Russia’s history reveals remarkable resilience. Over eight centuries, it has faced potential collapse several times, not only recovering but also expanding its territory in some instances. This resilience evokes the image of the Nevalyashka, a traditional Russian toy that rights itself. It underscores a profound tenacity within the state and society, enabling repeated rebounds from near collapse. The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union’s dissolution was a significant test of this resilience. Defying predictions, Russia maintained its territorial integrity.

After this collapse, anti-Westernism emerged as a powerful unifying ideology, drawing on cultural memory to create a sense of common purpose. Additionally, the absence of strong regional rivals during the turbulent post-Soviet years allowed Russia to navigate this critical juncture without significant external threats.

This stability, however, has come at a cost. The unifying anti-Western ideology has also fueled Russia’s contemporary imperial ambitions. It drives an increasingly aggressive foreign policy aimed at reasserting global influence. This transformation reflects a broader historical pattern: the need for internal cohesion and national survival often propels Russia towards expansionism and authoritarian tendencies. 

The soul of Russian identity

Shared characteristics and unifying values act as the glue that binds people together into a nation. Two different kinds of values can underpin national unity: cultural and historical values shared by an ethnic majority, or unifying values that transcend ethnicity. In other words, nations form on either an ethnocultural or supra-ethnic basis.

Immigrant states like the United States are the prime examples of supra-ethnic unity, but not the only ones. Switzerland, for instance, has functioned as a supra-ethnic state since the 16th century, solidifying its national identity around the concept of neutrality in the 19th century. Similarly, Pakistani religious nationalism unites the people of the multinational state of Pakistan.

Unlike Western European nation-states like France, Italy and Germany, Russia was founded as a multi-ethnic empire. Thus, it built its unity on supra-ethnic values. These take the form of a unifying, often religious ideal; a shared goal; a grand vision for the future or a regional mission.

Early 20th-century philosopher Georgy Fedotov argued that Russians lacked the “arrogant consciousness of a superior race” that plagued, for example, the British in India. Instead, they readily communicated with their subjects and even blended with them. This openness allowed local aristocracies to integrate into military and administrative roles across the empire. This facilitated a soft Russification across the nation’s vast territories.

Russian philosopher Nikolay Danilevsky encapsulated this process in his theory of Russian civilization, which emphasized granting privileges to local elites and partially emancipating peoples on the empire’s outskirts. These combined factors were crucial for creating a unified Russian nation over the centuries.

Throughout its history, Russia has relied on unifying values for national unity, but these have undergone significant shifts. Initially, Orthodox Christianity served as a cornerstone, reinforcing the Tsar’s authority and binding the population through shared faith. As the empire expanded, absolutism emerged as a unifying force, fostering a sense of collective identity among its diverse peoples.

The Soviet era offered a stark contrast, emphasizing proletarian internationalism and a global communist revolution. It aimed to unite citizens under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. However, the October Revolution shattered the Tsarist order, and the 1991 Soviet coup attempt, which led to the Soviet Union’s collapse, destroyed the unifying values with which the revolution replaced it. The transition to a post-Soviet world left a significant ideological vacuum.

This ideological vacuum contributed to the USSR’s collapse in 1991, which fractured into 15 independent states. Three key factors were at play. First, Russia, the linchpin of the USSR, initiated the break-up by declaring its withdrawal from the union alongside Belarus and Ukraine. Second, the USSR lacked unifying values by the early 1990s. Disillusionment with communism was widespread, and the “sacred mission” of the first socialist state held no sway. Nationalist movements arose across the republics, dominating public discourse and pushing for independence. Finally, by the late 1980s, national elites emerged within the Soviet republics. These elites prioritized the independent development of their nations over loyalty to the central union.

Russia’s state-declared values have their limits

The maintenance of this ideological unity as as important today as it always has been. The Russian government takes an active role in promoting traditional values like religious adherence, especially to the Russian Orthodox Church, and family loyalty to foster national unity. These actions form part of their strategy to bolster societal cohesion and national identity.

However, there are challenges, like the perceived gap between the publicly declared values and the actual experiences of many Russian citizens. This gap has its roots in the Soviet era, a time when the state required citizens to outwardly conform to state-sanctioned ideologies, regardless of their private beliefs. This historical backdrop impedes the government’s efforts to authentically resonate their promotion of traditional values with the people, limiting their success.

Different Russian thinkers proposed various ideas on traditional values: the old Orthodox concept of “Moscow as the Third Rome,” Danilevsky’s vision of Pan-Slavism encompassing both politics and culture, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s idea of cultural synthesis and most recently, the emphasis on traditional values actively promoted by the Russian government. The current state presents loyalty to conservative traditions as the unifying force for all Russians. The Russian government promotes the view that these traditions, including religious customs and universal values like patriotism, dignity and service to the Fatherland, are ingrained in the people. In recent years, the Russian state has also actively incorporated homophobic narratives into this concept.

However, a study by the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Higher School of Economics suggests that traditionalism may not be a unifying force for Russian society. The study found that traditional values occupy a middling position on the value scale of Russians compared to other basic values like self-enhancement, security and benevolence, using a scale of values developed by Israeli sociologist Shalom Schwartz.

Evolution of basic values of the Russian population, 2006–2021.

These latter values became more important during the COVID-19 pandemic. People also prefer autonomy to traditional values. Rounding out the list are individualistic values: enjoying life (hedonism) and a desire for risk and novelty.

In recent years, hedonism has surpassed power as a value. The value of power significantly decreased after the suppression of democratic protests in 2019. People seem to have concluded that it is safer and easier to delegate responsibility for their well-being to existing power structures. However, the role of traditional values remained relatively stagnant, even declining slightly between 2006 and 2021.

By the early 2000s, Russians transitioned from focusing on survival to embracing consumerism. Rising incomes fueled spending. When income growth stalled in 2014, household debt surged. Sales channels became hubs for socializing and spending. Increased income and access to credit allowed working-age Russians to move beyond basic necessities, pursuing goods and services associated with status. Rising incomes empowered consumers to prioritize an improved quality of life, even as social stratification widened. As the older generation scarred by the Soviet Union passed away, a new generation emerged, longing to experience life.

Despite the image that political and religious leaders attempt to promote of Russia as an Orthodox nation, Russians lean secular. True religiosity involves ritual observance, not just belief or celebrating major holidays. A Romir Research Group survey with Gallup International/WIN Association’s Global Barometer on Hope and Despair shows that 55% of Russians identify as religious. However, only 9% of those who called themselves Orthodox in 2007 followed all rituals and participated in church life. Even more concerning, 21% lacked knowledge of communion, a core Christian practice.

A 2010 Public Opinion Foundation survey found only 4% of self-identified Orthodox Christians regularly attend church. Notably, this “churched” demographic skews heavily towards elderly women. Similarly, in 2022, only 7% of those identifying with various faiths considered themselves truly religious. This is not surprising given Russia’s history of over 70 years of state-sanctioned secularism.

Traditional values often emphasize collectivism, prioritizing the family, community and social harmony over individual needs. However, a study reveals a slight decline in the importance Russians place on collectivism. Interestingly, Russia leads Europe in individualistic values —  prioritizing personal self-assertion —  which directly contradicts the claim that collectivism defines Russians. This stands in stark contrast to countries like Sweden and France, which are known for their strong collectivist tendencies. Family values also appear less important in Russia. The high divorce rate (73%) and poor demographic situation suggest a weaker emphasis on family compared to the rhetoric.

This disconnect between words and actions echoes the Soviet era, where public pronouncements often masked private beliefs. People swore allegiance to communism, but lacked understanding of Marxist theory or faith in those ideals. This pattern of performative pronouncements seems to have persisted.

Anti-Westernism is a Russian national idea

With traditional sources of purpose in decline, Russia increasingly relies on anti-Western sentiment to unify its people. This ideology is a form of xenophobia that repudiates Western values and aspires to resurrect past glories. It permeates the social fabric, shaping Russia’s assertive foreign policy and imperial ambitions. Anti-Westernism manifests in geopolitical maneuvers and a confrontational stance in international relations, fostering tension with the West.

While unlikely to secure complete national cohesion on its own, this external xenophobia has forged a shared identity, a feat that eluded preceding ideologies such as Russian Orthodoxy, Marxism-Leninism and the floundering liberal reforms of the late Soviet era. Filling the ideological vacuum, this narrative provides a unifying identity that resonates with the populace.

A large segment of Russian society actively opposes the West or advocates for a sovereign development model. A 2022 All-Russian Public Opinion Poll reveals that a significant 54% of Russians explicitly express hatred for Western values. An additional 27% hold similar views on Western development, forming a periphery of the core anti-Western group. This peripheral group differs by allowing a minimal inclusion of Western values in Russia, as long as it does not alter the national identity. Combined, supporters of sovereign development constitute a staggering 81% — the overwhelming majority of Russian society.

A wide range of social and ethnic groups in Russia support this ideology, including many wealthy people who often saw their wealth increase during the war. They hold a xenophobic worldview, rejecting everything Western and foreign in general. This ideology stems from 19th-century Russian Slavophilism and gained further momentum under Stalin’s repressions and his anti-cosmopolitanism campaign. They view Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika — the policy of restructuring the economic and political system — and the 1990s’ liberal reforms as a national betrayal, considering Russian liberals agents of the collective West. 

However, their ideology extends beyond anti-Westernism. It also emphasizes great-power status for Russia, a strong central government for order and development and social justice. While not pure great-power chauvinism — for ethnic Russians are not the only supporters — this ideology harbors disdain towards national minorities within Russia, without being outright racist or classically discriminatory.

The Russian Empire’s centuries of Orthodox intolerance towards foreigners, along with the Soviet era’s active promotion of anti-Westernism under the guise of anti-capitalism, have ingrained a deep-seated xenophobia in the Russian psyche. Both societies started with grand ambitions of global dominance: Moscow as the Third Rome and the USSR as the bastion of peace and justice. This perspective reflects the historical path of Chinese society, which has also grappled with its own form of xenophobia and a complicated relationship with Western influence. However, they eventually fell into narratives of victimhood, pointing fingers at the West for their problems. The claim is that the West has robbed Russia. In a similar vein, China has frequently attributed its historical struggles to foreign meddling, further reinforcing its parallel with Russia’s narrative.

The 1990s after the Soviet collapse saw a rise in external phobias in Russia. People feared the uncontrolled Western market and a foreign culture that supposedly threatened to destroy their traditions. They also harbored anxieties about NATO’s alleged expansionist aims. Ironically, this last fear was a key factor in keeping many regions, especially those with ethnic minorities, from seeking independence like the former Soviet republics.

By then, the USSR’s disintegration had played out. Russians witnessed the rise of non-citizenship laws in Latvia and Estonia. These targeted not just the old Soviet elite from the Russian-speaking minority, but the entire Russian-speaking population. They saw the turmoil in Tajikistan, which escalated from civil strife to a full-blown war fueled by Islamic radicals.

Similarly, Georgia’s independence led to civil war in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with a severe energy crisis that gripped Georgia and Armenia. It forced people to resort to fireplaces for warmth even in apartment buildings. Furthermore, Soviet collapse severed economic ties between republics, sparking fears of a similar break if Russia fractured. This worried many Russian regions already grappling with economic reforms.

By the early 1990s, Russia’s population was even more ethnically diverse than other former Soviet republics. Regional leaders were often Russian-speaking representatives of the old Soviet elite. For instance, in modern Tatarstan, ethnic Tatars only make up 52% of the population. It was even lower back then, at 48.48%. This ethnic diversity, coupled with the economic hardships, discouraged both the general population and regional elites from seeking separation from Russia.

Regional leaders in the early 1990s, aware of their dependence on Russian resources like hydrocarbons, sought autonomy within Russia. Resource-rich regions, for example, could not function without Russian infrastructure and materials (like the Nizhnekamsk refinery needing Tyumen oil for processing). Their goals were clear: secure a strong position in the new Russian Federation, gain economic independence and maintain stability, while avoiding the pitfalls found by some former Soviet republics. Society as a whole, wary of the uncertain future promised by local nationalists, preferred the familiar socio-economic reality of the early 1990s Russian Federation.

Chechnya was an exception. It saw federal authorities take a hands-off approach. Bordering Russia directly, this republic held the potential to export energy resources independently. Further fueling separatism, the Chechen Revolution and rising nationalism in the early 1990s led the Russian-speaking population to vacate, removing a key obstacle to independence. Historical memory, particularly the Stalinist deportation of Chechens in 1944, also played a role.

In the 1990s, Russia saw a rise in active anti-Western sentiment alongside existing passive phobias —  less overt forms of anti-Western sentiment that were already present in Russian society. Russians rejected their label as the Cold War loser, believing their goodwill averted a major conflict. They resented the West’s gloating and the US’s push for its policies and values. They saw NATO’s eastward expansion from 1994 as a direct challenge.

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia intensified anti-Western attitudes. It transcended geopolitics, becoming a civilizational clash. Yugoslavia, a historical ally with religious and cultural ties, was under attack. This marked a turning point; the West was no longer a savior and the US was no longer an arbiter. Russia stood alone. Many harbored resentment beyond Serbian solidarity.

The US then strained relations further. It unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 and deployed missile defense systems in the Czech Republic and Romania, rejecting Russia’s proposal for a joint system. Russia viewed these actions as hostile, particularly after it closed its Lourdes radar station in Cuba and Cam Ranh Bay base in Vietnam earlier in 2002.

Western foreign policy fueled a growing sense of betrayal in Russia. The populace saw these decisions as dismantling the legacy of the Soviet Union. From 2003-2004, Color Revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine coincided with intensified separatist activity in the Caucasus, culminating in the Beslan school hostage crisis. This allowed the Kremlin to abolish regional elections in Russia. It embraced securitization in Russian domestic politics. This tactic involved framing restrictions on democratic rights as essential security measures.

Following the Color Revolutions, Georgia attempted to retake South Ossetia in 2008. This triggered a Russian military intervention and recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. Russia also saw this as a response to Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence. 

This emphasis on anti-Westernism gained significant traction in the wake of Ukraine’s 2014 pro-Western Maidan Revolution. Viewing this event as a US-backed coup, Russia retaliated by annexing Crimea and covertly supporting separatist movements in eastern Ukraine. This ignited a full-blown political confrontation with the West, marked by crippling sanctions and a significant deterioration in diplomatic relations. The culmination of these tensions arrived in February 2022 with Russia’s large-scale military intervention in Ukraine, a move that shattered the fragile European security architecture and raised the specter of a wider conflict.

Russia’s military interventions mark a steady escalation of aggression. This culminated in open hostility not just towards Ukraine, but the entire collective West. Russia’s new ideology casts it as a virtuous nation surrounded by enemies. This anti-Western, xenophobic narrative fuels support for the Kremlin’s aggression. While collapse would not solve this, it could spark a civil war like Yugoslavia’s — now with nuclear weapons.

[Ali Omar Forozish and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post This Is Why the Russian People Chose Imperialism for Survival appeared first on Fair Observer.

On February 23, 2024, the European Commission (EC) adopted the 13th package of sanctions against Russia. No surprises are expected as the latest round of sanctions deals with preventing the circumvention of EU sanctions through third countries. Deutsche Welle, citing its own sources, writes that about 200 individuals and legal entities will be added to the sanctions list. Restrictions will be imposed, in particular, against several firms from China and Turkey, which help Russian companies and state held corporations bypass sanctions. Bloomberg also reported that the EU plans to impose restrictions on about twenty companies from China, India, Hong Kong, Serbia, Kazakhstan, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Turkey which allegedly help Russia evade previously imposed sanctions.

Instead of cracking down on Moscow’s multibillion-dollar oil and gas sales, including bypassing sanctions, or ensuring that banned technology does not reach its military, the European Union (EU), as Politico reports, is scaling back its ambitions in favor of sanctioning a small number of rule-breaking companies. Given the lack of consensus among the countries and fierce opposition from Hungary, which continues to seek closer ties with Russia and China, it is clear that the EU may find it difficult to agree on new yet significant sanction measures against Russia. In the meantime, the decline in foreign trade turnover allows Russia to increase its GDP by utilizing the opportunities present within its own market, something that sanctions have enabled.

The impact of sanctions on the Russian Ruble

The question of the effectiveness of sanctions has been raised more than once over the past two years of war. The most obvious indicator is the ruble exchange rate. In Russia, the dollar exchange rate depends much more on the volume of oil exports than on other factors, especially those not related to exports. In addition, for the Russian population, the dollar exchange rate is much more than just an exchange rate. Russians pin their hopes on it for protection from inflation and depreciation of their cash savings.  Before the war in Ukraine started, it was 77.4 rubles to 1 dollar. Immediately after the introduction of the first sanctions package, the ruble fell sharply to 104 rubles per dollar. However, by June it had increased to 57.2 rubles per dollar. 

The change took place because in anticipation of the introduction of the announced restrictions, Western buyers sought to speed up their purchases of cheap Russian energy sources as much as possible. Due to the purchase, Russian exports exceeded imports. Moreover, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation introduced a mandatory sale of 80% of foreign currency earnings for domestic exporters. These measures led to the supply of U.S. Dollar exceeding the demand for it in the Russian market in 2022. 

However, the developments created problems for the Russian budget, which was not prepared to handle a circumstance under which the ruble would become more expensive. Therefore, the norm of mandatory currency sales for Russian exporters was reduced to 50% in May 2022, and in June 2022, it was completely abolished.

In 2023, the situation began to change. Firstly, restrictions on Russian energy exports began to work. Secondly, the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, which had been exporting gas directly to Germany, bypassing Ukraine, was blown up in September 2022. Thirdly, it became clear that India’s massive purchases of crude oil could not be paid for in U.S. currency because of the sanctions and revenue received in Indian rupees could not be counted as foreign exchange earnings because India’s national currency is not convertible. Due to this Russian shipments to India began to resemble barter transactions more than classic trade. Fourth and finally, Western importers did their best to switch from cheap but politically toxic Russian energy to more expensive supplies from other countries, primarily from the United States. 

As a result of all of the above points there was a sharp decline in Russian exports (energy exports fell by 33.6% in 2023 and total exports by 28.3%) and, as a consequence it led to an equally sharp fall in the ruble from 69.2 rubles per dollar in January 2023 to 90.8 rubles per 1 dollar in December 2023. While revenues from oil and gas exports grew by 43% in 2022 to $383.7 billion, they fell by 24% in 2023. Almost 90% of all oil and petroleum product supplies were redirected to India and China. This seriously impacted the Russian economy, although there were other consequences as well.

Energy prices and the cost of living

In Europe, sanctions led to an almost two-fold increase in energy prices between January 2021 and January 2023. Consequently, the cost of household utilities in the EU countries increased in addition to other utilities such as motor fuel. The consequence of the increase in energy prices was inflation in Europe. In October 2022 overall inflation amounted to 11.5% and for energy inflation amounted to 40.2% in March 2022. However, the EU economies quickly adapted and by December 2023 inflation had fallen to 3.4%. 

But this did not solve the problem of rising utility prices for households. This was due to the continued rise in electricity prices. In 22 EU countries, residential electricity prices increased in the first half of 2023 compared to the same period last year.The largest increase was observed in the Netherlands, where electricity bills increased by 953%, helped by national tax policies. However, Lithuania, Romania and Latvia also saw significant jumps in electricity prices by 88%, 77% and 74% respectively. In Germany and the Czech Republic it was 25 and 35% respectively. 

The situation is even worse with gas prices. They rose in 20 of the 24 EU member states that report gas prices to Eurostat. Gas prices (in national currencies) increased the most in Latvia (+139%) followed by Romania (+134%), Austria (+103%), the Netherlands (+99%) and Ireland (+73%).

The increase in gas prices led to food inflation, which unlike general inflation in the EU remains high. According to Euronews Business, real food inflation stood at 4.6% in the euro area (4% in the EU) in October 2023, putting enormous pressure on low-income households. In October 2023, annual food and non-alcoholic beverage inflation exceeded headline inflation in 33 of 37 European countries. Moreover, if in Belgium it was 10.9%, then in the Czech Republic it was 5.7%. Food inflation led by rising energy prices, affected the entire agri-food chain: from farmers to processing enterprises and transport.

In Russia, the average price for electricity has remained virtually unchanged. Russian consumers faced an 8.5% hike in the regulated tariff at the end of 2022 when natural gas exports to Europe fell by 75% on an year on year basis.The increase in gasoline prices in rubles was 5% from February 2022 to September 2023. Gasoline costs approximately 0.56 euros per liter. However, in 2022, the general inflation was recorded at 11.9%, which is slightly higher than European inflation of the same year and 3.55% higher than what was recorded in Russia in 2021. At the end of 2023, inflation in the Russian Federation was at 7.42%.

The discrepancy between the collapse of the ruble and declining inflation in 2023 suggests that Russia has overcome its dependence on imports, at least for the main groups of goods. The cost of food items in Russia increased 8.10 percent between January 2023 and January of 2024. 

Moreover, the Russian leadership did not put up much resistance to the sharp depreciation of the ruble, as in October 2023 when Putin signed a decree obliging 43 exporting companies (out of several hundred) to sell foreign exchange exposure. The remaining companies were not affected. This stopped the collapse of the Russian currency, but did not bring it back to its previous high values of mid-2022. In the context of a mass exodus of foreign suppliers, the state benefits from a weak ruble, as it stimulates domestic industry.

The steps taken by the Russian government demonstrated the ineffectiveness of sanctions. Far from severely impacting the Russian economy, the sanctions brought Russia to a point that it was able to stimulate its domestic industry and led to it overcoming its dependence on imports. 

Effects of sanctions on the Russian domestic market

The weakening of the ruble exchange rate and decreased export revenues are probably the only serious results of the sanctions. A close look at the developments within the Russian domestic market suggests that McDonald’s restaurants changed their signage to the Russian “Tasty and That’s it!” (the author did not notice any difference in the menu and in the quality of dishes), the Zara brand of clothing stores was replaced by the Maag brand of Fashion And More Management DMCC from the UAE, the Australian 2XU replaced Adidas, and the South Korean firm Inni replaced H&M.

The Commonwealth Partnership (CMWP) estimates that of the 85 brands that wanted to shut down their business in Russia, only 25% have actually closed. According to the NF Group, since March 2022, 23 foreign companies have announced their departure from Russia, while another 34 have rebranded and transferred (or announced plans to transfer) Russian business to other market players. At the same time,16 new brands entered the country in 2023. Among them, the largest number of chain stores were from Turkey (5), two big companies from China, one each from the USA, Italy, Australia, South Korea, Estonia and Kyrgyzstan, and three from Belarus.

Hotels operating under the Radisson Blu, Park Inn by Radisson, and Olympia Garden brands, which were owned by the international company Wenaas Hotel Russia until March 2023, started operating under the Cosmos brand. In March, the Russian Cosmos Hotel Group bought 10 hotels in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, and Murmansk from this company for $200 million.

Moreover, the Russian population which had never been spoiled with high wages, survived the impact of European sanctions quite calmly, as energy prices remained virtually unchanged since the end of 2021. It is also the case that Russian manufacturers have very quickly replaced imported products with their own, especially in the consumer sectors.

Western companies that stopped business operations on the Russian market did so because they did not want to pay taxes to the aggressor country were replaced by other companies, mainly from Asian countries and by Russian companies themselves. Today, chain stores in Russia lack only well-known brands of expensive spirits. 

From the developments it is clear that Russia was prepared to deal with the economic consequences of the sanctions and there were countries that were willing to have economic relations with Russia in spite of the sanctions. This could clearly be seen in the developments that took place in the Russian market after the imposition of sanctions by Western Europe. 

The only place where the changes are noticeable is the car market – Western brands are no longer supplied to the Russian market. Their place has been taken by Chinese brands. Instead of new BMW, Opel, Volvo or Volkswagen, those Russians who could afford to buy new cars are opting for Chinese car brands such as Chery, Exeed, Omoda among others.

According to the Associated Press (AP), citing a Yale University database, by June 2023, 151 foreign companies are reducing business in Russia, 175 firms are trying to buy time, and another 230 are undecided over how to exit the Russian market. Among the latter, Chinese companies are particularly numerous.

As for production, the final data for 2023 allow us to draw conclusions about the industrial production growth rate in Russia. At the end of the year, growth amounted to 3.6%. The positive dynamics were provided by manufacturing industries, which grew by 7.5%. On the contrary, the extraction of minerals decreased by 1.3%, primarily due to reduced exports to Europe.

The main problem with the Russian industry last year was in the large raw material regions, mainly located beyond the Urals. Growth was mainly driven by the defense industry and import-substituting machine building in a country where economic activity is driven by raw material extraction. The growth of the military industry pulled along a number of related industries, primarily metallurgy, as well as those companies that took advantage of the withdrawal of certain sanctioned goods from Russia. These include food products, industrial production and machine building. 

While the defense industry is losing money, it has the potential to increase employment and wages, allowing the population greater purchasing power for individuals employed in the defense and manufacturing industries. During war time a larger than usual number of people will be employed in the defense and manufacturing industries due to which the war results in impact across the chain of the military industrial complex ranging from demand for metallurgical materials which produces metal for tanks to the textile industry which sews uniforms for soldiers. While the impact stemming from war and increase in employment prospects and the resultant purchasing power in the hands of the civilians is purely temporary in nature, money in the hands of ordinary people results in them having disposable income to buy civilian products. 

From the developments in the Russian domestic market it is clear that the sanctions have led to the revival of Russian manufacturing which is driven by war. If the sanctions intended to hurt the Russian economy that did not take place. 

Effects on the flow of capital

The situation with capital outflow from Russia best illustrates this process. In 2022, it reached a record high of $243 billion or 13.5% of GDP. This was certainly one more serious challenge for the Russian economy. It was related to several factors. First was that Russian companies were forced to repay their loans to Western banks in one go. Second was the withdrawal of Western companies and the purchase of assets from them by Russian companies. Third was the refusal of Western suppliers to work with Russian importers on pre-supplies (Reference in this context is only about advance financing of all imports) and the fourth was the withdrawal of western investments from the Russian economy. 

However, in 2023 the capital outflow decreased 6 times, according to the estimates of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. This outflow was largely compensated by the inflow of capital from Russian citizens, who have or had their accounts closed by Western banks and did not want to risk their assets previously based in Western countries.

Many of the most significant decisions of the West are restrictions related to money transfers from Russia and the entry of Russian citizens into Western countries, which I wrote about here. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia has been unable to solve the two important problems concerning its economy – stopping the flight of money and brain drain of individuals from Russia.  Sanctions on Russian banks, refusal to accept money from Russia and seizures of Russian bank accounts in the West resulted in Russians abroad transferring their money home. As of September 2023, $50 billion worth of money has returned to Russia. 

By closing its borders in the spring of 2022, the West did everything possible to ensure that Russian individuals, especially skilled individuals remained within Russia. The visa restrictions by countries in the West have helped the Putin regime reduce brain drain. One important example of this has been the reduction in the number of Russian scientists leaving the country. According to the Higher School of Economics of Russia in 2021 before the start of the war, 6,000 scientists had left the country. The total number of scientists who left Russia after the start of the war till 2024 is 2,500 people. However, the reduction is not limited to just scientists leaving Russia. 

Approximately 261 thousand people left Russia after the announcement of mobilization to other countries primarily Turkey, Georgia, Armenia and other countries in Central Asia. The question that arises is why did the people who wanted to avoid mobilization chose to go to these countries in specifc?. The answer quite simply was that at the beginning of the mobilization these countries did not prevent the entry of citizens who were leaving Russia in large numbers. The individuals are mostly educated people working in different sectors of the economy. Many of them have returned since these countries began to deny them the right to stay.  It is notable that Western countries did nothing to help these individuals.

The West promised, “sanctions from hell” at the beginning of the conflict in February 2022. The question is, who are the sinners who have felt them in full? These sanctions did not stop the war in Ukraine nor did it destroy the Russian economy. In fact in some cases the sanctions contributed to Russia’s development. The sanctions led to financial losses for millions of people in the West, losses of Western companies and their loss of access to the Russian market. Moreover, by imposing all sanctions almost simultaneously, the West lost its final opportunities to influence Putin. If this was done in the name of victory in Ukraine, then clearly, ineffective, means were chosen.

While the sanctions may work in a few years time say 3 to 5 years we may not have this time. The fate of Ukraine, and with it the future world order, will be definitely decided in 2024. Immediate and fundamental steps will need to take effect here and now in matters connected to the Ukraine conflict and in turn the international world order.

[Aniruddh Rajendran, Cheyenne Torres and Gwyneth Campbell edited the piece]

[Ali Omar Forozish fact-checked this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Myth of Economic Armageddon: The Truth About Western Sanctions on Russia appeared first on Fair Observer.

In recent months, European countries have increasingly adopted restrictions aimed at reducing contact between Western and Russian citizens. This is difficult to explain with the purpose of the sanctions — to economically weaken Russia and force it to make peace with Ukraine.

The EU’s increasingly restrictive travel sanctions

Recall that back on February 25, 2022, the day after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the European Council imposed visa sanctions on Russian diplomats and businessmen, who from that moment lost simplified access to the EU. The EU extended such restrictions to all Russians in September 2022.

Furthermore, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Poland banned visas at the national level and restricted border crossings for Russian citizens with EU visas, citing “a serious threat to our public security.” To put it bluntly, after the introduction of restrictions on money transfers to the EU for Russians, as well as the refusal of Western insurance companies to cooperate with Russian partners, obtaining Schengen visas for most Russian citizens is now impossible.

As early as the February and March of 2022, all EU member states, as well as the US and Canada, banned Russian airlines from flying to their countries. Russia adopted retaliatory sanctions. Air travel is now much more expensive and time-consuming, requiring additional connections to avoid banned airspace.

For now, however, Russia still has a land border with the EU, which runs through the territory of Finland, the Baltic States and Norway. However, all of them have restricted the issuance of visas and the movement of Russians with transit visas.

On March 2, 2022, the EU announced that it was banning key Russian banks from SWIFT, the most important global financial messaging system. It also prohibited the importation of EU-denominated banknotes into Russia. On March 5, leading credit card companies Visa and Mastercard ceased operations in Russia. On March 11, the US government also banned the importation of its currency to Russia. A little later, in April 2022, the EU extended its restrictions to all other official currencies of EU member states.

These measures primarily hit, not Russian citizens, but citizens of other countries who wanted to enter Russia. However, the EU did not object to its people exchanging euros for US Dollars and taking out the amounts of cash they needed in American currency. This proves that the goal was to make traveling to Russia more expensive — after all, in order to eventually buy the Russian ruble, people in European countries had to pay an additional fee for the double conversion.

On October 6, the EU adopted the eighth package of sanctions, providing for a ban on exports of Russian products, including vehicles, to Europe. In July 2023, German authorities interpreted this clause as a ban not only on imports for the purpose of sale but also on the temporary entry of cars with Russian license plates. Both Russian car owners who had the right to be in the EU (for example, family members of European citizens) and EU citizens who had cars with Russian registration came under threat. These cars began to be seized and confiscated.

On September 8, 2023, the European Commission (EC) issued a clarification confirming that Russian-registered personal vehicles were not allowed in the EU. This measure applies to all vehicles with Russian license plates. Moreover, the clarification stated that Russians are prohibited from importing not only cars into the EU but also suitcases, bags, purses, leather and fur products, cosmetics, semi-precious and precious stones, cell phones, cameras and laptops. EC spokesman Balazs Ujvari later said that EU countries should not confiscate Russians’ clothes, but insisted that this should be done with regard to cars.

EC spokesman Daniel Ferri emphasized that member states must strictly enforce the ban on importing cars specifically, even if the vehicle is not actually “imported” but crosses the border only for tourism or short-term stays. Ferri did not specify whether there could be exceptions to the obligation of national authorities to confiscate cars of Russian citizens, for example, if these citizens permanently reside in an EU member state or enjoy refugee or humanitarian status.

While Italy, Spain, Austria and a number of other Western European countries immediately announced that they would not seize Russian cars, the countries bordering Russia — Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Finland immediately agreed with the EC’s clarification. Moreover, only Finland agreed to respect an exception for EU citizens and Russians permanently residing in that country. Moreover, on November 2, 2023, Latvia formalized this by amending its law on road traffic.

In the near future, it appears that countries that have land borders with Russia will close their border crossings under the controversial pretext of “security.” Thus, slowly but surely, the West is lowering the “iron curtain” with Russia. This is fundamentally different from the situation in the 1930s, when it was the USSR that closed itself from the West. 

Travel bans are achieving the opposite of their stated purpose

Let’s try to understand why the West has chosen such a policy and how it will help to establish peace in Ukraine and democratize Russia.

The EU’s official explanation is that sanctions are aimed at weakening the Russian government’s ability to finance a war of aggression against Ukraine and are designed to “minimise the negative consequences on the Russian population”; “sanctions are designed to maximise the negative impact for the Russian economy, while limiting the consequences for EU businesses and citizens.”

That is, formally, the European Council declares that it does not aim to collectively punish the Russian population and or restrict EU citizens in their contacts. Its goal is to weaken the Kremlin’s economic and military-technical power and force it to make peace. Thus, there is a contradiction between the spirit of the sanctions originally laid down by the European Council and its interpretation by overzealous European law enforcers.

How has the actual massive visa ban on Russians and air travel ban advanced the peace process? If one assumes that Russian business has the ability to influence President Vladimir Putin (which is not really true, because Russian business is completely dependent on the government, not the other way around), then one would assume that these restrictions were anti-business. But this is also not true, because those rich Russians who are not under sanctions and own real estate in Europe have, as a rule, residence permission in these countries; they do not need a visa. Unlike to ordinary people, the additional costs associated with longer flights are of no consequence to the rich.

Ordinary people bear the brunt of the difficulties. Among these are representatives of the Russian opposition, who previously had the ability to run to one of Moscow’s nine airports in order to escape retaliation after a protest. It is interesting that after the air travel ban, protests in Russia virtually ceased.

The opposition has no longer the moral right to call on Russians to take to the streets, as that call is tantamount to imprisonment for a minimum of five years.

Could Russia’s economy and military potential really have been hit by sanctions on private Russian cars driving into the EU? There is not and has never been any significant importation of Russian cars into the EU. There has always been the reverse process — exportation of cars to Russia.

Given the visa restrictions already existing, the car ban only affects a limited number of Russian citizens, mostly permanent residents of EU countries with residence permits as well as Europeans with residence permits in Russia, who need a car with Russian license plates to travel safely around Russia. It is unlikely that they have any influence over Putin or the Russian authorities.

What do these people do now? They cannot neglect their families. They have to take a train or hitchhike to the Russian border, cross the border on foot and take a cab to the city of Pskov in order to access the rest of Russia by train or plane. And the ticket price will go to a Russian state-owned railroad company or airline, which in turn pays into the Russian budget.

And there are many such people who have families on both sides of the border. About 1,000 Karelian families moved to Finland from Russian Karelia in the 1990s. All of them have relatives in Russia. Let alone the several million Russian-speaking families in the Baltic States and Germany.

The real purpose of the restrictions

So, what effect have such sanctions really achieved?

Bans on the transportation of euros, or of Russian travelers’ cell phones or cosmetics, as well as the possible complete closure of borders with Russia — these measures are all of a piece. Their goal is to reduce contacts, to isolate Russians from the West and the West from Russia. In reality, these measures hurt those who have family ties on both sides of the border. This is completely contrary to the EU’s humanitarian policy, which prioritizes the maintenance of kinship ties.

Are we sure that these people blame the Russian authorities, who started the war with Ukraine, for the new difficulties and financial costs they are now having to bear? My personal experience suggests that such people are in the minority. People’s thinking is much more straightforward: It is the fault of the one who introduced the restrictions.

Most people who have trouble traveling across the border are convinced that they are not personally to blame for the Kremlin’s waging war against Ukraine and therefore should not be held accountable for its actions. And they begin to wonder whether Putin is right when he claims that the West simply hates Russians. Thus, the measures do not weaken support for Putin, but for Europe.

It is possible that those officials who made such decisions in Brussels or Berlin were simply mistaken. Perhaps they did not realize that the interests of permanent residents of the EU, including their own citizens, would actually be affected. Perhaps they did not realize that these measures would have no effect on the Kremlin or the war in Ukraine.

But why were these decisions so enthusiastically supported by European politicians and political analysts, especially in Eastern European countries? Perhaps authorities in countries bordering Russia want to use the moment to detach their fellow citizens from Russia, some of whom view it as a “historical homeland”. What does this have to do with the purpose of the sanctions?

Where did the idea that the West should close itself off from Russia by minimizing contacts come from? I think the main reason is quite prosaic. In January 2023, Mark Temnitsky, a journalist and staff member of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center, published an article in Euronews entitled “The European Union should stop issuing tourist visas to Russians.” In reality, by that time Schengen visas to Russians were practically no longer issued. The article was really about something else, which Temnitsky reveals in the anecdotes he cites.

During a trip to Montenegro, Temnitsky climbed one of the local mountains. He writes,

We reached into our bag and pulled out a Ukrainian flag. A customary tradition, we always take a photo with it during our annual trips.

We took a second to pose with our flag at the fortress and requested a neighbouring tourist to take our picture. 

But this encounter was different. As we stood for a photo, another group of tourists gave us unpleasant looks.

“Ukrainians,” one of them snarled in Russian, eyes cold with contempt.

We quickly finished taking our photo, packed our flag, and descended down the fortress. As our group continued on our walk, the discomfort among us became palpable as we came across additional Russian tourists who gave us similar stares.

Temnitsky was offended that the onlooker assumed he was a Ukrainian. But Temnitsky did not check this person’s documents, either. The tourist could have been a citizen of any of the former Soviet republics, including the Baltic States, as well as a citizen of Israel, the United States, Germany, Finland, or anywhere there is a Russian-speaking community. But he concluded that these were tourists from Russia.

Then the author went to Greece and Cyprus, where this story repeated itself. On this basis, he concludes: “This is Russia today. Over the past 19 months, many have mislabeled the Russian invasion of Ukraine as ‘Putin’s war,’ blaming the current circumstances on the Russian president.” According to him, all 145 million Russian citizens support the war. As proof, he cites the results of opinion polls conducted by Russian sociological services controlled by the Kremlin. 

The author’s conclusion is quite simple and radical: Russians should be punished for the actions of their government. Vacations and trips abroad are a luxury, and banning Russian citizens from traveling abroad will make them think twice about the actions of their government. It’s hard to imagine Temnitsky, an Atlantic Council staffer, could seriously believe what he’s saying — since the Atlantic Council regularly accuses Russia of rigging elections and being out of touch with voters. So, either the Atlantic Council is spreading disinformation and Russia remains a democratic state, or we should recognize that the author of this Euronews article is, to put it mildly, not logical in his inferences. His message is based on plain xenophobia.

Xenophobia in the form of Russophobia, as well as growing isolationist sentiments towards Russia, also based on fear of “outsiders,” is the main reason why the West is now lowering the Iron Curtain. There is simply no other explanation. The restrictions on travelers in no way bring victory over Putin’s Russia, but on the contrary contribute to the consolidation of anti-Western sentiment among the victims of this policy.

One can, of course, accuse the West of incompetence, but then the conclusions are even sadder. But if Western countries, whose main value is tolerance and freedom, begin to be guided by xenophobia in the development of political decisions, it is bad, first of all, for the West itself. 

Openness has always been the main weapon of the free world. We have always been strong because we profess freedom and are not afraid of the truth. We have carried this truth to the whole world, including Russia, and in the 1980s and 90s, it yielded results. Today, with the propaganda that characterizes the main official Russian media, the openness and accessibility of the West with its free information and values is becoming more and more important. Let us not forget that, although reforms in the USSR began with the coming to power of an adequate leader, Soviet public consciousness by that time had already been was already prepared for changes. And it was the openness of the West that played a key role in achieving that.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Associative Xenophobia in Europe: a New Old Trend

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The post Why Is the West Now Lowering the Iron Curtain? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Apart from the question of why anyone in a democratic society should consider isolating a group of one’s own citizens who hold an opinion different from the state’s, even on such a critical issue as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a more serious question arises. Why did President Levits single out a certain ethno-linguistic group as an object of possible reprisals? The fact that the next day his press service tried to interpret the Latvian leader’s words in the sense that all residents of the country must comply with the law adds little clarity here. Most likely, the man, who is president of the EU and of a state that is a member of NATO, made the statement based on a simplistic association between Russian speaking and Russia.

Associative xenophobia is a form of bias directed against persons one associates with a particular state and its policies. It is an old problem in Europe. Until recently, it was routinely applied to discriminate against Jews. A “new anti-Semitism” has emerged, directed both against Jews, who by association with Israel are deemed responsible for the policies of this country, and directly against Israel as a Jewish state. It is no secret that in countries such as France, Belgium, Britain and a number of others, there has been a clear correlation between outbreaks of violent anti-Semitism and the escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 

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This phenomenon appears widespread. For example, a CNN poll conducted in September 2018 in seven Western European countries found that more than a quarter of respondents (28%) said that anti-Semitism in their countries was a response to the actions of the state of Israel. A third of those surveyed believed Israel was using the Holocaust to justify its actions. And a third of Europeans said supporters of Israel were using accusations of anti-Semitism to stifle criticism of Israel. Only one in ten said this was not true. 33% of the French claimed in 2018 that “Israel is more important to Jews than France.” In a Friedrich Ebert Foundation poll in 2021 13% of Germans said that Jews are responsible for the actions and policies of the State of Israel, while in Britain 14% believed that “association with Israel has made Jews less loyal to their country.”

Tracing the recent history of Russian xenophobia

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine in 2014, associative xenophobia in Western countries, especially in Europe, has gradually spread to Russians and Russian speakers in general, regardless of their citizenship.

For example, European websites began to publish content presenting Russian speaking tourists as always drunk, noisy, thieving and behaving like  hooligans., This was actively promoted by the Ukrainian media, which built its policy of discrimination against Russians into a tool of psychological warfare.

At the same time, between 2015 and 2018, Ukraine and Latvia passed laws that sharply curtailed Russian-language education in national minority schools, causing sharp discontent among Russian-speaking residents of those countries.

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However, after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the situation changed fundamentally and took on a broader character, encompassing not only the domestic but also a diversity of public spheres. Unfortunately, no one has conducted a serious sociological research on the attitude of Europeans toward Russians and Russian-speakers. But there is a consensus that this attitude is more negative than the attitude toward Jews. To a large extent, this was facilitated by the Russian invasion itself, which caused a sharp decline in trust in Russia among Europeans. 

This had a direct effect on members of the Russian diaspora in Europe. For example, in Germany there have been cases of denial of service to Russian-speaking people in catering establishments. There have been cases of arbitrary treatment of Russian-speaking students at European universities. For example, Professor Martin Dlougy, who teaches at the Higher School of Economics in Prague (VSE), kicked Russian students out of classes and wrote on his Facebook page that “he will not teach Russians.” These are his personal sanctions.

Obstacles have been artificially created for the development of business related to Russia and Russian citizens, regardless of whether this business is under European sanctions or not. There is information that waiters and receptionists in hotels refuse to serve Russian-speaking people or serve them below any level of service.

President Zelensky’s lobbying

In August – September 2022, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia and a number of other countries announced the abolition of tourist visas for Russians, regardless of their political views. This effectively threatened the stay of oppositionists in these countries, including opposition journalists, as well as ordinary people in general holding a negative view of Putin’s regime. To a large extent, this practice has been encouraged by Ukrainian lobbying. President Volodymyr Zelensky explained his position in the following terms: 

“Whichever kind of Russian … make them go to Russia. They’ll understand then. They’ll say, ‘This [war] has nothing to do with us. The whole population can’t be held responsible, can it?’ It can. The population picked this government and they’re not fighting it, not arguing with it, not shouting at it. “Don’t you want this isolation?” Zelensky added, speaking as if he were addressing Russians directly. “You’re telling the whole world that it must live by your rules. Then go and live there. This is the only way to influence Putin,”” he told The Washington Post on August 8, 2022.

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Estonian Prime Minister Kaia Kallas tweeted on August 9: “Stop issuing tourist visas to Russians. Visiting Europe is a privilege, not a human right.”The theoretical dispute as to whether the ban on Russians entering Europe discriminates on the basis of citizenship, an action that runs counter to Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or whether it is a normal practice, has not ceased until now. However, as early as August 2022, Estonian authorities began to practice mass cancellation of tourist Schengen visas for Russian citizens, including those issued in third countries.

Meanwhile, article 32(1) of the European Regulation No 810/2009 (Visa Code) states that neither the nationality nor ethnicity of a person can be a reason to refuse a Schengen visa. Moreover, if the refusal of a visa is motivated by a particular nationality, the court of any EU state is obliged to overturn the decision to refuse. However, the new reasons for visa refusal, not mentioned in the quoted document, require a full legislative cycle, including a qualified majority in the EU Council and the European Parliament. 

Nevertheless, a number of countries stopped allowing Russians with Schengen visas to enter their territory on September 19. That means they are placing a collective responsibility on Russian citizens for the actions of their government. Moreover if we take into account repeated statements by the European media that elections in Russia have long been rigged, this decision becomes even more questionable. In Israel, for example, the responsibility of all citizens for the actions of the government of their country, despite free elections, is not assumed. Thanks  to secret ballots no one knows who has supported any particular candidate or party.

A massive injustice affecting millions of innocent people

However, this reasoning has had little effect on the position of many people in Europe regarding the responsibility of all Russian citizens for the actions of their government. And yet there are almost one million Russian citizens living in Europe. This attitude even affects other Russian-speaking people who are not citizens of the Russian Federation. These people already outnumber Russian citizens by a wide margin. The number of people included in the Russian-speaking diaspora in the world is estimated at 25-30 million. Germany alone has about five million Russian speakers, a number significantly greater than the population of 1.5 million Jews in all of Europe. No one has inquired about their views on policies discriminating against Russians, but it is now evident that quite a large number of people in the world, including politicians, hold them responsible for Moscow’s actions.

In fact, we are dealing with the above-mentioned phenomenon of associative xenophobia, which is gradually spreading from eastern to western Europe and to all democratic countries. The so-called “new anti-Semitism” is now accompanied by the “new Russophobia”. Behind both is the desire to sweep people of certain origins “under one roof,” to make them in the eyes of public opinion responsible for the actions of the countries with which most Europeans associate them.

A look at the discussions in the Baltic, Finnish, or Polish segments of the Meta’s social network (Facebook)  gives a clear idea of how the “new Russophobia” is becoming increasingly popular in those countries. This trend is similar to  the phenomenon previously identified in Fance and the UK as the “new anti-Semitism,” link to the of aggravation of tensions in the Middle East. 

History has certainly seen other examples of the attribution of collective responsibility. Many of them ended in tragedy. People who try to revive these traditions today — no longer politicians only, but also ordinary European people — do not usually associate them with past events. It does not even occur to them that the new level of risk they are creating in Europe may be significantly higher than those they believe they are fighting today.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Associative Xenophobia in Europe: a New Old Trend appeared first on Fair Observer.

Indeed, judging by this latest data, from January to September, there have been no attacks on Jews in the country, with only a minimal number of anti-Semitic statements made on social media and in the mainstream press. The attempted murder of Rabbi Yuri Tkach, the head of the Jewish community in Krasnodar, would probably be the hate crime of the year. The plot was hatched by activists of a cartoonish and unregistered organization, Citizens of the USSR, who do not recognize official Russian documents, carry old Soviet Union passports and refuse to obey Russian laws. The core of its activists are retired women. All of this has contributed to the fact that the police and the wider society did not take the group seriously.

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Nevertheless, according to the investigation, two Citizens found a potential assassin in September, providing Tkach’s personal data as well as an assembly knife and promising a high position in their organization in case of a “successful liquidation of the rabbi.” Although the assassination attempt was interrupted at this stage — the “killer” turned out to be an operative working undercover — the order itself can be considered real, given that the Soviet Citizens in Krasnodar had previously been distinguished by aggressive anti-Semitism and marginality.

Desirable Minority

In late July vandals damaged over 30 tombstones in the Jewish section of the January 9^th Memorial Cemetery in Petersburg. In September, a drunken hooligan shouting anti-Semitic slogans failed to enter the premises of the Shamir community in the east of Moscow, threw a Hanukiah from the porch, tore down the sign with the name of the organization, broke the mailbox and knocked the license plate off the rabbi’s service car. To put these attacks in context, over the same time period, dozens of vandals attacked World War II memorials, monuments to Vladimir Lenin (that still decorate many squares in Russian cities) and even the statue of the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin in Orsk.

Overall, the number of anti-Semitic incidents is lower than over the same period last year. All indications are that in 2020, there will also be fewer convictions for crimes previously committed on the grounds of anti-Semitism. On average, this picture is consistent with the previous two years. 

The September report by the Levada Center shows that Jews are becoming a more desirable minority compared to other groups like the Chinese, Ukrainians, Chechens, immigrants from Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Roma and migrant workers. The social distance between Jews and the ethnic majority is steadily shrinking. Its coefficient, in which higher values indicate social distrust, is 4.23 points. For comparison, Ukrainians, traditionally close to Russians, score 4.67, with Chechens at 5.21 and 5.83 for the Roma. The positive dynamics of the different components of this coefficient are also impressive. For example, the number of people willing to see Jews as their family members increased by more than six times and as close friends by three.

Of course, there is still a domestic anti-Semitism in Russia, which sometimes slips out even in the utterances of state officials. But today, the harsh insults have been replaced by other, more subtle ones that could even be taken as a sign of respect. Russian journalist Anna Narinskaya gives an example of a Jew promoted in a commercial company “because your nation knows how to [handle] money.” This is an improvement on past attitudes when Jews were not hired or admitted to university because Russians didn’t want to study or work with the “people with such surnames.”

This is all the more surprising because the level of nationalism in Russia decreased by only 2% in 11 years. While in 2009 the number of those who would like to implement the idea “Russia for Russians” was 18% and the number of those who were ready to support it “within reasonable limits” was 36%, in 2020 these figures were 19% and 32%, respectively. In this context of a relatively high prevalence of ethnic-majority nationalism, the number of anti-Semitic crimes in Russia has been steadily declining despite the decrease in the number of convictions. Unlike the trends in the West, levels of xenophobia against the Jewish minority are also decreasing.

How can this phenomenon be explained, and why are attitudes toward Jews undergoing such a change? Have people in Russia really become kinder and more tolerant of Jews? And if so, why?

Tolerance and Democracy

The first reason behind this trend is stricter punishment for extremism crimes that has emerged over the past decade. This is an extremely important factor that has replaced impunity of hate-motivated attacks, which prevailed in the Russian public consciousness until the end of the 2000s. This led to a decrease in the number of hate crimes in the country as a whole as well as a lower level of xenophobia.

Second, Russia doesn’t harbor an anti-Israel sentiment, characteristic of Western societies — what can be called the new anti-Semitism. As Narinskaya writes, a decent person in the West cannot say “Jews are inherently bad people,” but they can easily say that “Israel is the creator of the new Holocaust, and Jews all over the world are loyal to it, so I don’t like them.” In Russia, a doctor can illegally refuse to admit a woman wearing a hijab, but the story of an Austrian doctor refusing to admit a patient wearing a Star of David “until you equip hospitals in Gaza” would be impossible, according to Narinskaya.

Finally, the third and most important reason is the position of the president. Vladimir Putin, unlike all the previous leaders of the country, has a respectful attitude toward the Jewish community. He publicly congratulates Jews on their religious holidays, has authorized the annual erection of Hanukkah menorahs in Russian cities, including Moscow, and meets regularly with Jewish leaders.

The latest study on Jewish life in Russia also points to this factor. Its author is the sociologist Alexei Levinson, the head of the sociocultural research department at the Levada Center. Levison writes that the attitude to the Jews in Russia “has become so liberal that they [Jews] have reached the highest echelons of Russian society.” However, “Jews today are not at all euphoric. The community’s fears are based on Russian history, when they were subject to the whims of whoever was running the country.”

“Anti-Semitism goes hand in hand with the history of Jews for ages and ages, and they think these days are just a short interruption of this tradition,” Levinson told The Media Line. He attributes the current decline in anti-Semitic actions by the state to Putin’s personal position, suggesting that Jews in Russia “think that if he changes his mind, or if another less tolerant person takes his place, the whole state apparatus and the public will revert to the usual anti-Semitism.”

Such an eventuality will also remove the restrictive framework in situations involving domestic anti-Semitism, the potential for which is still great and even growing insignificantly. This is indirectly confirmed by Rabbi Alexander Boroda, the president of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia. In June, he stated that he was concerned about the level of latent anti-Semitism in the country. Boroda says that the US State Department report on religious freedom indicates a relatively high level of latent anti-Semitism in Russia, stressing that in 2017-19, the number of Russians who declare themselves as anti-Semites was already at 15%-17%. However, at the moment, these people, for the reasons mentioned above, prefer not to advertise their views in public.

Nathan Sharansky, the former chairman of the Jewish Agency and a political prisoner in Soviet times, believes that “Putin is not suited to Russian democracy, so Jews and other citizens of Russia may be disappointed by the restrictions on freedom.” It is difficult to disagree with him that, in the event of a change in leadership, “anti-Semitism returns to the level it was at for 1,000 years … today’s positive societal views of Jews won’t be enough to stop it. The democratic composition of the country has to be strong enough to fight these pressures.”

*[Correction: An earlier version of this article mistakenly stated that a doctor in Russia can legally refuse treatment to a woman wearing a hijab, whereas, in fact, Russia has no such legislation in place. Updated: 23/12/2020, 11:00 GMT.]

*[Fair Observer is a media partner of the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is Russia Immune to Anti-Semitism? appeared first on Fair Observer.

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But the government in Kyiv — first represented by the parliament leader Olexander Turchynov and then by the newly elected President Petro Poroshenko — preferred a different approach. An ongoing civil war soon broke out, in which Russia supports the Russian-speaking population of the separatist regions. Ukraine accuses Russia of military and financial support for the separatists. Moscow rejects these allegations and does not consider itself a party to the conflict. Meanwhile, in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, people continue to die.

Zelensky’s Promise

Unlike his predecessor, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, during his election campaign in 2019, promised to put an end to the war. Despite opposition from armed nationalist groups, he has managed to separate fighting forces in several regional sectors. In December 2019, he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Paris, which brought new hope for peace to the region.

It is understood that Zelensky is eager to reach an agreement to put an end to hostilities. At the Munich Security Conference on February 14, he announced his intention to complete the process of reintegration for Donbas this year. To do so, he wants to hold local elections in the fall of 2020 in accordance with the Ukrainian Constitution.

To achieve this goal, Zelensky made the following two statements in Munich. First, he wants to completely separate the fighting forces in the east of the country. Second, he aims to withdraw military equipment from the demarcation line in eastern Ukraine. As he put it, this fundamentally new approach will help to reduce the risk of shelling from both sides. He added that local elections are impossible without control over the border between the Ukrainian Donbas region, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other.

Given that the separatists fear the closing of the border with Russia, Zelensky made a truly revolutionary proposal. He agreed to joint control of this section of the border with representatives of the separatist Donetsk (DPR) and Luhansk (LPR) people’s republics in eastern Ukraine, as well as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Yet while he ruled out the possibility of holding direct dialogue with the official leaders of the self-proclaimed republics in Donbas — which Russia seeks from Ukraine — it is rather a tribute to nationalists who are against making any concessions to the separatists and believe there is only one way to peace: by force.

At the end of 2019, a series of protests led by nationalists took place in Kyiv against any cooperation with the leadership of the unrecognized DPR and LPR. Their position was expressed by Yuri Gurenko, the head of the Kyiv branch of the ultra-nationalist organization Right Sector. “If Ukrainian control is established over this (separatist-held) territory, then we can talk about elections, not just the border but the whole territory,” he said. “Elections held by terrorist groups can’t be legitimate.”

Given that the nationalists disrupted the complete separation of forces in eastern Ukraine in October 2019, Zelensky knows he needs to be careful when making statements about peace. Indeed, Ukrainian nationalist groups have not been fringe movements for a long time. These groups form the basis of the state ideology in Ukraine. The reincarnation of the ideology of integral nationalism, as well as the glorification of Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera and veterans of the SS Galicia division — who fought with the Nazis against the Soviet Union in World War II — began with the radical right in the 1990s.

The Right Sector’s Units

In addition, since 2014, almost all the nationalists have created the combat units. Many of these units have joined the ranks of the armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as volunteer battalions. In July that year, for example, the Right Sector formed the so-called Volunteer Ukrainian Corps (DUC-PS). The DUC-PS participated in military operations in the Donetsk region against armed groups of the DPR. The combat units of the DUC-PS were under the operational command of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO), interacting with neighboring units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU).

The DUC-PS withdrew from the frontline in April 2015, but that did not change anything. It is still an official armed group that de facto submits only to the political leadership of the Right Sector. Moreover, at the end of that year, the leader of the Right Sector, Dmitry Yarosh, created a new corps of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army, which actively participated in hostilities until recently.

But the DUC-PS and Yarosh’s corps are not the only two armed units of the radical right in Ukraine. There are dozens of such battalions that are formal subordinates of either the Ministry of Defense or the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The most famous among them are the Azov and Donbas battalions but, in reality, there are many more.

There are also so-called independent volunteer units of Ukrainian nationalists who do not answer to anyone. As of August 2016, there were up to 5,000 armed fighters in their ranks. In addition to the DUC-PS, there are the OUN Battalion — or the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists — three Islamic organizations and others. Most of these groups are financed by Ukrainian oligarchs, who, by 2016, led the conversation about the transformation of volunteer groups into private armies. This factor remains a serious argument in the formation of Ukrainian politics, especially in the fight against separatists and Russia.

Many of these groups work with the younger generation, recruiting not only ideological supporters but also ordinary militants. In 2015, the Right Sector’s DUC-PS recruited teenagers. Today, its training camps are not empty. They actively interact with nationalist and even pro-Nazi ATO veterans, primarily in western Ukraine.

Clearly, without solving the problem of the influence of the radical right in Ukrainian politics, Zelensky is unlikely to be able to achieve a peaceful settlement in the Donbas region. All of his decisions, in this sense, will be sabotaged by nationalists who are ready to use any means of pressure — from protests in Kyiv to armed battalions that have experience in military operations.

In October 2019, Ukrainian authorities were not able to complete the withdrawal of troops from the demarcation line that separates the warring factions. The reason was that nationalist battalions took up positions there instead of the assigned units of the Ukrainian armed forces. They also refused to comply with the order of the supreme commander to withdraw. Since being elected in April 2019, Zelensky has simply not tried his luck and has not had direct confrontation with neo-Nazis, given the mass protests organized by them in Kyiv in October 2019.

However, the question is whether there has there been any change in the attitude of officials toward these groups since Zelensky was elected. Indeed, has the new president done anything to reduce the political and ideological influence of these movements? The answer is still no. The future outlook does not look good either.

Issuing Grants

Since Zelensky came to power, the policy of moral and material support of nationalists by the state has not changed and, in fact, has only intensified. In late January 2020, the Ministry of Culture reallocated almost half of all funds originally set for youth NGOs to nationalist organizations instead. Of the 20 million Ukrainian hryvnias ($744,000), they received 8 million hryvnias ($297,000). Among these organizations are the Educational Assembly and National Center for Human Rights, associated with the ultra-right group C-14; the National Youth Congress, the Young People’s Movement; and the youth wing of the neo-Nazi Freedom Party, Falcon of Freedom, among others.

In December 2019, the exact same situation developed with the distribution of state grants by the Ministry of Youth and Sports to national-patriotic education. The radical right received 9 million hryvnias. According to the State Competition Commission, grants were provided for the implementation of projects aimed at “the formation of value guidelines and the establishment of a national-patriotic consciousness of children and youth, the popularization of the national spiritual and cultural heritage, and the raising of the level of knowledge about outstanding personalities of Ukraine.”

The lion’s share of the winning projects focused on the glorification of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). The UPA is well known for its ties with the Nazis and participating in the extermination of Jews and Poles in World War II. It is also known for individuals such as Simeon Petlyura, the organizer of the Jewish pogroms during the civil war of 1918-20; Stepan Bandera, the leader of Ukrainian nationalists who collaborated with Adolf Hitler; and Roman Shukhevych, the commander-in-chief of the UPA, the Wehrmacht Hauptmann and deputy commander of the Nachtigal special forces Whermacht battalion.

Several projects were won by the national scout organization Plast, which is associated with nationalists from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists-Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN-UPA). It is worth noting that Bandera and Shukhevych were once part of this organization. The money from the grants will go to the organization of military-patriotic camps for youth.

One of the most expensive projects will be the festival of “Ukrainian spirit,” known as Banderstat. It will be hosted by the NGO of the same name and will receive 420 thousand hryvnias from the Ministry of Youth and Sports. The organizers have not yet announced the list of musicians who will perform at the festival on August 7-9 in Lutsk, but they say the event will be “patriotic and ideological.” An important leitmotif of Banderstat and the main slogan of the organization is to remember “your story and [be] worthy of creating a new one.” UPA veterans visit the event every year, and “rebel and liberation battles” are reenacted. There is no doubt what Banderstat will be promoting this year.

The Union of Ukrainian Youth, which claims to uphold “the restoration of historical justice, rehabilitation in the minds of the people … the names of Petlyura, Bandera and Shukhevych, the struggle of the OUN and the UPA” — as written in the grant application — also won several state grants. In particular, a grant of 95 thousand hryvnias was provided to the mobile camp Zagrava, which says participants will have “an exciting journey through the historical sites of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.”

The Ukrainian Reserve Army — created in 2014 — will receive 310 thousand hryvnias for the Unizh Forge, a sports and “patriotic” camp designated for children of combatants. Another 230 thousand hryvnias will be sent to the Wings Youth Foundation, which has proposed the Rebel Nights project. This initiative was implemented last year in the Rivne region. Young people were involved in restoring and cleaning the graves of UPA soldiers.

Patriotic Education

According to Eduard Dolinsky, the director of the Jewish Ukrainian Committee (JUC), in January 2020, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Youth and Sports held hearings in parliament on the topic titled, “How to form a national identity and educate Ukrainians nationally and patriotically.” The hearings led to 10 pages of recommendations that were sent to all government agencies. The document states that national-patriotic education is of strategic importance for the future of Ukraine and, therefore, it is necessary to create a state agency for this purpose and allocate money for television programs. In particular, these would focus on the OUN-UPA, in order “to determine that the presence of harmful information products in the information space that lead to the degradation of the society.”

The document emphasizes that in Ukrainian schools, before the lesson of patriotic education, it is necessary to sing the UPA anthem, which was recently adopted as a theme of the new Ukrainian army. It states that when children are resting at youth camps, they should be provided with national education activities, taken to more national art events and that libraries should be filled with national-patriotic literature. The document focuses on the word “national.” So, instead of patriotic, it is national-patriotic, and instead of artistic events, it is national-artistic. This practice was widely practiced by integral nationalists of Bandera in the 1940s and 1950s.

The policy of glorifying Ukrainian collaborators from the Second World War has not changed under Zelensky. In February 2020, according to Dolinsky, a memorial plaque to Yuri Polyansky, the burgomaster of Lviv during the Nazi occupation, was officially opened in Lviv in western Ukraine. Under Polyansky, Jewish pogroms and the destruction of Polish intellectuals took place, while a Judenrat and auxiliary police were created.

On February 8, the VII Bandera Readings took place in the Hall of Columns of the Kyiv City Hall. Participants examined the global challenges of transhumanism, discussed the “great personality of Stepan Bandera” and looked at whether Ukrainian nationalism can withstand artificial intelligence.

In that same month, authorities in Lviv presented a jubilee stamp in honor of the late war criminal Vasyl Levkovych, in what would have been his 100th birthday. Levkovych was the commandant of the Ukrainian auxiliary police of the town Dubno, the organizer of Jewish pogroms, and the executioner of 5,000 Dubna and Rivne Jews and thousands of Poles. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, already with a new head, Anton Drobovich — who was appointed by President Zelensky — published an article about the so-called “hero” on his Facebook page and on the institute’s website. However, in December 2019, the Verkhovna Rada, where 70% of the seats are controlled by the Servant of the People, a pro-presidential party, adopted a resolution honoring Levkovych.

Zelensky Can’t Move

All of this suggests that President Zelensky is either afraid to oppose the radical right in Ukraine, or he has become a hostage to the system that has been formed in Ukraine over the past six years. As such, he is politically paralyzed and cannot effectively confront the far right when it comes to negotiating peace for the Donbas region. If this is the case, then he will not fulfill his election promise and will likely see a fall in his popularity ratings.

It is intriguing that the Ukrainian leader has publicly set the deadlines for local elections — October 2020 — and his next steps in this direction. In any case, over the next few months, we will either see a clash between the president and the radical right or the Ukrainians will freeze the Minsk protocol, which aims to put an end to the war in eastern Ukraine.

*[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) is a partner of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Can Volodymyr Zelensky Bring Peace to Eastern Ukraine? appeared first on Fair Observer.

In the modern world, such a guarantee is, first of all, the institution of a nation-state. What is a nation-state? It is any state that protects the interests of the nation. Today nations are formed either on the basis of the traditions and culture of the ethnic majority — most of the world’s countries, including European ones — or on the basis of a supra-ethnic idea, which is especially important for multi-ethnic societies. This last model includes almost all the “emigrant” states, like the United States, Switzerland, India and several others.

The Soviet Union, in principle, also belonged to this category. In the USSR, the Communist Party created a supra-ethnic nation, which was referred to as the “multinational Community of the Soviet people.” This nation was united by the idea of Marxism and proletarian internationalism, which collapsed with the beginning of perestroika. As we know, this collapse of the main ideology predetermined the collapse of the country.

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia, abandoning socialism as a path to development, also abandoned communist ideas. But while the Russian Federation left the Soviet model of the nation-state behind, it did not create a new one. A transition to the ethno-cultural model widespread in Europe, which the Russian nationalists lobbied for, would inevitably have led to the collapse of the country because it doesn’t take into account the interests of numerous national minorities. However, neither this model nor any other unifying ideology, like the ideas of freedom and democracy that liberals like Boris Yeltsin sought to develop, took root in Russia.

Does a Russian Nation Exist?

So does the Russian nation exist today? The official state strategy that lays out the country’s ethnic policy until 2025, characterizes the Russian nation according to the supra-ethnic (ideological) type, referring to “the multinational people of the Russian Federation (Russian nation) — a community of free equal citizens of the Russian Federation of various ethnic, religious, social and other affiliations, possessing a civic identity.” However, Article 11 of the strategy emphasizes the system-forming role of the Russian people in the construction of the Russian nation, which is quite natural in the conditions of a substantial predominance of representatives of the Russian ethnic group in society: “The Russian state was created as a unity of peoples, but the Russian people historically was the system-forming link of this unity.”

The document goes on to state that “Thanks to the unifying role of the Russian people … a unique cultural diversity and spiritual community of different peoples have formed on the historical territory of the Russian state.” It thereby emphasizes the role of Russian culture in the formation of cultures of the peoples of Russia, the role of the Russian language and the role of the Russian people in the formation of this diversity.

Thus, on the one hand, we see the priority of the ethnic majority, which is characteristic of all ethno-cultural nation-states, which is a step toward European traditions. On the other hand, there is a definition of the Russian nation as a combination of “equal citizens of different ethnic and religious affiliations,” which is more characteristic of a supra-ethnic or ideological model.

However, the question arises, about what unites these equal citizens? The strategy gives a rather slurred answer: Russian civil unity is ensured on the basis of “recognition by the citizens of the Russian Federation of the sovereignty of the state, its integrity, unity of the legal space, ethnocultural and linguistic diversity of the Russian Federation, historical and cultural heritage of the peoples of the Russian Federation, equal rights to social and cultural development, access to the social and cultural values, the solidarity of citizens in achieving the goals and solving the problems of the development of society.”

This means that the guarantee of unity is the recognition of the rights of minorities, which completely contradicts the principles of the ethno-cultural nation-state. However, it is doubtful that minority rights are a factor uniting the Russian nation as ethnic Russians form an overwhelming majority of 80%. Could a single Russian ethnic group be the unifying factor? No, because more than 200 peoples and nationalities live in Russia and speak more than 100 languages ​​and dialects. In general, they have co-existed peacefully for centuries. But it should be remembered that since the Soviet times these peoples have become accustomed to equal rights, including the status of their language as official in the region of residence, the right to study in their native language, etc.

Could the Russian language, Russian culture, common historical destinies, common territory play a role here? Not everybody considers these factors to be important, as the collapse of the USSR showed. What then?

Russian society has always been united by a common ideology. Whether it was the Christian Orthodox ideology in the late Middle Ages, or the slogan “Samoderzhdavie — Pravoslavie — Narodnost” (Autocracy — Orthodoxy — Nationality) that laid the foundations of multinational absolutism in the 19^th century, or the ideology of proletarian internationalism uniting the country that disintegrated in 1917, ideology has always played a unifying role in creating the Russian/Soviet nation. In this sense, of course, it can be called ideological and supra-ethnic. The rejection of ideology in the Russian Constitution and the demonstrative disregard for its importance by state leaders in the post-Soviet period is a dangerous factor that doesn’t allow the formation of the Russian nation through ideology and is a prerequisite for possible upheavals in the future.

Consequently, post-Soviet Russia also needs to create a nation-state and a single supra-ethnic (or ideological) nation, which would be perceived as such by all its people and political forces. So far, as we see from the Strategy of National State Policy of the Russian Federation until 2025, Russian political elites have created a model, which, however, does not contain any real ideological foundations for the unity of the nation. Vladimir Putin’s idea of patriotism does not hold water because it offers nothing concrete: All politicians call themselves patriots — liberals, communists and the far-right radicals. If it is so, then the question of the existence of the Russian nation, by and large, remains open, as patriotism alone can’t unite a nation.

What Unites Us

Today, Russian unity is ensured largely at the level of an intuitive understanding of common values ​​and an external threat, the presence of which, due to the deterioration in relations with the West, has objectively rallied people over the recent years.

Are there such ideological foundations today? Are there any values that most people with different political views can unite? Yes, there are, and they lie on the surface. A survey by Zircon published in March is revealing in this sense. Its findings suggest that Russians are united by conservative values, which include:

Traditionalism, meaning a decisive influence of a religious worldview on various spheres of society. It is interesting that the majority of Russian citizens are not religious, and this factor is not their priority, but religious moral values — attitudes to family, to the authorities, to the education of children, etc. — are very important for 57% of respondents.

Collectivism, or the priority of collectivist principles over individualistic ones. The survey suggests that personal freedoms of citizens do not play a major role in Russia as they do in the West, in contrast to the communal, collective interests and the interests of the state and the army.

Conservatism, meaning the priority of constancy and stability over novelty and change. This is evidenced by the opinion of 62% of respondents regrading the need for stability and a cautious approach to reform, despite the objectively urgent need for change. Hence the sharply negative attitude to LGBTQ people, with 85% condemning same-sex marriages.

Paternalism, or a system of relations based on patronage, guardianship and state control of its citizens. In a paternalistic system of government, the state is not a tool in the hands of society, designed to create the necessary laws and collect fair taxes. The state is a senior partner, which shoulders responsibility for the well-being of citizens and the obligation to provide them with a decent existence, including employment, for example. To do this, the state can concentrate national wealth in its hands. This is reflected in the survey, with respondents having skeptical views of the market and a positive attitude toward state regulation of the economy. Hence the low popularity of such values ​​as freedom, democracy, personal success, education, etc., which are shared by only 14% of respondents.

Russians think that the state is responsible for their welfare. Therefore, a low level of trust in such institutions as the government (28%), law enforcement agencies (31%), the courts (29%) and the state Duma (22%) is a serious signal that indicates that a credit of trust in the power as a whole is not great. The weight of the government is supported only by high approval ratings of the army (64%), the institution of the presidency (54%) and the Russian Orthodox Church (50%). Exhausting a credit of confidence in the authorities in Russia is a dangerous thing.

Justice, including social justice. The priority of this value follows, inter alia, from paternalism and collectivism. Some 40% of citizens believe that there is a conflict between rich and poor in the country, meaning they see an absence of social justice in Russian society.

Russian Version of Democracy

Many other, earlier studies, including sociological surveys, confirm these conclusions. This does not mean that the Russian people completely reject Western values like human rights, freedom, individualism, liberalism and seeing the state as an instrument of society. Simply put, these values ​​are not paramount for most of Russians. This is why Russia’s vision of democracy is different from the European models.

Given that, according to one poll, just over half of Russians (52%) have heard of liberal ideas and just 18% say they support them, a conservative ideology is the only thing that can unite Russian society today and complete the process of creating the Russian nation and the Russian nation-state. Indirectly, this will become a stabilizing factor and a guarantee against right-wing radicalism lobbying for an ethno-cultural Russian state. Conservative values ​​are popular today not only in Russia, but throughout the post-Soviet space. Therefore, by betting on a conservative nation-state, Moscow will get additional opportunities to strengthen its ideological influence not only among Russian compatriots in the former Soviet Union, but also in the post-Soviet space in general.

If Russian authorities continue to ignore the role of ideology, then the institution of a universal state will remain the only guarantee of stability, with the state seeking control over all spheres of society. Such a state is called an empire.

Russia has a choice in the coming years, and this choice will determine its fate for decades. It can remain an empire — but today’s empires do not live long. In the context of globalization and reactive dissemination of information, their lifespan is sharply reduced. Russia can again return to the way of democratization and liberalism without creating a nation-state. We have already seen this in the end of 1980s. Then it had led to the collapse of the USSR and the radicalization of society.

There is also a third way of uniting the nation on the basis of conservatism and creating a conservative nation-state, which will allow the country to develop further and increase its standing in Eurasia and other regions of the world. This choice lies in the area of ideology and values. Russian society has almost no time left for this. The countdown has already begun.

*[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Russia Needs a New National Idea appeared first on Fair Observer.

Firstly, we still have disappointing data when it comes to the fear of immigrants. The negative attitude of Russians toward migrants remains high, and has in fact increased. In general, between 63% and 67% of Russians, according to polls conducted by the Levada Center for public opinion research in August 2018 and by a Telegram channel in July 2019, view migrants negatively. The total number of migrants in Russia is just over 7% of the total population of the country.

Thus, we can state that the current level of migrant-phobia is between 5% to 9% higher than in 2017. It is interesting that the All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM), well known for closer ties to the government, gives an even higher figure — 78%. Experts largely associate this growth with events in Yakutia, where the rape of a Yakut girl by a Central Asian migrant has caused massive unrest in March this year.

Gaging Public Opinion

The events in Yakutia, as well as the mass protests against Roma in the village of Chemodanovka, in the Penza region, in June, where an ethnic Russian was killed by the Roma in a domestic fight, led to a sharp increase in the percentage of respondents who saw mass ethnic clashes as a possible occurrence. By the time the Levada report was conducted, this number has grown markedly. Now, 31% of respondents think confrontation is a possibility, versus 19% in 2017, although after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 this figure has been on a constant decrease. However, only 15% of respondents (8% in 2017) think there is a possibility of such clashes in the areas where they live.

Most experts also agree with the assessment of attitudes toward LGBTQ people in Russia. In May this year, the Public Opinion Foundation (POF) and the Levada Center conducted parallel studies on Russian attitudes toward homosexuality. Surprisingly, their conclusions almost coincided. More than half (55% and 56% respectively) of respondents said they had a negative attitude toward people with a different sexual orientation.

Moreover, according to the POF, 51% of respondents said that they would stop communicating with their friends if they found out that they identified as LGBTQ; among the Levada respondents, 49% said this. In addition, according to the Levada data, only 47% agree that homosexuals have the same rights as heterosexuals, while 25% believe that they must be treated differently from everyone else.

However, it should be noted that the situation with the attitude toward LGBTQ people in Russia as a whole has improved since in 2015, when the last report was conducted. The number of respondents in 2015 who were more or less negative or wary of homosexuals was 65%. Today, 39% say sexual orientation plays no role in their opinion of someone. However, the percentage of respondents who approve of homosexuality remained the same — 3%.

It is interesting that according to the Levada Center, 46% of Russians have a negative view negatively of representatives of various religious sects, by which they understand first of all Jehovah’s Witnesses. This is most likely due to negative representation of the activities of this group in the media in 2017-18.

Interethnic Relations

Regarding interethnic relations, various Russian sociological centers unfortunately gave diametrically opposite assessments. The Levada Center recorded a sharp increase in xenophobia among Russians in August 2018. The Public Opinion Foundation, which conducted its study in December last year, presented the opposite conclusion that the last years have seen a trend toward a gradual decrease in xenophobia.

Thus, according to the Levada data, those who wanted to limit the number of Roma living in Russia increased by 15% compared to 2017, up to 32% in 2018, and of Jews by 8%, now at 12%. In relation to immigrants from former Soviet Central Asian republics — Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan — fear grew by 7% (25% in 2018 against 19% in 2017 ), of the Chinese by 16% (31% in 2018 against 15% in 2017), and immigrants from the Caucasus by 1% (23% in 2018 against 22% in 2017).

In May 2019, Levada informed us that the number of those who viewed Caucasians and immigrants from Central Asian countries negatively was at 19%. But, at the same time, 28% of respondents do not want any restrictions on immigration.

However, according to the POF December 2018 poll, the number of xenophobic responses in relation to various ethnic groups as a whole did not exceed 14%, of which 3% negatively related to immigrants from the Caucasus, Tajiks and Uzbeks, and only 1% to Roma and Chinese. The study concluded that 82% of Russians are tolerant of their neighbors, and only 7% have ever experienced discrimination and insults related to their ethnicity.

It is unlikely that such a sharp drop occurred in the mood among the Russians in just the four months between the polls. Most likely, the reason lies in the methodology used in the studies. The methods used in the Levada report are more specific in determining attitudes toward immigrants. Questions included “Are you ready to see representatives of such an ethnic group among the inhabitants of Russia?”; “Would you let them to come into Russia?”; “Would you let them come in only temporarily?”; etc., which created a feeling among the respondents that they were talking about foreigners, and not about the citizens of their country. It should be borne in mind that Russians, in principle, are very wary of foreigners.

Other questions probed whether respondents were ready to see a representative of another ethnic group among their family members, friends and work colleagues, which already implies close communication with them. This methodology contrasts with the previous methods employed by Levada, in particular in 2017, when questions were asked about the general attitude of respondents to other ethnic groups: “What feelings do you personally feel about …”; “How do you personally feel about the representatives of another … ethnos … religion”; or “How do you feel about the slogan ‘Russia is for Russians?'”

As for the POF poll, it was also built on the principles of the general attitude of the respondents to representatives of other ethnic groups, aimed at finding out whether ethnic discrimination is occurring in the respondents’ region of residence, and how generally they relate to the fact that Russia is multi-ethnic country. Accordingly, a comparison of the results of the two polls is hardly useful.

Crime Statistics

The answer to the question as to which polling data is more accurate is given by the statistics on hate crimes for 2018 and the first half of 2019. As a rule, the growth in the number of hate crimes is accompanied by an increase in xenophobia, and vice versa.

The 2018 report by the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs on the hate crime shows that 1,679 crimes of a terrorist nature and 1,265 crimes of an extremist nature (hate crimes) were recorded; 1,188 of them were solved. These indicators, compared to 2017, decreased by 10.3% and 16.8%, respectively. According to the prosecutor general’s office, in the first half of 2019, the number of such crimes decreased even more — by 58.8% compared to the same period in 2018.

It is clear that the main share of the fall in statistics was in crimes under Article 282 of the Russian criminal code (Incitement of Hatred or Enmity, as Well as Abasement of Human Dignity), which was partially decriminalized on December 27, 2018. Now, an administrative penalty is provided for the offense if it is committed for the first time. Criminal liability now comes only after a repeated relapse. Since the discussion about the need to liberalize this article has been ongoing, and President Vladimir Putin had repeatedly spoken about it, investigators, on their own initiative, had been closing criminal cases initiated earlier under this article since July 2018 and refusing to initiate new ones. The same trend has been observed at the courts. If in 2017 the number of convictions under Article 282 totaled 253, in 2018 it dropped to 199. At the same time, the number of administrative penalties for distributing of extremist materials and demonstrating forbidden symbols increased.

However, liberalization concerned mainly the Part 1 of Article 282, namely insignificant acts, such as social media “likes,” imprudent statements on social networks, demonstration of extremist symbols, etc. Part 2, concerning incitement to hatred with violence or threats, organized by a group, etc., was not decriminalized. The same applies to Article 282.1. on the organization of the extremist community and participation in it, Article 282.2. on organization of activities of the extremist community, and Article 282.3. on financing of extremist activities. All of them still carry a criminal charge.

If we look at the statistics for hate crimes in 2018, we will see that the drop in crime statistics under Article 282 accounted for 20.8% — a total of 780 criminal cases were initiated under this article. At the same time, the number of murders motivated by hatred did not increase significantly (5 in 2017 and 6 in 2018), slightly reduced the number of cases initiated for causing serious bodily harm (3 in 2017 and 1 in 2018). The number of attacks resulting in medium harm to health (2 cases) and the number of attacks with mild infliction of harm (16 and 9 cases, respectively) decreased sharply.

At the same time, 6 more cases of beatings for reasons of hatred and hostility — 12 cases in 2017 and 18 cases in 2018 — were recorded. If you do not take into account the reduction in criminal cases under Article 282, which occurred as a result of preparations for partial decriminalization, the situation has not changed much compared to 2017. Consequently, the statement about a sharp rise in xenophobic sentiments in August 2018 can hardly be considered objective.

Causes for Concern

Nevertheless, the decriminalization of Article 282 may have major consequences, since criminal liability served to restrain those who have just started their journey toward extremism. Obviously, before committing a violent crime, today a potential extremist goes online, where he searches for his own kind, spreading his views, sharing appropriate symbolism, etc. As a rule, those who can be stopped at this stage do not commit more serious crimes. Time will tell if administrative penalties will provide such a deterrent.

The statistics for the first half of 2019 give cause for some concern, given a slight increase in the number of attacks with medium and light consequences for the health of the victims. There were 3 murders (2 for the same period of 2017), 8 cases of death threats (2 for the same period of 2017), 6 cases of hate hooliganism (versus 4 in 2017), as well as a sharp increase in the number of cases initiated for organizing the activities of an extremist organization (90 cases against 48), which, however, as is known from practice, are not always connected with right-wing radical groups in Russia.

It is interesting that, according to the Zircon Public Opinion Research Center, trust among Russians in any mass non-governmental organizations and parties has recently dropped to a minimum of 20%. This also speaks in favor of the fact that while the right-wing radical structures of Russia are unlikely to have a high rating.

Thus, analysis of statistical data and surveys shows that, on the whole, the positive trend in the deradicalization of Russian society is likely to continue, and will continue unless the country undergoes serious economic or political changes.

*[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How Tolerant Is Russian Society? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Let us not forget that for many residents of the former Soviet republics, the collapse of the USSR was not welcome. The referendum on March 17, 1991, witnessed almost 78% of the population in favor of preserving the union. The decision to dissolve was taken by the leaders of the Soviet republics behind closed doors without a mandate from the people. Moreover, it should be emphasized that by 1991, in a certain sense a Soviet nation had actually been formed. The language of interethnic communication across society was Russian, and the number of mixed marriages grew. Even among families where neither of the spouses was ethnically Russian, the spoken language was still Russian, and children, as a rule, went to a Russian school.

Therefore, creating a new nation-state on this basis was a difficult task for the new leaders, because they had to explain to the people why they needed independence. The former Communist Party elite that remained in power in the newly independent states sought to create new nations through reducing the influence of Russian culture — and ethnic Russians as its propagators — and by developing local ethnic culture. The reduction of the influence of Russian culture was possible in two ways: by banning the use of the Russian language in schools and in the state service, and by replacing the pro-Russian heroes of the Soviet period by anti-Russian icons.

New Heroes

As a result, the number of native Russian speakers (read ethnic Russians) in the school and governmental structures was reduced, with hundreds of thousands of children from families of national minorities deprived of the right to study in their native language. Instead of the Red Army and Soviet partisans who fought against Germany during the Second World War, nationalists and those who collaborated with the Nazis and took part in the massacres of Jews, Poles and others were glorified. For example, in December 2018, Ukraine’s then-president, Petro Poroshenko, signed changes to the law on the status of war veterans, granting members of several 20th-century Ukrainian civil and military organizations social support from the state.

The law targets, first of all, members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), though dozens of other organizations are also listed as having fought for Ukraine’s independence: the Polissian Sich, the Ukrainian People’s Revolutionary Army, the Ukrainian Military Organization, etc.

The director of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee Eduard Dolinsky wrote: “The O.U.N. and its military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or U.P.A., are now being glorified as freedom fighters. What is not mentioned is the O.U.N.’s xenophobic, anti-Semitic ideology, which described Jews as a ‘predominantly hostile body within our national organism,’ or that the O.U.N.-U.P.A. militia collaborated in the Holocaust and also massacred between 70,000 and 100,000 Polish civilians in order to create an ethnically pure Ukraine.”

Similar situations have arisen in Lithuania and some other countries of the former USSR. This choice of “heroes” was forced — all other options did not fit into the category of being “anti-Russian.”  

Thus, the opposition between the Russian minority and non-Russian majority was not only limited to culture, but also extended to the field of historical memory, which will inevitably affect the whole layer of traditional values. Objectively, the main goals of the governments of the new post-Soviet states in the 1990s were to revise history and pit the cultures of the majority and minority against each other, institute discrimination of national and linguistic minorities, and create a new society based on the ethnocultural values of the majority, including the forced assimilation of minorities and by encouraging the emigration of minorities.

These aforementioned trends suggest a radical agenda. This process undoubtedly contributed to the growth of the influence of radical right-wing organizations. The authorities either did not notice their activities or secretly promoted them. The goals of the radicals and state authorities were united. Post-Soviet countries tried to form a European ethnocultural model of the nation-state, which involves the creation of a nation based on the ethnic and cultural values of the ethnic majority.

Yet, unlike in Europe, this process did not take place in conditions of culturally homogeneous societies with the gradual rise of immigration. In the post-Soviet countries, these processes took place under the impact of multi-ethnic and multicultural societies and the failure of the ideological social model. This led to the division of society along ethnic lines and to the emergence of dangerous trends that can be described as modern racism.

Modern Racism

Back in 1954, an American psychologist named Gordon Allport noted that cultural racism arises when “one group declares its claim to determine cultural values for the whole society.” Modern racism is not about discrimination based on race: It has to do with cultural discrimination. In the discourse of modern racism, it is believed that different racial and ethnic groups with divergent cultural codes have no chance of getting along with each other. Thus, there must be limits on the influence of a minority culture upon the culture of the indigenous majority.

Three methods commonly used to implement the ideas fueled by modern racism involve limiting the flow of people of other cultures into the country. These include restricting immigration in order to limit the cultural influence of a minority; reducing the presence of representatives of another culture in the country — a number of economic, political or cultural-educational tools are used for this purpose, including forcing undesirable people of another culture to leave the country; and, finally, the cultural assimilation of minorities. Being a declared benefit for the national minority, assimilation is replaced by the word “integration” more and more often. Although integration is a two-way street, assimilation is always a movement in one direction — toward the majority.

It is necessary to distinguish between voluntary and compulsory assimilation. It is obvious that voluntary assimilation cannot be considered a sign of modern racism, due to the right of choice. It is absolutely normal when people have the right to choose their cultural identity.

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Forced assimilation, however, is a sign of racism, indicating policies aimed at involuntary change of identity. It includes depriving national minorities of the right to choose in matters of their education and culture, like in Ukraine or Latvia; no alternative to the obtrusion of the majority culture on minorities; the destruction of the educational infrastructure of national minorities, including private schools and universities, accompanied by a total ban on education in the languages of national minorities; and prohibiting the language of national minorities in communication with authorities and even in everyday life.  

For example, in April 2019, the Ukrainian parliament adopted the Law of Languages. This is a law of total Ukrainization, which mandates that only the Ukrainian language may be used in the realms of the state, local governments, state and municipal companies, the judicial system, the armed forces, law enforcement, elections and referenda, labor relations, education, science, culture, television and radio broadcasting, and print media. Attempts to grant official status to another language are equated with actions aimed at forcibly changing or overthrowing the constitutional order and can lead to 10 years in prison. Attempts to introduce multilingualism at the official level in Ukraine can also punishment with 10 years in prison.

So, modern racism involves violent acts aimed at limiting the influence of another culture. As a consequence of these actions, minorities are forced to abandon their own culture and to be absorbed by the majority culture. Again, this is presented as a boon to minorities. But, in this case, the right of choice is not granted to them — except for one thing: to leave their country.

Therefore, the classic racist openly says that he doesn’t like the representatives of a certain race, but a 21-century racist says, for example, that he doesn’t like mosques because they spoil the look of European cities, and also calls for another identity to be imposed on the neighbor “for equal opportunities.”

Racist States

This actually corresponds to the policy of building new nations in most of the post-Soviet space. Having chosen the right-wing radical way of building new nation-states, the new post-Soviet countries have embarked on the path of transformation into modern racist states.

Thus, while in the countries of Western Europe this was a trend characteristic mainly for the right-wing opposition political movements, such as the Alternative for Germany or the National Front (now National Rally) in France, in post-Soviet countries this is already a state policy that has completely divided both centrist and right-wing parties, which often form ruling coalitions, as was the case in Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia and Georgia (until 2016).

As a rule, post-Soviet countries from the Baltics to the Caucasus rushed to announce that they had made a “European choice,” implying that they refused to come closer to Russia. But they professed few European values. They needed to advance the discourse of this “European choice” because they believed that countries making this choice cannot be subject to criticism for violating minority rights.

Thus, radical right-wing ideas became a systemic factor in the formation of new post-Soviet states. The ruling elites in these countries tend to actively adopt radical right-wing ideas. There seems to be a gradual merging of the ideals of state elite and radical right-wing organizations. Take, for example, the displacement of representatives of national minorities from the government structures on formal grounds or the creation of non-citizenship institutes in countries such as Latvia and Estonia, among others.

We can mention also the deployment of nationalist propaganda and the revision of the history of the Second World War. The best example is Ukraine’s 2015 law, On the Legal Status and Respect for the Memory of the Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in the Twentieth Century. This law glorifies the members of right-wing militaristic organizations that collaborated collectively or individually with the Nazi regime. Article 6 of this law established that persons who publicly show “disdain for these fighters for the independence of Ukraine or deny their role in this struggle are criminally liable in accordance with the current legislation of Ukraine.”

Official glorification of the executioners of Jews means that Ukraine has revived the tradition of state anti-Semitism. All of that was the main points in the programs of the radical-right parties and was adopted by the ruling coalitions in the last 25 years.

The risks of interracial and inter-ethnic conflicts increase dramatically in countries that forcibly impose a majority culture on a minority. Today, about 30% of Muslim migrants in Europe and 85% of Eastern European irredentists, for example in Latvia, do not wish to assimilate. It is precisely in this environment that radical organizations are most effective, filling in the vacuum that has arisen after the state’s refusal to engage in educational issues, including religious and minority cultures. In this context, nearly three decades since the collapse of the USSR, the nation-building projects in the post-Soviet space remain tarred by their attempts to escape its shadow.

*[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Modern Racism of the Post-Soviet States appeared first on Fair Observer.

As the popularity and influence of right-wing radicalism grow in Europe, a question has arisen as to whether democracy is actually able to ensure stability and multicultural development. Indeed, how efficient is the democratic struggle against radicalism? After all, democracy suggests availability of different points of view, freedom of speech and expression, providing room for dissent — something that contributes to social discord and allows the spread of radical ideas. On the other hand, totalitarian or absolute rule, or ethnocratic regimes for that matter, are quite successful in terms of control over society: They rarely afford public disturbances by suppressing any sign of dissent.

However, there is one catch: Universal states — according to Arnold Toynbee’s terminology — do not live for long these days. They expend tremendous efforts to maintain control over society, which eventually undermines their stability and economic base. On top of that, there is a number of features specific to such states that make their workings difficult.

Firstly, universal states take on a primary position in relation to society. Hence, they do not depend upon the electorate’s opinion and do not take it into account. This results in the fact that the leader (or leaders), rather than society itself, is fully responsible for actions of such a state despite an existing system of elected bodies — as the public has little or nothing to do with the formation of these institutions (because of corruption, vote rigging, etc.). As a result, society does not feel responsible for actions of such a state.

Secondly, owing to its precedence over society, a universal state engenders a plethora of internal enemies whose activity it initially controls and suppresses. What’s more, with time, the enemies only grow in number, as people’s dissatisfaction with the economy and totalitarian policies increases. This popular discontent becomes more and more difficult and expensive to control.

Lastly, a universal state is always aggressive toward its neighbors. According to Toynbee, this happens because, being a pillar of a weak civilization at the expense of its external aggressiveness, such a state succeeds for some time in supporting its own civilization by competition with other civilizations. Putting Toynbee aside, it is possible to define in a clearly empirical way that universal states always create fear among their democratic neighbors. As far as they remain enclosed within their borders, universal states play according to entirely different rules and they are associated, in their neighbors’ imagination, with potential threats.

Defining a Nation

To ensure protection from such states, surrounding countries undertake preventive aggressive measures. As a result, apart from internal enemies, a universal state engenders external enemies, causing it economic and military problems. And, with a purpose of overcoming these problems, such a state also has to expend additional efforts. Countries like Russia, China and Burma, among others, are usually cited as the most vivid examples of universal states or those in the process of transition from a democratic to a universal state. In time, they will have to go through a complicated and tricky transformation.

As a consequence, all-out efforts directed at controlling society — including a repressive state and military apparatus, compounded by fighting both internal and external enemies — create levels of tension that the state can no longer support. There are two options left in this scenario: collapse or a transformation toward more democratic norms and openness. This has happened to all empires, including the Russian Empire. As time goes on, taking into account the fact that we live in the era of globalization and immediate information exchange, a rate of dissipation of universal states increases rapidly. Another issue is that social processes in the West always take place faster than in the East. Hence, a way of ensuring a social cohesion through a universal state is a dead end and, by historical standards, short lived.

But is it possible to achieve a triumph of multiculturalism and social cohesion in democratic societies? An answer to this question is not straightforward. Social stability and intercommunal harmony depend on the extent to which demographic structure of society is relevant to a nation’s state type. It is evident that any state is a nation, as long as it protects the interests of the nation. The question is, What should the meaning of nation be?

There are several definitions of a nation. One, given some time ago by Professor Valery Tishkov, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, appeals to me the most: “A nation is first and foremost a form of collective self-awareness (identity) of people belonging to a certain community that is considered by them as a nation.” Different states define these communities in different ways. Its characteristics depend on a number of factors, starting from historical traditions and ending with the impacts of power on society in terms of choosing these or other features. From this author’s point of view, there are three popular characteristics of a nation existing in society.

National Communities

First of all, a nation is equivalent to an ethnic group, meaning that being a member of a certain ethnic group is the main criterion of belonging to a nation. All other attributes, such as common territory, common historical destinies, etc., are secondary or irrelevant. This is an ethnic nation state. There are practically no states like that left in the world. One can cite an example of Nazi Germany from historical experience. Any multiculturalism is clearly out of the question in such states.

Second, a nation is a community of people united by a long-term coexistence in a common territory as well as — and this is the main feature — by their affiliation with the culture and traditions of the ethnic majority. Traditions of the ethnic majority represent a key pillar uniting citizens into nation states of this type. A nation state of such type can be called ethnocultural. This is where the assimilation model of minority integration in modern Europe originates from. Ethnic affiliation of a citizen is absolutely irrelevant for nation states of this type. What matters is one’s spiritual bond with the culture of a titular ethnic group, with its traditions, language, common perception of history, etc. This is the nature of France and Greece refusing to acknowledge availability of ethnic minorities in their state — this only divides society, after all!

This is the nature of Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands recognizing their own traditional small minorities such as Serbians, Frisians, German Romani and so on, having stated this in special provisions when signing the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Latvia and Estonia fall into this category, restricting the list of minorities to citizens of their countries and, following the collapse of the USSR, having deprived a significant part of the Russian speakers (30-40% of the population) of the right to automatically receive citizenship. Great Britain, which signed the Framework Convention without any reservations, de facto guarantees a complete observance of national minority rights for three groups only — Irish, Scottish and Welsh. In other words, a majority of European states belong to nation states of this type.

Is it possible for such state to ensure social cohesion under globalization, when recognized traditional native-born minorities account for an evident minority when compared to the so-called new minorities, like Turks and Arabs in Germany, or Pakistanis in Greece and Great Britain, for example? It is possible, but subject to one condition — if an overwhelming majority of migrants is open to voluntary assimilation. A 2017 study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung demonstrates that this has not been the case for a long time now, with an average of 30% of European Muslims choosing their own community instead of assimilation into the society of their country of residence.

This is a substantial amount. Moreover, the number refers to second and even third-generation migrants, rather than first-generation migrants. States like Germany, France, the UK and Austria can’t ensure a success of multiculturalism because it conflicts with their goals of creating culturally homogeneous societies. This is the reason why a multiculturalism policy is failing in Europe.

Such a state does not support aspirations of those who are not open for assimilation models of integration. It is aloof when it comes to their needs. As a result, isolated from the larger society, many become susceptible to radical influences that fill the vacuum created by an absent state. As a response to this gulf between ethnic minorities and the majority population, which manifested itself in a wave of Islamic terrorism across Europe in recent years, right-wing radicalism has been on the rise on the continent.

In this context, to ensure a stable society, the governments of ethnocultural states sacrifice democratic values and civil liberties to security concerns. Thus, they gradually drift toward universal states as, having chosen interests instead of values, they have to control a growing number of social spheres, and for that purpose they have to restrict civil liberties even more. Most of all, the ethnocratic regimes of the Baltic states and a number of other Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Poland and Ukraine have already advanced toward universal states. A process of the transformation of democratic states into universal ones will take a long time, but it has already started in Europe.

Above Ethnicity

The third characteristic of a nation treats the latter as a community of people being united not by a common territory and historical destinies alone, but by a common idea that goes beyond the ethnic one. This type of nation state can be called ideological or “over-ethnic.” For instance, Switzerland is such a state, where neutrality serves as the unifying national idea. The Soviet Union used to be such state at the first stage of its development. This type of nation states exist today in the majority of countries with large founding immigrant communities, including the United States. It does not mean that there are no interethnic, interfaith or even intercivilizational contradictions in these states. They exist, but they are less pronounced, as such a state does not strive to build a monoethnic, single-faith society to ensure a cultural and linguistic uniformity.

Thus, a mottled ethnic and cultural structure of present-day societies under conditions of globalization corresponds to a greater extent to a third type of a nation state — a state protecting the nation’s interests, created in the first place on the platform of a common ideology rather than on the basis of the ethnic majority’s traditions and culture. These are the states that are able to ensure success of a multiculturalism policy. While it is incorrect to say that there is no radical threat in these countries, but it is largely connected to some external factors — a government’s foreign policy rather than to unsolved problems of an internal ethnic approach.

Such states are powerful as long as the idea uniting the nation is strong. Once the significance of the national idea fades away, a country starts experiencing problems. The Soviet Union collapsed when its state ideology, which welded together the vast population of the former Russian Empire it broke up in 1917, became unpopular. The Soviet government attempted to save it from dissolution, having transformed it into a strict universal state; but such a state could not exist for a long time (by historical standards). However, if a unifying idea is powerful enough, with a country maintaining democratic principles, then such a nation state will be the most stable type under modern conditions.

States of other types are doomed to crisis that broke out in Europe a long time ago. Its characteristic features are aggravation of interethnic and interfaith contradictions, drifting toward ethnocracy and a gradual abandonment of democratic liberties in favor of interests ensuring stability. The secret services liven up, a police regime is formed, internal and external enemies are being uncovered, the government’s control over democratic institutions is strengthened, values are sacrificed for the sake of interests — all this characterizes a start of transformation of a democratic state into a universal one. Taking into account the fact that nation states of the second type prevail in Europe, this crisis scale becomes evident.

There is one way out: transformation into nation states of the third type. In the 1990s, it seemed that Europe would wend that way — an “over-ethnic” European idea gained traction not only in the West, but also in the East, in the former countries of the Soviet Bloc. The European Union is a global project with a goal of mixing ethnic groups, races and languages, abolishing borders and a gradual creation of an “over-ethnic” European federation.

However, events of the last decade show that popularity of this idea winds down along with a growing number of those Europeans who want to go back to the “traditional Europe,” with borders closed to migrants and with a traditional division according to ethnocultural criteria. The European Union gradually transforms into an amorphous structure of small states, whose unity is ensured by European funds enabling to plug budget holes rather than by a unifying idea. This means an existential danger for these very states, and there are no prospects for multicultural development here. Instead, radical ideas and radical politicians have wide prospects in front of them today.

*[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Can Multiculturalism Triumph in Europe? appeared first on Fair Observer.

The latest measurements in Europe show that after a sharp spike in xenophobia and radicalism in 2015 caused by the migration crisis, the situation has improved slightly, but in some respects it has become even worse. In 2017, for example, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia recorded the highest level of Roma-phobia in the last four years, and in Italy and France the same is true for anti-Semitism. A peak of anti-Islamic attitudes over the same period was recorded in Britain, Germany and France.

The situation surrounding hate crimes has further deteriorated. In 2017, an increase in violence was recorded in Britain, France, Greece, Italy, Poland and many other countries. The Netherlands, Germany and Russia are an exception, but this summer Germany experienced right-wing riots in Chemnitz, and in September there were inter-ethnic clashes in the Russian region of Kabardino-Balkaria, which indicates that the situation is still very far from stable.

The level of hatred is still extremely high, and the trends are not encouraging. There are reasons to doubt that this is exclusively the result of the activities of the parties and movements we call extremist or radical. These trends are part of a more complex system that reproduces xenophobia and radical attitudes on a large scale. A variety of political forces are involved in this system — not only extremist ones. In a certain sense, the state plays a significant role here.

In fact, the state establishes the rules of the game, including the rules for the integration of minorities. At the same time, it makes mistakes, leading to radicalization. This happens insofar as it offers mainly assimilation models that are rejected on average by 25-28% of those for whom these models are intended. Within assimilation, one part of a society (or an entire ethnos) loses its distinctive features, which are replaced by features borrowed from another part of society (another ethnos).

The discriminatory conditions for registration of Muslim religious communities in Slovakia and Austria, discrimination against Muslims in terms of language in the religious worship in Italy, the temporary withdrawal of children from immigrant families to imbue them with Christian values in Denmark, or the ban on teaching in schools of national minorities in the languages ​​of national minorities in Ukraine and Latvia, and even the ban on religious headgear are the elements of assimilation with expressed traits of violence. People rejecting assimilation are locked in the self-created ghetto, where they become victims of radicals of all colors.

This is the main problem: In 2017, 22% of Muslims in France and Germany, and 32% and 38% in Britain and Austria respectively, did not have or did not seek any contact with non-Muslims and with the nationals of host countries.

Winners of the Game

Naturally, the state does not exist in a vacuum. It is influenced by various political forces seeking the dividends from the current situation. The conservative parties and those right of center are the main players here, and the parties in power are the main beneficiaries of this game. The migration crisis caught many of them unawares. Right-wing radical views became more and more popular among their voters, but these parties did not want to give the voices to the extreme right. Instead, they began to play on the right-wing field.

They lost only once, when they decided to play the Brexit card. In other cases, the elite always won. In France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Ukraine the ruling parties managed to outplay the right-wing radicals in their own field, effectively playing the anti-migration and nationalist cards, and taking tough security measures, on the verge of violating fundamental human rights. For example, in the Netherlands, strict anti-terrorism legislation was adopted, authorizing expatriation out of court. Foreigners who participated in armed hostilities, financed terrorism or were members of extremist groups were declared as undesirable. For a long time this postulation could not be disputed in court; an opportunity to do so appeared only in 2017.

In general, we can say that we are moving toward the creation of monocultural and monoethnic states. That absolutely contradicts the reality of the modern globalized world. 

In Hungary and Poland, the government actively used the migration crisis to stir up fear toward migrants and Muslims among ordinary voters, seizing the initiative from the radicals. As a result, in 2016, the Poles and Hungarians demonstrated the highest indicators of fear of migrants and hatred of Muslims in Europe. At the same time, the ruling parties, Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, have increased their ratings, and neo-Nazis from Hungary’s Jobbik party were forced to distance themselves from the topic of migrants. In Ukraine, the ruling parties practically intercepted the nationalist Russophobic agenda, actively promoting the Ukrainian language and culture at the expense of minority ones.

What is the social danger of this phenomenon? It’s the fact that the ruling parties, playing on the right-wing field, are forced to drift to the right. Thus, instead of extinguishing xenophobia, the ruling elites play on the xenophobic sentiment and sometimes contribute to the growth of prejudice.

Carpe Diem

The second player and another group of beneficiaries are parliamentary right-wing radical and populist parties. Realizing the chance presented to them today, they are eager to use it to enter the political elite. Unlike establishment parties, they are moving toward the center, understanding the need to expand their electoral base, including representatives of the minorities, whom they just recently positioned as enemies of the nation. They abandon their most odious slogans and formally become presentable for external audience.

So the French National Front was forced to radically change the ideology of its party, making it completely tolerant, for example, to the LGBTQ and Jewish communities. Today, one third of French gay couples votes for them. The same can be said about the Freedom Party in Holland. Its leader Geert Wilders abandoned anti-Semitism and sexism in his public speeches. In Hungary, Jobbik, which has acquired a neo-Nazi reputation, has changed its tone. Its leader, Gábor Vona, sent congratulations to the leadership of the Jewish community on the Hanukkah holiday in 2016 and demonstrates a serious liberalization of views, even being criticized by ordinary members of the party.

However, such maneuvers don’t mean these parties should be hastily transferred from the right-populist and right-wing radical spectrum to the center right. Their birthmarks are still there, although they are stubbornly trying to hide them. So, the leader of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) Alexander Gauland stated during the campaign in the Bundestag that Germany “should be proud of its soldiers who participated in both world wars, and people should stop reproaching the Germans with the Second World War.” His colleague, the leader of the party branch in the federal state of Thuringia, Björn Höcke, called the monument to the victims of the Holocaust in Berlin “the disgrace of Germany.”

This is proved also by Marine Le Pen’s proposal to close all mosques in France, as well as the participation of PiS activists in anti-Semitic actions in Poland. The latter was highlighted even by the extremely politically correct European Jewish Congress. The leader of the Russian LDPR party, which seemed to get rid of its nationalistic image, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, included frankly xenophobic, nationalistic and anti-migrant slogans in his program during this year’s presidential election and managed to get more than 5% of votes, coming in third place.

Small right and left-radical parties, as well as Islamists, are the remaining players and beneficiaries of the third and fourth levels. They generate hatred at the domestic level and commit acts of terrorism and hate crimes. At the same time, right-wing radicals tend to occupy the extreme-right niche and conquer the ultra-right electorate, who traditionally voted for those parties, which today, in their opinion, betrayed their old ideals by rushing into power.

They are more radical than their predecessors. They openly profess the ideology of fascism and Nazism, question the outcome of the Second World War and so on. They are hungry, and therefore they strive to do everything possible to be recognized by the street — so far unsuccessfully. In the past six months, they have failed to attract more than a few hundred people to their events. Even in Chemnitz in August, right-wing radicals, despite great efforts, brought no more than 900 people to the streets, although a year ago tens of thousands participated in their actions.

The Islamists were also significantly weakened after the defeat of the so-called Islamic State in the Middle East. The flow of recruits from European countries decreased. The cash flow has also markedly dried up when ISIS lost control of the oil fields. They continue to work as before by ideologically engaging youth through their legal organizations, recruiting young people into terrorist organizations and even sending them to Syria and Iraq, but on a much smaller scale.

The Wheel of Xenophobia

What is the real danger? It is a process that can be called a wheel of xenophobia, when all the players interact with each other, eroding the situation from within.

The state, acting as the main participant of the process, essentially defines the rules of the game, offering minorities an assimilative — and, in fact, discriminatory — form of integration and undertaking interventions in the Middle East. Unwillingly, it creates conditions for Islamists to work destructively within minorities. Right-wing radicals use this situation to stir up hatred, this time among the indigenous population of Europe. The right-centrist parties of the political establishment and the parliamentary ultra-right parties, which drift toward each other, try to get maximum dividends from this situation. They are most effective today in the electoral field, attracting a frightened voter.

Thanks to this voter, they get into the parliament and form, sometimes together, a government, making even greater mistakes in the sphere of minority integration. The wheel of xenophobia spins faster and faster, washing away the boundaries between democracy and outright discrimination.

The second danger is the rapprochement of large right-wing radical populist parties and the political establishment, as it shifts the entire political spectrum of Western society to the right and threatens democratic values. Political establishment parties no longer see any problems in forming a government together with right-wing radicals and populists. They see even fewer problems in cooperating with right-wing radicals on certain issues without joining them in government. This is really dangerous for social unity.

For example, in 2018, the government of Denmark, which includes the right-wing radical Danish People’s Party, adopted a new set of rules to regulate life in 25 low-income Muslim enclaves of the country (thereby recognizing the presence of the Muslim ghetto in Denmark). People living in the “ghetto” were referred to a special category of citizens who are actually deprived of the rights. For instance, they can be imprisoned if they force their children to make a long trip to their country of origin, described in the law as a “retraining trip.” Now, for such an “offense,” parents can face up to four years in jail.

Double penalties are given for any crime within the indicated 25 Muslim enclaves. Even infants are subject to special measures. Now children older than one and born in ghettos will be forcibly removed from their families for at least 25 hours per week, for compulsory education in “Danish values,” including the traditions of Christmas and Easter, the Danish language, etc. Non-observance can lead to the termination of social payments from the state, even if the family doesn’t have other sources of income. These measures do not just contradict democratic values, but resemble a certain experience of the recent past. There is a difference — one can leave the ghetto. But if you don’t want to be assimilated, it is better to leave the country altogether.

In the Name of Integration

There is a second example: Ukraine, a country where right-wing radicals are not in power, but have a significant impact on government policy, especially in the areas of culture, education and ideology. Last year, a new law on education came into force that bans education in any language other than the Ukrainian. Starting from 2018, teaching in the languages ​​of the national minorities is only allowed at primary school level. Some 400,000 children will not be granted the right to education in their native language. Starting from the fifth grade, the teaching in the languages ​​of national minorities has been almost eliminated. From 2020, education across the country will only be conducted in Ukrainian.

This worsens the quality of educational training for children. According to the conclusions of international organizations and researchers, teaching a child in a non-native language lowers its potential achievements by 20-30%. According to the well-known Danish scientist Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, who studies the influence of the language of education on the future fate of communities not only in Europe but also all over the world, “teaching children in a non-native language contributes to their disintegration, marginalization and even suicide.”

From the point of view of human rights regulations, the law puts children from different language groups in an unequal position: It allows for one of the groups to acquire knowledge faster and better, and creates problems for others. As a result, a significant part of children from linguistic minority groups will not receive the necessary knowledge and will be in a worse position when entering universities or the labor market. If parents want to give their children a good education, they have no other choice but to leave the country with their children.

Approximately the same law was adopted in 2018 in Latvia. Here, even Russian private schools and universities were banned. Here the right-wing radical party, All for Latvia, initiated the law.

In all these cases, it is no longer just a question of voluntary assimilation, which is normative in European integration models, but rather the partial introduction of violent methods, since the subject is deprived of choice. Cooperation between right-centrist and right-wing radical parties almost always leads to changes in the legislation and implementation of laws in the sphere of national and religious policy toward the introduction of violent methods of assimilation.

Does this violate any international legal norms, like the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe? No, it doesn’t. Although Article 5.2. of the convention says that “the parties refrain from any political or practical actions aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to national minorities against their will and protect these persons from any actions aimed at such assimilation,” but at the same time makes a very significant reservation that “without damage to the measures taken within the framework of its overall integration policy.” Thus, if assimilation measures are justified by the interests of integration, then everything is completely legitimate.

In general, we can say that we are moving toward the creation of monocultural and monoethnic states. That absolutely contradicts the reality of the modern globalized world. Moreover, violent methods start to appear in this movement. The process of merging political elites with right-wing radical groups, which was impossible 20 years ago, leads to a series of problems. They include the legitimization of discrimination against minorities; devaluation of democratic values ​​as a result of the conflict between values ​​and interests, such as the right to choose and freedom of religion conflicting with the need for assimilative integration of minorities aimed to create a homogeneous society; the transformation of the political establishment, which includes right-wing radical and populist parties, who may formally abandoned their populism and radicalism but kept it in their policies; and further radicalization of the voter under the influence of all these factors, as well as pro-government media.

Such a process has already occurred in the 1930s. All this ended up with the fascist and Nazi parties coming to power in a number of European countries. Everybody loses everything in such a scenario: a minority that becomes the subject of discrimination at state level, the majority that develops a problematic relationship with the minority, the authorities that get a splintered society and, finally, a democracy that is devalued as a result of a conflict between values ​​and interests, where the interests get the upper hand. Only political players win, earning political capital on the radical field.

*[The Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer. Updated: January 28, 2019.]

 The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Europe Is Caught in a Wheel of Xenophobia appeared first on Fair Observer.

On June 7, 2018, Vladimir Putin confirmed on live television that Russia does not intend to enact economic and political sanctions against Latvia in response to its elimination of Russian-speaking schools, making clear the Kremlin’s unwillingness to protect the rights of its citizens abroad. Calling any punitive measures counterproductive, Putin suggested these would more likely harm Russians living in Latvia. He did, however, add that the Latvian government should be ashamed for its actions.

This position was echoed by Russia’s special representative on international cultural cooperation, Mikhail Shvydkoy. In an interview with the Latvian Segondya (today) newspaper, Shvydkov suggested that education is Latvia’s internal affair and is thus not to be dictated by bilateral relations. This became an important signal for the Latvian government, which is currently conducting an extreme right-wing policy toward the Russian linguistic minority.

Both statements are of course rational and expected. They follow a string of statements and policies we have seen over recent months, where the Russian leader seeks to show to the West that sanctions are not only ineffective, but harmful to both sides of the conflict. Also, Moscow is starting to view its compatriot policy (at least temporarily) as not something worth damaging relations with Washington and Brussels over. The Russian compatriots movement (there are at least three international umbrella organizations — International Council of the Russian Compatriots, the World Coordination Board of the Compatriots at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and the European Russian Alliance) living abroad has not solved any of the main objectives set 18 years ago, such as strengthening economic and political influence of the Russian Federation and improving relations with foreign countries.

Complicating Factor

The movement has gradually become a complicating factor in the relations with Russia’s neighbors, because countries with large Russian-speaking minorities are starting to perceive it as a “fifth column” that is misleading Russia’s interests. At the same time, they accuse Russia of using the movement of compatriots to undermine the state security of these countries. These statements are often not true, but many, for example the Baltic countries, are happy to support this myth for their domestic political purposes. Given that Russia seeks to gain an equal standing with the West on the world arena, this is proving counterproductive.

On the other hand, the negative reaction of compatriots themselves to the statements of Putin and Shvydkoy was in itself logical and natural. In some cases, there was genuine astonishment. Just recently, Russia had imposed sanctions against Turkey after the Turkish air force shot down a Russian military aircraft over Syria. There was no talk of counter-productiveness — the sanctions actually encouraged Turkey to come to the negotiating table, proving their effectiveness. Hundreds of thousands of Russian speakers in the post-Soviet space clearly do not consider themselves less worthy of protection than Russia’s interests in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, representatives of Russian compatriots in Latvia have recently visited the Russian State Duma, where they asked to impose sanctions for violation of their rights, with Russian parliamentarians expressing their support.

The compatriots also understand that Shvydkoy, in light of his education and position, must realize that national minority issues are human rights issues after all; they are not considered internal affairs of any state, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted back in 1948, and the 2010 OSCE Declaration Towards a Security Community, and should not be regulated only by bilateral relations. Russia is well aware of this (the Jackson-Vanik amendment is particularly relevant), having been made to discuss for the past 70 years the rights of its national minorities, from Jews to Crimean Tatars, which the West refused to consider to be an internal affair.

Now, Russian compatriots abroad were clearly shown that there are boundaries beyond which the Kremlin will not go to protect their rights. Negotiations, work of international organizations will resume, but there will be no acts of direct economic pressure. In fact, this was pretty much what Riga, Kiev and many other post-Soviet capitals were hoping to achieve. After all, the worst-case scenario for many of these countries would be if Moscow followed the example of Hungary, which is defending the rights of its compatriots in Transcarpathia, through other means.

Thus, Latvian and Ukrainian politicians who pioneered so-called school reforms in their countries can take a breath for the time being. National minority schools in Ukraine will be shut down, and education in the Russian language will be substantially reduced in Latvia, where the reform has a more pronounced Russophobic character. In the Baltic states, the quota for foreign language education extends to Russian schools, but not to schools teaching in EU languages. Russian private schools also came under restrictions, which constitutes as an intrusion in the sphere of business.

By dismissing the possibility of sanctions against countries that adopted these discriminatory measures, Putin essentially rejects aggressive foreign policy. It is obvious that Latvian and Ukrainian school reforms could be easily used as an excuse for further expansion, which was actually expected and feared in the West. Now, the Russian president has reassured the West, having condemned these actions but avoiding any direct punitive measures.

We Prefer Diplomacy

So what are the reasons that prompted the Russian leader and his representative to make a statement that discouraged the compatriot activists? First, Putin once again emphasized that Russia rejects the policy of sanctions as ineffective. Russia, he says, resorts to these measures only in response to Western sanctions but never initiates them, preferring diplomacy at the negotiating table. The aforementioned sanctions imposed by Russia on Turkey were rather an exception to the rule.

Second, this statement most likely indicates that the area of vital Russian interests abroad today is limited to Ukraine and Syria. Other foreign policy interests have most likely been given lower priority and can be easily turned into bargaining chips in negotiations with the West. The Russian leader, in effect is saying to his Western partners: “Let’s agree that you take into account our interests in Crimea, Syria and southeastern Ukraine, and we take into account your interests in other parts of the world, including where our compatriots live. Are you afraid that we will take active steps in the Baltics? We are showing that we are not going to and look forward to a constructive response from your side.”

We can assume that such a position will have far-reaching consequences. First, while the world leaders in the United States and the European Union are unlikely to agree to such a compromise now — given that at the G7 summit in Canada they reiterated their intention to further adhere to the sanctions policy toward Russia — the overall situation in the world may deescalate as a result of change in Moscow’s position.

Second, of course no one in Ukraine and Latvia will be ashamed of their discriminatory policy toward their Russian-speaking residents, although Putin hopes otherwise. Therefore, after turning the other cheek, Russia and Russians abroad (and in Eastern Europe, these two terms are rarely separate) should expect these policies to continue. Latvia is already intending to shut down all Russian higher education institutions in the country, which currently have several thousand students. The Visu Latvijai (All to Latvia) party, which is currently part of the ruling coalition, is also planning to shut down Russian kindergartens.

The situation is more or less the same in Ukraine, although there all non-Ukrainian schools have become targets. This, of course, famously prompted Hungary to step in and protect the interests of its minority, after having invested heavily into Hungarian schools in Transcarpathian region, which so far is discouraging the efforts of Ukrainian nationalists. Hungary promises to impose sanctions against Ukraine and blocks contacts between Ukraine and NATO.

Third, what happens to the Russian linguistic minority in Latvia and Ukraine is most likely a pilot project in the post-Soviet space. If it is successful and safe for these countries, then there is every reason to believe that it will be applied to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and everywhere else. Therefore, Russia will have to reconcile not only the local problems of Russian speakers in Eastern Europe, but the powerful elimination of Russian cultural presence in the entire post-Soviet space.

Displacement

Historians and political scientists know what this means: It is not so much the Russian culture that is displaced but Russia itself, and not just from the sphere of education. Moreover, it is to be expected that in the course of this process, the activity and popularity of various kinds of right-wing radical groups and parties, which de facto impose their policies on the ruling political elite, will dramatically increase.

We may well see, in a few years’ time, Russian-speaking communities in Eastern Europe resembling something similar to their counterparts in the US and Israel, most of which categorically reject the very term Russian compatriot, emphasizing that they are Israelis and Americans of Russian origin.

If this happens, it will automatically put an end to the idea of a Russkiy mir — Russian world — at least in its current form. But this isn’t something that Russia is prepared to accept. In any case, the Russian compatriots movement increasingly resembles a “white elephant” — hard to keep, but a pity to dispose of. Sooner or later there will have to be a choice or a massive reform of the entire project.

The compatriots movement did not become the catalyst of Russian economic influence abroad, as the Huaqiao did for China. It did not bear the same results as the francophone movement did for France, where the goal wasn’t to cultivate a French population abroad, but to spread French language and literature among the non-French. Neither did it become a catalyst of political power for Russia, as today it risks forming the image of Russians in the West as a fifth column — more influential Russians have recently been punished by sanctions and asset freezes. The only effective direction here is the legal protection of Russian-speakers abroad — a sphere that most likely will remain the same.

At the same time, the compatriots movement is not cheap for the Russian budget, and now, with Russia fighting Western sanctions following its annexation of Crimea in 2014, is not the time to throw money to the wind. As already mentioned, it has become an irritating factor abroad. To some extent, the movement resembles the Communist International (Comintern) created by Lenin as a tool for a world revolution in 1918. It was dissolved in 1943, replaced by a system of meetings of communist party leaders. At that time, Comintern became a large obstacle in establishing decent relations with the allies during World War II.

Abandoned and Deceived

Meanwhile, the compatriots themselves, especially in the aforementioned countries, are increasingly feeling abandoned and deceived. There is a growing feeling of betrayal by Russia, which many think “talks a lot, but does nothing to protect the rights of compatriots.” Among them there is disappointment in the Russian authorities, despite the fact that the majority of Russian citizens living abroad voted for Putin in the March elections. Accordingly, the idea of the Russian world is losing its popularity in the Kremlin as a whole.

We may well see, in a few years’ time, Russian-speaking communities in Eastern Europe resembling something similar to their counterparts in the US and Israel, most of which categorically reject the very term Russian compatriot, emphasizing that they are Israelis and Americans of Russian origin. Of course, this can happen only on the condition that the authorities of the post-Soviet countries like Ukraine and the Baltics dial down their Russophobic regimes, which they built with the tacit consent of the US and the EU.

If not, these countries will inherit a serious problem in the form of a split society, infected with cultural racism, which has gradually replaced the “traditional” racism in Europe. Let’s not forget that Soviet Jews, who lost their language, religion and culture but preserved their Jewish identity, above all, thanks to the tough policy of state anti-Semitism that existed in the USSR from the late 1940s and well into the 1980s.

Therefore, the crisis of the idea of a Russian world is most likely inevitable under the current political conditions. This idea might acquire a completely different character and take the form of cultural and educational projects abroad. Perhaps under these conditions, it would be more welcome abroad. Yes, the Russian Federation will certainly continue to protect the rights of the Russian linguistic minorities around the world, primarily on international platforms and in bilateral relations. But in modern conditions these are ineffective. Therefore, the Russian world outside of Russia will change.

There is a fourth consequence of this new policy toward Russian compatriots. Russia is gradually becoming the only country in the world where the Russian language and culture are guaranteed state support and development. Indirectly and not at once, this will contribute to the gradual revival of the Russian national idea, which is currently marginalized by the international domestic policy that is currently the basis of a multi-ethnic Russia. This calls for a closer look at the Russian right-wing radicals, who today represent a miserable sight thanks to Putin’s efforts. Given the almost absolute disappointment in the Western project among Russians, in the conditions of anti-Russian sentiments abroad and the displacement of Russian education and culture from post-Soviet states, the nationalistic project may well prove attractive to many.

It is a safe bet that all of the above would become a reality, unless the West hears Moscow’s signal about a constructive dialogue and takes advantage of it. What if they don’t? Putin is a smart and experienced politician to underestimate the risks. Therefore, if the call for talks and compromises sent to the West on June 7, along with other similar signals — at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in May, during a meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron, during Putin’s visit to Vienna in June — is not heard, Russia’s position may change yet again.

A peace dove could be quickly transformed into a war hawk, as has been the case repeatedly. If Moscow is convinced that the “hand of friendship” is rejected and it must work out another strategy, the vector of Russian foreign policy may change. And there is a certain probability that these changes will affect the attitude toward compatriots living abroad who have always been an instrument of this policy.

We probably have several months left in reserve. The transformation to a more aggressive foreign policy does not, as a rule, occur during major sporting events like the FIFA World Cup and economic forums. Moscow will finish this season in mid-September, after the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok comes to an end. Then, it would be worth monitoring an end to Moscow’s current thaw. In the meantime, right-wing radicals in the post-Soviet space can take a breath of hope and resume their policy toward the Russian-speaking minorities.

*[Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Juan Ci / Shutterstock.com

The post Why Is Russia Not Stepping In to Protect its Compatriots Abroad? appeared first on Fair Observer.

It is commonly believed that the main reason for radicalism in Europe is the presence of entrenched xenophobic traditions of the majority versus minority, inadequate legislation on minorities and the increase in migration flows from Asia and Africa that create the demand for extreme-right policies from the indigenous populations. However, migration from developing countries into Europe has been present since the 1950s. In addition, radical Islamists are often second or third generation immigrants, born in Europe and fluent in the language of the country they live in.

It is therefore fair to say that the cause is more fundamental and lies in the self-determination and the readiness of minorities to respect the traditions of the majority and vice versa. Does this mean that traditions and legislation play a main role in this issue? Not necessarily. There is a whole range of influencing factors, including the type of integration model implemented by a country.

Most European countries, excluding Switzerland and, to some extent, Russia, have implemented an assimilation model of integration. This model allows members of any ethnic or religious minority to become French, Greek or Italian if they satisfy the strictly defined conditions for naturalization. In other words, to be a part of the French nation, a resident of the French Republic does not have to be French by ethnicity, but must be fluent in French, accept the history and culture of France as one’s own and feel an integral belonging to the country — to voluntarily assimilate.

The word “voluntarily” is key here. This does not mean that one has to forget one’s roots and native language. In France, for example, we find the descendants of Russian immigration of the 1920s who preserved the Russian language and their ancestors’ culture, but they were actually French in a cultural, linguistic and everyday sense of the word.

Integration Models

This model is still considered a major achievement of European democracy, an essential tool in the struggle against racial and religious discrimination. It is the result of a type of a nation state, a classical European model. It is based on the term “nation” as a community of people united by not only common land, but also a common supranational (supra-ethnic) cultural and historical identity, which is based on the traditions of the titular nation.

This is the reason why countries like France and Greece (excluding Western Thrace) do not recognize minorities at all — in their view, it would prevent their self-determination. Therefore, all citizens of France are considered French and all citizens of Greece, Greek. The same may be said about many other European countries, who refuse to recognize new national minorities, as the support of minority cultures, languages, education and so on (as required by the Framework Convention For The Protection Of National Minorities), as it contradicts the idea of assimilation and cultural self-identification.

In general, the European countries that recognize all minorities and ratify the Framework Convention without reservations also have the assimilatory integration model. Typically in these countries, there is one national language and, sometimes, several official regional languages ​​belonging to traditional national minorities, there is no state support for schools, ethnic and religious minorities and so on.

For example, according to a 2012 report by the Council of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, in the United Kingdom the government supported only two Muslim schools — in Brent and Birmingham — considering these establishments sufficient for the demands of state education. Instead of establishing religious and national schools, the government implemented the policy of the “promotion of religious and cultural identity.” So, if a large amount of minority students wants to introduce halal meals, such meals are introduced for the whole school. Minority cultures are only studied by the minorities themselves.

All in all, Great Britain does not prevent minorities from education and self-realization; however, this is usually not funded by the state. The same can be said for the religious side of life. Generally, this model is supported by a vast majority of foreign nationals. However, this is no longer an absolute majority.

Voluntary Assimilation

The crisis arose as a result of the globalization process, when streams of immigrants poured into Europe unwilling to voluntarily assimilate. Tunisians in France wanted to stay Tunisians, not become French. In France, 25% of Muslims do not want to accept the European model of integration. This figure is not very different among the Christian immigrants from the developing world. The situation is similar in other European countries. It is a large figure. In other words, a quarter of immigrants from developing countries consider themselves nationals of their original countries or ethnicities — Muslims, Arabs, Turks or Pakistanis — not French, Greek or Italian.

Yes, they enjoy living in these countries where their children are born, and they are ready to accept themselves as citizens of France or Germany, but not as French and Germans. This is particularly relevant with respect to people who were born in these countries, who even consider themselves European, but with a completely different identity that has nothing in common with European traditions. However, European traditional national states, despite claims of commitments to the ideals of multiculturalism, are not ready to accept the new reality.

If 25% of minorities are unwilling to accept the integration model of the state, then it is a crisis not only of integration, but also the national state itself. Ancient European traditions upon which the nation states were founded came into conflict with the modern reality and the unwillingness to respect these traditions as a significant part of “new” minorities.

Herein lie the foundations of the conflict. Members of national and religious minorities, an increasing number of whom are unwilling to assimilate, demand their national-cultural and religious rights to be observed by the state, which denies them on the basis that their minority does not officially exist in the country. As a result, this area is usually dominated by radicals, such as Islamists.

However, a significant section of this 25% is not just rejecting assimilation. These minorities are seeking to impose their own civilizational model on the majority. Governments are welcoming this with their integration policies, for example by introducing halal meals or demanding a “more modest” uniform dress code in schools to accommodate Muslim students. This also manifests in the refusal of some city councils to set up Christmas trees in city centers or discouraging the sale of pork and alcohol in certain markets.

Some governments have a completely opposite reaction, no less harmful, which is an attempt to repress the national-cultural development of minorities. Greece is a good example of this, having tried to prohibit the reading of the Koran in Turkish minority schools and appoint Islamic leaders without consulting the community itself.

Irredenta

Both of these approaches only breed tension and protest of either minority or majority. The resulting conflict leads to radical nationalism and extremism. The situation became more complicated in post-Soviet countries that have irredentas. There is a difference between the term “diaspora” and “irredenta.” American sociologist Rogers Brubaker uses the term “accidental diasporas” and differentiates between the terms “movement of peoples across borders” and “movements of borders across peoples.”

Irredenta (from the Italian irredentismo — unredeemed), or irredenta nation is used to describe ethnic minorities inhabiting the territory adjacent to the country dominated by their compatriots. An unredeemed nation is left beyond the borders of its country following wars, annexations, border disputes or as a result of various colonial models — in this case, the fall of the Soviet Union.

Unlike a diaspora whose members are scattered throughout the territories far from their historical homeland, members of irredenta are compactly settled in countries bordering their historical homeland, with particularly high concentrations in the border adjacent regions. The main feature of irredenta is its large numbers on a relatively low level of internal consolidation.

Irredenta are usually sensitive to any infringement of the majority on their rights, since they consider themselves autochthonous inhabitants of the territory they occupy. These groups continue to regard themselves as part of the majority. They are particularly sensitive to relations between their country of residence and their historical homeland. If discrimination takes on a systematic character, irredenta form a movement for the reunification with the territory of the ethnic majority — irredentism. A similar situation arose in Ukraine, which currently tries to implement the European model of a nation state based on the formation of a nation grounded in the traditions of the titular ethnos. Events in Crimea and in the southeast of Ukraine are primarily a result of this process.

Crisis of Tradition

The crisis of a traditional European nation state has been a long-term problem, where globalization and intense migration flow caused a contradiction between the traditions and principles that founded European nation states in the mid-19^th century and expectations of a significant section of national and religious minorities living on this territory. Is there a solution to this crisis? Certainly there is.

As is known, an assimilation model of integration could be replaced with a multicultural model, which recognizes the equality of cultures and allows for changes of the hosting society under the influence of new arriving cultures. However, attempts to implement such models in the 1990s have failed, largely because of contradictions between the multicultural model and the European model of a nation state. Therefore, the only alternative is changing the type of nation state.

A state built on the traditions of a titular nation can be transformed into an international state, based on a fundamental unifying idea. For example, the establishment of the United States was based on the Protestant messianic idea of exploration and democracy. A new American nation was created on the basis of this ideology and a universal mythological immigrant state.

The Swiss nation was based on the idea of neutrality. In 1291, three cantons populated by different, primarily Germanic, ethnic groups united to defend themselves against Austrians, Burgundians and other troublesome neighbors. In 1513, they were joined by 10 more cantons (currently there are 26). For a small country surrounded by large, constantly warring states, neutrality guaranteed safety and allowed the Swiss to play an important role on the world arena.

The notion of class — the idea of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and proletarian internationalism — united almost all lands of the disintegrated Russian Empire and created the Soviet Union. Over the years, the USSR almost concluded the process of creating a new multi-ethnic nation, or as it was then called “a new historical community — the Soviet people.” The idea then lost popularity, was discredited and substituted in several Soviet republics with nationalist ideas, which along with objective destructive processes characteristic for all of the empires, largely contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Conventionally, a state established around a unifying idea can be called international, since it is not created around the traditions of a particular titular ethnic group. The new unifying ideas can be very different. One of them is the European idea, or the idea of European federalism, which is currently being attempted in the European Union. Another idea — realized by Russia and Kazakhstan — is that of the Eurasian confederation. Internationalism can be implemented within one country. Russia serves as an example in this regard having generally accepted an internationalist idea based on the cooperation of peoples living on its land. Its national republics — Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya and so on — have their national languages recognized on an official level (as second state languages), and the rights of all of the national minorities, of which there are more than 100, are guaranteed.

However, the influx of Central Asian immigrants in Russia reaccentuates the issue that this list is ever expandable. Russia will then face the challenge of fully converting to an international model of state or face the difficulties encountered by European states today.

Identity Change

Changing the type of nation state is an extremely painful process, as it presumes a change of identity of both majorities and minorities, including those individuals who try to impose their civilizational model on the majority. This process would be easier for the former Soviet republics, as they have recent experience of living in an international state. EU countries will find this process more challenging as their model has stood for centuries, and it is different.

This is why the European idea, the ultimate aim of which is the change of individual national identities to a common European identity — multicultural and multireligious — causes so much protest among the nationalist Eurosceptics. Their proposed alternative is the further expansion of nationalistic tendencies, a weakening of European institutions, the disintegration of Europe and a return to the classic model of the state, which includes the assimilation of foreign nationals. However, in the current climate, this policy is a dead end, as the number of foreign nationals to be assimilated will continue to grow, and these people hold different ideological views (especially in social isolation). Forced assimilation in these conditions is unlikely, given the number of subjects, their mutual solidarity and their mistrust or even hostility toward the majority. Such an experiment may result in the most unexpected and harmful of consequences, including the rise of extremism in Europe.

European xenophobia is the result of fundamental historical traditions and miscalculations in modern legislation. However, both of these factors are related to the obsolete model of European nation states, built on the traditions of titular nations and allowing for only one type of minority integration — through assimilation. The rejection of assimilation among a significant and constantly growing portion of minorities in Europe leads to the crisis of the nation state, which manifests as a conflict between the founding principles of the state and the rejection (or revision) of such principles by minority groups. These conflicts accumulate in the form of xenophobic sentiments between both groups, which then leads to hate crime, as well as inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions in Europe.

The growth of aggressive nationalism and xenophobia in Europe, especially considering the impressive influx of asylum seekers from the Middle East, has gradually become alarmingly problematic, and is an issue that will soon face the entire continent. It endangers not only the current model of the nation state but also the prospects for European integration and, most importantly, the identity of many European countries formed over the centuries.

*[Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR) is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: franz12 / Shutterstock.com

The post The Roots of Europe’s Xenophobia and Radicalism appeared first on Fair Observer.

The ideology of the radical right is becoming increasingly popular across Europe. In the West, one key reason is the rapid change in the demographic picture as a result of growing migration in recent years as well as an increased terrorist threat from Islamic extremism. While there is no complete disenchantment with democracy or in the principles of respect for the rights of minorities, a willingness to refuse immigrants liberal freedoms in order to preserve the traditional cultural image of European cities is becoming discernible.

This has led to the emergence of two centripetal tendencies. First, radical-right parties, seeing the possibility of significantly consolidating their positions, began to correct their extremist image; many have become less chauvinistic, more pro-Jewish and less homophobic. On the other hand, traditional center-right parties, seeing new tendencies in voters’ moods, have started to move toward radical-right positions. Thus, in Western Europe, there is a dangerous process of rapprochement between radical-right parties and center-right parties. The latter, now playing on the radical-right field, are forced to drift toward extremist positions.

The situation is even worse in some of the former Soviet Union (FSU) republics. There, the movement is in one direction: The center-right, being in power, has been moving into the radical-right field, with the latter seeming disinterested in shifting toward the center.

Why are radical-right parties from FSU countries, as well as some that once comprised the Eastern Bloc, not seeking to correct their image, in contrast to their Western European counterparts? One answer is that there is no need. Radical nationalism has long been a state ideology in some of these countries, and voting has often been along ethnic lines. Accordingly, to get more votes from the ethnic majority, populist parties need to be more radical toward ethnic minorities.

The New Non-Soviet Man

How did this happen? For many residents of the former Soviet republics, the collapse of the USSR was not an obvious political necessity. It was important for the political leadership of the newly independent states — at this point mostly the functionaries of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party — to justify the need for independence. It is no wonder that the second president of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma, titled his 2003 book Ukraine Is Not Russia. In it, he tries to explain the collapse of the Soviet Union, still ambiguously perceived in Ukraine at the time, and the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state. “We have a task on the agenda … to create an Ukrainian,” Kuchma stated during the book launch. “The danger of not returning to one’s Ukrainianness is relevant for millions of Ukrainian citizens.”

Yet the only sure way to “create an Ukrainian” on account of the development of “Ukrainism” and Ukrainian culture — especially in the fields of education, media and government service — was at the expense of “Russianness” and Russian culture, which remains widespread in the central and eastern parts of Ukraine. The same situation can be seen in other countries, like the Baltic states and Moldova. These newly independent countries needed national heroes unrelated to either Russian or Soviet history. Given that the peoples that have become absorbed into the Soviet empire have intermingled with Russians for many centuries, they now had to take inspiration from those who fought against Russian and Soviet authority.

In Ukraine, this meant the Nazi collaborators from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, who were responsible for the Volyn massacre of the Poles in 1943, and before that have actively participated in the murders of Ukrainian Jews in the wake of Operation Barbarossa. Similar “heroes” were found among the Waffen-SS veterans in Latvia, Estonia and elsewhere. Venturing further west, the same can be said of the Romanian Marshal Ion Antonescu, Hitler’s ally in World War II.

Building up this new national narrative in the 1990s post-Soviet space meant reducing the use of minority languages, destruction of educational systems ​​for national minorities, displacement of representatives of minorities from the governmental structures (due to insufficient knowledge of the state language, for example), deployment of nationalist propaganda and a revisionism of Second World War history. This process took place across practically the entirety of the former USSR, which undoubtedly contributed to the growth of radical-right movements. Thus, the radical right in these countries found itself in a favorable environment, one created over the last 25 years. Today, many are represented in national parliaments.

Interethnic Quagmire

Moreover, it seems that large political parties — senior partners in ruling coalitions — are afraid to confront right-wing radicals because they are afraid to lose the support of their electorate, which increasingly votes on ethnic grounds. For instance, in Latvia, the National Alliance has been part of the ruling coalition for seven years. Its current goal is to bring to an end to the policy of assimilating national minorities. In September 2017, the party demanded that bilingual education in national minorities secondary schools be eliminated.

Surprisingly, not just the center-right parties in the ruling coalition, but also opposition parties across the country, supported this initiative. The new bill, now being discussed in the Latvian Seimas, even includes a ban on the existence of private Russian schools, since, technically, Russian is not an EU language. This directly contradicts the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as well as the Hague Recommendations on the Rights of National Minorities for Education. The result has been sharply aggravated interethnic confrontation in Latvia.

In Ukraine, ruling parties have appropriated a nationalist Russophobic agenda and are actively engaged in promoting Ukrainian language and culture at the expense of minority groups. An Ukrainian law prohibiting all education in languages ​​used by national minorities was adopted on September 28, 2017, with the active participation of the ruling coalition. This also completely contradicts Ukraine’s obligations under the Framework Convention for the Protection of Minorities as well as on the European Charter for Regional Languages​​. It affects all ethnic minorities in Ukraine, like the Transcarpathian Hungarians, who do not speak Ukrainian or Russian well. The law has led to international disputes, with the Hungarian government promising to block all “European initiatives” from Kiev. Despite this tension, international organizations have remained silent.

Working in close contact with the ruling majority, radical-right parties in Eastern Europe have no need to hide their activity. Thus, the adoption of new laws on education are designed to solve two tasks: “To annoy Putin” and to assimilate Russian-speaking children. Most likely neither goal will be achieved.

Yet we can be assured that interethnic tension will increase as a result, and that the competitiveness of representatives in the Russian linguistic minority in the labor market will drop as a result of the educational levels of Russian children being lower than that of their peers. Also, such laws will necessarily affect the results of the parliamentary elections to be held next year both in Latvia and Ukraine, where once more voters will be expected to vote along ethnic lines. Russia’s position in these countries may in fact be strengthened as the Russian linguistic minority will turn more toward Russia, which will doubtlessly use this situation for its political interests. In this way, an interethnic quagmire could quickly escalate.

*[Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right is a partner institution of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

Photo Credit: Roberts Vicups / Shutterstock.com

The post Right-Wing Radicalism in the Post-Soviet Space appeared first on Fair Observer.