month, he has a history of pulling the strings from the shadows — an impression reinforced by the recent appointment of Irakli Garibashvili, former defense minister and close ally of Ivanishvili, as Gakharia’s replacement.

Nevertheless, even today, Saakashvili exerts influence on the politics of the UNM, despite having left the country in 2013 and having only stepped down as party leader in 2019. Saakashvili currently leads the executive committee of Ukraine’s National Reform Council, and his recent inflammatory comments mentioning civil war are clearly unhelpful and serve to further division in Georgian society. As is the case in most political crises, there seems to be no option for neutrality within Georgia at the moment. Even a new election, which the UNM is calling for, would most likely result in nothing but another 50/50 split.

While the governing Georgian Dream coalition has certainly acted irrationally in case of Melia’s arrest, to a certain extent, the events have been provoked by the UNM to further deepen the divide. These events come alongside accusations of Georgian Dream being too pro-Russian. Ivanishvili, the former prime minister the country’s richest man, made his nearly $5-billion fortune in the Russian Federation — a feat clearly only possible with close ties to the Kremlin. Yet the current government follows the approach of European integration and has even, rather optimistically, set a goal to apply for EU membership in 2024. This apparent disconnect can be explained by Georgian Dream trying to remain the party of the economy by maintaining open trade with Russia while embracing deeper European integration.  

On the other hand, although the pro-European agenda of the UNM is beyond doubt, by undermining certain European values during its time in power, the party has shown its willingness to use authoritarian methods of governance, including human rights violations such as the Gldani prison scandal, which strongly contributed to its electoral downfall in 2012. It has since remained in opposition.  

Volatility and Opportunity

The South Caucasus is becoming increasingly volatile. In September 2020, the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted once again in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to a six-week war between the two countries. In the Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement signed on November 9, Azerbaijan gained control over the territories captured during the fighting, and beyond. Armenia’s prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power via peaceful protests in 2018 — the so-called Velvet Revolution — has now had to face protests himself. On February 25, the Armenian army demanded his resignation, which he refused, calling it an attempted coup.

Political instability in Georgia and Armenia, the persisting unsolved issue of breakaway territories and continued Russian involvement in the region, on top of the current COVID-19 crisis, make the region uncomfortably unstable at present. The pandemic has hit Georgia especially hard. As a country reliant on foreign tourism, many thousands in the industry have lost their jobs. With proportionally little government aid compared to Western European countries and with Georgian society only recently beginning to come out of a lockdown, societal tensions are running high and patience is wearing thin.

What Is Russia’s Stake in the Nagorno-Karabakh War?

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However, with woeful tidings comes an opportunity for the European Union’s regional policy in Georgia. On March 3, the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, will visit Georgia. Once again, this will be a delicate mission, as the main task must be to call on all parties to calm down, and the EU will need to take the lead in facilitating that process. While the recent attack on the opposition should be condemned, it is possible that this could be interpreted by supporters of Georgian Dream as Brussels backing the UNM. Such as scenario needs to be avoided at all costs in order to prevent further escalating the conflict.

The EU finds itself in a uniquely advantageous position in Georgian politics. Both the UNM and Georgian Dream are committed pro-European political parties and actively seek EU membership for Georgia. If the EU were to engage both sides bilaterally, it could calm political nerves and potentially lead to it mediating a dialogue. Georgia has long looked to Brussels as a democratic role model to fulfill its European aspirations. In offering to mediate, the EU could incentivize both sides to come to the table and demonstrate their political maturity.

Although EU foreign policy has often struggled to find a common approach supported by all member states — still the dominant players in the external relations of the bloc — Michel might just be the right person. As Belgium’s former prime minister, he has at least some experience in mediating internal political and societal polarization. And while Georgian politics is a far cry from the halls of Brussels, Michel can make use of the fact that both the UNM and Georgian Dream would bolster their pro-European credentials significantly if they were to heed Brussels’ advice in this matter.

Staying on Course

Ultimately, if this political crisis cannot be solved, authoritarianism will be the only winner in this situation. Georgia’s authoritarian neighbors — Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey — have made it through the pandemic politically unscathed, while Azerbaijan’s recent victory in Nagorno-Karabakh has strengthened the Aliyev dynasty and left Armenia’s extremely vulnerable democracy in peril. If Georgia’s dwindling beacon of democracy, human rights and the rule of law were to falter, there may be little hope in salvaging its remarkable advancements the country made over the last 20 years.

If the EU truly values the Eastern Partnership and shares Georgia’s vision for eventual EU membership, more than warm gestures will be necessary on its part in this crisis. In order to save democracy in the Caucasus, the EU may have to show its mettle and get creative, for only it can provide the necessary incentives, be they political or economic, to inspire Georgia to stay on course.

In order to remind ourselves why events in this lesser-known region carry a wider significance, it is worth looking at its history. Almost to the day 100 years ago, the Red Army entered Tbilisi and Georgia lost its independence. Although the Soviet Union is long gone, there is a real danger that Georgia may lose its political independence if all parties involved do not find a way for a real dialogue.

Another conflict in the South Caucasus might just set the necessary precedent for another regional power play. We should not forget that the Russian army has been present on Georgian territory since the five-day war of 2008, with Moscow supporting Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s declaration of independence. The Kremlin has always been quick to seize an arising opportunity. It will surely be ready to reassert itself over Georgia and to restore fully its sphere of influence in the Caucasus.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Georgia’s Democracy Is on the Brink of Chaos appeared first on Fair Observer.