In the West, political change is a regular feature. Except for Bahrain, the GCC has had its taste of political change too. New monarchs have taken charge and they do not subscribe to the same views of international relations as their predecessors. Today, the GCC has an increasingly negative perception of the West in general and the US in particular.

The convergence of Brexit, the disintegration of European unity, the effects of the Donald Trump administration, a rising China and COVID-19 has put further stress on the dominant US-led postwar order. The GCC now sees its future pointing to the East. Anwar Gargash, the UAE’s senior diplomatic advisor to the president, highlighted this point when the US pressured its Gulf ally to halt the construction of a Chinese military facility in Abu Dhabi. As per Gargash, the UAE and the GCC are worried about another cold war, claiming that it “is bad news for all of us because the idea of choosing is problematic in the international system, and I think this is not going to be an easy ride.”

While the UAE did indeed stop Chinese construction, the decision to allow it in the first place might have been a misstep by the Emiratis. They should have realized that the West would view the base as a threat. There is little room for another military competitor within the GCC. Therefore, Abu Dhabi faced a simple choice: choose China as a security guarantor or maintain ties to the West.

Saudi-led GCC ignores the West’s requests

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine War, the West has sought support from its partners to isolate President Vladimir Putin. Lower energy prices are critical to the success of the West and Washington has pressured the GCC to increase oil production.

Therefore, the Saudi-led decision in the recent OPEC+ meeting in Vienna to cut production has upset Washington greatly. In fact, the White House was enraged by the OPEC+ decision. President Joe Biden has been trying to rein in prices at the pump before the November midterms but prices will now go up thanks to the Saudis and their friends. The decision to cut production hurts Biden domestically and helps Putin in prosecuting his war against Ukraine. As an oil producer, Russian revenues have just received a shot in the arm.

Thanks to the OPEC+ decision, inflation will go up. So will interest rates and the risk of a global recession. It is now clear that both Biden and Boris Johnson, the former British prime minister, failed in their efforts to convince the GCC to increase oil production. Although cutting oil production was a Saudi-led initiative, no other GCC power expressed any objection. This suggests that the GCC has a collective political intent to raise oil prices.

After this decision, the White House has announced that it is re-evaluating its relationship with Saudi Arabia. Members of the US Congress have called for a freeze on future cooperation including stopping arms sales. For them, given the context of Putin’s war on Ukraine, the GCC’s decision to cut oil production effectively aligns it with Russia.

As far as the GCC sees it, Ukraine is not in the same geographical sphere and, therefore, it does not see the war as a security concern. For the GCC, Iran is the big security concern. It is also irked that the White House rubbished concerns over the Houthis and ended support for the Saudis in the war in Yemen. The decision to cut oil production is not a product of petulance but the culmination of a decade of mistrust.

Ever closer relations with Russia

The UAE’s rapid growth in international standing has won many plaudits. It has been able to expertly manage strategic narratives to align with foreign partners on issues such as countering violent extremism. Under the leadership of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) the UAE has grown assertive in its foreign policy, engaging in conflicts in Mali, Libya, Sudan, and Yemen.  His diplomatic initiatives include building a strong relationship with Putin’s Russia. On his part, Putin sees the UAE as an extremely useful partner in his long standing goal to build an economic and transportation corridor to markets in Asia.

After the OPEC+ decision to cut production, MBZ traveled to Moscow for a state visit. The UAE has claimed the visit was intended to help support peace talks. But its timing and intention are clear. If Abu Dhabi wanted to signal neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine War, UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed would have made the trip. Alternatively, MBZ could have made a phone call instead. The in-person meeting was to broadcast the strength of Emirati-Russian ties.

Russia is giving the UAE military support and conducting joint operations across Africa. Defense platforms manufactured in the UAE have been seen in the hands of Russian and Chechyen troops in Ukraine. The UAE has also emerged as a key outlet for Russian trade in oil and chemicals with Asia.  Even so, it is the Saudis who have drawn the ire of Washington while the UAE’s close engagements with Moscow have flown under the radar.

Ukraine is more than aware of the strong relationship between the UAE and Russia. Kyiv does not see MBZ as a neutral actor. The UAE initially refrained from condemning Russia’s invasion. Thereafter, senior Emirati officials have routinely visited Moscow. On the other hand, dialogue with Kyiv is sparse.

Many will attempt to reshape the narrative of recent events within the GCC. However, the deterioration of trust and confidence between the GCC and the West is out in the open now and will lead to further strains. Neither MBS nor MBZ have traveled to the US in recent years. MBS’s involvement in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and the MBZ’s in Russian interference in the 2016 US election that brought Trump to power have clouded potential visits. By aligning so closely with Russia and raising oil prices, the two rulers have wrought a sea change in GCC policy that will inevitably have seismic consequences.

[Arab Digest first published this article and is a partner of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The GCC Now Prefers Russia to the West appeared first on Fair Observer.

Even as the UAE has a historic relationship with the US, it has been deepening its relationship with Russia. Both countries target periphery nations for discreet joint involvement. Shared interest across Africa has seen the UAE-Russia partnerships from Senegal to Sudan.

A power struggle in Sudan

The UAE has significantly increased its involvement and direction of affairs within Sudan since the resignation of the civilian prime minister Abdalla Hamdok in January. He had already been ousted in a coup led by the generals in October last year and his brief return was due only to international pressure, primarily from Washington.

Since Hamdok’s departure, a power struggle between the chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, General Mohamed agalo, “Hemeti”, has developed. As competition between Burhan and Hemeti quietly intensifies, Sudanese actors are courting the UAE. Abu Dhabi is receptive to such overtures and Tahnoon bin Zayed, UAE’s national security advisor and Mohammed bin Zayed’s brother, has decided to back Hemeti. So has Russia.

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Burhan has attempted to consolidate his position by centralizing power within institutions, such as the ministry of defense, and by maintaining formal relationships with regional allies. This has seen the ministry increase its stake in the control of Port Sudan as well as other industrial ventures in the eastern region. By doing so, Burhan seeks to reduce the potential for Hemeti and his principal backer, the UAE, to secure access for themselves and Russia to the area. 

Moscow has long been trying to secure naval access to Port Sudan, a deal that continues to be delayed as Khartoum tries to secure greater financial and political support. It is important to note that Burhan is not overtly opposed to the UAE and Russia but is driven by the principal requirement to secure his own grip over Sudan. Burhan has tried to balance internal power dynamics while managing the tainted legacy of former president Omar al-Bashir with the whims and expectations of the international arena.

Burhan has recently visited Egypt, Libya, and Chad in an attempt to reinforce his own centrality in the future of Sudan. This has been conducted through high level relations with regional actors. Additionally, Burhan deployed Gibril Ibrahim, the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), to Saudi Arabia to secure short-term funding for Sudan.

Even as Burhan is making his moves, Hemeti is countering them. The chief of staff to Chad’s president is his first cousin and a prominent negotiator with leading figures in the Darfur region. There are even reports that the governor of Darfur, Minni Minawi, is preparing to leave Burhan’s coalition and side with Hemeti. However, this dynamic is extremely delicate as Hemeti was the leader of the Janjaweed who perpetrated mass violence in the Darfur region. The implications of these power struggles for Sudan’s domestic scene are extremely perilous. After several coups, there is a real risk of another civil war.

The UAE and Russia join hands for a common cause

Sudan is still suffering from continuing US-led sanctions imposed after the coup that removed Hamdok. In such a situation, the UAE has assumed the role of facilitator and provider of urgently needed funds. In doing so, the UAE is bolstering the military-led administration in Sudan, developing its network in Khartoum and averting any potential shift of power to civilian government. 

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While  supporting the role of the military within Sudan’s  political structure, Abu Dhabi has sought to develop ties with key civilian actors. The UAE is cultivating Osama Daoud, a billionaire businessman with close ties to the military. He is the chairman of the DAL Group, which has an office in the UAE.  It has been reported that Daoud maintains a very close relationship with Tahnoon bin Zayed, and it is through this dynamic that a $6 billion investment project came through. 

The Abu Dhabi Ports Group will construct a new port, just north of Port Sudan, with an accompanying free zone. In addition, the Sudanese Central Bank will have $300 million deposited which should help to smooth over the condemnation the country faces over the lack of progress towards a civilian government. The UAE has also signed an agreement to develop a large agricultural project in Eastern Sudan that will export its produce through the new port. While the West has been trying to force the military to cede power, the UAE has been concluding deals with key military and military-backed players that will only further their influence in Sudan.

The timing and decision to increase financial assistance to Sudan is crucial. It is now clear that the UAE backs Hemeti. In the past, he has proven his loyalty to Abu Dhabi by supplying a large contingent of soldiers to South Yemen where Hemeti’s soldiers helped secure key areas from Houthi forces. Now, Russia may be joining hands with the UAE to back Hemeti. The Wagner Group, Russia’s shadowy mercenaries, could intervene should civil war in Sudan break out. Hemeti has visited Moscow on several occasions, securing military assistance and intelligence support from Russia’s Internet Research Agency. 

To counter Hemeti, Burhan has tried to win the UAE’s support. In March 2022, Burhan visited the UAE but did not gain Abu Dhabi’s backing. Therefore, he recently ordered the release of some Islamist prisoners, a move that has irked the UAE and made it move closer to Hemeti.

The US is watching the UAE’s involvement in Sudan with concern, especially as Abu Dhabi and Moscow are working together to back the same horse. In essence, Washington’s long-term project to install a civilian government in and bring peace to Sudan is being undone by Abu Dhabi. The UAE is not only eradicating the last vestiges of Sudanese democracy but it is also enabling Moscow to extend its reach far beyond the Eurasian sphere. Washington would not be pleased if Moscow gains naval access in Sudan. Yet it can do little as Abu Dhabi and Moscow cooperate to achieve a common goal. Dynamics in Sudan reveal clearly the UAE’s centrality in a shifting power dynamics in the Middle East, both in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

Sudan has been on the periphery of international attention. The new democratic government was poorly supported by the international community. This made the country vulnerable to external designs. The transition to civilian rule failed when the UAE and Russia backed military elites to achieve their strategic interests. Should Sudan succumb yet again to civil war, Russia is likely to provide security assistance to Hemeti while the UAE will provide the money. In the process, Abu Dhabi will acquire economic assets whose value would have depreciated due to conflict. Any internal conflict and civil war will enable Russia and the UAE to secure their long-term interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

[Arab Digest first published this article and is a partner of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Civil Strife Could Further Advances by Russia and the UAE in Sudan appeared first on Fair Observer.

Plagued by more than three years of civil war and a humanitarian disaster, the Yemen crisis rages on with no hope of an end in sight. In 2015, the coalition of Arab and African states led by Saudi Arabia initiated a war against the Houthi rebels, yet today Ansurallah (the dominant Houthi militia) continues to repel the coalition from northern Yemen. Moreover, Ansurallah is bringing the war into Saudi Arabia, most recently evidenced by the November 4 missile launch that the Saudis intercepted over Riyadh.

Although Ansurallah remains the coalition’s principal target, the different states behind the Riyadh-led campaign have differing strategies, which have contributed to the prolongation of Yemen’s civil war. Saudi Arabia continues to back Yemen’s internationally-recognized president, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, although in practice he has extremely limited power in the country. The United Arab Emirates has been highly active throughout what was once officially South Yemen. Abu Dhabi has used the UAE’s military-orientated presence to deliver stability and security, creating and deploying local fighters, such as the Security Belt Forces and Hadrami Elite Forces, which has enabled a civil society to re-emerge, albeit one that increasingly backs Southern cession. Although Riyadh suspended Qatar from the coalition shortly after the Gulf dispute erupted in June, Doha was previously part of the bloc and backed the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood, al-Islah.

Ultimately, the different Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ attitudes toward al-Islah have fueled tensions within the divided council. Although Saudi Arabia is boycotting Qatar for numerous reasons, including Doha’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood, in truth Riyadh and Doha have previously, to a certain degree, aligned behind al-Islah in Yemen. As an important political and social institution within Yemen, al-Islah has traditionally been close to Saudi Arabia, and Yemen’s current deputy president, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, is a leading personality within the party. Such dynamics have pitted Riyadh against Abu Dhabi, which always saw the local Muslim Brotherhood offshoot as menacing and did not join Saudi Arabia in viewing al-Islah as an actor that should be collaborated with for the purpose of shoring up Sunni forces against the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.

Increasingly Polarized

With Yemen’s current battle lines drawn between the traditional boundaries of North and South Yemen, the divided communities’ political and ideological affiliations are becoming increasingly polarized. Several prominent Salafists such as Aidarous al-Zubaidi and Hani bin Breik lead the UAE-backed Southern Transition Council (STC), which plays upon South Yemenis’ historical grievances against northern political elites. An important aspect to this strategy is the political and kinetic struggle against al-Islah.

Within a wider UAE struggle against political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood, Abu Dhabi has aggressively backed the STC’s struggle against al-Islah and extremist groups in South Yemen. Abu Dhabi’s stewardship of local security forces in South Yemen has allowed the Emiratis to influence and direct combat operations against al-Islah, with routine counterterrorism operations conducted throughout Aden and other cities.

Over the past five months, the UAE and its locally-backed figures have accused al-Islah of looting, murdering and attempted insurrection. Multiple raids and arrests, such as the detention of 10 al-Islah members on October 11, including the group’s under-secretary, Mohammed Abdul Malik, have led to increased violence. One such raid on al-Islah’s al-Qalua branch in Aden discovered C4 explosives, detonators, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), mines and small arms ammunition. Apparent reprisals by al-Islah-affiliated parties have included the assassination of four Salafist imams across Aden in October alone.

In combination with the STC and Security Belt Forces’ focus on combating al-Islah is a continued assault against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State (Daesh). Although experts debate al-Islah’s extremist inclinations and relationship with violence, the barbaric acts committed by AQAP and Daesh leave no room for doubt about their self-confessed and self-promoted brands of extremism. These groups have targeted Emirati forces in Yemen despite Abu Dhabi’s close cooperation with Washington on counterterrorism in this war-torn country.

Interpretations of Terrorism

Despite the GCC states’ differing interpretations of terrorism, in October all six members of the council joined the US Department of Treasury in imposing sanctions on 13 individuals suspected of supporting and financing AQAP and Daesh in Yemen. The announcement was timed with the regional visit of US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin to the Gulf. These were the first sanctions imposed via the Riyadh-based Terrorist Financing Targeting Center (TFTC), unveiled during President Donald Trump’s historic visit to Saudi Arabia in May.

As the UAE continues to exert greater influence in Yemen’s southern territories, and with the coalition’s campaign in Yemen already suffering from internal divisions, Riyadh is being pragmatic by distancing itself from al-Islah and other Sunni non-state actors in Yemen, including AQAP. Notable was the inclusion of Yemenis previously backed by the Riyadh-led Arab coalition: Abdel-Wahab Humayqani and Adil Abduh Fari Uthman al-Dhubhani (aka Abu Abbas). Whereas Saudi Arabia previously engaged with certain Sunni Islamist groups and individuals in Yemen within the framework of Riyadh’s quest to counter the Houthis and, by extension, Iranian influence, the kingdom’s new foreign policy trajectory is increasingly aligned with the UAE’s, with Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed at the helm.

In light of the Qatar crisis, as well as stepped up pressure from the Trump administration to target extremists such as AQAP and Daesh in Yemen, the Saudis are seeking to distinguish themselves from Doha, which continues to patronize groups that other GCC states and Egypt view as terrorist organizations.

Previous US sanctions and continued accusations from Saudi and Emirati media outlets have indicted Qatari residents and the state itself from sponsoring AQAP and Daesh in Yemen. While Doha has joined the other five GCC states in imposing last month’s sanctions on 13 Yemeni individuals, the Saudi/UAE-led bloc’s narrative will continue to maintain the message that Doha backs al-Qaeda and other extremists across the Arab world. Due to Qatar’s historical affiliation with extremist financing, Doha will have to continue abiding by international law in combating international terrorism.

The Yemeni crisis is complicated and multifaceted, with many competing outside and local actors attempting to shape the impoverished country on conflicting terms. The recent targeting of certain individuals in Yemen who were once cooperating with GCC states in the struggle against “Persian hegemony” will have an impact on Yemen’s future. Both Saudi Arabia’s new approach to fighting “extremism” while returning to “moderate Islam” and the war of narratives amid the Qatar dispute will influence how Riyadh approaches all the crises along its borders.

*[Gulf State Analytics is a partner institution of Fair Observer. This article was updated on November 19, 2017.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Oleg Znamenskiy / Shutterstock.com

The post Saudi Distances Itself from Yemen’s Muslim Brotherhood appeared first on Fair Observer.