Despite the ongoing strife, world leaders at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 79) in September merely reiterated the same sentiments that they have been repeating over the past six months. They condemned Houthi terrorism, but they did not put forward a coherent strategy to halt the strikes and force the Sana’a rebels back to negotiations.

Tensions grow amid broken promises

The people of South Yemen, in particular, cannot wait another year for solutions. Conditions on the ground are ripe for instability. The areas under the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the Yemeni institution officially recognized by the international community, remain fragile across South Yemen. The PLC and its Saudi-led international allies cannot afford distractions from the fight against Houthis. Neither can the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the secessionist organization backed by the United Arab Emirates. While the PLC and the STC signed the Riyadh Agreement in April 2022, joining forces against the Houthis, the STC still advocates for the South’s secession. As discontent against both leaderships grows, leaders must advance the interests of the marginalized population to sustain momentum against the Houthis.

Via Borysk5 on Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

The Riyadh Agreement not only transferred power from former president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to the newly established PLC, but it also served to recognize the STC as the representative of the people of South Yemen. STC chief Aidarus al-Zubaidi stated that the agreement would pave the way “to develop a negotiating framework” wherein “determining the future, the solution of the issue of the people of the South [should come] naturally.” However, more than two years since the STC joined with the PLC, South Yemenis remain marginalized.

Initially, the PLC didn’t aim to resolve the political conflict in the South, but rather to unite ranks with the STC against the Houthis. However, the PLC has not made much progress on this front. Lack of trust between the parties prevented military unity. While the lack of success undoubtedly affects the STC, the PLC became the main focus of criticism when it proved unable to counter Houthi strikes that halted all oil and gas production.

The government has made no progress regarding the issue of southern independence. When al-Zubaidi joined the talks in 2022, he aimed to situate the southern issue front and center. However, a year later, PLC leader Rashad al-Alimi claimed that “now is not the right time to discuss southern independence.” STC officials immediately shot back at al-Alimi, claiming he “showed a lack of seriousness.”

Alimi’s comments inflamed feelings across the South, not only among pro-STC elements but also among the tribes of eastern Yemen, an area that is formally under PLC control. The PLC has failed to meet basic demands for public services in areas like the eastern region of Hadhramaut. When al-Alimi visited Hadhramaut in July, he was met by protests. Then, on October 14, thousands in Seiyun, Hadhramaut sent a clear message to al-Alimi. During a celebration commemorating the 61st anniversary of independence from Britain, citizens of Hadhramaut expressed their support for the STC. On October 19, another event in al-Ghaydah, al-Mahra promoted “Southern Identity” as a symbol against PLC leadership. 

A deepening economic crisis stokes tensions in the South

South Yemenis are dissatisfied. The PLC has failed to eliminate security threats, public services are diminishing, and an economic crisis is deepening. Over the last year, the Houthis have been attacking commercial vessels transiting through the Red and Arabian Seas. Their tactics and weapons have evolved with potency and efficiency. Al-Zubaidi points out that failures to deal with Houthis are “no longer acceptable.” He maintains that “it is in the interest of our people to end the conflict and find a permanent solution.”

Related Reading

FO° Exclusive: Houthis Cause Chaos in the Red Sea

Not only have the Houthis interfered with international shipping lanes, they have also devastated southern Yemeni ports. This dramatically increases the difficulty of getting imports into South Yemen, exacerbating inflation and choking supplies of international food aid.

According to the OCHA, food imports in the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla declined by 13%. The UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) notes that shortages in incoming aid left “around 3.6 million [Yemenis] with reduced rations.” More funding crises could affect a further 2.5 million. The Yemeni rial also slid “to an all-time low of YER1,681/USD by the end of April 2024.”

The failure to stop Houthi attacks has also prevented Yemen from exporting oil, a potential source of much-needed cash. In mid-2021, the Houthis attempted to take over oil facilities across Shabwa. After they failed to do so, in October 2022 their strategy shifted to using missiles and drones against factories, ports and oil tankers, effectively shutting production down.

Just prior to al-Alimi’s arrival in New York for the UNGA 79, reports surfaced claiming the PLC had failed to produce a new budget. Al-Alimi held meetings with a number of UN officials and representatives of Western donor countries but failed to gain a public commitment for financial support. Until the PLC is able to put forth a cohesive plan to unite the country of Yemen against Houthi threats, Yemen will not receive international support. In the meantime, public unrest will only grow.

[Cheyenne Torres edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Yemen’s Government Cannot Ignore Looming Unrest appeared first on Fair Observer.

The announcement sent shockwaves throughout Yemen. The Houthis and Muslim Brotherhood affiliate al-Islah immediately complained, but Saudi authorities and fellow members of the Saudi-led coalition — formally on the same side of the war as the STC — also expressed concerns about the strengthening of the southern parties. Saudi Arabia fears it could lose influence over parties within the Political Leadership Council (PLC), the internationally recognized Yemeni government’s executive body.

The first step taken by Saudi Arabia following the STC announcement was to convene a series of meetings in Riaydh with rivals of the STC that represent Hadhramaut, in the country’s east. The meetings culminated in the establishment of a National Hadhrami Council (NHC), in an apparent move to counter the STC’s Southern National Pact.

Other parties formed the People’s High Council of Resistance, based in the center of the country, for similar purposes.

Some observers present these developments as progress among the opponents of the Houthi in preparation for a break in the Saudi–Houthi détente. On the ground, however, it is obvious the new council is a reaction to growing STC momentum. Yemeni political factions seem to be more concerned about southern secessionism than about the threat the Houthis pose.

What has the STC decided, and why now?

PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi had exacerbated North–South tensions in February when he dismissed the southern issue as a priority. This angered southerners and put pressure on the STC to act.

Undoubtedly, this hastened the organization of the Aden dialogue conference hosted by the STC in early May. Southern factions were quick to exploit the optics of the week-long conference through well-coordinated media campaigns. They gave a general audience access to the participants. Longtime political rivals came together in Aden. With over 30 factions signing the SNP, the STC now serves as the umbrella organization for southerners. This is a significant development following recognition under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement as the representative of the southern peoples.

The STC also announced a major restructuring of its executive leadership. It expanded its membership by including some former rivals, including PLC members Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani and Abd al-Rahman al-Mahrami (aka Abu Zaraa’a) as co-vice presidents along with Ahmed Saeed bin Breik. Bahsani and bin Breik are former governors of Hadhramaut and former commanders of the Second Region Command there. This move not only cemented the strategic importance of Hadhramaut, Yemen’s largest province, but it also placed allies of the South within the PLC itself — three of them within the eight-member council.

The accession of Bahsani, a Hadhrami, and Abu Zaraa’a, a Salafi leader from Lahj, as vice presidents could highlight two goals of the STC. The first is to cement the influence of the South within the PLC with regard to Saudi Arabia. The members of the PLC are seen as hand-picked by Saudi Arabia, so their legitimacy and influence cannot be questioned. Second, the vice presidents are military leaders with a history of opposition to al-Islah’s influence in the South. As former commanders of the Second Region, based in Mukalla in southern Hadhramaut, bin Breik and Bahsani represent the southerners’ opposition to the al-Islah-affiliated First Region Command, based in Sayyun in northern Hadhramaut. Further, Abu Zaraa’a served as commander of the STC-affiliated Amalaqa Brigades, which act as the tip of the southern forces’ spear from the Red Sea coast to Shabwah. In an environment of constant rebalancing acts, the message is abundantly clear.

Saudi overreach derails Riyadh Agreement

The success of the STC-led dialogue among southern factions has undoubtedly raised fears of southern secessionist ambitions. Fears among Yemeni parties have grown since the signing of the Riyadh Agreement, which legitimized the STC, in November 2019. Now, nearly four years since the agreement and a year and a half after the establishment of the PLC, all efforts to stabilize the liberated areas and unite the Houthi’s rivals have failed.

The STC has gained tremendous momentum since former president Hadi replaced the al-Islah-affiliated governor of Shabwah with an ally of the STC in December 2021. The conflict between al-Islah and the STC then shifted to northern Hadhramaut, with the STC demanding the ouster of the al-Islah-affiliated leadership of the First Regional Command. These developments have raised concerns in Riyadh over the extent of influence by the STC beyond its core in Aden, possibly consolidating in northern Hadhramaut along the Yemen-Saudi border.

Saudi Arabia has attempted to solidify its influence in Hadhramaut. Observers in south Yemen remain unsettled by Saudi Arabia’s decision to host tribal leaders from Hadhramaut soon after the STC dialogue conference in Aden. The gathering of Hadhrami leaders was made public from the first flight from Sayyun to Riyadh aboard a Saudi military aircraft. Meetings in Riyadh were also broadcasted by media outlets, and on June 20 the group announced the establishment of the Hadhramaut National Council (HNC). The charter, yet to be made public, was then signed on July 27. Al-Islah was the first political party to announce signing the charter.

Further antagonizing the STC and its base across southern Yemen, members of the new council met with Saudi officials and Alimi. The composition of the council, with a number of leaders from the al-Islah, makes it appear to be a direct rival to the STC. Among the notable al-Islah members of the council are Bader Basalama, Mohsen Basura, Adel Bahamid and Abdullah Saleh Al Kathiri. Other high-profile leaders on the council include members of the General People’s Congress (GPC), the former ruling party under deposed president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Alimi is also a member of the GPC.

Tension further escalated in early July when the STC organized a demonstration outside the Sayyun Palace and gunmen affiliated with members of the new council met unarmed demonstrators. In neighboring Shabwah, another group of tribal leaders announced the Alliance of Sons and Tribes of Shabwah, another attempt to challenge the STC.

The latest move exacerbating tensions among competing parties was the announcement of the Supreme Popular Resistance Council for al-Jawf and Mareb under Hamoud al-Makhlafi, a sheik from Taiz. Sheik Hamoud, an al-Islah affiliate, resides in Turkey but remains highly influential in the city of Taiz. This new council has met opposition even within Mareb City, a stronghold of al-Islah. It is undetermined if Saudi Arabia knows about or supports this group.

The factional lines are being drawn. As Saudi Arabia draws together its anti-STC allies, it puts the unity established by the Riyadh Agreement at risk.

Imminent escalation on two fronts

Meanwhile, optimism remains among UN officials who view the lopsided prisoner exchange of April 2023 as a step forward. The completion of the oil transfer from the FSO Safer off the Red Sea of Hodeida is also touted as a major diplomatic victory by the UN. This has led the mainstream consensus to share the UN’s optimism about their efforts to restart the peace process. However, the Safer operation’s costs now surpass the current potential revenue from the oil. The wreck, in any case, remains under Houthi control and is still vulnerable to floating sea mines released by them.

UN Diplomatic Success in a Potential Oil Disaster

Despite UN positivity, the fragile détente is on the brink of collapse. Houthis continue to clash with southern forces in al-Dhale and Yafa’, and new clashes have been reported across Taiz. The Saudi–Houthi détente has merely eliminated cross-border strikes while the rebels have reinforced their positions across all fronts. Furthermore, the Houthi head of the Supreme Political Council (SPC), Mahdi al-Mashat, recently threatened new cross-border missile strikes.

Saudi Arabia evidently expects an imminent escalation by the rebels. Houthi tactics always involve escalating rhetoric or increasing demands to extract maximum concessions from Saudi Arabia or the UN. The period since October 2022 has not seen any changes in Houthi behavior. They only adhered to Saudi Arabia’s agreement on halting cross-border strikes because it has allowed them to regroup, train and redeploy militia across their territory.

With crisis looming, US Special Envoy Tim Lenderking is once again in the Gulf region following a visit by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg to Riyadh in August.

Saudi Arabia’s move to support the establishment of new subregional councils in Hadhramaut and Shabwah, in particular, may prove highly counterproductive. As the Houthis prepare for a renewal of hostilities within Yemen and across the border, the emergence of competing councils will exacerbate the fragmentation of the Houthi’s rivals. Saudi Arabia hopes to unify anti-Houthi factions under the Riyadh Agreement, but its mismanagement of rivalries across southern Yemen and within the PLC has paved the ground for potentially larger losses in Hodeida and Taiz. Ultimately, Houthis may choose to re-engage southern forces, a move which could drag the United Arab Emirates — which the Houthis have recently attacked — back into the conflict and further destabilize the region.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar and Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Southern and Northern Allies Now Vie for Influence in Volatile Yemen appeared first on Fair Observer.

As the truce expired, Houthi military spokesman, General Yahya al-Sareh, and Houthi delegate, Mohammed Abd al-Salam, published statements threatening foreign oil companies and vessels operating in Yemen. The threats were in line with Houthi demands for a larger share of oil revenue as part of failed negotiations with UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg to extend the six month long ceasefire. The incidents temporarily suspended production and exports. Only a week later, Cal Valley Petroleum declared force majeure and suspended all work starting November 1.

Who Are the Houthis?

LISTEN NOW

After eight years of conflict between the IRG and Houthi rebels, the listing by the NDC came a week after Saudi Arabia urged the UN Security Council (UNSC) “to designate Houthis as terrorists.” Calls at the Security Council by Saudi Arabia aimed to expand on language used in UNSC Resolution 2624 (2022), where at the urging of the UAE the Council referred to Houthis as a “terrorist group.” These efforts by members of the Arab coalition to restore legitimacy aim to pressure the US and the EU to officially designate the Iran-backed militia a “terrorist organization.”

An Increasing Threat

The accuracy and velocity of the latest drone strikes by Houthis are an indication of increasing capabilities, including intelligence resources. This should not come as a surprise following months of recruitment and deployment of troops and weapons by Houthis, who organized a dozen military parades throughout northern Yemen during the period of the UN-brokered truce.Their recent choice of targets also indicates a clear shift in strategy since the truce expired. Prior to the start of the truce in April 2022, Houthis focused on cross-border strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The shift to oil facilities within Yemen fits the Houthi narrative, calling the IRG mercenaries and the coalition members “thieves”, looting Yemen’s oil.

Demands by Houthis for a bigger share of oil revenue appears to extend from decreasing sources of income this year. The UN donors conference in March 2022 only delivered $1.3 billion from the requested $4.2 billion. This has affected humanitarian operations across Houthi-held territory. It was a major blow from the rebels who profit from the entire cycle: from collecting taxes at the port, to the control of ground transport and warehousing, to the local civil society organizations in charge of distribution of aid, and now to the banks and foreign exchange shops. The decrease in the flow of aid has affected the entire cycle, which also maintains a complex patronage of networks, sustaining the elite down to tribal levies.

US Sanctions Miss the Mark in Yemen

READ MORE

By targeting the Rudhum terminal at al-Nushayma, Shabwa, the rebels also sent a message to the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose ally is now governor of Shabwa province. The aim is to prevent the STC from profiting off oil exports. In al-Dhaba port, near al-Rayyan airport, the drone strikes on the South Korean Nissos Kea vessel were called a warning by Houthis to foreign companies, more specifically, those that are linked to members of the coalition. Al-Masirah media reported Houthis used Samad-3 drones for the strikes in al-Dhaba.

New Targets   

While Houthi drone strikes within Yemeni territory are not new, the locations and distance show a shift amid a new balance of power. Aden has been a target along with nearby military bases and high-ranking security officers, but the reach to facilities along the coastlines of Hadramawt and Shabwa with such accuracy represent new threats to rising powers like the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The stalemate in al-Dhale province between Houthis and pro-STC forces remains months after southern Giants Brigades expelled Houthis from Bayhan, Shabwa. 

In January 2022, the clashes along Shabwa’s western mountains delivered the first major victory over the Houthis, reversing territorial gains beyond the old north-south divide. A fractured national army and a weakened al-Islah party had placed pro-STC forces at the forefront in the fight against Houthis. This new balance comes with a high price for southerners, and Houthi strikes on oil facilities in southern provinces aim at dragging STC forces into direct confrontations along new frontlines.

Houthis know southern forces are stretched along multiple fronts. Security Belt Forces continue to advance across Abyan against terrorist elements, while Amalaqa and Shabwa Defense Forces cleanse Shabwa of rebellious elements that oppose governor Awad al-Awlaqi. Attacks on vital energy infrastructure come at a minimal risk and cost for Houthis. They are gambling on either instigating a wider response by the National Army or the coalition, which leads to a return of cross-border strikes on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, or a mobilization by southern forces that are already stretched thin.

The government of Yemen echoed members of the coalition and has called for the international community to strengthen its stance on Houthis to designate the militia a terror group. Statements by western governments following the attack on al-Dhaba ports have also come under criticism for their weak stance since the truce expired. In absence of compromise on a new ceasefire threatens an escalation across battlefronts under new conditions with higher stakes for warring parties.  

[Charlize Cheesman edited this article]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post A Surge in Attacks: Houthi Rebels Exploit Oil Infrastructure appeared first on Fair Observer.

Chaos Makes a Comeback in Southern Yemen

READ MORE

As the economy continues to deteriorate in war-torn Yemen, with widespread protests from Lahj to Shebwa and Hadhramawt, there has been little to no hope. Devaluation of the Yemeni rial is a prominent issue driving protests across southern provinces, while the mass displacement of civilians from northern provinces is driven by violence and unpaid salaries by Houthi authorities. The humanitarian crisis deepens as unemployment grows and donor funds are insufficient to meet demand by international nongovernmental organizations. Opportunities for job creation are minimal, but small initiatives led by local actors, with direct assistance from state donors, have made progress as economic activity contributes to local stability.

In a micro-environment like Soqotra, political stability over the past seven years of conflict has come at a high price. While fighting at a scale similar to the Yemeni mainland has not reached the Soqotra archipelago, the political conflict managed to disrupt life until a degree of order was established over a year ago. Humanitarian assistance has flowed into Soqotra for years following devastating cyclones, but with recent political stability on the island, assistance has shifted to more permanent projects — from hospitals and a power station to the island’s first factory.

Small Steps Forward

While industries struggle through a moribund economy, the agriculture sector has received much-needed investment, mostly from aid agencies. Challenges remain, like annual storms, drought, pests and shortage of labor. From Hodeida to Hadhramawt, agriculture has struggled. Date farming is a particular example. This sector has suffered across the mainland, but it is being resurrected on Soqotra.

In August 2020, a group of women led now by Wafa Mohammed was hired to operate the first factory on Soqotra island. Built in the outskirts of Hadibu, with funds provided by the UAE’s Khalifa Bin Zayed Foundation, the date factory became the first major project of its kind on the island. The factory can deliver nearly three tons of dates per day from a harvest of around half a million palm trees. According to Mohammed, this factory collects produce from around 500 farmers and has a direct impact on the economy of nearly 2,000 families on the island.

Prior to the construction of the factory, production was only for local consumption. Saeed Othman, a date farmer in Soqotra, said that in the past, “production was very weak because it was just for daily consumption.” The island also lacked other agricultural products and dates were often used as feed for livestock. Production at the factory has also created a competitive environment among local farmers as demand for higher quality increased for export, said Othman.

The factory project instantly provided unexpected opportunities to a group of college graduates, who simply had no hopes beyond the usual “routine at home, cooking, cleaning, doing the other home chores,” said Mohammed. Farmers across the island also highlight the opportunities created by the factory, primarily through an increase in income impacting their daily life. Farmers and factory workers alike enjoy the benefits from a stable environment that allows economic activity outside a war economy that prolongs the armed conflict on the mainland.

Conflict and Aid

As local, regional and international organizations jockey for their share of available funds since the donors’ conference on March 1, the debate continues over alternative approaches. UN organizations requested nearly $4 billion this year, only to receive pledges for $1.7 billion, of which an undisclosed amount has been dispersed so far.

Corruption, low-impact and reduced funding have all contributed to wide-ranging debates in recent months over alternatives to the current process. The multilateral approach has failed to deliver sufficient funds to meet demand, while warring parties continue to capture aid and obstruct delivery. In an environment like Soqotra, isolated from the armed conflict on the Yemeni mainland, direct delivery of aid by a state actor has proved efficient, delivering long-term impact on the ground.

Make Sense of the World

Unique Insights from 2,500+ Contributors in 90+ Countries

I agree to receive emails and other content from Fair Observer. I understand that I may repeal my consent at any time. You can review our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use for further information .

The date factory project came as the political conflict in Soqotra settled. Under the current circumstances, the situation in Soqotra could offer an alternative. For example, in contrast to affected areas in Hadhramawt or Mahra, soon after Cyclone Chapala struck the Soqotra in 2015 and following Cyclone Makunu in 2018, the United Arab Emirates delivered life-saving assistance directly to the people on the island. During the length of the conflict, the UAE has delivered over $110 million in aid to the Soqotra archipelago. The aid has targeted areas in public and health services, transport and storage, fishing sector, construction, public education, energy and potable water.

Aid provided over the years also targeted farmers, who not only benefit from the funds provided for their crops, but also from projects like the date factory. The factory, for example, has provided an outlet for farmers to export goods rather than relying on local consumption alone. The aid provided has allowed the farmers to expand and stabilize harvests, improve the quality of products and increase revenue. In addition, the power plant in Hadibu, with a capacity of 2.2 megawatts, provides facilities like the date factory with a sustainable power supply that contributes to local economic security. The UAE also provided the Qalansiya area with 800 kilowatts. Other projects include a distribution network for more than 30 sites and solar-powered street lighting.

Development projects in Soqotra account for a fraction of funds requested by aid agencies every year, but the impact so far is wide and sustainable. Other environments could emulate the process in Soqotra, but deeply rooted political conflicts remain an obstacle. Aden, the interim capital, continues to suffer from a lack of sustainable power source, unemployment is high despite efforts by Aden authorities and the political conflict easily escalates to armed clashes. On the mainland, it is more difficult, but opportunities abound across southern provinces.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How Date Farming Helps Yemenis on Soqotra appeared first on Fair Observer.

Cautiously Optimistic: The Biden Administration’s Options in Yemen

READ MORE

The five individuals were listed under the rules of the Yemen Sanctions Regulations, amended on October 29, which implements Executive Order 13611 of May 16, 2012. The process implemented by the Trump administration provides a hint at how the US could further target the Sanaa-based rebels prior to Joe Biden taking office in January. The move was largely symbolic, a gesture toward Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, and falls short, so far, from the threat to sanction the Houthis as a terrorist organization.

There was also no mention of the links between the sanctioned rebels and Iran or its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The US did sanction Hasan Irlu, Tehran’s new envoy to Sanaa, linked to Hezbollah and the IRGC Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani, assassinated by the US in January. Iran responded immediately by blacklisting the US Ambassador to Yemen, Christopher Henzel, for his “pivotal role in the occurrence of the humanitarian crisis.”   

Path to Sanctions

The October amendments to the Yemen Sanctions Regulations allowed the US to respond to pressure from regional allies and circumvent the stalemate within the UN Security Council (UNSC). The nature of the war — where Houthi rebels claim to be fighting on two fronts, one against the Saudi Arabia-led coalition and the other against the “Yemeni mercenaries,” as they refer to the forces of the legitimate government — has allowed Saudi Arabia to take the lead in diplomatic and military affairs.

In 2014, the UNSC sanctioned Yemen’s former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and two rebel leaders, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din al-Houthi and Abdullah Yahya “Abu Ali” al-Hakem. This was followed by the sanctioning of Abd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh in April 2015 under Chapter VII. Both sets of mesures came as result of diplomatic efforts by Saudi Arabia, President Hadi and their Arab allies.

The US Office of Foreign Assets Control followed each round of UN sanctions by listing individuals under Executive Order 13611 for “engaging in acts that directly or indirectly threaten the peace, security, or stability of Yemen.” These were significant diplomatic victories for Saudi Arabia and Yemen at a time when the Obama administration was negotiating the Iran nuclear deal.

On the military front, Saudi Arabia published a bounty list in November 2017, offering millions for 40 individuals from the Houthi-Saleh alliance. So far, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition has only claimed the strike that killed Saleh al-Samad, the first head of the Supreme Political Council, in April 2018. While some accused the coalition of assassinating the Houthi minister for youth and sport, Hassan Zaid, this October, sources familiar with the incident claim it was as a result of infighting among Sanaa actors.

The current US administration has moved the bar to accommodate diplomatic pressure, risking creating both an obstruction to the delivery of aid across north Yemen and potential sabotage of the Biden administration’s future efforts. While it is imperative to continue to put pressure on Houthi officials over human rights abuses, the latest move by the Trump administration has only weakened the US role in the conflict rather than strengthening the opposition to the Houthis. The rebels will again claim that the US is not an honest actor in peace negotiations, especially following the release of US nationals by Houthi authorities in October under a UN-negotiated prisoner exchange. 

Bowing to Pressure

While Houthi opponents celebrated the news from Washington, many noted the bowing to pressure and the US failure to work through the United Nations. The listed officials — Abdul Hakim “Abu Karar” al-Khaiwani, Abd al-Qader al-Shami, Abdul Rahab “Abu Taha” Jarfan, Motlaq Amer “Abu Emad” al-Marrani and Sultan “Abu Sagar” Zabin — have been mentioned by the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen at one point or another since January 2017. At least two of the five have been at the center of discussions on a new round of UN sanctions.

Jarfan, the former director of the National Security Bureau (NSB), was first mentioned by the UN panel in January 2017 as part of the Houthi apparatus co-opting intelligence services in Sanaa. Although he was the face of the NSB until late 2019, Jarfan was most active in leading the extortion of local businesses to generate revenue for the Houthi leadership. Utilizing the full strength of the NSB, Jarfan was able to take over major corporations, like Universal Group and Yemen Armor, to increase revenue. These two companies in particular — a major property owner in Sanaa and the principal provider of armor vehicles — secured large streams of revenue extending from contracts with international aid organizations and UN agencies headquartered in Sanaa.

Al-Marrani, Jarfan’s former deputy and of Hashimi origin, served as the NSB supervisor and oversaw the detention and torture of political prisoners. As a Hashimi, al-Marrani was a highly trusted official closer to the top Houthi leadership.

Major General al-Khaiwani, also of Hashimi origin, was deputy minister of interior and is now the head of the Security and Intelligence Service established in October 2019. This agency merged the NSB and the Political Security Office (PSO), removing Jarfan and al-Marrani as result of a major conflict within Houthi ranks. Khaiwani’s new deputy, Major General al-Shami, another Hashimi, served as director of the PSO. Both were mentioned in the UN panel report in January this year, and we can only assume the US listing extends from their role over an agency holding hundreds of political prisoners among whom were the two US nationals released two months ago.

Lastly, Brigadier General Zabin, head of the Criminal Investigation Department, received significant attention from the UN panel as a result of his links to indiscriminate arrests of women in Sanaa. Zabin was reportedly recommended to the UN Security Council committee on Yemen for sanctions this year, but the stalemate extending from rivalries among the P5 members has delayed that vote. The US listing of Zabin may champion the human rights cause to protect women, but it directly disrupts operations by international organizations working through Houthi-held territory in northern Yemen.   

Push for a Solution

While the international community continues to condemn human rights abuses by Houthi authorities, all organizations working in Yemen would rather see a push toward a comprehensive solution to the armed conflict. Since the first two rounds of sanctions by the Security Council, seen largely as ineffective over the years, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Yemen have sought further action by the international body, particularly with regards to the relationship between Houthis and Iran.

Pressure on the international community peaked in late 2017, when the UN panel confirmed the Houthi use of Iranian missiles and technology across battlefronts in Yemen and for strikes against Saudi territory. The calls to list Houthis as a terrorist organization have grown since 2019 as an alternative to bypass the stalemate at the UNSC.

The five individuals sanctioned by the US for human rights abuses control the apparatus that maintains a strong grip on the population, deterring dissent. None are known to have assets outside Yemen. In fact, of the 10 Yemenis sanctioned so far, only the former president (who died in 2017) and his son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, have known assets outside Yemen. China and Russia will continue to oppose new sanctions at the Security Council.

Retaliation by the Houthis is expected to further affect the general population as obstacles arise for aid agencies due to escalating military operations, which include targeting Saudi territory with increasing capabilities via sea mines, long-range ballistic missiles as well as air or water-borne drones. Further unilateral actions by Washington will only weaken the international sanctions regimes and embolden Houthis on the ground at great risk to foreign and Yemeni aid workers.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post US Sanctions Miss the Mark in Yemen appeared first on Fair Observer.

For Yemen, No Consistent EU Policy in Sight

READ MORE

Yemeni-Americans have also raised expectations for the Biden administration, as part of the coalition that won the crucial state of Michigan. Mounting pressure at home will undoubtedly drive a number of opportunities to advance efforts to de-escalate the conflict and restart peace talks in Yemen soon after Inauguration Day in January next year.   

Unique Approach

The current administration’s policy in the Middle East has exonerated Arab regimes both at home and in the region. As reality sinks in on a Biden presidency, concern grows among both President Donald Trump’s supporters and American progressives over the potential for a Biden pivot toward more intrusive Obama-era policies and limited access to weapons purchases. Biden would shift from the Trump administration’s policy to a reciprocal relationship maintained with Gulf monarchies based on access to weapons in exchange for mutually beneficial public gestures of cooperation while balancing tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council. Observes highlight the pressure from some in Biden’s own camp demanding significant departure from Trump’s approach to relationships with the Arab regimes, in particular.

Critics of the current administration underline the manner in which Trump’s hands-off approach and business interests served to prolong the war in Yemen and turned a blind eye to possible international humanitarian law violations. Focus remains on the personal relationship between Trump family members and Arab officials, marginalizing the work by US diplomats and defense officials. This approach will definitely not continue under a Biden administration, raising concern among Arab leaders over access to the president and control over their own institutions. While observers acknowledge these concerns, they highlight the persistent reliance on US cooperation amid growing economic and security vulnerabilities in the region. Iran remains a top priority for both sides following an end of UN sanctions.     

While Biden’s potentially unique approach — a more pragmatic agenda than that employed during President Barack Obama’s second term — will rattle relations with the Gulf monarchies, his pivot could lead to substantial progress on Yemen’s peace process. There are three main reasons a Biden presidency encourages such positive expectations.

One, progressive members of Congress such as senators Bernie Sanders and Chris Murphy, Representative Ro Khanna and even the Republican Senator Mike Lee are expected to pressure the Biden administration on weapons sales and on criticism of Saudi Arabia. This group will undoubtedly be joined by the so-called Squad — Democratic House members Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, Ilham Omar, Ayanna Pressley and Rashida Tlaib — all staunch critics of Gulf regimes.

Second, Biden will most likely prioritize a return to talks with Iran to rescue the nuclear deal abandoned by President Trump. Saudi Arabia and Israel will again aim to influence the Biden administration to limit concessions made to Tehran. Third, a Biden administration would prioritize reengagement with the European Union and the NATO alliance, addressing, among many other issues, relations with Turkey and the situation in Iraq and Syria at a highly volatile time and amid a growing threat from Islamic State-inspired terrorist attacks in Western Europe. These issues cannot ignore the role of Iran in the region as the one-year anniversary of the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani approaches.       

Under Pressure at Home

Joe Biden’s victory signaled an astounding rejection of President Donald Trump, delivered by a wide-ranging coalition of Democrats, progressives and moderate Republicans. Among these are the likes of Bernie Sanders, Senator Elizabeth Warren and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, all holding significant leverage over the incoming administration. This pressure is not confined to domestic issues, with foreign policy also featuring high on priorities for Sanders and Warren during their own presidential bids.

Relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, embroiled in the conflict with Qatar and the war in Yemen, will definitely face mounting challenges. Biden is not just seen as a repudiation of the Trump approach to the region, but also as an extension of the Obama legacy. When Biden served as President Obama’s vice president, he witnessed the change of the guard in Saudi Arabia from the late King Abdullah to King Salman bin Abd al-Aziz, and will find a much different Saudi Arabia, now nearly five years now under the de facto rule of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

The crown prince now holds the defense portfolio, with his brother Khaled as his deputy, and in charge of the Yemen file. Both Mohammed bin Salman and Prince Khaled have visited the White House and maintained direct communications with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner. The personal relationships that granted Saudi Arabia reprieve following the murder of The Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul two years ago and the mounting accusations of war crimes in Yemen will not exist in a Biden administration.

It is important to keep in mind that the Powers Act is among the issues carrying over from the Trump era. The most recent fight in Congress aimed at limiting Trump’s ability to go to war with Iran, but we must recall that Senator Sanders was among a number of members of Congress who criticized President Obama and Vice President Biden for supporting Saudi Arabia and the UAE at the start of the Yemen conflict in March 2015. President Biden would have two options in the emerging political environment: either negotiate a deal with progressives in the Democratic Party, pledging to not go soft on Saudi Arabia and halt weapons sales or face an embarrassing scenario where members of his own party, joined by Republicans looking to obstruct his administration as much as possible, move to limit his powers and publicly undermine his foreign policy options.

As opposed to Trump’s relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which emboldened their roles in Libya and Yemen, a Biden presidency under pressure from the Democratic left would undercut leverage of Gulf monarchies vis-à-vis actors on the ground in Yemen, for example. In response to increasing unpredictability in recent months, Saudi Arabia and the internationally recognized government of Yemen resisted pressure to announce a new cabinet following the agreement in August between President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the pro-secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC) until after the US presidential election. Saudi Arabia and President Hadi hedged their bets on a second Trump term, which would grant both leverage over the STC and advance a more favorable composition of the cabinet. It is still likely that a new cabinet is formed before the end of 2020, as the STC knows its relationship with the UAE could also change under a US administration that is more engaged and looking to de-escalate the conflict upon taking office.

Iran has not sat idly on the sidelines either and has perhaps positioned itself far better than its regional rivals. The arrival of a new ambassador to Sanaa in mid-October signaled a major escalation in diplomatic relations. Hassan Eyrlou, reportedly “an IRGC member tied to Lebanese Hizballah,” was smuggled into Sanaa from Oman during the latest prisoner exchange between Houthis and the government of Yemen that included two US nationals. This move aggravated relations between Saudi Arabia and the office of the UN special envoy to Yemen as local officials accused the current UN envoy, Martin Griffiths, of complicity in the violation of the embargo. Iran has grown bolder in publicly acknowledging its relations with Houthis since the signing of a defense cooperation agreement in December 2019 in Tehran.

No Straight Path

Iran has positioned itself within the Arabian Peninsula in a manner in which it can exploit substantial leverage on a Biden pivot away from the current US approach in the region. The regime in Tehran, more so than Houthis in Sanaa, has managed to prove to the international community that it can operate around Saudi and Emirati defense posture and expand its political and military spheres to advance its interests. Whether it is a military confrontation under Trump or a diplomatic test under Biden, Iran has secured enough leverage to negotiate under favorable terms.

Yemeni observers agree that Ambassador Eyrlou was not the only one smuggled from Muscat. The tactic used is fairly well known, as a number of Iranian officials and Houthi elements travel to and from Sanaa by air, bypassing the long road from Sanaa to Mareb, Sayyun and the Mahra-Oman border. While no one is yet suggesting flights serve to smuggle weapons, drones or missiles, observers don’t doubt smaller components such as batteries, computer chips or radar components are transported to Sanaa. The trend in both smuggling operations and attacks by Houthis on Saudi territory has involved the use of smaller drones, along with deployment of short-range ballistic missiles and weaponized over-the-counter drones on positions held by the Yemeni army and coalition troops along various battle fronts.

This complicates the circumstances for the Biden administration as well as the position held by progressives in Congress aiming to halt weapon sales to Gulf allies. The military threat posed by Iran, and now by the Houthis, has long been used by Israel and Saudi Arabia to justify their role in the war in Yemen and in the procurement of weapons systems, both defensive and offensive. In order to rally support from Gulf allies for reengagement with the Iran nuclear deal, Joe Biden will have to reassure allies of pressure on Iran to de-escalate and rein in the Houthis in Sanaa. Both demands will come at a very high price.

Tehran will insist on the UN expanding the table and include the Iranian regime as a power broker in peace negotiations under Griffiths. The aim is not just to act as a counterweight in negotiations but to ensure a role in organizing a final solution to the conflict in Yemen that advances its interests and maintains Houthis within its sphere of influence. This is problematic for Mohammed bin Salman, who aims to recreate Saudi influence in Yemen as his uncles did since the end of the revolution in North Yemen in 1967.

It is worth noting that Saudi Arabia provided monthly stipends to Yemeni officials, including members of the Al Houthi family, for decades until the start of the Youth Uprising in 2011. For instance, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, a member of Yemen’s parliament, helped the Saleh regime fight secessionists in 1994 and was involved in the settlement of the Saudi-Yemeni border agreement of 2000, all while receiving financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, while Houthis greatly benefit from the international recognition granted by Iran, they don’t necessarily see eye to eye on Iran’s role beyond providing military assistance. Houthis continue to insist on their sovereignty and reject claims by Saudi Arabia and other rivals that they are Tehran’s puppets, while a number of Iranian officials have publicly announced that “Sana’a is the fourth Arab capital in [their] hands.” In order for the Houthis to accept any deal on a ceasefire, they will insist on direct talks with Saudi Arabia prior to the start of any comprehensive peace talks with President Hadi and the STC. This is not only a problem for Iran but mainly a non-starter for President Hadi and his government. Both Iran and Hadi fear a secret deal between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis will undermine their long-term interests in Yemen, and Hadi particularly fears being removed as president as part of the agreement.

It would be difficult to convince Iran to abandon Sanaa as part of the process to reengage with the nuclear deal, but it is not impossible. In partnership with European allies who hold deep economic interests in advancing relations with Iran, the Biden administration could ideally negotiate an Iranian exit from Sanaa, knowing the regime will maintain a low-level presence. Unilateral sanctions against Iranian entities remain an option for the US, and, under a more pragmatic Biden administration, European allies would be less reluctant to join in order to exert further pressure on Iran to comply. Joe Biden would hold on to Trump-era sanctions as a carrot, which would also serve to assure both Israel and Saudi Arabia that he is not willing to let Iran off the hook easily.

Other Options

The war in Yemen is now near its seventh year, and the Houthis continue to hold the upper hand on the ground. Yet even with gains against the coalition and Yemen’s National Army, Houthis also recognize there is no final solution through military victory. Houthis are suffering economically and know the limited support they receive can always be bargained away for greater interests. The economics of the war have also had a great impact on the UAE, forcing it to withdraw its troops from southern Yemen and the west coast in 2019 primarily as result of budget constraints, which have also affected relations with the STC and its affiliated security forces. Saudi Arabia has also felt the pinch from the financial support for President Hadi’s government, financing the war against the Houthis and weapons purchases from the US to strengthen its defense throughout the kingdom, all at a time of economic uncertainty.

There is no doubt the Biden administration will be pressured to end support for the war on Yemen on day one. Its options are limited and come at high political risk at home and in the region. European allies, who have proven limited in their influence since the signing of the Stockholm plan in December 2018, also want to see progress in the peace process. Ultimately, there is no doubt that if any of these efforts are to succeed, Yemenis must bear the bulk of the responsibility to secure progress and deter potential spoilers along the way. There is no way Joe Biden can secure progress through diplomacy alone if the parties on the ground do more to protect their individual interests than advancing peace and relief to millions of impoverished Yemenis facing famine and outbreaks of infectious disease throughout the country.

While a number of Yemeni actors have reached out to Russia, it is unlikely that President Vladimir Putin is willing to play a major role in the conflict. Russia is expected to continue playing a role at the UN Security Council, where the UK is the penholder on Yemen, primarily blocking the expansion of mandates or a new round of sanctions on individuals. On the UN track, Martin Griffiths is the third UN envoy to Yemen and is on his third year in the post, and he’s come under increasing criticism by all parties, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Under such conditions, a Biden administration could see an opportunity to reintroduce a plan drafted by former Secretary of State John Kerry in 2016 that could marginalize the UN in the process. Griffiths is close to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and both would fight to maintain the UN as the host of any peace talks, but it is unlikely the US would expend much political capital to hand over the process to the UN. It is difficult to predict if the UN can maintain its high-profile role in Yemen, or if it is time to introduce a new neutral broker who can better balance relations between actors to restart comprehensive dialogue toward a peace agreement.

*[This article was cross-posted on the author’s blog, Diwan.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Cautiously Optimistic: The Biden Administration’s Options in Yemen appeared first on Fair Observer.

As the international community welcomed Saudi Arabia’s announcement, the UN special envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, published his framework of how to end the war in Yemen. Soon after, the Houthis introduced their own “Comprehensive National Vision” that included a number of demands, which were mostly directed at Saudi Arabia to prepare the path for a new round of talks and a solution to the conflict. The three announcements exposed the dynamics of the Yemen War and the fog that obscures the path forward.

Can the Saudi Call for Ceasefire in Yemen Work?

READ MORE

New territory gains in al-Jawf, Mareb and Sanaa provinces this year have empowered Houthis and weakened the leverage of both the Yemeni government and the Saudi-led coalition. The dynamics of the conflict continue to shift as Houthis prove their capability to maintain drone and missile attacks across the Saudi-Yemeni border and deeper into the government’s enclave in Mareb. The basic equation to restart the peace process has three parties that are unwilling to compromise, while “warlords continue to convince the Saudis that they can still win the war,” according to Khaled al-Yamani, the former Yemeni foreign minister. Then there are the southern secessionists who continue to search for a guaranteed seat at the big table.

Some international observers saw the Saudi ceasefire as a sign of potential capitulation amid growing criticism of their conduct during the war or in response to economic stress. But “Saudi Arabia is far from accepting defeat or terms dictated by Houthis considering the rebels’ alliance with Iran,” says the Mareb-based Yemeni journalist Ali al-Sakani.

Three Perspectives to Consider

There are three issues to consider. First, Saudi Arabia did not appear to have coordinated its decision to announce a ceasefire with Yemen’s President Abdu-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Furthermore, media reports and a statement from Deputy Minister of Defense Prince Khaled bin Salman of Saudi Arabia focused on prioritizing public safety amid the coronavirus crisis.

The ceasefire that began at midday on April 9 came as news organizations reported that dozens of Saud family members may have been infected with the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19, and a day before Yemen reported its first case in al-Shihr, Hadhramawt. A week earlier, other media outlets reported that the public health crisis could have led to British personnel leaving the Riyadh-based Air Operations Center that is vital to the conduct of the aerial campaign over Yemen. In all, Hamed al-Bukhayti, a pro-Houthi writer, sees the abrupt announcement by Saudi Arabia as a move to prioritize its own security at home and in Yemen, while preempting any major damage to the chain of command and vital personnel.

Second, Griffiths presented Houthis and the legitimate government of Yemen with his own initiative on April 10. Again, while his initiative mentioned the importance of addressing the public health crisis, it seems to lack any coordination with the parties. The UN envoy tends to propose new road maps for peace talks following a round of talks with the parties involved, which was not the case this month. Nowhere in his statement did Griffiths address the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose allied armed groups continue to engage Houthis in al-Dhale province and pro-Islah party military elements in Shebwa province.

Again, this highlights the limits of both Saudi Arabia’s unilateral announcement and the UN envoy’s proposal. While the Saudi government merely aims at a two-week pause, and the envoy rushed to call for a comprehensive dialogue, the government of Yemen is left condemning continued Houthi aggression in Hajja, al-Jawf, Mareb and Taiz.

Third, on April 9, the Houthis published a prepared and unsigned document in the name of the government for national salvation. The document also shows it was prepared by the Houthis’ Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC), which was led by Mohammed Ali al-Houthi, who is now a member of the Supreme Political Council (SPC) that runs the day-to-day affairs. The document lists a number of demands directed at Saudi Arabia as the leader of the coalition that supports the legitimate government of Yemen. In the document, the Houthis address the air and land blockade and economic constraints, including the lack of salaries for government employees.

For the past two years, the Houthis have insisted that any peace process must begin with direct talks with Saudi Arabia, followed by Yemeni-Yemeni dialogue — meaning the Houthis and the Hadi-led government.

The final point in the Houthi document emphasizes the “unity, independence and territorial integrity” of Yemen, excluding any mention of the STC and its own ambitions. It is interesting to note that the Houthis frame the fight in al-Dhale province as clashes with government troops and coalition mercenaries, coupled with the fact that the Houthis have yet to recognize the UAE-sponsored Security Belt or Elite Forces allied with the STC as anything other than mercenaries. The Houthis do recognize the role and responsibility of the UN within their comprehensive approach to the peace process.

Pressure Grows as Leverage Weakens

International aid organizations continue to warn over deteriorating conditions, adding pressure on donors and Houthi authorities. Over recent months, humanitarian agencies have faced mounting challenges that include Houthi obstruction of the delivery of aid across territory under their control, along with threats from donors to cut funds in response to Houthi corruption. UN agencies have confronted the Houthis since May 2019 over obstruction and rampant corruption without any improvement in the relationship. The conflict between the Houthis and aid organizations has escalated as the Saudi-led coalition refuses to loosen restrictions on imports through the Red Sea port of Hodeida or lift the blockade on Sanaa International Airport.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration in Washington is said to have further pressured Saudi Arabia to find a way out of the conflict. The US warned Saudi Arabia over Houthi advances in al-Jawf and Mareb as concerns grow over the Houthis encircling Mareb city from Sirwah in the west and Murad in the south. Yamani, the former foreign minister, noted that “if al-Jawf, Mareb … the entire area falls in hands of Houthis, then it would be impossible for the Saudis to defend the desert,” adding to the challenges to restart peace talks while the Houthis have the upper hand. The government of President Hadi faces the possibility of losing the enclave at Mareb after being expelled from the interim capital of Aden in September 2019.

The pressure on Saudi Arabia grows, not merely as a result of Houthi gains but also as the implementation of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement stalls. Since the withdrawal of UAE troops from southern Yemen last year, Saudi Arabia became the sole mediator between the STC and Hadi’s government. So far, the only point implemented since the signing of the deal has been the return of Prime Minister Maeen Abd al-Malek Saeed to Aden. Saudi Arabia has been unable to end the conflict between pro-STC forces and Islah-affiliated government army units in Abyan and Shebwa, undoubtedly distracting from the fight against Houthis. The Saudi government is now tasked with maintaining two major fronts, one against Houthis and the conflict between the STC and the legitimate government.

As various elements push for more confrontations between parties, in the north and the south, Saudi leadership comes under tremendous strain. It remains to be seen if this two-week pause allows Saudi officials to regroup and present new initiatives to move on the UN-sponsor peace proposal or increase financial and materiel support for Murad tribes and government troops in al-Baydha and al-Jawf provinces.

Just prior to the ceasefire announcement, media reports claimed that Saudi Arabia’s ministry of defense proposed to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman the procurement of light-attack helicopters, precision-guided munitions for artillery and drones for aerial surveillance. Yet if the conflict in the south escalates, Saudi Arabia may be forced to reach out to the UAE to exert further influence over the STC.

Undoubtedly, the UAE will reengage under its own terms and a list of demands for Hadi regarding the role of the Islah party within his government and the military. It is doubtful the UAE would play a major role with troops fighting Houthis in Hodeida, but under the right circumstances, it could play a positive role in reaching out to both the Houthis and Iran to push for the start of UN-sponsored peace talks this year.

*[Updated: May 1, 2020.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Hope Fades for New Talks in Yemen as Battles Intensify appeared first on Fair Observer.

The hopes and aspirations of Yemen’s youth have dissipated into a near permanent state of war. Five years on from the electrifying momentum toward change sweeping through the Arab world’s poorest nation, an entrenched stalemate has completely derailed the political transition process. The year-long civil war, now sponsored by an Arab coalition, feeds a regional war by proxy and serves as breeding grounds for the Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The current situation has truly vaporized any sense of an Arab Spring, and instead has magnified a cycle of revenge among elite political actors.

The United Nations (UN), increasingly critical of the Saudi-led military coalition, has raised alarms over the devastating impact of the ongoing war. While armed clashes continue between Zaydi-Shia Houthi rebels, allied with military forces loyal to deposed President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and resistance militias, allied with military loyalists of President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, reports indicate that up to 93% of casualties and injuries from aerial bombardments have been civilians. The war has caused a collapse of the country’s health system throughout rebel- and resistance-held areas. Aid agencies have also reported that, as of August 2015, nearly 1.5 million people have been displaced by the current civil war. Prior to the conflict, there were 300,000 internally displaced persons. The Arab coalition also enforces an air and sea blockade, which is exacerbating the humanitarian crisis affecting over 80% of the population.

One year into the war, Houthi rebels and forces loyal to Saleh remain unaffected and committed to multiple fronts, some of which include clashes with militants affiliated with AQAP and affiliates of IS. Local media estimate that more than 160,000 airstrikes have taken place since March 2015 in Yemen by the Saudi-led coalition. Targets include military bases in northern Yemen, Houthi positions in multiple provinces, and houses of pro-Houthi leaders or associates, as well as the residence of former President Saleh and his relatives. Yet forces aligned with President Hadi have been unable to repel Houthis and Saleh’s forces from areas other than the coastal province of Aden. Fighting in Ibb, al-Jawf, Mareb and Taiz provinces remains intense and in constant flux. A number of ceasefires negotiated by UN Special Envoy Ismail Ould Cheikh have failed to deliver any relief since mid-2015.

Hope for opportunities to reengage peace talks among Yemeni actors, and the Arab coalition, remain faint as the option for total war appears to sustain the stubbornness on both sides. The recent appointment of General Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar as the new deputy chief of staff implies that Hadi and the Arab coalition are committed to a military victory. But Ali Muhsin’s resurrection since September 2014 may backfire and strengthen the Houthi-Saleh alliance rather than weaken their tribal pillars.

© Shutterstock

War crimes have undoubtedly been committed throughout the war, and reaching a lasting ceasefire long enough to engage peace talks remains a top priority amid growing fragmenting alliances. Reconstruction is simply beyond priorities held by warring parties at present.

Elite Bargaining

Debate over the nature of the political conflict that erupted in December 2010 has clearly eliminated the illusion of any populist movement, and provided overwhelming evidence of an intra-regime conflict responsible for today’s devastating war. The Arab Spring-inspired protests of 2011 across the Middle East and North Africa were all unique events, yet most observers fail to understand the origins and unique trajectory of Yemen’s own political infighting. It remains that an unresolved elite conflict perpetuates instability and is a principle reason for the breakdown of the transition process that was initiated in November 2011.

When Saleh stepped down after 33 years—the first phase of the transition plan—economically marginalized youth were neither empowered nor responsible for the autocrat’s downfall. The first indication of such marginalization was the fact that signatories to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) transition agreement only included the ruling party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), and the official opposition members of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP).

In theory, the GCC-sponsored agreement negotiated by then-UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar simply inked a temporary solution to a political crisis, which erupted in December 2010 when the GPC moved to unilaterally amend the constitution. Protests organized by would-be 2011 Nobel Laureate Tawakkol Karman and independent Member of Parliament (MP) Ahmed Saif Hashid coincided with the Tunisian uprising in December 2010. The situation escalated in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, when the National Solidarity Council (NSC), led by Hussain Abdullah al-Ahmar, joined protests against Saleh’s move to reform the electoral commission and extend his term in office to make way for his oldest son, Ahmed Ali. Karman and Ahmar were seen as proxies for the Sunni Islamist party, al-Islah, which is the senior partner in the JMP.

The crisis leading to the Day of Rage, scheduled for February 3, 2011, was meant as political positioning rather than Saleh’s outright overthrow. The Islah party aimed at negotiating the parliamentary elections of April 2011, gaining further concessions from Saleh through a restructuring of economic resources and political posts, even if it meant marginalizing Sheikh Hamid Abdullah al-Ahmar’s ambitions to prevent Ahmed Ali’s ascent to the presidency in 2013.

Instead, the tsunami spreading from President Hosni Mubarak’s overthrow in Egypt emboldened Saleh’s principle rival, Sheikh Hamid, an MP for the Islah party. For Sheikh Hamid, there would be no negotiations on Ahmed Ali’s grasp on power. His support for the mass gatherings at Change Square undoubtedly represented a continuation of his fiery public criticism of Saleh since 2006. The stage was set for an escalation and the perfect storm gathered against Saleh—youth outside patronage networks, Sunni Islamists, Nasserists, socialists, Baathists, Houthis, GCC monarchies and even a US administration that believed time had come for democracy in the Arab world.

Failed reconciliation and backroom deals

The second phase of the agreed-upon transition from Saleh’s rule involved the electoral ritual to elect Hadi as president. In a one-man election, under the mantra of consensus, Hadi was elected in February 2012. The process was mandated under the GCC agreement, which was meant to contain the crisis and avert a civil war rather than initiate an era of change.

Hadi served as Saleh’s vice president from 1994 to 2011, and while of southern origin, people saw him as a continuation of the regime. Another source of contention for independent protesters was the power sharing equation produced by the GCC deal, where half the cabinet posts were given to the GPC, half to the JMP with Islah taking the largest share, and the appointment of Mohammed Salem Basindwa as prime minister. Each faction picked the ministry appointees, while President Hadi was allowed to appoint the minister of defense; Basindwa was chosen as a nonpartisan candidate. No posts were reserved for independents or for representatives of marginalized youth protesting against the regime.

The hopes and aspirations of Yemen’s youth have dissipated into a near permanent state of war. Five years on from the electrifying momentum toward change sweeping through the Arab world’s poorest nation, an entrenched stalemate has completely derailed the political transition process.

This 35-member cabinet was to oversee the two-year transition period scheduled by the GCC. The first order of business was to restructure the national armed forces and security organizations, meant to gradually remove Saleh’s grip on vital national resources, but also targeted influence wielded by General Ali Muhsin, Saleh’s former close ally who defected in March 2011 and pledged to protect the “revolution.” The ultimate goal was to reform the armed forces in order to expand Hadi’s authority as commander in chief. The process not only bred further conflict among the elite, but eventually fragmented the military along patronage networks and further eroded President Hadi’s own power, rendering him nearly incapable of mobilizing sufficient resources to address the expanding security vacuum.

Breakdown of Dialogue

The third phase of the transition plan was the launching of a National Dialogue Conference (NDC). Delayed by a year, the NDC was finally established in March 2013. Again, ordinary Yemenis expressed their dissatisfaction with the equation used to select delegates, and later complained of further marginalization within negotiations by President Hadi, Jamal Benomar and the political elite, who bargained away aspirations of independents behind closed doors in order to produce a final agreement. Youth voices, in particular, were merely relegated to the occasional photo-op with the UN envoy and other diplomats.

The dialogue process began to disintegrate soon after Ramadan 2013, when war broke out in Amran province between Houthi rebels and tribes loyal to Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar, and it quickly spread into Damaj, Sadah. This has been presented as the start of the transition’s failure. The war in Amran also led to a boycott by NDC southern delegates aligned with Mohammed Ali Ahmed, who was initially allied with President Hadi to represent the southern contingent along with Yassin Makawi and then-NDC Secretary-General Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak, who is now the Yemeni ambassador to the United States.

While a number of observers have fixated their analysis on the January 2015 Houthi-led coup, a trajectory of events identifies the Amran conflict as the start of both a historic realignment of the structure of power in northern Yemen, and the chaos that would ensue from August 2014. When the NDC concluded in January 2014, it further exacerbated the conflict as protests erupted from the GPC, Houthis and independents. Although it had been discussed in committees, the newly announced plan to establish a six-region federal state in Yemen intensified tensions among political parties, as it had not been part of the official NDC outcomes, but rather a plan forged behind closed doors and sponsored by President Hadi.

The Cause

Based on this author’s conversations with people inside the country, Yemeni analysts see the failure of Hadi’s government to contain the lingering elite conflict as being responsible for events that followed the NDC conclusion up until the Houthi takeover of Amran province. Houthi militia managed to capture Amran province from the 310^th Brigade under General Hamid al-Qushaybi, a staunch ally of General Ali Muhsin and the Islah party. Islah officials were enraged at Hadi’s second failure to aid their cohorts—the war in Damaj was the first instance. Ali Muhsin, who also attempted to safeguard his position vis-à-vis Hadi, was attacked publicly by the party for his failure to deploy forces to Amran.

As events were mismanaged and the Hadi government overwhelmed, the government itself may have sealed its own fate and directly paved the way for a Houthi ascendency.

In July 2014, Prime Minister Basindwa’s cabinet agreed to lift fuel subsidies, handing Houthi rebels the opportunity to revive their revolutionary narrative on behalf of the masses. Houthis undoubtedly capitalized on the anger among Yemenis and reclaimed the banner of revolution from 2011. Thousands across the political spectrum answered the call to demonstrate, including GPC loyalists, who organized social media campaigns and neighborhood protests often blocking streets around Sanaa. It was an opportunity to capitalize on renewed popular discontent that neither Houthis nor Saleh could waste. A new alliance between former enemies was forged in the oddest revolutionary narratives.

Bleak prospects beyond the stalemate

The stage was set for a final blow on the “model transition” and a downward spin into chaos. Hadi’s position was in peril, as early reports indicated that Houthis and Saleh forged their alliance of convenience outside Yemen with help from regional powers.

© Shutterstock

Events leading to a Houthi takeover of the Yemeni capital in September 2014 were a product of overconfidence on the part of President Hadi, and Houthi collusion with Saleh’s military and tribal loyalists. Hadi is said to have opened the gates of Sanaa for Houthis in efforts to shift the balance of power away from General Ali Muhsin and the Islah party. But President Hadi, Benomar and bin Mubarak were unaware of the Houthi-Saleh alliance that ensured a military defeat of Ali Muhsin and the political downfall of Islah.

Hadi was forced to accept Houthi interpretation of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) signed on September 22, 2014, including a new power sharing equation abrogating the entire text of the GCC initiative, especially since the president had originally been granted only a two-year term. Houthis were not signatories to the GCC agreement, therefore, the PNAP gave the rebels a seat at the table otherwise not granted by the NDC.

The period between Houthi calls to protest against the lifting of fuel subsidies and the coup d’état of January 2015 undoubtedly took President Hadi by surprise, along with the international community. It is clear the transition was mismanaged, and that regional and international powers underestimated a number of political actors, such as the Islah party, Ali Muhsin, Saleh and Houthis.

This view is indeed Sanaa-centric, and does neglect the role of southern secessionists, but this group remained on the sidelines of the northern power struggle until President Hadi fled house arrest and landed in Aden in February 2015. The relevance of southern actors has surged as Yemen faces a historic possibility of fragmentation. At this time, underestimating political actors, especially Saleh’s survival, left the international community unable to deal with strong challenges to Hadi’s legitimacy, leaving only the use of force as an option against Houthis and Saleh over the past year.

Today, the situation in Yemen is far beyond a “crossroads.” It is beyond “the brink.” The conflict faces a dangerous impasse as low intensity clashes expand, exacerbating the humanitarian crisis and widening the security vacuum across the country. It is no longer a conflict between traditional elite actors, as southern and northern Salafists have joined the fight against Houthis and Saleh’s loyalists. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula no longer holds a monopoly on Yemen as Islamic State-affiliates have established a presence in various provinces. This makes it even more difficult to coordinate peace talks.

Furthermore, President Hadi has been unable to sustain support from various resistance groups fighting Houthis, as tension rises over financial and material resources provided by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Saudis hope that General Ali Muhsin can serve as a uniting figure among northern tribes in order to overcome current obstacles along the military front.

After one year of airstrikes on the capital Sanaa, Amran, Hajja and Sadah provinces, observers see a deepening quagmire for Saudi Arabia, at times using the Vietnam analogy. It is clear that no actor is in a position to make concessions. There is no confidence among warring parties due to weak, fragmented alliances, and UN efforts are hindered by a lack of resources.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Claudiovidri / Peter Sobolev / Dinosmichail / Shutterstock.com

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your donation is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a sponsor.

The post What Happened to Yemen? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Despite Saudi Arabia declaring an end to Operation Decisive Storm, victory still seems elusive for either side in Yemen as the Saudi-led coalition continues to bomb targets and exerts efforts to coordinate local ground forces. The air campaign has eliminated a number of Houthi and high value military targets, but it has come at a cost in civilian casualties, mainly in the Yemeni capital, Sana’a.

Amid talk of a ceasefire and new dialogue, as Saudi Arabia announced Operation Renewal of Hope on April 21, Houthi leaders remain resilient as militias hold ground in Sana’a and besiege the southern port city of Aden and Taiz in central Yemen. Recent developments point to a protracted ground war to be led by a number of military and tribal leaders loyal to Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi against the Houthis and those loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

In the political arena, President Hadi, who remains in Riyadh after fleeing Yemen earlier this year, appointed former Prime Minister Khaled Mahfoudh Bahah as his new vice-president to ensure continuity of the government in exile. With assistance from Saudi Arabia, providing weapons and munitions to pro-Hadi militias since the start of the military campaign in March, financial support has led to a number of military and tribal leaders across Yemen’s southern provinces joining the fight on the president’s side.

But a defiant speech by Houthi rebel leader Abdulmalek al-Houthi on April 19 underscored the Saudi-led coalition’s mounting challenges. Ongoing airstrikes causing civilian casualties, and gains made by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in eastern Yemen, simply fuel the Houthis’ resolve to remain on the offensive. In his speech, al-Houthi called upon Yemenis to remain steadfast against the Saudi aggression, and he warned parties and individuals of dire consequences for supporting foreign intervention.

Former President Saleh and his party, the General People’s Congress (GPC), have responded to mounting international pressure by reaching out to neighboring Gulf states in order to start a new round of talks. In a speech after al-Houthi’s televised address, Saleh agreed to work toward a ceasefire as recommended by United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216 of April 14. His words caused an instant reaction from the Houthi camp, threatening to abandon their fragile alliance with the deposed president.

© Shutterstock

A Fight Over Legitimacy

Every side involved in the ongoing conflict has created its own narrative of legitimacy: Houthis regard themselves as the legitimate representatives of the popular revolution in 2011; southern factions claim a legitimate right to self-determination; deposed President Saleh claims the legitimacy of constitutional continuity; the Sunni Islamist party al-Islah and its allies claim legitimacy through popular support against Saleh’s 33-year rule; President Hadi clings onto legitimacy through having been elected in a one-man election; while Saudi Arabia claims a right to restore order at its southern flank under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) agreement of 2011.

Saudi Arabia’s primary concern has been to prevent a protracted civil war in Yemen that could spill across its southern border. Many critics have claimed Operation Decisive Storm actually hastened this scenario, which local observers felt was preventable through ongoing UN-mediated talks between all political parties, which had stalled rather than collapsed. Saudi Arabia’s newly appointed foreign minister and former ambassador in Washington, Adel al-Jabeir, claimed the kingdom “would do anything necessary [to restore] the legitimate government in Yemen,” meaning President Hadi.

A top objective for the military campaign was to restore order and force the “Iranian proxy” to abandon all government institutions and give up its weapons. The order of concern to Yemen’s northern neighbor and long-time financial supporter is rooted in the 2011 GCC agreement and the stability required to prevent dissent within its own borders. The six Gulf monarchies composing the GCC were not about to allow a Shiite-aligned militia to inspire revolt within fragile societies in a post-Arab Spring era.

Shaping Yemen’s Future?

A more difficult task, the Saudi-led military campaign aims to reestablish Saudi Arabia’s ability to shape Yemen’s future. Saudi ties to a whole range of actors in Yemen reach back decades. But the breakdown of order in 2011 damaged Saudi Arabia’s relations with Yemeni political and tribal actors. The uprising ignited a conflict Saudi Arabia had worked arduously to prevent since 1967.

At the end of the revolution against the last Zaydi imam — who Saudi Arabia supported — in northern Yemen, Saudi Arabia established itself as the patron of numerous military, political and tribal leaders, a role later re-enforced following the short civil war between north and south in 1994.

The order created under the ruling triumvirate of Ali Abdullah Saleh, Gen. Ali Muhsin and prominent Shaykh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar broke in March 2011 when Muhsin joined the uprising sponsored by Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar. Relations between the three camps had already begun to strain following the death of Shaykh Abdullah in 2007 and were exacerbated by Saleh’s alleged attempt to eliminate Muhsin in order to install his eldest son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, as his successor. The 2011 uprising weakened Saleh politically and hurt his relations with Saudi Arabia, the sponsor of the GCC agreement replacing him.

© Shutterstock

Furthermore, while Muhsin and Shaykh Abdullah’s clan jockeyed for control of the state under Hadi, the Houthi rebels delivered a historic death blow to the Ahmar family and their military and tribal allies in Amran in July 2014, and then moved against the latter’s political ally, al-Islah, later in September.

Saudi Arabia appears to fear the rise of a new order in Yemen challenging its position as the hegemon in the Arabian Peninsula. The kingdom was not completely comfortable with the outcome of Yemen’s nine-month long National Dialogue Conference, in particular the proposal to establish a six-region federal system. The emergence of unfamiliar new centers of power, especially following the breakup of the Bakil and Hashid tribal confederations in northern Yemen, laid the foundations for an unpredictable future along Saudi Arabia’s southern flank.

Hashid tribes, controlled by the Ahmar family throughout the 20^th century, were pillars of the republican regime. After the conflict in Amran — Ahmar territory — tribal members like Khalid Ahmed al-Radhi say: “Hashid is no longer the same as [we knew] it, one solid tribe following one leader … Hashid was divided in 2011, [and it] will be that way until someone steps up and takes the lead.”

Bakil, which lacked Hashid’s cohesion under Ahmar, is also divided among Saleh’s supporters, allies of the Islah party and some supporting the Houthi rebels. This fracturing of the established order, particularly in north Yemen, worries Saudi Arabia as the battle over control of the state may bring years of instability at the kingdom’s doorstep.

The Ground Offensive: Who’s Who?

The Saudi-led military campaign planned for a ground assault following an extensive air campaign. Saudi Arabia believed allies like Egypt, Pakistan and Sudan would supply troops for an incursion to secure physical territory in Yemen. In an unexpected turn of events, two weeks into Operation Decisive Storm, Pakistan’s parliament issued a resolution preventing the government from sending troops into Yemen. Such developments led to a change in strategy, increasing delivery of weapons and money to elements in south Yemen pledging to fight Houthi rebels.

Adding to new challenges faced by the Saudi-led coalition is the fact President Hadi already lacked significant support among military officers prior to leaving for Saudi Arabia. Othman BaBoukhan, a London-based southern activist, told this author: “Hadi completely lost any influence over any trained army [units] to take back Aden” from Houthi rebels.

Lacking an exit strategy, and refusing to engage in talks until Houthis lay down their weapons, hopes now rest on Commander Thabet Muthana Jawas from the southern Lahj governorate bordering Aden, who leads a small unit trying to take back al-Anad air base located in the governorate. Jawas was initially rejected as commander of the Special Security Forces (SSF) in Aden by the Houthis, accusing him of being one of those responsible for killing Hussein al-Houthi, the founder of the Zaydi-Shiite rebel group, in 2004.

Thabet Jawas, Gen. Abdulrahaman al-Halili and individuals like Saleh bin Farid and Awadh al-Thawsli in Shebwa province represent Hadi’s primary ground forces, along with elements of the Hadhramawt Tribal Confederacy (HTC). Tribal elements in central Mareb province are far from pledging allegiance to Hadi, but they are suspected of receiving aid coordinated from Riyadh.

Some tribal camps in Mareb have been pictured displaying Saudi Arabia’s flag on tents and vehicles. But Jawas, Halili and the HTC are highly fragmented elements tasked with recruiting men to fight Houthis on the ground. By dropping weapons, munitions, communications equipment and cash, Saudi Arabia hopes to encourage elements to pledge allegiance to Hadi and facilitate coordination between groups across southern provinces, from Aden to Shebwa and Hadhramawt. The problem, as media outlets have reported, is that Saudi Arabia lacks a plan to secure Hadi’s legitimacy and that of his office, meaning continuity of the transition process.

© Shutterstock

A recent Reuters report, citing an official Yemeni source, said that 300 tribal fighters were trained in Saudi Arabia and then sent back to their home area in the Sirwah district of Mareb province. The same report also noted that heads of tribes were invited to a meeting in Riyadh in an effort to build a united front against the Houthis.

Saudi Arabia’s efforts to shape the conflict on the ground, by mainly dropping military supplies and cash, are having mixed results. Houthi rebels have been quick to post pictures of Saudi weapons captured nearly after every drop in the area of Aden. Others post pictures of weapons with Saudi Arabia’s logos being sold in the black market. Aside from logistical errors, the air drops, particularly in Aden, have played a major role in shaping the conflict. Adenis, previously dedicated to a peaceful revolution and simply employing civil disobedience to protest Sana’a’s grip, have now prevented the Houthi militia from taking full control of the province with weapons provided by Saudi Arabia.

With the announcement of Operation Renewal of Hope, a second phase said to involve talks about a political solution as well as troop mobilization at the Saudi-Yemen border, observers remain concerned over the nature of the coming ground operation. Concerns over the start of a ground offensive have increased, even as an initiative proposed by the Sultanate of Oman aims to de-escalate the conflict and restart talks. The urgency to restart peace talks was also highlighted by Omani diplomat Abdullah al-Ba’dy, who was quoted during an event hosted by the Arab Center as saying the conflict of today may produce a Yemen beyond control.

The fear of a protracted catastrophe among a number of observers in Sana’a is that the Saudi-led coalition is empowering local actors that will challenge central authority for years to come. This also reflects the observation that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be able to launch its own independent ground offensive. Members of the southern secessionist movement have yet to pledge support for Hadi as the legitimate president, especially since he continues to support Yemen’s unity, which southerners reject outright.

Each side merely sees the other as an instrument of resistance against Houthis. At the moment, military and tribal leaders have one target: defeating the Houthi militias. But the big question is: How will this translate into support for Hadi’s return? In a protracted armed conflict with Houthis these military officers and tribal leaders may simply become a type of proconsul, well-funded and armed regional administrators of battle-fronts for Saudi Arabia, in the absence of an organized ground offensive that brings about an end to hostilities.

Such a move would expand the authority and security vacuum across Yemen. The window of opportunity to avert this scenario is small, but it still exists. Only a comprehensive dialogue can empower the role of state institutions and restore legitimacy to central authority.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Sunsinger / Peter Hermes Furian / Anton_Ivanov / Shutterstock.com

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your donation is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a sponsor.

The post The Next Step in Yemen’s War appeared first on Fair Observer.

As the conflict in Yemen has taken a turn for the worse, observers believe Saudi Arabia’s military response to calls for assistance by Yemeni President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi has eliminated all options for a peaceful solution.

The drums of war beat in unison from Riyadh to Rabat, Khartoum to Amman and the streets of Yemeni cities like Aden and Taiz. All those involved in the Saudi-led alliance are not only aiming to degrade the military and political power of the Zaydi-Shiite Houthi rebels, but also to halt Iran‘s expanding sphere of influence. Analysts have largely focused on Saudi statements regarding the mission to reestablish order on its southern flank, an attempt to restore a degree of certainty at a time of unprecedented lack of predictability.

Yemenis themselves remain divided over Operation Decisive Storm, undertaken by a coalition of ten countries led by neighboring Saudi Arabia. They are divided between protesting violations to their country’s sovereignty and opposition to unrestrained Houthi aggression, which saw the group consolidate its grip on power from the capital city, Sana’a, to southern provinces like Lahj and the port city of Aden. Military operations by regional powers, threatening a ground offensive, have not only exacerbated Yemen’s downward spiral into disintegration, it has now also nurtured discord among the Yemeni population.

The failure of mediated talks between Yemeni political actors led by UN Special Advisor Jamal Benomar in Sana’a lies at the center of the military option. According to the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir, Operation Decisive Storm aims to create a situation where Houthis see no option but to reengage in dialogue, inside or outside Yemen, a move to prevent a descent into civil war.

But Yemenis believe the destruction of military infrastructure will exacerbate the security vacuum and create new spaces for Islamist militants to establish safe havens and expand their own operations targeting Houthis and their army allies, as well as providing them with the ability to plan and possibly execute operations against Western interests.

By targeting airport runways, radar posts, munitions depots, missile sites and fighter jets on the ground, the Saudi coalition may degrade the Houthis’ military capabilities, but it cannot force the militia and its military allies to capitulate and withdraw from cities and lay down their weapons.

The Houthi rebel group, an Iranian client allied with deposed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, is supposed to fall in line and join a new round of talks according to Saudi calculations. The dialogue, outside Yemen, would aim to strengthen the legitimacy of Interim-President Hadi, currently in Riyadh, and his government, which resigned in mid-January after Houthis took control of the capital. Yemeni Prime Minister Khaled Bahah also resigned at the time and was  released from house arrest on March 16, subsequently having left Yemen to join his family.

© Shutterstock

Early Warnings

Observers warned as early as March 2013 of impending failures in the transition process as a result of a faulty transition plan adopted as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative and the absence of a “Plan B.” The Office of the UN Special Advisor (OSA) on Yemen lacked the capacity to manage the transition after the 2011 protests, and staff were overwhelmed by political maneuvering outside the confines of the nine-month-long National Dialogue Conference (NDC).  Talks held in Sana’a under the auspices of Special Envoy Benomar aimed at reconciliation among rival political parties and the drafting of a new constitution.

The United Nations lost all credibility as result, and it became the target of an extensive and well-coordinated demonizing media campaign by allies of Saleh and the Houthi rebels. The UN Security Council’s failure to follow through on threats of sanctions against those obstructing the transition process since 2013 also contributed to a loss of credibility among the Yemeni population. Furthermore, the failures to safeguard the transition and Hadi’s legitimacy naturally led to former President Saleh’s resilience as a center of power and the rise to prominence of Houthi rebels under the leadership of Abdul-Malek al-Houthi.

After the start of the air campaign, all UN staff were evacuated from Yemen to neighboring Djibouti and Ethiopia. Some observers see this as a crippling sign against delivery of much needed humanitarian aid and the possibility of a solution to the conflict via dialogue. However, the option of continued talks under the auspices of the UN was nearing its own demise even before the start of the campaign, as parties had already boycotted the latest round of talks led by Benomar before he departed to present his latest report to the UN Security Council at its meeting on March 22.

While the current military campaign primarily aims to create a balance among Yemeni factions, it risks exacerbating the conflict and divisions among the population. No political faction has been able to beat the Houthis on the battlefield. Salafist and tribal elements were defeated in late 2013 in northern provinces, and military and tribal forces loyal to the Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, the Islah party, suffered a devastating blow at the hands of UN- and US-sanctioned Houthi field commander Abdullah “Abu Ali” Yahya al-Hakim between July and September 2014. The last of the tribal elements loyal to Islah are currently pinned down in the oil-rich eastern province of Mareb.

The strongest resistance to the Houthis in recent months came from Sunni tribes in al-Baydha, where they receive support from Ansar al-Sharia militants, an affiliate of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and from tribes supporting the southern Secessionist Movement (al-Hirak) in other provinces. Civilian opposition to the Houthis also increased in Sana’a as a result of a Houthi crackdown on youth activists and journalists, a scenario that is now repeating itself in the central province of Taiz. Further opposition is growing in Aden, where Hirak elements have taken up arms against Houthi cells within various state security institutions like the Military Police and Special Security Forces (SSF). The main fight in Aden continues over control of the airport, one of two remaining ports of entry/exit in the country after the coalition disabled airports in Sana’a, Taiz and Hodeida on the Red Sea coast.

© Shutterstock

On March 27, former President Saleh announced a new initiative to deescalate the conflict and restart talks. His four-point proposal includes a call for talks in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) or a UN facility outside Yemen.

Soon after the announcement on television and social media, Saleh came under attack from his opponents as he had previously refused offers from Saudi Arabia and Qatar to host a new round of talks, which are also supported by President Hadi. Saleh has now lost all credibility among a large segment of the population and regional powers, which may endanger the future of his political party, the General People’s Congress (GPC). President Hadi dealt Saleh a new blow in his attempts to remain relevant as a new presidential decree removed the former president’s son, Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, from his ambassadorial position in the UAE on March 29.

Dialogue as the Only Way Forward

The end game in Yemen has only one route: dialogue. The military campaign, already opposed in Morocco and Pakistan, two of the ten countries taking part in Operation Decisive Storm, can only lead to a protracted armed conflict that could threaten Yemen’s territorial integrity. Saudi Arabia has failed to provide a concrete timeline and fixed goals for the campaign, alarming the US administration, which is concerned over an open-ended armed conflict in a highly volatile territory. The longer the Yemen conflict continues, the faster the security vacuum will expand and create new opportunities for armed militants like AQAP and new affiliates of the Islamic State (IS). The two groups are not only a menace to Saudi Arabia and Western interests, but they also have made attacks against the “apostate” Houthi rebels a priority.

The Saudi-led coalition has yet to declare a mission to pursue Islamist militants like AQAP in Yemen. The US has withdrawn all its diplomats and military personnel from Yemeni territory, in effect suspending counterterrorism operations, even though the State Department claims to maintain relations with Yemeni authorities for intelligence gathering purposes. AQAP and IS, which have so far remained silent since the start of the air campaign on March 25, may find opportunities to target Houthis, similar to the assassination of Abdul-Karem al-Khaiwani, which was carried out by AQAP, or the attacks on two mosques in Sana’a on March 20, claimed by IS.

This will embolden Houthi elements to retain their military capabilities and perhaps expand relations with regional allies to gain financial support and armament. Saudi Arabia may then find it difficult to explain their pursuit of the Houthis if the latter are fighting terrorists previously targeted by the United States. In addition, prospects for peace talks would diminish, as Houthis will find no incentive for engaging talks, inside or outside Yemen.

There is no doubt that the Houthis had no intent to return to the negotiation table prior to the start of Operation Decisive Storm. It is further evident that the Houthis will continue to reject talks in Riyadh, Doha or at the United Nations due to their opposition to UN Envoy Benomar’s role. Saudi Arabia listed the Houthis as a terrorist group in March 2014, and the Houthis see Qatar as still very close to the Muslim Brotherhood, which complicates relations further due to the Houthis’ opposition to the Islah party in Yemen. The Houthis still have leverage they can use, while Saleh may soon run out of his own leverage to keep himself relevant in talks. Other parties like Islah, trying to find its own way out of this conflict, remain open to dialogue as it appears to be the only road to recover any meaningful role in Yemen’s future.

Notably, Oman’s Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who recently returned to Muscat after a several months-long health check-up in Germany, opted against joining the military coalition. Yemen’s eastern neighbor is the only Gulf state to maintain cordial relations with Iran, and it often acts as a mediator for members of the GCC. The sultanate has also remained on the sidelines as a passive observer during the transition period in Yemen. Omani diplomats assisted American and British personnel to evacuate from Sana’a in mid-February, and the country is the only GCC state to keep its embassy in Sana’a, while all other five member states opted to suspend services and join President Hadi in Aden in late February. Saudi diplomats were subsequently evacuated from Aden on March 28.

Efforts to end the ongoing devastation across Yemen will require the United States to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia amid tense relations over nuclear talks with Iran. The US would also have to play a role in positioning the Sultanate of Oman as a viable option. The US may be able to convince the GCC to allow Oman to offer its good offices and territory to host a new round of talks between Yemeni actors, and perhaps later between Houthis and Saudi Arabia.

Some actors have already reached out to Oman as the military operation begins to take a toll on the general population. A week into Operation Decisive Storm, coalition strikes have moved beyond high value targets to soft targets, already claiming a high number of civilian casualties. Hopes for dialogue in the coming days seem increasingly likely, as reluctance to place troops on the ground among Saudi Arabia’s allies begins to surface. Houthis continue to advance on the city of Aden as militia numbers remain unaffected, presenting high risks for foreign troops that could be entangled in a protracted ground conflict.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Dmitry Chulov / Anton_Ivanov / Shutterstock.com

We bring you perspectives from around the world. Help us to inform and educate. Your donation is tax-deductible. Join over 400 people to become a donor or you could choose to be a sponsor.

The post Oman Could Hold the Key in Yemen appeared first on Fair Observer.

Although the impact of recent events in Yemen, driven by a brazen rise to power by northern Houthi rebels, has already been felt at the national and international level, it is yet to fully unravel. For observers inside and outside Yemen, the situation has exposed an unprecedented degree of uncertainty for the future of the country.

Yemen’s nearly 25 year old unity remains under threat; the political transition process — once hailed as a progressive model based on dialogue — has been derailed by violent clashes between political actors; the length of interim President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s term in office has been threatened by mounting pressure from Houthi rebels; political alliances are in constant flux; militant extremists still remain a resilient force of instability; and confidence in the government by regional and international powers fades as their own influence withers at the margins.

Military advances by Houthis and the Popular Communities they created through alliances with local tribal elements, and their growing political influence, have raised a number of concerns over the future of Yemen. The local population remains uncertain over the role Houthis will play in the near-term, as their objectives remain ambiguous even after the latest agreement with President Hadi signed on January 21. The president and prime minister resigned the day after.

Statements made by the rebel group since the takeover of Sana’a, the Yemeni capital city, in late September continue to create an image of the Houthis as guardians of the 2011 popular revolution and as guarantors of security as the vacuum expands and violence spreads. Yet as their demands to end corruption in state institutions and foreign interference continue to undermine state authority, the latest agreement with the  Hadi has brought to the surface their political ambitions.

Houthi demands for a larger stake in government institutions were met on January 21 as point five of the agreement aims to grant the rebels more posts in state institutions. President Hadi’s constitutional authority as an elected official, and his mandate under the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sponsored initiative of November 2011, would remain highly constrained were Hadi to withdraw his resignation submitted to parliament on January 22 as Houthis strengthen their role as a center of power.

Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi © Glenn Fawcett

The rise of Zaydi-Shiite rebels has been linked to various conspiracies. Most prevalent are suspicions over an alliance of convenience between Houthis and former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Cooperation between these former enemies is believed to center on common interests: the elimination of threats from Gen. Ali Muhsin, the Ahmar family and the Sunni Islamist party al-Islah. For Saleh, Houthis avenged those responsible for the conflict of 2011.

The second most common suspicion centers on collusion between Hadi and the Houthis to weaken Islah and thus remove a major obstacle to his ability to govern. Tensions between the two intensified, when Hadi began to marginalize Islah’s influence in the military and intelligence agencies.

Evidence to support the Houthi-Saleh alliance surfaced on January 21, as Al Jazeera released a voice recording of a conversation between the deposed president and prominent Houthi supporter Abu Ras. Yemeni analysts claim that evidence of the Houthi-Hadi alliance would come in the form of an agreement to extend the president’s term beyond February 2015, under the guise of a need to complete the transition process. Evidence substantiating these scenarios has been damaging to Yemen’s image and its relations with regional and international powers.

Further exacerbating the situation faced by the Yemeni public is the potential of a breakdown of all authority and the establishment of a ruling council in the form of a power-sharing agreement between Houthis and Saleh.

While the United States remains committed to supporting Hadi, Gulf monarchies, led by Saudi Arabia, are gradually withdrawing their support. In November 2014, the GCC called for a new initiative to save the political transition and put Yemen back on a track to stability. However, Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s primary financial sponsor, has since withdrawn aid in response to the Houthis’ apparent control of the state and potential security threats. Political actors have declined the GCC proposal and argue that the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) from September 21, 2014, provides the mechanisms needed to direct implementation of the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference that concluded in January 2014.

The passing of Saudi King Abdullah on January 23 and ascent of former Minister of Defense Crown Prince Salman to the throne may result in a more consistent Saudi policy toward Yemen, since the new king was previously in charge of the Yemen portfolio. Disputes among members of Saudi Arabia’s ruling family have been cited as a primary reason for the country’s disastrous policies toward Yemen since the popular uprising in 2011. Any immediate response to Yemen’s financial needs remains unclear.

Adding further tensions to already complicated bilateral relations, Saudi Arabia listed Houthi rebels as terrorists in a move followed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Two Houthi leaders, Abdul-Khaleq al-Houthi and Abdullah (Abu Ali) Yahya al-Hakem, were also sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council and then the US on November 7.  The latter is exercising caution as speculation adds to fears over potential Houthi obstruction of counterterrorism efforts, specifically drone operations, even as Houthis continue to pursue leaders and loyalists of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia.

Ali Abdullah Saleh and George Bush © White House

Media outlets have focused on Houthi gains creating opportunities for AQAP to seize territory as Yemen implodes. Armed clashes between Houthis and AQAP have spread from al-Baydha and Ibb provinces in central Yemen to the district of Arhab, near Sana’a International Airport. The fighting included confrontations between Houthis and militias loyal to al-Islah party, who were accused by Houthis of colluding with AQAP militants.

Furthermore, the spiraling conflict in the eastern oil rich province of Mareb between Houthis and elements allied to al-Islah party have created a space for AQAP elements aiding anti-Houthi tribes. Ansar al-Sharia claimed it assisted a group of Mareb tribesmen in the capture of a military convoy with heavy weapons and tanks in early January. It remains unclear whether Houthi rebels, with their slogan “Death to America,” will continue to allow operations by the US military and CIA on Yemeni territory. Due to growing upheaval, training programs with Yemen’s military have come to a halt, as the US lacks confidence with security agencies under Houthi pressure. Yet a drone strike in Mareb province on January 26, killing three suspected AQAP operatives, clearly illustrates that Washington maintains operational capacity, even if access to real-time intelligence may be compromised.

A New Power Imbalance

To understand the current situation and the grave shifts that have occurred in Yemen’s political and security landscape, there is a need to examine the impact of the historic shift in military balance in North Yemen. Houthi rebels — named after Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi who died in 2004 — overran the homeland of Yemen’s long-time paramount sheikhs of Bayt al-Ahmar and imposed their order over state institutions and society. Empowered by their success, they gained a new degree of confidence to sustain the fight against their rivals in al-Islah. The Houthis’ primary aim has been to eliminate longstanding politico-religious threats to Zaydis from Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi elements. Al-Islah has subsequently been weakened, as its tribal and military centers of power were crushed.

Houthis not only dealt al-Islah a devastating blow, but they also upset the political order that temporarily served President Hadi. Prime Minister Mohammed Salem BaSundwa’s resignation on the same day that Houthis took over Sana’a in September 2014 represented the first blow to the established order set by the GCC initiative of 2011.

© Shutterstock

The second aspect was the signing of the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) by the Houthis in a ceremony alongside Hadi and United Nations Special Envoy Jamal Benomar. The PNPA dealt what some see as a fatal blow to the GCC initiative, as it called for the dissolution of the coalition cabinet, which was composed of Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), led by al-Islah. The new PNPA governing equation, under a new prime minister to be approved by Houthis — who were not part of the GCC initiative — demanded a more technocratic composition, a difficult task under the current circumstances.

As part of negotiations, Houthis also installed a number of presidential and government advisors, mainly to monitor activities within vital state institutions. The final agreement on the position of prime minister came in mid-October 2013, when Houthis approved Khaled Bahah, who was Yemen’s envoy to the UN at the time, to head the new cabinet. The new government was sworn in on November 9, 2013, as Houthis rejected a number of ministers. This ruling equation was once again renegotiated on January 21, 2015, granting Houthis and southern secessionists an expanded share in government. At the time of writing, negotiations led by UN Special Envoy Benomar were ongoing to have Hadi withdraw his resignation, just as four names were proposed to succeed the president; among them is the speaker of parliament and Saleh loyalist, Yahya al-Ra’i.

While recent events in Sana’a may appear to grant Houthis an upper hand over other political actors, the situation on the ground indicates no individual is capable of commanding significant authority over others and, therefore, real power cannot yet emerge to impose order among warring parties.

After Hadi’s Resignation

The Houthis’ rise to prominence was not a product of their overwhelming military capacity over the state or individual actors. It represents a major consequence of the gradual disintegration of Yemen’s national armed forces, weak command and control and the weakness of traditional centers of power. Bayt al-Ahmar, Ali Muhsin, al-Islah and even former President Saleh were indeed weakened over the past three years, as President Hadi managed to distance this old ruling elite from state institutions and former pillars of the regime. Today, there is an imbalance in political relations, primarily as economic resources that maintained alliances were wrestled from traditional centers of power.

Flickr

Professors Sheila Carapico and Stacey Philbrick recently described the situation as a process wherein the regime is being rewritten as Houthis hope “to influence Yemen’s future regime.” This is in reference to the fact that the 2011 uprising did not cause the fall of the regime, while the GCC initiative merely rearranged the distribution of power among the elite. Now, after the resignation of President Hadi and Prime Minister Bahah and yet another push for southern secession, the nature of the political system and territorial integrity of Yemen remains uncertain.

Already before the latest fighting in the capital from January 19 onward, tensions surfaced and a new war of words erupted between Saleh and the Houthis, which some indicate is a pure smoke screen as their limited alliance remains. However, Houthi gains and renewed strength also pose a threat to Saleh’s long-term plans to return to power.  The former president perceives Houthi advances against al-Islah, Ali Muhsin and Bayt al-Ahmar as a sweet revenge for their betrayal against him and support of the 2011 uprising.

For over three years now, final solutions to Yemen’s political crisis have been relegated to backroom negotiations as the public fixated its hopes on a dialogue process with weak foundations. The consequences of unrealistic expectations to shape Yemen’s future, as the pillars of the old regime remained, have surfaced in the form of a major power shift — an imbalance forcibly produced by a non-state actor from within rather than imposed by regional powers or international consultants.

This shift in the balance of power is far from set in stone, and Houthis remain constrained in pursuit of decisively taking control of the state. Such doubts on their capacity to directly rule surfaced when a Houthi statement refused to accept President Hadi’s resignation on January 22. Former President Saleh, who was recently sanctioned by the UN Security Council for obstructing the political process, remains bent on returning to power. It is not in his interest, or of his son Ahmed Saleh’s, to see Houthis fully take over power or decimate state institutions.

Another key aspect is the Houthis’ disapproval of the current draft constitution, which was cited by some observers as an important reason for the military offensive in Sana’a. Before his resignation, Hadi agreed that the draft constitution could be amended. The Houthis had previously rejected the proposal to establish a federal system with six administrative regions — a plan supported by the international community. In addition, there is concern among ordinary Yemenis that Houthis will slowly take over the fragmented and demoralized security forces from within.

If Houthis are to play an active role in government, beyond that of monitors, the rebel group must first become a constitutional actor — meaning they would need to establish a political party. It is a path that remains uncertain, as Houthi leader Abdulmalek al-Houthi appeared on television on December 15 and demanded that the government hands over control of the Auditing and Monitoring Agencies and cease work on the FY 2015 budget or face escalation by his rebels. His speech gave no indication that Houthis are moving toward a constitutional role, but the January 21 agreement may lead to such a situation. This issue was highlighted by Ali al-Bukhaiti on January 23 in his letter of resignation from the Houthi’s Ansar Allah Political Bureau in Sana’a. As a prominent figure in Ansar Allah, Bukhaiti indicated that Abdulmalek al-Houthi must realize that moves from the mountains of Amran to Sana’a must involve bold changes in the group’s behavior.

It must also be noted that even as Houthis place mounting pressure on Hadi, Abdulmalek al-Houthi has continued referring to him as Yemen’s president. Yet even as speculation grows over Houthi links to financial support from Iran, the rebel group remains incapable of contributing to solutions for the economic crisis or the escalating conflict with southern secessionists. Abdulmalek Al-Houthi made clear that the rebels will protect Yemen’s unity, but secessionists in the port city of Aden remain on high alert as Houthis begin to increase their presence there.

Fair Observer is a nonprofit organization dedicated to informing and educating global citizens about the critical issues of our time. Please donate to keep us going.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Anton_Ivanov / Dmitry Chulov / Shutterstock.com / Glenn Fawcett / White House / Richard Messenger / Flickr

The post Yemen Faces Uncertainty After Government Resigns appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Yemeni army launched military operations in the southern provinces of Abyan and Shebwa on April 28, in order to thwart the resurgence of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and its affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia (AAS). The offensive followed a series of events, including a major AQAP gathering following a prison break and a US drone strike campaign over the Easter weekend. The outcome of ongoing battles will shape the security environment for months to come, posing monumental challenges during the post-conflict period, and influence Yemen’s relations with vital regional and international partners.

As of April, President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi appeared to have nearly exhausted his leverage with regional and international partners supporting his political transition plan, and has given into pressure to focus on the deteriorating security situation, at the expense of a deepening economic crisis and political stalemate in Sana’a. Evidence of mounting pressure surfaced as Saudi Arabia labeled the Muslim Brotherhood and the Zaydi-Shia Houthi rebels as terrorist organizations. Caught between regional rivals — Qatar and Saudi Arabia — who provide the largest portion of foreign aid to Yemen — and Western partners, securing much needed political support at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Hadi is now forced to shape an acceptable security environment that balances domestic politics and international relations.

The president must also deal with violent clashes between political rivals in the north and an unwavering secessionist movement in the south. Threats posed by AQAP are part of a myriad of challenges faced by Yemen’s transition government. The inability to address simultaneous challenges to Hadi’s authority is a direct consequence of a weak coalition government engulfed by legacy conflicts. The conflict between Zaydi-Shia Houthi rebels and tribal militias loyal to al-Islah are far more complicated than mere images of sectarianism. The secessionist movement (Hirak) remains peaceful but fractured, while the potential for escalation to violence remains.

Deteriorating Security

A deepening security vacuum has been exacerbated by further evidence of AQAP’s persistence and ability to expand operations and counter the US-led drone campaign. In March, AQAP claimed responsibility for a prison escape freeing 29 known militants from the capital city’s central prison. The escapees later appeared in a video published by al-Malahem on March 27, which included a speech by Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the emir of AQAP. The prison break in Sana’a served to replenish the organization’s ranks with experienced militants. It also sent a strong warning to Hadi’s government and the US as nearly 200 militants remain inside the political security prison (PSO) in Sana’a.

Evolving relations between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), now known as the Islamic State, and elements within AQAP potentially present Hadi and the US with a new set of challenges. 

The frequency of brazen attacks by AQAP have increased since US intelligence purportedly intercepted messages between al-Wuhayshi and Ayman al-Zawahiri in August 2013. Mid-level losses among AQAP’s “rising stars,” resulting from nearly 100 US-led surgical strikes across Yemen, caused the group to escalate operations, not only to remain relevant but also to benefit from the expanding security vacuum. Recent figures published by Yemen’s government have showed the group still relies on a large number of Yemeni and foreign fighters, in addition to mercenary assets within AAS. Yet the current pace of military operations in Abyan and Shebwa proves AQAP has suffered from its own success as the number of battle-ready elements depletes.

The exact number of militants in the country remains a point of contention for analysts and the governments of the US and Yemen. The estimates produced regarding the group’s members and sympathizers were simply based on casualties from operations until 2011 — estimates from videos of training camps and discussions on jihadist online chat rooms. Yemen’s foreign minister, Abu Bakr al-Qirbi, was the first official to publicly announce an estimate in 2010, when he claimed about 400 militants in Yemen were loyal to al-Qaeda. Not until the rise of AAS in 2011 did anyone imagine AQAP to have followers in the thousands. The expansion of AAS, which at best has an internally incoherent foundation, may lay in the hands of a new generation with weak ideological links, but shared interests with its patron, AQAP. AAS’ localized priority is to grab power and create safe havens for a patron with global ambitions.

As Yemen’s government claimed a number of victories in Abyan and Shebwa, AAS launched a number of well-coordinated attacks in Hadhramawt governorate. As early as March, a month before the US drone campaign escalated, AQAP claimed an attack on a military checkpoint. Sources indicated that AAS militants in the eastern province carried out the attacks. Later in May, nearly a month after the military offensive began, Jalal Bil’ayd,  AAS’ emir, spearheaded simultaneous attacks on a military post, a number of banks and a museum in the center of Hadhramawt’s second largest city, Sayyun. Bil’ayd, who was thought to be hiding in the Maraqasha mountains of Abyan in April, was featured in a number of pictures taken in Sayyun, which were published online on the evening of the attack. The significance of this operation was that it illustrated AAS’ persistent ability to launch effective operations, while the military claimed victories in Abyan. It also sent a strong message regarding Bil’ayd’s freedom of movement.

AQAP’s Evolution and Ties With ISIS

The morning of June 26 witnessed another well-coordinated AAS attack in Sayyun, this time on the city’s airport and a government telecommunication’s office. Such attacks not only prove the resilience of militants, but also add to challenges faced by President Hadi’s government. The evolution of AQAP since 2011 and the role played by AAS now present a clear threat to the survival of the political transition, representing a widespread insurgency similar to events in Iraq and Libya. In early 2012, Yemen-based journalist Hakim al-Masmari described AQAP’s strategy as changing from holding safe havens to guerrilla tactics. AAS, at times believed to act under AQAP and others independently, according to journalist Abd al-Razeq al-Jamal, is definitely a local actor with local ambitions, a phenomenon not seen in Yemen since the Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan (IAA-A) last operated in 2003.

Furthermore, the US still views AQAP as “the most active operational franchise” of al-Qaeda, the global jihad organization; a view supported by the August 2013 alert in Sana’a and the most recent warning to airlines of a possible bomb threat. AQAP’s resilience has certainly added to Yemen’s transition problems, as well as to the challenges to close the security vacuum created by an unprecedented breakdown in government authority and capability to enforce law and order throughout the country.

Political conflicts have also created an environment of distrust in Hadi’s government, as well as weakened the government’s ability to address public needs such as access to water, electricity and shelter for displaced persons. As a consequence, AQAP and AAS have been able to expand relations with local clients, providing safe havens throughout Yemen. Hadi’s failure to improve the efficiency of government services, and his weak political position also impede necessary efforts to gain allegiance of tribal elements that aid and harbor militants. The US also finds itself in a difficult position as the Obama administration has extended unwavering support to Hadi during the transition period, while acknowledging his weaknesses concerning the ability to pursue militants with existing military and intelligence capabilities.

A potential split within AQAP not only poses new challenges to Yemen’s neighbors, the US and President Hadi, but would also create a new dynamic within the global jihadist movement as al-Zawahiri holds onto its leadership in the post-Osama bin Laden-era, while ISIS gains further support from jihadists in Yemen, the Caucasus and Southeast Asia.

Efforts to target AQAP’s upper echelon — Nasser al-Wuhayshi (named general manager of al-Qaeda), Ibrahim al-Asiri (expert bomb-maker) and the likes of Makmun Abdul Hamid Hatim (spiritual leader of AAS) — are hampered by politicized intelligence agencies under Hadi and weak US human intelligence (HUMINT) capabilities. Hadi’s acquiescence mainly to pressure from Saudi Arabia and the US, partly to agree to American drone strikes, primarily extends from the fact that AQAP has made it a priority to target government facilities and officials, and AAS has evolved from an insurgency group in Abyan to a national threat to wider stability.

The transitional president made clear that AQAP is an enemy of the state, and his cooperation with regional and international partners simply serves his own survival. America has also been hampered by the lack of options beyond drone operations, as it can neither commit extensive troops on the ground, nor can it simply rely on intelligence provided by Yemen’s intelligence apparatus or Saudi Arabia.

The Islamic State

Moreover, evolving relations between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), now known as the Islamic State, and elements within AQAP potentially present Hadi and the US with a new set of challenges. Any gains made against AQAP in Abyan and Shebwa since late April may be reversed by the organization’s new sense of empowerment from its relations with ISIS, as well as financial and material support from this ambitious jihadist group in Iraq. AQAP’s evolution since 2009 has illustrated an ability to advance transnational threats against Western interests, as well as the ability to engage a local strategy that delivers safe havens to host training camps, recruiting propaganda for foreign militants, and space to develop plans such as the attempted assassination of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia, and the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airliner in 2009. Further evidence of the group’s success include a number of attacks on government facilities, namely the Ministry of Defense in Sana’a in 2013, while 2014 has seen an increase in activity and veracity in threats posed to Yemen’s own stability and the West.

Recent events, such as the arrest of an alleged AQAP/ISIS cell in Saudi Arabia and the attack on a Yemen-Saudi border post, have illustrated how threats posed by AQAP are equally credible for Yemen, Persian Gulf monarchies and the West. A failure to tackle threats posed by such militants groups in the short-term will present the international community with deepening instability in the Middle East and North Africa, as groups like AQAP and AAS will benefit from the momentum created by ISIS in Iraq.

The implications of closer relations between ISIS and AQAP, or a potential split within AQAP, will exacerbate Yemen’s security challenges for months to come, undermining any progress achieved by Hadi in relations with his political rivals in Sana’a. A split in AQAP or AAS would force Yemen’s government to face two enemies on two fronts and, if ISIS provides direct support to either faction, a new degree of escalation would resemble Iraq or Syria in regard to tactics and targets. For some of Hadi’s loyalists, continued US assistance is vital to preventing a decapitating blow to his government.

While journalist Abdul Razeq al-Jamal indicates that differences within AQAP’s leadership are insignificant, other observers in Aden and Sana’a believe closer relations with ISIS will affect the group’s cohesion. Noting the close relationship between al-Wuhayshi and al-Zawahiri, local analysts cannot see how praising ISIS by some mid-level AQAP leaders would not cause tensions when al-Zawahiri has yet to reconcile with ISIS.

The announcement of an Islamic Caliphate by Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi at the start of Ramadan, which was rejected by a number of jihadist groups in the region, will have an impact as AQAP leaders such as Makmun Abdul Hamid Hatim and Ibrahim al-Rubaish are said to be ready to grant allegiance to the caliphate. A potential split within AQAP not only poses new challenges to Yemen’s neighbors, the US and President Hadi, but would also create a new dynamic within the global jihadist movement as al-Zawahiri holds onto its leadership in the post-Osama bin Laden-era, while ISIS gains further support from jihadists in Yemen, the Caucasus and Southeast Asia.

AAS attempted a second attack on Sayyun’s airport on July 3 and later targeted a Saudi-Yemeni border post on July 4. The attack on the Saudi border post illustrates the evolution of jihadist elements in Yemen. This attack also coincided with claims of responsibility by AAS for assaults on Houthi rebels in northern Yemen during the first week of July. Sources in southern Yemen caution that ISIS may begin to claim direct responsibility for operations in Yemen as the relationship with AQAP elements evolves.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Jialiang Gao / Creative Commons

The post Yemen at a Glance: Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula appeared first on Fair Observer.

Challenges posed by Islamist militants are among a myriad of threats to Yemen’s stability. President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, however, continues to face mounting challenges on two other fronts: the northern province of Amran and the unwavering southern secessionist movement.

The political transition process, anchored in the outcomes of a ten-month-long National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which ended in February 2014, continues to be derailed by widespread armed clashes between tribal militias loyal to the Sunni Islamist party, al-Islah, and supported by Army Brigade 310 and Zaydi-Shia rebels in Amran. In addition, while Hadi has had significant success in reaching out to people in the south, his efforts to gain full support for a federal system remain obstructed by leaders on the ground and in exile, who are bent on a two-state solution.

The Houthi Rebellion

The ongoing conflict between Houthis, led by Abd al-Malek Badr al-Din al-Houthi, and al-Islah is far more complicated than mere sectarianism. Politics and vendettas are at the core of a protracted conflict threatening to engulf Sana’a, as clashes spill onto the streets of the capital. Houthis — Zaydi-Shia rebels, who are often accused of receiving aid from Iran — have controlled the northern province of Sadah, bordering Saudi Arabia, since March 2011 under a negotiated deal with Gen. Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, then-chief of the northwest regional command.

Houthi grievances extend as far back as the mid-1990s and grew from perceived religious discrimination under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime, which granted more influence to al-Islah following the 1994 civil war. Abd al-Malek al-Houthi, a sayyid or descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, represents more than family ambitions to rule the Zaydi Imamate, as tribes in Sadah and neighboring provinces of Hajja and al-Jawf view him as a vehicle of rebellion against the Yemeni government. Some sayyid families abroad support him, in order to address longstanding grievances rooted in the 1962 revolution that overthrew the last Zaydi imam. Houthis have recently focused on countering the influence wielded by sheikhs of the Ahmar family from Amran, who are members of al-Islah, as well as Salafi elements in northern Yemen.

Al-Islah was at the frontline of the uprising that overthrew Saleh in 2011. The party holds 50% of the current cabinet posts as part of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) coalition. Al-Islah is partly composed of Muslim Brotherhood elements, tribal and business actors, as well as self-described Salafis. Tribal leaders of the Ahmar family, part of the Hashid confederation and originally from Amran province, have been a pillar of al-Islah since its creation in the early 1980s. While not a member of al-Islah, Gen. Ali Muhsin has been a staunch supporter of the Sunni Islamist party and the Ahmar family. The party and its supporters have been natural rivals of the Zaydi-Shia Houthi rebels, as the Ahmar family helped spearhead the revolution against the last Zaydi imams in 1962. Al-Islah was also at the forefront of government policies targeting Zaydi schools from the mid-1990s onward. Ali Muhsin was also commander of the Northwest Command and the First Armored Division, charged with confronting Houthis in Sadah during six wars fought between 2004-09.

Hadi’s impromptu visit to Saudi Arabia on July 8 to meet with King Abdullah added to criticism of his handling of the Houthi threat. Speculation also mounted as to how Saudi Arabia may approach deepening instability on its southern flank.

Just months before the conclusion of the NDC, clashes erupted in Amran province between Houthis and tribes loyal to Sheikh Hamid al-Ahmar, a parliament member for al-Islah. The initial clashes, which were ignited by the murder of a family by tribesmen of al-Uzaymat, quickly spread throughout Amran. Following the Houthi takeover of al-Khameri village, home to the Ahmar family, the conflict spread into Sadah. When the conflict sparked clashes between Houthis and Salafis in the Damaj and Qitaf districts, al-Ahmar and elements within al-Islah rallied tribes and Salafi militias from northern and southern Yemen to battle the Houthis.

The well-organized and armed Houthi rebels, however, delivered a second major defeat to al-Ahmar and al-Islah. The conflict in Sadah only reached a ceasefire when President Hadi managed to negotiate the exodus of thousands of Yemenis and foreigners from Damaj in January. This decisive victory for the Houthis ensured full control over Sadah province and increased popular support for them among the Yemeni population . The two major defeats for al-Islah and its allies weakened the political party and shifted the political balance in Sana’a, which strengthened Hadi’s own hand vis-à-vis al-Islah, Ali Muhsin and Hamid al-Ahmar. Yemenis hold that Hadi was initially forced to gravitate toward the general, al-Islah and Bayt al-Ahmar, in order to politically counter deposed President Saleh. Following this, the public believed Hadi was granted a second chance as Houthis grew in power and influence. Anti-Islah elements cited the president’s unwillingness to provide military assistance during conflicts with Houthis as evidence of such shifts in political alliances.

The most recent ceasefires between Houthis and al-Islah between June 4-22 were fragile and armed clashes continued. On July 8, Houthi militants launched an assault on the headquarters of the 310 Brigade, killing Commander Hamid al-Qushaibi, and later taking over the city of Amran. Media organizations and observers instantly began to speculate about the next move for Houthis: the possible taking of Sana’a. Media organizations have continued to report on clashes in the Hamdan, Arhab and Bani Matar districts of Sana’a since the last ceasefire of June 22.

The conflict remains a thorn on President Hadi’s side. His efforts to reach a permanent ceasefire have failed, and the killing of an army officer has placed him in a most uncomfortable position, as state institutions seem to be in direct conflict with a non-state actor. Hadi’s impromptu visit to Saudi Arabia on July 8 to meet with King Abdullah added to criticism of his handling of the Houthi threat. Speculation also mounted as to how Saudi Arabia may approach deepening instability on its southern flank.

The Southern Issue

The southern issue is another thorn in Hadi’s side. No final solution was agreed upon during the ten months of dialogue. Efforts to reach out to southern leaders in exile, including Ali Salem al-Baydh, Haydar al–Attas and Ali Nasser Mohammed, have failed. Hadi recently reached out to leaders such as Nasser al-Nouba and Abd al-Aziz al-Maflahi to gain support from within Yemen. But the Supreme Council of the Southern Movement (Hirak), under the leadership of al-Baydh, immediately moved to discredit all southerners meeting with the president. The council’s secretary general, Ambassador Qassem Askar, issued a statement claiming figures such as al-Nouba did not speak for the people of the south and had no direct contact with the movement.

President Hadi’s previous effort to co-opt secessionist leaders failed from the start. In May 2013, less than two months after the start of the NDC, Sheikh Ahmed bin Farid al-Sureima resigned as a vice president of the conference, citing a “plot against the southern cause.” His place as leader of the southern contingent was soon filled by Mohammed Ali Ahmed of Abyan province, who later withdrew from the conference in September 2013 after clashing with Hadi and UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar. Hadi then came to rely on Yasin Maqawi, who replaced Mohammed Ali, to push for support of the conference outcomes by using Aden as a base. No major accomplishments were achieved between February and May 2014, forcing Hadi to once again look for more reliable allies in the south. It remains to be seen if al-Nouba can spearhead new efforts to close the gap between the people of the south and President Hadi.

As result of the latest armed conflicts in northern Yemen, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator commented on the estimated 15,000 families displaced by the conflict, out of a population of 120,000. Other agencies highlighted the growing number of new internally displaced persons (IDPs) reaching nearly 35,000. 

The secessionist movement continues on a peaceful path anchored in civil disobedience as a primary form of protest. Only a small faction in Hirak, under Taher Tamah, has taken up arms in al-Dhale province. A tribal alliance also surfaced in summer 2013 in the eastern province of Hadhramawt to exert further pressure on Hadi to address grievances in the region, such as the distribution of oil wealth and support for secession. This tribal alliance later took up arms against security forces following the killing of Sheikh Sa’ad bin Habrish in December 2013 at a checkpoint. The same alliance also prioritized increasing pressure on the oil industry in Hadhramawt, by taking over a number of closed wells and threatening to seize working fields, in order to pressure companies and the government to properly compensate the population in the area.

Hirak, throughout the south, continues to be committed to peaceful resistance until secession is achieved. But the presence of armed groups willing to engage in violence threatens to ignite a full-blown conflict. Since mid-2011, Tamah has often been mentioned by Sheikh Tareq al-Fadhli of Abyan as the leader of Hirak’s armed wing. Al-Fadhli recently broke his house arrest in Aden to join Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), an affiliate of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), citing his willingness to join the fight against Yemen’s government. In addition, Ali Mohammed al-Kurdi, charged with the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, has also pledged to fight secessionists in order to safeguard Yemen’s unity. Sporadic clashes between security forces and protesters also present a potential spark for a much wider armed conflict.

Running Out of Chips?

As result of the latest armed conflicts in northern Yemen, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator commented on the estimated 15,000 families displaced by the conflict, out of a population of 120,000. Other agencies highlighted the growing number of new internally displaced persons (IDPs) reaching nearly 35,000. This is in addition to the number of IDPs from the Sadah conflict in 2013. Thousands more have been displaced in Abyan and Shebwa, as result of the government’s offensive against AQAP and AAS militants. IDPs from Amran are said to have reached Sana’a and taken over streets in the absence of appropriate shelter.

Hadi was received by Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz in Jeddah prior to meeting King Abdullah, as Houthis consolidated control over Amran city on July 8. Much speculation remains over the precise topics discussed during the visit. Media organizations mostly reported that talks involved further requests for financial assistance. Others indicate President Hadi and King Abdullah could have discussed relief as Yemen’s fuel crisis grows, recent attacks by AQAP militants on Saudi guards at a border post, and events in Amran. In March, Saudi Arabia designated Houthi rebels a terrorist group.

Yemeni and foreign observers continue to forecast a widespread civil war, but others dismiss any willingness by rival factions to escalate further. A civil war scenario does not appear in the immediate interest of any actor. Speculation over possible direct conflict between Houthis and the army are also dismissed, since Hadi lacks full control over the armed forces and clashes are expected to fragment the military further. Hadi once again has come under fire mainly by al-Islah and its sympathizers for failing to deploy sufficient reinforcements to prevent the assault on the 310 Brigade in Amran. AQAP leaders in January, following clashes in Dammaj, also expressed similar criticism of Hadi for his lack of support for Sunni civilians threatened by Shia militants — adding to reasons legitimizing attacks on Hadi loyalists and government facilities.

President Hadi continues to face mounting security challenges. Relief for a population suffering from dire economic conditions and conflict trauma remains beyond the immediate reach. Yemen’s cabinet remains fragmented and unable to respond to widening crises. Foreign aid is dwindling and oil income has reportedly decreased by 64%, at a time when financial resources are vital to address budget deficits and economic needs. No new aid has been announced in 2014, and Hadi may soon run out of bargaining chips to encourage international partners to commit further funds in Yemen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Secretary of Defense / Flickr

The post Yemen at a Glance: Houthi Rebels and Southern Secession appeared first on Fair Observer.

Much elation over the transition from Ali Abdullah Saleh’s rule has long dissipated, replaced now by local and international acknowledgment of the failure to strengthen the foundations of this transition. The agreement not only allowed Saleh to survive the Arab Spring, but his party continues to share power with the Islamist-led opposition, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), in a 50-50 governing equation. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) also retains a ruling majority in the Yemeni parliament, which was last elected in 2003. But President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, secretary general of the GPC, has neither the full support of his own party, nor that of the electorate.

Between Hadi’s election and the start of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) on March 18, 2013, Yemen was engulfed by political conflicts of survival. What appeared to be a relatively peaceful agreement to transfer power from Saleh was, in reality, a simple episode in rebalancing power within the ruling regime. The transition narrative, on behalf of the Group of Ten (G10) embassies supporting the transfer of power and Hadi himself, was focused on attempts to demonize “the former regime” — meaning Saleh.

But in real terms, the “old regime” still ruled Yemen. The same partners that governed Yemen prior to November 23, 2011, when the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative was signed, still formed the coalition government of December 2013 — al-Islah and the GPC. Hadi was the former vice president who served for almost 20 years; the parliament and Shura council were the same under Saleh; and the prime minister and cabinet ministers were from among the political elite.

“Restructuring” of the armed forces dominated most of 2012 until the removal of Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, commander of the First Armored Division, and Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, commander of the Republican Guard, early in 2013. Ali Muhsin was Saleh’s right-hand man, until he joined the uprising following the Friday of Dignity massacre in March 2011, while Ahmed Ali laid in wait to succeed his father as president. The restructuring process, under the auspices of the US Embassy in Sana’a, was prioritized to transfer greater command and control over the armed forces to Hadi. Both Ali Muhsin and Saleh retained a high degree of influence within the armed forces through a number of proxies — commanding officers and tribal networks.

The intelligence apparatus also remains highly polarized, even though Hadi removed the chief of the National Security Bureau (NSB), Ali al-Anesi; his deputy, Ammar Mohammed Saleh, nephew of the deposed president; and Ammar’s brother, Yahya Mohammed Saleh, as deputy commander of Central Security Forces (CSF) within the Ministry of Interior. Control over these services was vital for Hadi’s own political survival and his relations with Saudi Arabia and the US.

The first move, unexpected and yet a fundamental priority for Hadi, was to remove Saleh’s half-brother, Gen. Mohammed Saleh al-Ahmar, as commander of the air force. Hadi quickly moved to secure strategic air superiority, even as he risked all-out war with a stubborn general who refused to be the first victim of the transition. Soon after Mohammed’s acquiescence, the president ordered a general inspection of the armed forces and armament.

At the center of Hadi’s project is the attempt to reverse a quarter century of domination by the northern tribal-military elite. His record as vice president did not grant him any praises from his southern brethren. 

The difficult task was never fully completed, but Hadi preempted threats to his monopoly over the skies and quickly moved to relocate aging air force assets from the capital city’s al-Dailami base to al-Anad air base in Lahj. The latter was considered Soviet Russia’s largest air base in the Middle East during the Cold War. By having his brother, Nasser Mansour Hadi, as political security chief of the southern region, and Gen. Mahmoud al-Subaihi as commander of the army’s southern region, Hadi believed his primary assets were more secure than in Sana’a.

Hadi and the National Dialogue Conference

Events in the first 12 months of Hadi’s interim term served to cement the executive’s control over vital government institutions. Once the initial phase of the transition handed Hadi a number of victories, enshrining his unique role as president, it was time to launch the long awaited NDC. This was not only Hadi’s instrument to expand his authority and marginalize elite rivals, but it was also a source of pride for UN Special Envoy Jamal BenOmar — champion of the GCC agreement of 2011.

The NDC was launched under the auspices of the UN and the GCC, with BenOmar taking the lead at a time when tension between the G10 and him was at an all time high. The G10, mainly the US, were not happy with the direction of the process. Tension had been brewing between the G10 and BenOmar since mid-June 2011, when the agreement process was “hijacked” by the UN envoy, making it more difficult for Saudi Arabia and the US to maintain direct oversight of the process. This tension between governments and the UN is often cited as a primary source of conflict, preventing more cohesive decision-making on the part of the UN Security Council in favor of BenOmar’s prescriptions.

A success of the NDC was not only in the interest of Hadi’s legacy. It was launched with the intent to restructure Yemen’s political foundation. Hadi is not only the second president in the 24 years of the Republic of Yemen; he is the only non-Zaydi leader that North Yemen has ever seen. He was a consensus candidate among the elite prior to March 2012, merely because both sides believed Hadi owed them his new position and would fall in line, either under Saleh or Ali Muhsin. The latter was regarded as Hadi’s mentor since he defected from Aden in 1986. However, Saleh made Hadi minister of defense during the civil war against the southern contingent, and later vice president in order to adhere to the principles of unification enshrined in the constitution of 1990.

At the center of Hadi’s project is the attempt to reverse a quarter century of domination by the northern tribal-military elite. His record as vice president did not grant him any praises from his southern brethren. The fact that Hadi had been near the bottom of hierarchies in the south and the unified republic did not grant him much legitimacy for his term in office; he has had to either earn it or take it. Hadi was a subordinate of all southern leaders, such as the former president of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY, 1967-1990), or Ali Salem al-Baydh or Haydar al-Attas. He was always a subordinate of the ruling triumvirate of Saleh, Ali Muhsin and Sheikh Abdullah Hussein al-Ahmar. The monumental task came as Hadi became the president of the NDC and thus the only holder of veto power over the outcomes. In the eyes of the ruling elite, there was no way Hadi would dictate the direction of Yemen’s future, never mind redistribution of power or wealth.

BenOmar and Hadi recognized the failure to develop and sustain a support foundation would remain a weakness during the NDC. They set out to create an equation for membership that granted youth and non-elite members an equal voice in negotiations. The equation to distribute the 565 seats also created room for non-elite delegates to lead the various committees, thereby granting the president and BenOmar expanded influence within the process itself. Many young men and women became chairs, vice-chairs or rapporteurs of the nine committees. It also created a mirage of unprecedented proportion, when many wrote about the blurring of the traditional gap between the ruling elite and the ordinary Yemeni in the halls of the Movenpick Hotel.

However, the primary goal was defeated as Nobel laureate Tawakkol Karman and Sheikh Hamid bin Abdullah al-Ahmar boycotted the NDC from the start. The failure was quickly salvaged by elite-driven closed door negotiations, particularly in the case of the south issue and state-building committees. Hadi was forced to grant the elite a number of concessions in order to save the larger project in the long-term.

Yemen has a history of resilience, but many speak of a boiling point, making recovery a near impossible task. For some Yemeni analysts, the country’s creeping crises have taken it from beyond the brink to near implosion.

Efforts to placate rival factions within the NDC only served to exacerbate government dysfunctionality. Rivals simply fell in line in order to avoid blame for derailing the process, but each side continued to confront its rival through proxies or demonizing media campaigns. The lack of success in creating a united front within the NDC simply worsened relations within the cabinet, obstructing progress in efforts to diffuse a number of crises nationwide.

Dysfunctionality and Failures

The failure to avert a widespread humanitarian crisis extends from a dysfunctional government and monumental mismanagement by international partners. The coalition government, consisting of Saleh’s GPC and the opposition JMP, led by al-Islah, has been nothing of a coalition. Both sides have assured since December 2011 that the rival gains no favor among the population. The allocation and release of donor funds since 2012 was primarily obstructed by political conflicts over which ministry would receive funds, what proportion and who would oversee the contract assignment. Limited funds never delivered the expected impact on the economy, nor have ordinary Yemenis received any benefit from the $8 billion pledged for the transition period.

Furthermore, Hadi has been overwhelmed by political conflicts with al-Islah, Houthi rebels, southern representatives and his own party. As a result of the reality on the ground, many Hadi loyalists and southerners refer to the president as a man “without a country and without a party.” His southern comrades do not recognize him as their representative, and GPC rank and file see Hadi as a traitor: the man who conceded Yemen’s sovereignty to the UN. Yemen was placed under UN Chapter VII in February 2014. The GPC threatened to oust Hadi as secretary general in late August 2013, and the media campaign demonizing the president and BenOmar was also mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 2140. Saleh has now positioned himself as the moderate within the GPC in order to pressure Hadi and prevent a shift of power, which would have the president side with al-Islah or Houthis as balancing forces.

Al-Islah, a former partner in Saleh’s government since 1994, managed to co-opt the uprising of 2011 and exert strong influence over Hadi. The Islamist party, a mix of Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, tribal elements and business elite have also managed to accumulate more rivals than Saleh himself. Fear of a scenario similar to Egypt under the Brotherhood among independents, southerners and Zaydis has consequently isolated al-Islah, even within the ranks of the JMP.

On the other hand, Houthis, represented by Ansar Allah within the NDC, are now a strong force controlling territory in four northern provinces. The Zaydi-Shi’a rebel group survived six wars against the Saleh government, led by Ali Muhsin’s brigade. Often accused of links with Iran, Houthis were not signatories to the GCC initiative of 2011, but joined the NDC process in efforts to clean up their image. Their priority is to sustain sovereignty over Sadah province, bordering Saudi Arabia, in efforts to preserve Zaydi religious identity that is threatened by the growing influence of Sunni Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists.

Yemen Beyond the Brink?

The G10, as representatives of the international community, carries much responsibility for numerous failures. It is true that politics in Yemen has its unique pace that frustrates the ordinary diplomat. But petty quarrels over who takes credit for what and who is more relevant than others simply have caused tremendous damage on the ground. There appears to have been more money spent on workshops to discuss federalism than money spent on solving the roots of the humanitarian crisis.

To be fair, security challenges faced by Hadi present major obstacles with regard to the president’s agenda and pace of reform. Ungovernable spaces and a growing security vacuum in the north and south prevent any contributions to economic stability. A dysfunctional government and reluctant donors provide no relief to the monumental task of stabilizing the country. Yet most Yemenis do focus on Hadi’s inability to properly multi-task, or even build a trust circle to delegate a policymaking process under direct presidential decrees.

Yemen has a history of resilience, but many speak of a boiling point, making recovery a near impossible task. For some Yemeni analysts, the country’s creeping crises have taken it from beyond the brink to near implosion. It remains to be seen how the government and its international partners manage to impose authority nationwide; regain control over areas in the north and south; begin to implement NDC outcomes that include a new electoral registrar; and deter sabotage by tribal elements and al-Qaeda’s own resilience.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Sunsinger / Shutterstock.com

The post Yemen at a Glance: Politics appeared first on Fair Observer.

According to the 2011 political transition agreement sponsored by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 2014 was to become a milestone in Yemen’s history. Often lauded as a model for post-Arab Spring transitions, the political process promised competitive and fair presidential elections, and a new constitution by the current year — reasons for much elation among Western diplomats and observers.

Activists and diplomats offered an image of unprecedented rebalancing of the political structure as youth, women, tribal leaders and elite figures interacted without boundaries during the ten-month long National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which ended in January. Yet outside the conference halls, crises engulfed the everyday life of a highly stressed population.

Yemen’s youth have proven the most resilient asset of the revolutionary spirit as the country spirals deeper into a humanitarian crisis amid a growing security vacuum. Young men and women, the initial drivers of the February 2011 popular uprising, continue to endure monumental challenges with relatively high spirits and aspirations for change.

The most recent manifestation of such spirit was the online launch of Support Yemen’s latest initiative, “Happy Yemen,” a music video parody of Pharrell Williams’ award-winning song. The “happiness,” however, masquerades a widespread condition of disillusionment and frustration with a weak and dysfunctional coalition government.

Young men and women have also illustrated the wealth of knowledge and potential across the country through a number of TEDx events. From the capital Sana’a to the port city of Aden, Taiz and soon Mukalla in Hadhramawt, TEDx-inspired events have reinvigorated the youth spirit amid crises of near famine; sabotage of the electricity grid across the country; ongoing armed clashes between Zaydi-Shi’a Houthi rebels and Salafi militias; a resilient southern secessionist movement; a tribal uprising in the east; and a resurgent al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Not yet desensitized by a new heightened level of violence around them, spirited youth continue to cling onto hopes for stability and real political change.

In Sana’a, formidable challenges certainly continue to increase the pressure on all actors. Recently, the government failed to secure much needed financial support at the seventh Friends of Yemen meeting in London, where international donors complained of government failures to tackle endemic corruption and the lack of a comprehensive economic plan.

Furthermore, branches of government have exchanged accusations of illegitimacy as popular pressure grows on parliament and the cabinet of Prime Minister Mohammed Salem BaSundwa. Each side has called for a vote of confidence on the other side, with the most recent move having been started on May 28. In addition, the momentum of popular support for President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s offensive against AQAP and its affiliate, Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), wanes as the fuel and electricity crises demoralize ordinary Yemenis.

Yemen’s economy was already in crisis at the start of the popular uprising. Even as supporters of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempt to paint a picture of chaos as a mere consequence of the uprising, data shows the economy was already in despair by 2010. 

For outside observers, it is difficult to muster up some optimism, but many among the 1% of Yemen’s Internet users work diligently to present a different face of Arabia Felix. The problem with a view “beyond the headlines” is that Yemen’s problems will not be solved by Western audiences learning more about scenic landscapes or creative awareness campaigns.

Yemen’s problems are structural and deeply-rooted in five decades of failed state-building projects. Problems are also exacerbated by the absence of a coherent policy approach on the part of regional and international partners, whose interests in Yemen, primarily those of neighboring monarchies and the US, are myopic at best, and incoherent to the general public. What follows is a four-part series that explores the most crucial issues at stake in Yemen.

Economic Crisis and Saboteurs

Yemen’s economy was already in crisis at the start of the popular uprising. Even as supporters of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh attempt to paint a picture of chaos as a mere consequence of the uprising, data shows the economy was already in despair by 2010. By mid-2011, United Nations (UN) agencies reported that nearly 10 million people in Yemen were suffering of malnutrition and near famine, a condition that could not have simply surfaced since February. It took over three months for the Yemeni government, mainly the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC), to accept data published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in 2012. But as over 200 companies closed their doors by the end of 2011, and security deteriorated, economic inactivity had reached a critical point.

The lapse in government services, mainly access to potable water and fuel, also transcends the instability of 2011. The transition government initially fed off the popular euphoria following the symbolic election of President Hadi, former vice president under Saleh and originally from Abyan in South Yemen, in February 2012. The honeymoon did not last long. As services deteriorated again by mid-2012, people soon became highly critical of a government breaking its promises and lacking the ability to address basic needs. Delivery of potable water in the capital, for example, has gone from a stable weekly delivery at worse, to people obtaining supplies once or twice a month.

The population has suffered from scarce supplies of gasoline, diesel and electricity since mid-2013. As a result of limited infrastructure and constant sabotage by criminals and politically motivated tribal elements, mostly from the oil rich province of Mareb, Yemenis live through intermittent blackouts and depleting fuel supplies interrupting daily life and economic activity. The crisis has even created so-called “café refugees” among unemployed youth and those in search of dismal Internet connections. Frustration, near depression, is most often expressed through postings on social media. Criticism of the government as a whole has led to numerous demonstrations in Sana’a.

Expanding Cash Economy and Friends of Yemen

The situation today is somehow softened by the expanding cash economy. Money continues to flow for a smaller sector of the population as a result of reinforced political patronage from Sana’a to the margins, as well as from corruption and Qat markets. Studies have shown how the economy has survived due to the flow of cash patronage across the country. Political actors continue to sustain their supporters through cash stipends that allow the economy to stay afloat in urban centers. Yemenis often point to the vibrant Qat markets and home or business construction as signs of growth in patronage or corruption. In rural areas, the situation is grimmer. As the UN reported in February, the overall number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has reached nearly 15 million.

During a speech commemorating Yemen’s Unity Day, President Hadi admitted the economy faced monumental challenges. The admission of a dire situation came nearly a month after international donors refused to pledge new funds to sustain the transition process. New views by donors are more than an about-face from mid-2012, when neighboring monarchies pledged around $7 billion to support the needs of the government, in addition to $80 million for infrastructure projects by the World Bank. The funds helped contain inflation by supporting the Central Bank’s foreign reserves with a billion dollars in credit, and provided fuel supplies from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates through 2013. Leading up to the Friends of Yemen meeting in London, Western donors demanded stronger anticorruption policies from the current government, while Gulf monarchies requested a comprehensive economic plan and a controversial phasing out of fuel subsidies.

The decision to withhold new funds from Hadi’s transitional government has also been a consequence of ongoing regional rivalries. Yemen has found itself amid a growing rivalry between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. As neither monarchy can be seen as a champion of popular uprisings, both have taken diverging approaches to the post-uprising transitions. As a result, Egypt and Yemen have found themselves at the forefront of such rivalry. While Saudi Arabia has declared the Muslim Brotherhood and Houthis terrorist organizations, Qatar supports the Brotherhood politically and has served as a mediator between the Houthis and Yemeni government.

The Friends of Yemen was formed as a group to support political and security policies in Yemen, not the country’s economy. The group has made it clear that economic stability is the primary responsibility of neighboring monarchies, who, in reality, are in a better economic position to meet Yemen’s needs. Since the signing of the transition agreement, the US and Britain have been the largest donors, with a combined total of $700 million over three years for humanitarian assistance.

Furthermore, while Yemen’s government initially denied plans to reduce fuel subsidies, reports now confirm that Sana’a has no other option. Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund for new loans are said to be predicated upon a plan for phased-out subsidies. President Hadi has engaged a narrative that focuses on highlighting the impact of “excess storing … black market activities” and smuggling on the high cost of fuel subsidies, for both the government and the population. This will not be an easy task for a government whose legitimacy is constantly challenged, or for a president whose rivals wait on the sidelines for an opportunity to replace him.

*[Read part two here.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Sunsinger / Shutterstock.com

The post Yemen at a Glance: The Economy appeared first on Fair Observer.

Yemen’s political transition after the Arab Spring conflict, which aimed at ushering in a new era of democratic development, has descended into political infighting in the capital, Sana’a. Armed clashes in the north and center of the country prompt fears of civil war, and unresolved issues within the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), such as the southern issue, are at the center of a potential breakdown of the entire transition process in coming weeks.

The People’s Republic of South Yemen was an independent state from 1967 until 1990, when it united with the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). The main factions of the secessionist Peaceful Southern Movement (Hirak) under Ali Salem al-Baydh, the February 16 (2011) youth movement and Ahmed Ba’oum, continue their full rejection of the Dialogue Conference in Sana’a, demanding that the process only involve direct talks between the north and the south. 

However, southern personalities such as Mohammed Ali Ahmed (chairperson of the NDC working group on the southern issue), Lutfi Shattara, BaSharahyl Hisham BaSharahyl and Yaseen Makawi, lead a delegation of 85 southerners who have joined the NDC since its launch on March 18, 2013. This group has taken on the representation of Yemen’s seven southern provinces: al-Dhalae, Lahj, Aden, Abyan, Shebwa, Hadhramawt and al-Mahara.    

Participation of the southern delegation, under the guise of Hirak, has led to many challenges to their legitimacy from the general population and leaders in south Yemen, as well as by many in Sana’a. Under the leadership of Ahmed, who returned to Yemen as an ally of President Abdo Rabo Mansour Hadi, after self-imposed exile to the UK since 1994, southern delegates have introduced a number of proposals to solve the political conflict over secession. 

Calls to end the unity between the former Yemen Arab Republic (north) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (south), extend from grievances over the collective punishment and discrimination of southern people by victorious northern political forces since the end of the civil war in 1994. 

Southern NDC participants in Sana’a have maintained a political line short of demanding secession. This contingent has been at the front line of the proposal to establish a federal government in Yemen, with varying methodologies and timelines. Their proposal, presented in a 2,600 page document containing 460 recommended articles for the new constitution, came under scrutiny during the month of Ramadan, and later became the source of contention between southern delegates, UN Special Envoy Jamal BenOmar, NDC Secretary-General Dr. Ahmed Bin Mubarak Awadh, and President Hadi. 

As political actors now aim to quickly complete the NDC, originally scheduled to have concluded on September 18, this political conflict has now divided the southern delegation into factions led by Mohammed Ali from Abyan and Yaseen Makawi from Aden.

Friction Within the National Dialogue Conference

Political conflicts began to surface near the scheduled end of the NDC and intensified after talks broke down during Ramadan. Tensions reached a new high on October 7, before the start of Eid al-Adha, when Ansar Allah delegates, representing Abd al-Malek al-Houthi’s northern rebels, were joined by Ahmed and his southern contingent in a boycott of the final sessions. 

Southern Representative Ali is said to have filed a formal complaint with UN Special Envoy BenOmar and the Group of Ten (G10) embassies guaranteeing the transition process, as he announced the boycott. Ali primarily complained of interference by NDC Secretary-General Bin Mubarak Awadh and other administrators through their participation in committee meetings and voting on procedural and substantive matters, said BaSharahyl. 

Bin Mubarak Awadh is also accused of having overstepped his duties as secretary-general when he joined southern representative Makawi, on October 8, in attempting to convince southerners to reject Ali’s boycott and return to the sessions.

Another southern delegate, BaSharahyl, also indicated that tensions rose when Ali was denied an audience with President Hadi prior to the start of Eid al-Adha. In the weeks between the start of the boycott and October 29, other events further contributed to growing friction between southerners and other political forces within the NDC, as well as within the Southern Movement itself in Aden. 

This friction came to a head on October 30 when Ali reinforced his call for a continued boycott of the plenary sessions. At this point, Makawi, sitting co-vice president of the NDC representing the south, called for the removal of Ali as leader of the southern delegation in Sana’a. The move created deep fractures within the group. 

Hirak members in Aden indicate such political moves by Makawi and NDC political forces simply aim at rushing to conclude the dialogue process before the two-year anniversary of the signing of the Gulf Cooperation Council-sponsored initiative, which led long-time President Ali Abdullah Saleh to transfer power to then-Vice President Hadi. 

Divisions Within Hirak

Adding to existing tensions in Sana’a, many activists in Aden believe President Hadi’s visit to the Island of Soqotra during Eid al-Adha, and his announcement of plans to turn the island into a province within a federal Yemen — thereby removing it from southern Hadhramawt province’s jurisdiction — was aimed at creating further friction within the Southern Movement for political gain. Hadi’s announcement, seen by Hirak as part of a divide and rule strategy, inflamed criticism of him amongst the southern population and criticism of southerners in Sana’a as being complicit in a plot against the south. 

Hadi’s Soqotra announcement was preceded by clashes between Hirak factions on October 12 in Aden’s Khor Makser district. The incident occurred during a ceremony to commemorate the 50^th Anniversary of the revolution against British occupation. Clashes led to the fatal stabbing of Mohammed Saleh al-Sulhi, an ally of the Peaceful Southern Movement’s leader al-Baydh, and brought to the surface divisions within the Southern Movement. Ali Munasar, second secretary of the Socialist Party in Aden, indicated the incident was exploited by the media to tarnish the image of Hirak, whose leadership still aims at stronger unity among all factions. 

Fragmentation was also rejected by the president of the Youth Movement for South Liberation, Fadi Hassan Ba’oum, who claimed Sana’a had a hand in the incident, and that it should serve “as a wake-up call” for southerners. Yet, other activists in Aden challenge Munasar’s views and acknowledge deepening divisions within Hirak.

Some observe the resurfacing of southern divisions created by the political conflict of 1986, when the Socialist Party ruling South Yemen split into two factions under then-President Ali Nasser Mohammed, referred to as zombra (defeated), and al-Baydh, known as thogma (victors). 

Adeni activists believe the October 12 incident revived a rivalry now manifesting through geographic centers of power in southern Yemen: al-Dhalae province and Yafa’e area under al-Baydh’s loyalists’s rule; Abyan split between President Hadi and Ahmed; Hadhramawt split between al-Baydh loyalist Ahmed Ba’Ma’alam and Hassan Ahmed Ba’oum; and Aden divided by districts among all factions, including the February 16 (2011) youth. 

To many who recall the political infighting, the current environment in Aden begins to resemble the fracturing of the province in January 1986. To such warnings, activists in Aden are adding concerns over the potential return of southern Salafists after the current Sa’dah War — another name for the Houthi rebellion — ends.        

Aden’s Coming Turmoil

This combination of political infighting in Sana’a and growing rivalries in Aden signal an increasingly bleak future for the south. Analysis of the current situation leads one to believe that as the province of Aden remains the center of political leadership in the south and a symbolic center of power for President Hadi to bring about a final solution to north-south conflicts, it is also likely to be the center of violent clashes.

Streets throughout districts in Aden show the scars left by violent clashes with security forces since April of this year. Streets littered with burned tires and broken asphalt in Mansoura, Ma’ala and Tawahi, as well as piles of rocks. The impact of the October 12 clashes has so far been contained as a committee, led by Dr. Ali Jar’allah, looks into the murder of al-Sulhi. 

Yet, al-Baydh’s allies from the southern al-Dhala’e and Lahj provinces have expressed concern over a possible alliance between the Yemeni Socialist Party, February 16 youth, and elements under the leadership of southern NDC delegate Ahmed against them, in order to gain an upper hand in negotiations with Sana’a. 

Radfan Saed Saleh indicated that the split of the southern NDC delegation between Ali and Makawi on October 30 proved that the politics of the October 12 clashes backfired on Radfan’s and Hirak leader al-Baydh’s opponents, as NDC political forces have marginalized socialists and Ali. 

All southern factions insist on the failure of the National Dialogue, in both its aim to resolve the political conflicts in the north and to properly address the southern issue. Leaders in all factions also indicate much of the blame rests with the international community, who failed to properly format the GCC initiative’s mandate and continue to marginalize the south within the transition process. 

In turn, the population at large seems to dismiss any legitimacy left for southern NDC delegates. Southerners participating in the Dialogue Conference are now accused of mere political positioning for the post-transition period like their northern counterparts, rather than being honest advocates of southern grievances. Direct blame is also increasingly directed at BenOmar and President Hadi.

NDC delegates indicated that the current plan is to conclude the conference by the end of November. In order for this occur, nearly two and a half months after the September 18 deadline, UN Envoy BenOmar must pull a rabbit out of his hat, at a time when confidence is at an all-time low. 

Political conflicts inside the NDC halls are far from being solved, and as long as the Southern Issue Committee fails to gain support from the influential southerners Ali and Shattara, voting cannot take place, thereby preventing progress on the ultimate issue: a new constitution for Yemen. Expectations of a quick conclusion to the NDC prior to the scheduled end of the two-year transition period are low, and southern delegates see no legitimacy in any extensions without full consultation.

In Aden, prospects of a unified Hirak leadership seem further away than prior to the events of October 12. The primary issues of contention between factions seem irreconcilable as leading figures, inside Yemen and abroad, insist on their right to lead the movement. Youth in the south refuse to be led by those who signed the unity agreement in 1990, and yet lack the funding and capacity to establish institutions creating a cohesive movement. 

Challenges to Hirak are also moving beyond those presented by Sana’a. Many activists acknowledge growing concern over the potential backlash from returning Salafi militias mobilized to fight Houthi rebels in Sa’dah province. The future for south Yemen indeed looks bleak. 

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Image: Copyright ©    Shutterstock. All Rights Reserved

The post Breaking Point: Turmoil in Aden appeared first on Fair Observer.

Yemeni observers believe Ansar al-Sharia (AAS) now represents a co-opted movement that began with a local militant agenda targeting the former regime, taking advantage of a clear opportunity early in 2011. The original leadership was believed to have been strengthened during the decade following the 1994 civil war by the former regime for its own interests against rivals. This also represented dependence by the leadership of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) for their security on individuals with perceived divided loyalties. Both the original AAS and the Islamic Army of Aden and Abyan (IAA-A) were known to have links to the patronage networks of the north, and therefore impaired operational independence of AQAP since its establishment in Yemen.

These relationships often facilitated operations in Yemen as a result of access by such individuals with divided loyalties. The rise of AAS in 2011 was initially recognized locally as a militant group of mercenaries who entered the country between February and May 2011 from countries not requiring entry visas. This was partially confirmed by officials within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who could not explain the influx of young men from Muslim countries without their families at a time of civil conflict in Yemen. "This could not logically be for any type of tourism,” officials said. Yemeni and Somali militants are often seen chewing qat in Abyan, which does not fit with a group of Salafist extremists. The new structure of AAS grants AQAP new sources of support at the local level, even though current military operations against known AQAP operatives prove the group’s vulnerabilities in areas of communication and protection while in transit.

Countering Homegrown Militancy

The vacuum of authority, created throughout 2011 by retreating government forces, helped realize the prophecy of the rise of Islamic militancy in Yemen. Prior to the spark of the Arab uprisings, the Republic of Yemen was already experiencing a weakening of central authority as a result of growing opposition to the regime. Primarily, within tribal areas of the north such as the Sadah province, and many areas in southern Yemen, the government no longer held a monopoly on authority or use of force (many say it never did at all). This also weakened access to resources like water and electricity. The breakdown in security around the country increased criminal activity along national roads, against private individuals and commercial entities. Tribal leaders from areas like Rada in Baydha often visited Sana’a to request increased security personnel for their areas which were becoming vulnerable to threats from people like Shaykh Tareq al-Dhahab, of a nearby village. Their pleas were always deferred to a later time as result of ‘strained capabilities’ from operations dealing with protests in Aden, Sana’a and Taiz as well as conflicts in Arhab, al-Hayma, Hadhramwt and Nehm. Tribesmen in Rada were initially able to repel attempts to take over the city by al-Dhahab’s men, but they only succeeded after the killing of Shaykh Tareq by his older half-brother Hizam al-Dhahab, of the National Security Bureau.

Tareq al-Dhahab was another personality representing the complexity of clearly defining Ansar al-Sharia along a traditional al-Qaeda spectrum. When al-Dhahab entered Rada in January 2012 and declared a new Emirate affiliated to Emir Jalal in Abyan, people could not believe how an Islah Party affiliate could openly ally himself with al-Qaeda. Yet his ambitions extended more from personal and family interests than from an ideological alliance with AAS. Such alliances form the complex web of AQAP relations in Yemen. The terrorist group has sought refuge in areas beyond central government control, and through financial support for individuals with particular interests, AQAP often creates a new balance in areas granting refuge and facilitating transit routes.

Until the launching of Operation Golden Swords in the Abyan province in late May 2012 by the government of President Abdo-Rabo Mansour Hadi, the fight against AQAP depended solely on intelligence gathering and targeted assassinations by drones. This is because intelligence was often unreliable and human assets infiltrating AQAP and AAS were very limited. The US has often been reluctant to act on intelligence provided by the Yemeni government, unless confirmed through its own sources.

Nonetheless, intelligence gathering is flawed and mistakes have cost innocent lives, especially with drone operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although analysts often advice against the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), the realities on the ground allow few options. The most costly UAV attack for the Yemeni government and US interests was the killing of Mareb province Deputy Governor Jabir al-Shabwani, brother of AQAP operative Ayed al-Shabwani, in May 2010. His tribe continues to attack power lines in Mareb in retaliation for the killing and as a result of unfulfilled demands for compensation. Reactions against such counter terrorism policies as witnessed in Afghanistan or Pakistan, are yet to be seen in Yemen.

Losing & Winning Hearts and Minds

Local journalists, Ahmed Zurqa and Tawfeq Abdul-Wahhab, confirm that anti-American sentiments in Yemen are far from representing any form of radicalization among the general public. Media outlets have attempted to present a new degree of radicalization in Yemen as a result of counter terrorism policies implemented in recent years, or to justify AAS' presence as a symptom of radicalization. Officials and ordinary Yemenis deny such assertions by the media and analysts, but they do not deny AAS has definitely gained ground beyond Abyan, such as in Shebwa, Baydha, Mareb and Hadhramawt. Their explanation for growing sympathies rests on the tactic providing cash payments to some tribal members, providing basic services such as electricity and law enforcement forces. In addition, Ansar al-Sharia has provided AQAP additional support through expanded tribal relations via family links.

As seen with other groups taking arms in Yemen, it is not very difficult to gain material support from a population suffering from a deep economic crisis. As a result of deteriorating economic conditions, both urban and rural populations find themselves vulnerable to manipulation by groups able to provide financial relief. This has been the tactic in the north and south of Yemen, where families often receive as little as $300 per month in order to secure limited loyalties. Therefore, it is clear that instability in the country extends from a near famine crisis rather than insecurity causing the economic crisis. Ordinary people in Yemen would have no ideological reason for supporting militants if their economic needs were met.

Yemen’s central government began losing hearts and minds early in 2010 following many warnings of a looming crisis. Failure to address economic grievances of the young and old created the environment for protests in December 2010 and sparked Yemen’s own Arab uprising in 2011. Groups like AAS merely took advantage of a vacuum in authority. The initial propaganda of AAS to win over the population in Abyan focused on opposition to an illegitimate government in Sana’a and the neglect of rural populations. By ‘expelling’ government forces from Abyan, the militant group further proved the weakness of central authority and quickly attempted to fill the vacuum by establishing Islamic courts and issuing identification cards.

Primary evidence against the idea of radicalization of the general public exists in the fact that thousands of people fled Abyan and sought refuge in the neighboring Aden province. If AAS has won the hearts and minds of ordinary Yemenis, why are they unable to convince people to remain in the homes? Also, at the initiative of local tribal leaders in Abyan, the government accepted a limited engagement of AAS. Tribal and religious leaders attempted to engage dialogue with militants, even though the government refused full engagement until AAS abandoned their weapons. Local analysts indicated the dialogue broke down as a result of the insistence by AAS that all tribal leaders impose Islamic law. AAS executed a number of government soldiers before agreeing to release the remaining prisoners in their custody just prior to the end of talks with tribal leaders. Therefore, how radicalized is the population if Muslim tribal leaders object to imposing Islamic law by force?

It is true the central government has been unable to regain the trust of the people, but this is far from justifying claims of widespread radicalization and support for Ansar al-Sharia. Battles won in Abyan recently were primarily due to support from local tribal forces. This clearly illustrates how AAS threatens the interests of tribal communities. It remains to be seen if the government and its international partners reward such support by tribes and address the main sources of weak central authority in the area. Since many militants managed to escape by boat from Zinjibar, as reported by Nasser Arrabyee, and by car, it will be impossible to assure those taking refuge in Aden of a secure environment in Abyan until government forces have full control over the entire province. Recent promises of aid from Sana’a, around 97mn Yemeni Rial ($450,000), will not be sufficient to keep Ansar al-Sharia out of Abyan. As long as the economic conditions continue on a downward spiral, hearts and minds are still for grabs in Yemen.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Deepening Crises Breed Local Support for Ansar al-Sharia: Part 2 appeared first on Fair Observer.

The post Deepening Crises Breed Local Support for Ansar al-Sharia: Part 1 appeared first on Fair Observer.

In a region like the Arabian Peninsula even an imperfect, coerced election is a step forward. This reality may not appease Yemeni youth or sincere advocates of democracy in the Middle East, but pragmatism has deterred possibilities for a prolonged civil war in a very unstable environment. For Yemenis nationwide, February 21 remains a dilemma that has still to produce confidence on a transition process addressing their grievances in totality.

The presidential election on February 21, where ballots will only include one candidate, is not perceived as a referendum on Vice-President Abdo Rabo Mansur Hadi, but rather accepted as a democratic ritual for the sake of stability. The transition from 33 years of rule by President Ali Abdullah Saleh to his long-standing deputy Hadi has provided a sense of confidence to Yemen’s regional and international partners who feared a downward spiral into a prolonged conflict in a highly volatile area.

However, it has divided the Yemeni youth whose steadfastness led to the signing of the transitional agreement mediated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on November 23, 2011. The youth remain unsatisfied, and to a degree, feel betrayed by regional and international actors, and parties of the opposition, including Noble Laureate Tawakkol Karman who has expressed her full support for the election of Hadi.

Image Fiasco

People inside and outside Yemen continue to voice their disgust at the farcical election. The government’s failed public relations campaign is to bear much of the blame for this unfavourable opinion. The government has failed to present a coherent argument for the elections. Simply arguing that the elections are the most promising option for stability has not been sufficient to convince the people or critics. Claiming this option is constitutional and democratic has also further enraged protesters. There is nothing constitutional about the transition process, nor is there a legitimate democratic nature to the election beyond the fact that consultants convinced the government to allow everyone over 18 years of age to vote with valid government identification, in the absence of updated voter registration lists.

The government has failed to acknowledge the true nature of the transition process. Despite an evening television appearance this past Sunday by both Vice-President Hadi and interim Prime Minister Mohammed Salem Basundwa, the people have still not heard a legitimate argument that justifies the presidential election. This image of a farce election further deteriorated when nominations for candidates were blocked through a unanimous vote in Parliament in support of Hadi. Independent members of Parliament and members of the Joint Meeting Party (JMP) failed to justify in a coherent manner their decision to decline support for alternative candidates. This decision was then transmitted nationwide by the opposition through statements by General Ali Muhsin, Hashid’s leader Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar and his brother Hamid, as well as activists inside protest squares in Sana’a and Taiz during Friday sermons and lectures in tents.

Primary Challenges for the President Elect

Amidst fractured government institutions and further deterioration of security, Hadi faces four critical challenges. These are the economy, security and stability, youth engagement and divisions within the General People’s Congress (GPC). Of course there are other pressing issues that will undoubtedly pose major challenges to Hadi, but the Southern issue and Houthi rebellion can only be addressed once he strengthens his support base and gains the people’s trust.

The interim government has been unable to assist with the list of mechanisms outlined by the GCC initiative. Their only contribution so far has been the public support for the coming election. This lack of activity has frustrated international partners who are anxious to move forward with the military committee, urban demilitarization, and the liaison committee to demobilize protesters. It might have been too much to ask of a fragmented interim cabinet, whose centers of power have yet to decide how they will deal with the second phase of the transition, but people expected a more proactive government after President Saleh signed the agreement last November.

Uncertain Transition

Even as leaders convey their support for Vice-President Hadi, Yemenis and observers remain uncertain over the success of the transition process. US Counterterrorism chief John Brennan arrived in Yemen on Saturday along with UN Special Envoy Jamal Ben Omar to close ranks in support of the election, but people still remain wary of the potential breakout of violence in areas beyond the control of central authority. Events in southern cities like Aden and Mukalla over the past week have raised concerns over the potential outbreak of violence as a result of a number of attacks against youth protesting against the legitimacy of the presidential election. It is still unknown whether the perpetrators were militants from the Southern Movement against potential supporters of the election or Islamists attempting to further fragment the secessionist Southern Movement.

Popular optimism is a rare commodity nearly three months after Saleh agreed to transfer authority to his deputy. International media remain focused on the presidential election while analysts await the next outbreak of violence. In the meantime, people in Sana’a hope the extraordinary holiday before election day will deliver more than the first full day of constant electricity supply.

After months of increasing weapons being seen on the streets of the capital, Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar’s call on Sunday to declare February 21 a weapons-free day may serve to alleviate people’s worries over violence or intimidation at the polls.

The government and its international supporters need a higher than expected turn out on Tuesday, but many among government officials and civil society organizations claim that two million voters nationwide would be sufficient to declare a successful election. This is only a floor limit and people around Hadi continue to exert all efforts to ensure provinces remain calm and voters feel secure enough to vote. A last-minute agreement between tribes from the northern areas of al-Jawf and Mareb granted the interim government increased confidence amidst calls for election boycott in Sa’dah by Houthi rebels and throughout the south by secessionists.

With an estimated price tag of over $40mn, the single candidate presidential election will continue to be challenged as illegitimate. President Elect Hadi will continue to face an uphill battle as he positions himself within his own political party and renegotiates the interim cabinet with an opposition empowered by their role in the past three months.

Hadi must still deal with President Saleh’s legacy, family and loyalists who remain uncertain about their future in the regime. The election is only the start of mounting challenges and without a powerbase, the new president will remain under the influence of the old regime and in a weak position in relation to the overconfident opposition. Furthermore, removing protesters from Change and Freedom Squares will require more than eloquent speeches and intimidating thugs.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy

The post A Referendum on Stability or Democratic Processes? appeared first on Fair Observer.