Located in the South Pacific, the islands became a part of France in 1853. French arrivals — including many deported prisoners — lived alongside the native Kanaks. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Kanaks saw population growth that boosted their share of the electorate and, thus, their political aspirations. They have advocated for increased autonomy and even independence from France.

Many Kanaks are discontented because they feel excluded from the territory’s recent economic growth, driven by the expansion of the nickel industry. This industry has made many French entrepreneurs rich and employed a new population of workers from Southeast Asia but largely left the natives behind.

The Kanaks’ population growth stagnated, even declining between 2009 and 2014. They now constitute 41% of the island’s population, well short of a majority. However, they have increased political influence because the electoral law restricts voting to Kanaks and others, including the island’s ethnic French population, who have been in the islands for a long time; it excludes the new French arrivals and Asian workers who have come with the nickel boom. Now, the government in Paris has threatened to change this settlement with a proposal to extend voting rights in provincial elections to French residents who have lived on the island for at least ten years.

The French government acknowledges the Kanaks’ aspirations for local autonomy but maintains that the proposed changes are a matter of fairness. The ‎Élysée argues that individuals who live in New Caledonia and contribute to its economy should have a say in its governance. Some New Caledonians do support this perspective, arguing that all island residents, not just its indigenous population, should determine the island’s future. Yet disgruntled New Caledonians have taken to the streets, with some even going as far as erecting barricades and looting to show the government their discontent.

The latest chapter in a long history

The current political crisis is not an isolated incident. It is the latest manifestation of long-standing tensions between the Kanaks and the French government over the island’s future. These tensions have erupted into violence before, notably in the 1980s and 1990s, when clashes between Kanak independence activists and French security forces resulted in significant unrest.

The Nouméa Accord of 1998 was the culmination of a series of agreements reached in the late 1980s and 1990s. This accord outlined a path towards greater autonomy for New Caledonia and included provisions for three referendums on independence. The first two referendums, held in 2018 and 2020, resulted in narrow victories for the pro-France side. However, the pro-independence Kanaks boycotted the third referendum in 2021, citing concerns about the process’s fairness due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their community.

These most recent proposed changes to voting laws have reignited the debate over New Caledonia’s future and its relationship with France. The Kanaks perceive these changes as a betrayal of the Nouméa Accord’s spirit, which they believe paved the way for their eventual independence. The French government, on the other hand, maintains that the changes are necessary to ensure fair representation for all residents of the island.

Strategic importance and economic value further complicate the situation in New Caledonia. The island holds 10% of the world’s nickel resources, a critical component in the production of batteries for electric vehicles and other technologies. This makes New Caledonia a valuable asset for France, both economically and geopolitically.

What will the ‎Élysée do next?

President Emmanuel Macron, leading the French government, has expressed his commitment to fostering dialogue and finding a political solution to the crisis. In June, he decided to halt the proposed reforms. Yet Paris’s long-term goals for the island territory remain uncertain.

Kanaks continue to deeply distrust the French government’s intentions. They view the suspended proposed voting law changes as the latest attempt to undermine their aspirations for self-determination and maintain French control over the island.

The situation in New Caledonia serves as a reminder of the ongoing challenges faced by indigenous populations around the world in their struggle for self-determination. It also highlights the complex and often fraught relationship between former colonial powers and their overseas territories. As the global community watches, the people of New Caledonia and the French government must chart a path forward that respects the rights and aspirations of all involved.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Making Sense of the Trouble in New Caledonia appeared first on Fair Observer.

Differing views on Russia within NATO

Not all NATO members share the same perception of Russia. While some Eastern European countries, like Poland, perceive Russia as a direct threat and advocate for a stronger military presence, others, like Hungary, adopt a more balanced approach, prioritizing diplomacy and national interests. This divergence in viewpoints highlights the complexities within the alliance and the challenges of reaching a unified stance on Russia.

The varying perspectives on Russia also reflect the influence of historical experiences. Countries like Poland, which suffered under Soviet rule, harbor deep-rooted fears and advocate for a more assertive approach toward Russia. In contrast, countries with less traumatic histories, or those prioritizing economic ties, may lean more towards diplomacy and cooperation.

The debate over NATO’s role and the perception of Russia extends beyond Eastern Europe. Western European powers, including Germany, France and the UK, have unique worldviews influencing their foreign policies towards Russia. Germany has frequently supported Eastern European nations and sided with the US because of historical guilt. At the same time, France has traditionally sought a more balanced approach, maintaining dialogue with Russia while supporting Ukraine. On the other hand, the UK has historically been more aligned with the US and has taken a stronger anti-Russia stance.

Recent developments, such as France’s consideration of sending troops to Ukraine and the UK’s training of Ukrainian soldiers, indicate a potential shift in the alliance’s dynamics. France’s position suggests a growing alignment with Eastern European nations, calling for a more assertive approach in light of its losses in Africa and the perceived threat posed by Russian mercenaries. The UK’s actions reflect its historical grievances with Russia and its close alliance with the US.

Economic Woes Hinder Defense Spending in Europe

The economic and political challenges European countries face further complicate NATO’s decision-making. Many European nations grapple with economic downturns, rising inflation and unbalanced budgets. The need to prioritize economic growth and social services may limit their willingness to increase defense spending or commit additional resources to military interventions.

Its members’ differing priorities and security concerns exemplify NATO’s complexities. Turkey, a NATO member, has played a complex role in the Ukraine conflict, balancing its support for Ukraine with economic deals with Russia. People have raised concerns about Turkey’s reliability as an ally and its potential influence on NATO’s decisions.

NATO can solidify its future by overcoming internal divisions and forging a common approach. Navigating varying perceptions of Russia, balancing member priorities and adapting to a shifting geopolitical landscape are crucial tasks. As the world becomes increasingly multipolar, NATO’s role and effectiveness will face new challenges. The alliance must demonstrate agility in adapting to these challenges while ensuring its core principles of collective defense and security cooperation remain robust.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast and wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Establishing Unity Within NATO by Bridging the Divide appeared first on Fair Observer.

Unlike the Catholic Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church does not have a unified global governance structure. Rather, it is a set of regional churches that share the same theology but have independent (or “autocephalous”) heads, usually called patriarchs. Formally, the boundaries of these regional churches are independent of political borders. However, there is a strong tendency for each independent Orthodox nation to desire its own independent church.

Historically, the Orthodox Church in Ukraine, headed by the Metropolitan (senior bishop) of Kyiv, has been under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church, headed by the Patriarch of Moscow. After Ukraine declared independence following the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, Archpriest Vasyl Lypkivsky took the title of “Metropolitan of Kyiv and All Ukraine.” He founded the independent “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” (UAOC). The Soviet Union, however, soon absorbed Ukraine, and the UAOC failed to gain a significant following. Neither did the other Orthodox churches worldwide recognize it as legitimate.

Ukrainian aspirations for national and ecclesiastical independence got a second chance after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. In 1992, Metropolitan Filaret of Kyiv declared independence from Moscow, taking the title of “Patriarch of Kyiv” and founding the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Kyiv Patriarchate” (UOC-KP). As with the UAOC, the other Orthodox patriarchs did not recognize the UOC-KP.

Those portions of the Ukrainian Church that remained loyal to Moscow coalesced around a new Metropolitan of Kyiv, Volodymyr, and came to be called the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church—Moscow Patriarchate” (UOC-MP). There are now at least three churches claiming to be the true Ukrainian Church: the UOC-KP, the UOC-MP and the UAOC. For that matter, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, stemming from a 16th-century reunion between the Ukrainian Church and the Roman Catholic Church, makes a fourth.

To the Ukrainian faithful, this amount of confusion was an intolerable situation. For Orthodox Christians, questions of succession and legitimacy are not simply questions of governance. Because they received their own sacramental ordination from their forebears in a line of succession that stretched back to the Apostles and ultimately to Jesus Christ, the bishops could impart grace to the populace through the sacraments. Thus, underlying a question like, “Who is the legitimate bishop of Kyiv?” is the more fundamental question, “How may I be united to Christ?” An illegitimate bishop, on the other hand, is a usurper against Christ and thus endangers the souls of those in his care.

To remedy this situation, representatives of the UOC-KP, the UAOC and parts of the UOC-MP met in a council to negotiate a reunification. They were partly successful. In 2018, they formed the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine” (OCU). The Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople—the most senior patriarch in the Eastern Orthodox Church—granted the OCU his official recognition and released it from its dependence on Moscow. For this affront, the Russian Orthodox Church broke communion with the Church of Constantinople and the other Orthodox churches (Jerusalem, Greece, and Cyprus) that recognized its action. The schism, which had once been internal to the Ukrainian church, thus spread to the entire Eastern Orthodox Church. To the present day, it has not healed.

A look at Ukraine’s wartime religious landscape

The OCU and the UOC-MP became the two main competitors in Ukraine. In 2018, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko supported the OCU as a potential bulwark against Russian interference. Meanwhile, the state looked upon the UOC-MP with suspicion, seeing it as a potential source of Russian influence and even outright treachery.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, the UOC-MP itself declared full autonomy from Moscow. Thus, neither major Orthodox church in Ukraine officially owed allegiance to the Russian Orthodox Church. However, this did not remove the stigma of disloyalty from the UOC-MP.

Investigative journalist Flavius Mihaies visited Ukraine to assess the situation on the ground. He was fond of people who had endured significant destruction. Ukrainians have lived under two years of missile attacks that have destroyed infrastructure, homes and religious sites as well. This hasn’t stopped their determination to fight. They acknowledge how vital Western military support is, but many are diffident about the speed and amount of it. Similarly, while everyone acknowledges the need to defend the Ukrainian state from an invading foreign power, some have been dissatisfied with that state’s indifference and even hostility in matters of religion.

The Ukrainian state has put heavy, albeit unofficial, pressure on UOC-MP parishes to switch their allegiance to the OCU. UOC-MP parishes may be subject to police searches, looking for signs of collusion with the enemy. In some cases, church buildings have been forcibly taken from the UOC-MP and given to OCU priests. Mihaies reports that many OCU priests perform the liturgy in a mostly empty building. In at least one case, the local UOC-MP community, locked out of its own church, chose to perform the liturgy in a barn.

These people would rather worship standing in the hay than attend an illegitimate liturgy with a priest they do not recognize. To make matters worse, the two churches do not even pray in the same language. The UOC-MP uses the ancient Church Slavonic tongue, a language related to the common ancestor of Polish, Serbian, Ukrainian and Russian. The OCU, on the other hand, uses the modern Ukrainian language, distancing itself from the Russian Orthodox Church, which also uses Church Slavonic.

Yet Mihaies did not find the UOC-MP faithful any less patriotic than their OCU compatriots. Nationalism runs strong here, especially since the state is under attack. The UOC-MP vehemently denies accusations of sympathizing with Russia, and its faithful see themselves as no less Ukrainian than anyone else. Like the members of the OCU, they too fight in the trenches, organize support for the war effort at home and pray for Ukrainian victory.

Mihaies expresses concern about religious freedom in Ukraine. UOC-MP members fear the sidelining or even persecution of their church. The church has complained of violence and forced conversions. For the most part, the international community has failed to take heed. Although the UN has documented a few incidents, there remains a fear of criticizing Ukraine too strenuously. Human rights observers and Western governments do not want to undermine Ukraine or give ammunition to Russian propagandists. The US and its allies tend to take the Ukrainian government line. They accept its official religious freedom policy at face value and are not involved in intra-Orthodox issues.

Mihaies proposes a more nuanced Western approach to Ukraine. We should acknowledge the ongoing religious conflict and its impact on Ukrainian society. He suggests linking Western support with efforts to address concerns about religious persecution and corruption in Ukraine.

By promoting inclusivity and transparency in governance, the West can empower Ukraine to heal internal divisions and emerge stronger from the conflict.

[Peter Choi edited this podcast.]

[Peter Choi and Anton Schauble wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Ukraine’s War and the Fight for Faith appeared first on Fair Observer.