In September 2015, Russia’s armed forces intervened in the Syrian civil war. Russia’s involvement here forms a key element of its Middle East policy, and its military presence has served multiple objectives. First, it has kept Putin’s ally Bashar al-Assad in power as president of Syria.

Second, Syria is its foothold in the Middle East. It has allowed Russia to establish several bases across the nation. Russia has secured a naval port in Tartus. From this port, the Russian navy can project its power over the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, it has deployed air bases.

Third, it has made Syria a testing ground for Moscow’s military reforms. These include newly-developed force structures, operational concepts and weapon systems.

Russia and Iran cooperate in a number of fields. In the realm of nuclear energy, Moscow has built a nuclear plant in Bushehr, Iran. Both states possess considerable quantities of natural gas, which they can use to influence the international energy market. Iran is one of the biggest buyers of Russian weapons, and Russia returns the favor by purchasing Iranian drones for use in the Russia–Ukraine war. Both countries collaborate in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a political, economic and security entity of the East. (This group comprises the nuclear powers of China, India and Pakistan as well.) Moscow and Tehran combine forces in military exercises. For example, in January 2022, Russia, Iran and China conducted joint naval drills.

Russia’s bond with the Palestinians

Russia has a lasting relationship with Hamas in Gaza. Hamas was invited to Moscow after it won the 2006 elections in the Palestinian territories. Since then, its delegations have frequently visited the Kremlin. Russia does not label Hamas as a terrorist organization but rather an Islamic resistance movement. Given its policy change to an explicitly pro-Palestinian stance, Moscow has increased its contacts with Hamas since the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel.

On October 26, less than three weeks after that massacre, Russia received a Hamas delegation. During the visit, at Moscow’s request, Hamas promised to locate and release eight Russian Israeli dual citizens who were taken hostage. Hamas made the offer because it “consider[s] Russia to be a closest friend.” Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ali Bagheri Kani, Hamas’s chief sponsor, also attended the talks in Moscow. The Israeli Foreign Ministry condemned Russia for hosting a Hamas delegation, saying that Moscow “gives support to terrorism and legitimizes the atrocities of Hamas terrorists.” On January 19, 2024, the Kremlin again received a Hamas delegation for consultations in Moscow.

In the aftermath of October 7, Russia has also strengthened its relations with the Palestinian Authority (PA) of President Mahmoud Abbas. In their phone conversation on December 22, 2023, Putin asserted that Moscow would continue sending humanitarian aid to Gaza and urged Abbas to end the war quickly. He called for the peace process with Israel to resume, leading toward a two-state solution: the formation of a Palestinian state next to Israel.

Russia gave Abbas an open invitation to visit when it is convenient for both sides. Additionally, Russia invited all Palestinian factions to meet in Moscow. This is further evidence that Russia is strengthening its bonds with Hamas and the PA. These two groups sought unity and hoped to establish that in the Kremlin-facilitated meeting. PA Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh stated, “One should not continue focusing on Oct. 7.”

On Monday, February 26, Shtayyeh and his Fatah party government resigned, most likely due to Western pressure to do something about the rampant PA’s corruption and thus make it more suitable to govern Gaza. Russia will probably attempt to exploit this opportunity to create greater unity — perhaps a national unity government — between Fatah and Hamas.

Russian–Israeli relations: before and after October 7

Russia’s military contingent in Syria is a potential threat to Israel. To this end, Israel created the so-called deconfliction mechanism as a safeguard. When the nation intended to conduct air strikes on Iranian targets in Syria, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) informed the nearby Russian military — that way, the air defense systems would not shoot down their jets.

Hundreds of thousands of Jews live in Russia. For their safety, it is best for Israel to maintain good relations with Moscow. There is, however, a difference between having calm, stable relations and friendly, accommodating ones. These nations previously had the latter, which is why Israel initially avoided rebuking Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine in February 2022, while the rest of the Western world condemned Moscow. Both Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett made frequent visits to Moscow and had phone calls with Putin.

Israel’s attitude changed after October 7. The nation distanced itself from Russia when it invited Hamas leaders to Moscow. Israel canceled its deconfliction mechanism and admonished Russia diplomatically for cordially receiving the Hamas killers. On December 10, 2023, Netanyahu criticized Putin for supporting Hamas. Netanyahu also voiced his discontentment with Russia’s positions against Israel in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and other international forums. He warned against the dangerous cooperation between Russia and Iran.

Putin responded by saying that Moscow rejects terrorism, but it cannot support the dire situation of Gazan civilians. After the call, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov countered by stating: “It is unacceptable that Israel uses Hamas’ October 7th attack as a justification for collective punishment of the Palestinian people.” However, Lavrov’s comment acknowledged Hamas’s infamous terrorist attack, which Russia allegedly condemned immediately. Lavrov distinguished between its cooperation with Hamas’s political branch, operating from Qatar, whilst condemning the October 7 massacre by Hamas’s military wing.

The Kremlin also argues that since Hamas is not on the UN list of terrorist organizations, there is no reason for Russia to label it as such. This line of thought apparently is how Moscow tries to justify its ties with Hamas. Israel does not recognize any differentiation between political and military branches of terrorist organizations, neither Hamas nor Hezbollah.

In the week before his talk with Netanyahu, Putin met with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, praising Tehran’s support for Moscow’s war effort and holding talks on the Israel–Hamas war. Putin stated that it was crucial for Russia and Iran to exchange views on the region’s situation, especially regarding Palestine. Thus, the Kremlin discarded Israel’s disapproval of Russia’s global standpoint in the Israel–Hamas war, as well as Israel’s reproach of Moscow’s camaraderie with Tehran.

“Friendship” gone cold

Russia’s objective is to disrupt the US-led world order. From Moscow’s perspective, any escalation of the Israel–Hamas war would further this goal. Russia presumes that continued US support for Israel will diminish Washington’s influence in the Middle East. However, Putin fails to understand that key regional powers, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, resent Hamas and would welcome its annihilation. The Kremlin considers Israel part of the Western coalition united against Russia, and therefore condemns its war in Gaza. 

Moscow has canceled its friendly ties with Jerusalem and has replaced them with an explicitly pro-Palestinian stance. Putin has accused those denouncing the Russia–Ukraine war of ignoring Israel’s “extermination of civilians in Palestine and the Gaza Strip.” Furthermore, Russia is actively collaborating with Iran and China to wage a massive disinformation campaign to support Hamas and attack Israel for defending itself. In particular, they use social media to turn public opinion against the nation.

Russia’s unambiguous support for Palestine is also reflected in its actions as a permanent member of the UNSC. Shortly after October 7, Russia drafted a controversial UNSC resolution that referred to Israel and the Palestinian Arabs without mentioning the perpetrator of the war: Hamas. Russia and China then vetoed a US-drafted UNSC resolution, which condemned the October 7 attack, supported Israel’s right to defend itself and called for the unconditional release of hostages from Gaza. In November 2023, Russia even stated in the UNSC that Israel has no right to defend itself against Hamas, as it is an occupying power. According to Moscow, Israel’s security could only be fully guaranteed if the Palestine issue were resolved on the basis of relevant UNSC resolutions, like by creating a Palestinian state.

In January 2024, Lavrov called on Israel to stop the war with Hamas and told Israel not to extrude Palestinians from their land. He underlined Russia’s previous stance: Only the creation of a Palestinian state could prevent more violence. He then stated that the October 7 terrorist attack was no excuse for Israel to retaliate with equally barbaric carnage. Lavrov slammed Israel for attacking Syria, including the airports of Damascus and Aleppo, which would interrupt the delivery of humanitarian assistance. He also panned Israel for its alleged strikes in Lebanon and Syria, which targeted military sites and personnel of Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.

What should Israel think now?

The government of Israel was convinced that Hamas wanted to maintain the status quo. As a consequence, before October 7, Israeli leaders ignored warnings of a looming massive attack by Hamas. The consecutive governments of Bennett and Netanyahu were equally confident that they had a solid, even friendly relationship with Putin. As such, they disregarded Moscow’s firm relations with Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria — Israel’s archenemies.

Putin is not against Jews. In fact, when he was young, a Jewish family supported him. However, Putin ambivalently views the State of Israel as just a piece on the global chessboard. In its campaign to counter US influence, Russia’s Middle Eastern partners are Syria, Iran and the related proxies of Hamas, the PA and Hezbollah. October 7 saw the Kremlin replace its steady relationship with Israel by increasing its ties with Hamas and the PA.

This rude awakening flipped Israel’s attitude toward the suddenly antagonistic Russia. Israel has now embraced the US and the rest of the Western world. Russia is now treating it accordingly, burning past bridges. The fierce rejection of Israel’s military campaign demonstrates that Moscow and Jerusalem’s relationship may be cold for a while, if not indefinitely.

How should Israel view Russia? From a military perspective, the cancellation of the deconfliction system is a boon for the nation. The Russian air defense was only deployed in Syria to counter US or Israeli aircraft. Russian–Iranian ties have been reinforced by Moscow’s isolation in its war against Ukraine and its dependence on Iranian drones. Likewise, Tehran is eager to replace its outdated jets with modern Russian aircraft.

The Russian–Israeli deconfliction system had always been a superficial one. At any time, Moscow could have informed the Iranian targets in Syria about impending IDF attacks. The air defense systems in Syria likely will not shoot down Israeli jets now, as the IDF can easily destroy them in retaliation. Israel benefits from the freedom of movement that is now afforded to the IDF as a result of the deconfliction system’s cancellation.

From a political perspective, Russia’s tough stance toward Israel provides clarity. Just like the deconfliction system, the allegedly friendly relationship between the two nations had an artificial characteristic: Putin’s warm reception of Israeli prime ministers always had Russia’s strong ties with Israel’s foes in the background. Israel now has nothing to expect from Moscow. Jerusalem should act accordingly after this wake-up call, keeping its relations with Russia at a low and pragmatic level.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How Did the Israel–Hamas War Affect the Ties Between Russia and Israel? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Since the day of the massacre, many fragments of information have come to the surface, revealing that for years the political and military leadership at all levels have erred in recognizing the upcoming threat — sometimes by miscalculation, sometimes by sheer mistake. Although there is a lot of information available, it is all bits and pieces, without any line of thought or direction. My aim is to give them order and thus gain insight into where and when things went wrong in military and civilian policy circles.

Currently, two state inquiries into Israel’s policy and intelligence failures regarding 7/10 are underway. At the end of December 2023, Israel’s State Comptroller, Matanyahu Englman, announced that he will look into all aspects of the failures including examining those with “personal responsibility” for the “failures on all levels — policy, military and civilian.” He stated that his investigation will take up the larger part of 2024. Englman is unwilling to wait for a formal state inquiry committee or for the end of the war. In January 2024, he already submitted a long list of questions to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). 

Subsequently, in January 2024, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi, the IDF Chief of Staff and Israel’s highest military actor, formed a team to probe the 7/10 massacre. Though the right-wing part of the coalition government heavily criticized the decision, it seems wise since having an evaluation now could help Israel make correct operational decisions in the current war. Israel is currently fighting Hamas in Gaza and may soon be fighting the terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon, at Israel’s northern border.

Conversely, on the political side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that an investigation on the decision-making before and during the Hamas War will only be conducted after the end of the conflict. However, it is unclear when the war against Hamas will end; it may well last the whole year of 2024. Even if the fighting with Hamas were concluded, Israel might still be fighting Hezbollah. Besides, the outcomes of such a state investigation could take years.

In the current absence of results of state inquiry commissions, I will deliver a preliminary analysis of the Israeli policy and intelligence failings. Why preliminary? First of all, because the Hamas War is ongoing. Secondly, because as a private Israeli citizen, I do not have access to governmental documents; I will have to base my conclusions upon media reports.

Methodology: the levels of warfare

I will apply the “levels of warfare” (or “levels of military operation”) analysis. Scholars of military studies commonly use this schema to describe how national interests are translated into national objectives. States generally use hard military power only in the case of a serious violation of national interests. We examine the way in which they use military power at four descending levels: political strategy, military strategy, operations and tactics. The division into these four levels is not strict; they influence each other, and there is overlap.

The highest level, political strategy or “grand strategy,” involves the coordinated use of all the economic, diplomatic, psychological, military and other political instruments the state has at its disposal to achieve its objectives. The actor at this level is the government of the State of Israel. 

At the level of military strategy, we see the use of military means of power to guarantee the security of the state. The actors at this level are the IDF Chief of Staff and the commanders of the different services, i.e. the army, air force and navy.

Operational strategy comprises the execution of particular joint campaigns (conducted by the army, air force and navy) in order to achieve a military-strategic objective. In the current situation, the war against Hamas in Gaza is called Operation Swords of Iron. This operation serves the military strategic objective of the destruction of Hamas.

At the tactical level, individual military units are deployed and operate in combat to achieve the operational aim of a campaign. For example, within Operation Swords of Iron, the 7th Armored Brigade raided a Hamas command center in Gaza.

7/10 scrutinized at the political strategic level

On the eve of 7/10, the Israeli government was convinced that Hamas was deterred from starting a war with Israel. Political and military officials of Israel had frequently stated that Hamas was discouraged from a large conflict with Israel. Aryeh Deri, Member of Knesset and political leader of the ruling coalition party Shas, has admitted that the Israeli political and military leadership failed by not recognizing the Hamas threat. According to Deri, Israel underestimated Hamas’ strength and overestimated the IDF’s military power.

This belief was based upon the fact, among others, that Hamas kept aside from several rounds of conflict between Israel and the terrorist organization Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 2022 and 2023. Hamas had ostensibly learned its lesson from its 2014 and 2021 conflicts with Israel.

Hamas intentionally encouraged Israel to believe it was interested in a quiet situation. They gave the impression that they were focusing on economic build-up and avoiding conflict with Israel. Allegedly, Hamas even provided Israel with intelligence on Palestinian Islamic Jihad to reinforce the impression that they were willing to cooperate with Israel.

At least a year before 7/10, the IDF had acquired a Hamas manual that described how to take control of the Israeli area near Gaza. It explained how the operation was to be conducted (see the operational level below). The manual also described the objective to deceive Israel into inactivity, creating a low threat perception by holding negotiations for some form of long-term arrangement to create a false sense of security while at the same time conducting regular exercises and carrying out small security incidents on the border. The details of the manual were forwarded to senior IDF officers. Their reason for dismissing this threat was that Hamas would not be capable of carrying out such a large-scale attack.

Besides the Hamas attack manual, in spring 2022 Hamas TV broadcasted a series which dramatized a huge assault on Israel with pickup trucks, deactivating IDF communications, kidnapping soldiers and civilians and attacking kibbutzim (rural settlements) and IDF bases, among them the location of the Gaza Division. Presumably, neither news of Hamas’s intent to create a false sense of security (as mentioned in the manual) nor of the attack scenario (as mentioned in the series) ever reached the political decision-makers.

In the summer of 2023, a human source from Gaza informed Israel’s internal security agency, Shin Bet, that Hamas was planning a large attack on Israel soon after Yom Kippur. The information was regarded as irrelevant: Hamas simply could not operate on such a large scale. Consequently, the information did not reach Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar. Obviously, the upper political and military echelons did not hear about it either. 

In order to shore up intelligence weaknesses discovered during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the IDF maintains an intelligence unit of different thinking. The task of Ipcha Mistabra, or the “Devil’s Advocate Unit,” is to doubt intelligence assessments and offer alternative conclusions. In the weeks before 7/10, the head of the Devil’s Advocate Unit sent out a number of warnings to all senior decision-makers in the army and the political echelons, assessing an impending attack by Hamas. The unit thus succeeded in its primary task, contradicting the conventional view shared by intelligence, military and political officials. Senior leadership dismissed the assessment, and Netanyahu has denied receiving the warning.

The military strategic level

The IDF leadership assumed that Hamas was deterred because of the impact of the losses they suffered in the 11-day conflict of May 2021, dubbed by IDF “Operation Guardian of the Walls.” Furthermore, the IDF was convinced that, in that operation, they had destroyed the larger part of Hamas’ underground tunnel network. On 7/10, both assumptions proved to be totally wrong.

On October 6, 2023, some hours before the Hamas attack, the IDF’s most senior officers were alerted to some irregular activities on the Gaza border and that Hamas was preparing to launch an offensive. On the night between October 6 and 7, Herzi Halevi held an encrypted telephone call with the head of the Operations Directorate, Major General Oded Basyuk, and the head of Southern Command, Major General Yaron Finkelman. They discussed reports from military intelligence and from Shin Bet on irregular activities by Hamas.

The head of the IDF’s military intelligence directorate, Aharon Haliva, was not invited for the talk. But even if Haliva had participated in the meeting, his military intelligence would have given no indication of an imminent wide-scale attack by Hamas. Military intelligence estimated that the detected activities by Hamas were likely to be routine exercises, similar to previous months.

Consequently, the nightly meeting only resulted in limited action. Halevi ordered that the reported information be checked. He entertained the possibility that the prevailing assessment may have been wrong. Nevertheless, these doubts did not convince Halevi to prepare for a major Hamas assault.

For the intel check-up, three drones and a combat helicopter were activated. In addition to this, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar decided to dispatch Tequila teams to the Gaza border. Tequila is an elite undercover unit of Shin Bet, seen as a last resort in stopping one or a few individual terrorists who are already preparing to launch an attack. The use of Tequila teams, thus, confirms that Shin Bet also did not have the impression that a large Hamas offensive was looming.

The IDF thus prepared their defenses around Gaza for limited incursions by small groups of terrorists, not a large-scale invasion by thousands of Hamas operatives. As a result, when 7/10 came the IDF were unprepared to counter such a massive attack. According to standard procedures, battalions are expected to deploy within 24 hours in the event of an invasion, after being forewarned by military intelligence. Clearly, no such warning had gone out before 7/10. 

The IDF’s response was slow and disorganized. It took considerable time to comprehend the size of the attack; hence, the initial units deployed were ill-equipped to counter the assault.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) also missed out on 7/10. Only a pair of combat helicopters was on standby, but they were located in northern Israel. Some unmanned aerial vehicles were quickly deployed in the Gaza area, but they could not cope with the scale of the attack. IAF fighter jets arrived shortly after, but they did not understand what was going on and returned to base without taking any action.

The operational level

The terror manual mentioned above can be considered as Hamas’s operational plan. It mentioned conquering IDF army bases and posts, capturing communities, killing and abducting Israelis and taking hold of the cities of Sderot, Ofakim and Netivot. The vehicles to carry out these tasks would be pickup trucks, motorbikes and hang gliders. Large-scale rocket fire from Gaza was to give cover. The manual accurately described what would happen on 7/10.

Israeli intelligence had further knowledge of Hamas’s operational plans. Allegedly, Aharon Haliva visited Unit 8200, a unit of the IDF Intelligence Corps responsible for signal intelligence. They had signaled an upcoming Hamas attack (see “The tactical level,” below). But the warning was not passed on to Haliva. On the contrary, the assessment that he received suggested that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had no intention of causing the situation to deteriorate.

Already in July 2022, an unnamed intelligence officer belonging to the IDF’s Gaza Division gave a briefing on “The Mass Invasion Plan of Hamas.” It described Hamas terror squads invading southern Israel from Gaza, together with engineering teams to breach the border fence on multiple spots. The presentation warned that this invasion constituted a very serious threat to the defense of Israel.

Subsequently, in October 2022, a document drafted in the Gaza Division described in detail the Hamas attack that would take place a year later. This document listed details of the impending Hamas operation, concurrent with those mentioned in the aforementioned Hamas manual in possession of the IDF: invading army bases and kibbutzim, killing, destruction and hostage-taking. This was to be preceded by breaching the fence at several spots, neutralizing the IDF technological warning, communications and remote weapon systems. Hamas would penetrate Israel with pickups, jeeps, motorcycles and paragliders, as well as with boats.

Allegedly, the document was sent to the top of the Military Intelligence Directorate. Its head, Aharon Haliva, was also aware of the contents of the report. Nevertheless, no conclusions were apparently drawn nor any action taken.

On October 1, 2023, the commander of the same Gaza Division ordered a situational assessment, which noted a sharp increase in Hamas drills — six battalions were exercising once or twice a week. The division’s intelligence officer described, on the one hand, the economic benefits for Hamas for absence of violence and, on the other hand, a continuation of disturbances at the Gaza border. However, he assessed that there was a development towards détente and a decrease in disturbances.

How could this intelligence officer come to such a conclusion in the light of a sharp increase in exercise activity by Hamas? What happened with the July 2022 briefing on “The Mass Invasion Plan of Hamas”? Considering the fundamental opposite views, the intel officers most likely of July 2022 and of October 1, 2023 were not the same. Nevertheless, how could such divergent views be held in the same division?

The tactical level

On different occasions, Unit 8200 presented warnings about Hamas preparing for a major assault. In July 2023, they warned that Hamas was conducting large-scale exercises aiming at invading kibbutzim and several Israeli towns near Gaza. In September 2023, personnel from this unit noticed a Hamas military exercise which included preparations for a mass invasion with multiple entry points into Israel. The exercise included the use of vehicles to carry out the attack and practiced taking over Israeli towns. Subsequently, Unit 8200 warned a senior officer that Hamas was preparing a well-organized and planned invasion. However, their warnings were met with disbelief, and the senior officer failed to act on the information.

For at least three months before 7/10, lookouts from the Combat Intelligence Corps had reported on training, unusual activity and preparations near the border. They warned about a number of peculiar activities. For instance, more people who had not been previously observed in the area were arriving; the usual Palestinian farmers had been replaced by others; Hamas members were frequently conducting training sessions, digging holes and placing explosives along the border, et cetera. The lookouts saw furthermore that Hamas operatives had models of a tank and weapons on the Israeli fence; the operatives showed how to blow them up. The lookouts also noticed that the Hamas operatives observed the cameras on the fence and were taking pictures of them.

The lookouts passed information about what they were seeing to intelligence and higher-ranking officers, but were powerless to do more. As with Unit 8200’s findings, the lookouts from the Combat Intelligence Corps too had to experience their senior officers disregarding their warnings and consequently declining to forward them up the chain of command. Beyond this, the lookouts were threatened with legal action if they continued bringing up such alarming reports.

Conclusions

The policy and intelligence failures demonstrate shortcomings throughout the system. Intelligence warnings of a looming assault by Hamas were disregarded at all levels of warfare: warnings by Unit 8200 and lookouts of the Combat Intelligence Corps at the tactical level; Gaza Division intelligence at the operational level; warnings by the Devil’s Advocate Unit at the military and political strategic levels. Leaders were convinced Hamas was sufficiently deterred and interested in maintaining the status quo.

With these policy and intelligence deficiencies in view, we cannot help comparing 7/10 to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the other war that took Israel by surprise. The big difference, of course, is that in 1973 regular armed forces of neighboring states (Egypt and Syria) attacked Israel, whereas in the current war, paramilitary troops (Hamas) did so.

Nevertheless, similar failures occurred. In 1973, the Israeli government was wary of starting a war. The US government exercised political pressure on Israel to remain the status quo. This likely also played a role in Israel’s reluctance to prepare for war or to launch a pre-emptive strike in spite of several intelligence warnings. Equally, in 2023 the Israeli Government was convinced that Hamas was aimed at a calm relationship with Israel. Thus, the government neglected intelligence warnings on a threat by Hamas and was unprepared for warfare. As in 1973, in 2023 the US government under President Joe Biden was putting pressure on Israel to avoid conflict. In this case, Biden hoped to improve the circumstances of the Palestinians.

After the Six-Day War of 1967, in 1973 Israel considered itself invincible; any enemy would stay far away from IDF’s superior military power. Likewise, after 2014 and 2021, Israel considered itself as having soundly defeated Hamas. As Aryeh Deri has admitted, Israel misjudged the threat.

In the months preceding the Yom Kippur War, Israel received a number of warnings about a potential attack by Syria and Egypt. In the same way, over a year before 7/10, Israel received intelligence reports on a forthcoming assault by Hamas and did not act on them.

In 1973 Israel felt safe and secure behind the Bar Lev Line, a fortified set of defenses along the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, built shortly after the 1967 Six-Day War. But on Yom Kippur, Egypt quickly seized all the fortresses except for one. Similarly, before 7/10 Israel was sure that its high-tech sophisticated barrier with Gaza (consisting of remote controlled electronic signaling, camera surveillance and weapon systems) would be a reliable defense against Hamas. In December 2021, Minister of Defense Benny Gantz had ensured that an expensive, state-of-the-art upgrade to the wall would protect the bordering Israeli communities from terror attacks by Hamas. The fence was supplemented by a number of army bases surrounding Gaza. As with the Bar Lev Line, the fence around Gaza was also sparsely guarded, because the IDF relied on its high-tech capabilities. On 7/10, Hamas rapidly breached the fence at multiple locations and overran most of the army bases.

The inquiry committees of the State Comptroller, the IDF and of the State of Israel will have to deal with the question of why all these intelligence warnings were ignored. Was it out of sheer arrogance — Israel considering itself invincible? Or did the political and military leadership regard all the intelligence warnings that came from below as insignificant because it did not concur with the rosy outlook coming from above? Or were policymakers and senior officers afraid that setting off a false alarm might affect their careers?

Did careers outweigh the security of the nation and the lives of its citizens? Why did Israel not learn from similar failures 50 years earlier in the Yom Kippur War? These questions can only be satisfactorily answered if the political and military leadership of Israel is willing to do some deep soul-searching. Without such an introspection, Israel is likely to make the same mistakes again.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Israel Didn’t Predict the October 7 Massacre. The Reasons Why Are Important. appeared first on Fair Observer.

Under former Russian president Vladimir Putin, the Russia-China relationship had considerably improved. For instance, the long-standing border disputes between both states were settled in 2005. Furthermore, the nations signed cooperation agreements, which enabled them to reach a ‘strategic partnership’. To demonstrate their partnership and dominance over the Asian region, China and Russia repeatedly conducted large military exercises. Aside from the political realm, economic cooperation was also fostered, especially through Russian exports of energy resources and weapons. However, there is also another side of this shining Russo-Chinese coin: Russia’s Far East region is flooded with Chinese migrants. Moreover, Beijing is driving Russia out of its traditional backyard of Central Asia, and in Moscow it is a taboo to speak of a Chinese threat. This raises doubts whether this assumed and formally laid-down partnership in in fact friendly. Is it more realistic to describe the relationship between China and Russia as antagonistic?

Politics: Harmony and Dispute

The Russo-Chinese strategic partnership was aimed at countering the Western and US-driven ‘monopoly in world affairs’, as was made clear in a joint statement by the Chinese and Russian Presidents in July 2005. Subsequently, in other joint communiqués, Beijing and Moscow condemned Western military action in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Current Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has also given a high priority to maintaining close ties with China, as established by President Putin beforehand. At the end of May 2008, soon after his presidential inauguration, Mr. Medvedev made his first visit to Beijing. A joint statement by the Russian President and his Chinese counterpart Hu Jintao revealed a number of like-minded views on international politics, which included a rejection of the US missile defence system.

In addition to this, the two parties signed deals on nuclear energy, aerospace, and nanotechnology. In July, the Russian and Chinese foreign ministers signed a border agreement, which settled the demarcation of the 4,300-kilometer border. However, the Chinese media made clear that the agreement was seen as a territorial hand-over by Moscow.

Conversely, in August 2008 the previously friendly Sino-Russian relationship and accord on international security became fractured, as China did not approve of Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia after Russia’s conflict with Georgia due to its own separatist problems in Tibet and Xinjiang.

In addition, tension has arisen in the international realm of bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Beijing due to different perspectives regarding the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is a regional international grouping on political, economic and military cooperation, with China and Russia in a leading role and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan as the other Member States. Although Russia and China initially used the SCO to make a joint stance against the West, Russia considers the SCO an instrument of its foreign and security policy, in order to reinforce its position in the international arena.

On the other hand, China regards the SCO as a useful economic platform in order to acquire energy resources and to sell its own products. Emphasizing military power through the SCO, as done by the Kremlin, could well be detrimental for the economic objectives of Beijing. Taking into account that Russia has resisted Western military presence in its ‘backyard’ – the former Soviet Central Asian republics – Moscow has to increasingly face the fact that not the West but China is taking over this region.  China has managed to do so by investing in energy plants and in road and railway networks, thus making itself an attractive partner for the Central Asian states. Hence, it is clear that international cooperation is also eroding between China and Russia as a result of contradictory interests.

Demographic Threat

In itsFar East, Russia is facing a significant illegal immigration from China. In December 2005, Rashid Nurgaliev, Russia’s Interior Minister, stated that illegal migration – among other aspects – was creating a threat to national security in Russia’s Far East. Although Mr. Nurgaliev did not mention the word ‘Chinese’, and in spite of frequent formal statements contradicting such a development, there has been a continuous influx of illegal Chinese immigrants in this region. Russia has a long border with China and is sparsely populated in its Far East. The numbers of Chinese immigrants may vary but several sources mention a flood of Chinese entering Russia, although this has been continuously officially denied. One source claimed that in 2004 there were already four million Chinese residing in Russia, with an annual inflow of 600,000, which would suggest approximately 10-20 million Chinese living in Russia by 2015. However, according to another source, in 2005 there were no more than 100,000 Chinese living in Russia’s Far East.

Another possible indication that Moscow feared a Chinese takeover of its Far East appeared in December 2006, when Mr. Putin warned of the social and economic isolation of the Far East from the rest of Russia, which would pose a serious threat to Russia’s position in the Asia-Pacific region and to its national security. It was not inconceivable that the overflow of Chinese immigrants was more than a coincidence, but possibly a planned policy directed from Beijing in order to gradually increase its influence over this Russian region. The reasons for such a population policy were perhaps to create an overflow area for Chinese citizens from overly populated regions in China, but also to gain a political and/or economic foothold in Russia’s Far East, which is rich in energy sources.

In addition to an alleged ‘demographic’ policy from Beijing, Russia’s own regional and local authorities in the Far East are also following a separatist course divergent from the one taken by Moscow. For example, in the Birobidzhan district, bordering China, regional Russian authorities were allegedly using federal budget transfers to finance Chinese businesses. Furthermore, Chinese farmers in Birobidzhan, subsidized by the regional authorities, were selling their produce to China. In fact, Birobidzhan represented a region in which 80% of the foreign trade of the Far East region was oriented to China, Japan and South Korea, not Russia. Hence, because of continued demographic (influx of Chinese immigrants) and economic developments (the region’s outlook to the East), Russia’s leaders felt that Moscow was gradually losing its grip on its Far East.

War Games

In August 2005, for the first time in 40 years, Russian and Chinese armed forces, formally under SCO aegis, carried out joint ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises, comprising 10,000 military personnel, navy vessels, and aircraft. According to Russia’s Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, the decision to conduct bilateral exercises was made in Beijing, in December 2004. China took the lead in proposing the size, the participating type of forces, and the content of the manoeuvres. The Chinese Chief of the General Staff and his Russian counterpart stated multiple times that the manoeuvres were in line with UN principles and were not aimed against other countries. The formal objectives of the exercises were to fight against international terrorism, separatism, and extremism, and to enhance mutual combat readiness against novel developing threats.

Another aim of these exercises seemed to be to promote arms export from Russia to China. The Chinese armed forces were – as a consequence of China’s increasing political and economic power – in a stage of growth, in size as well as in ambition. Therefore, practising command and control procedures, but also purely operational aspects, such as carrying out an airborne assault, strengthened the capabilities of the Chinese forces. It is also important to consider that if Russia considered that China could turn into a threat in the long run, then these exercises were worthwhile for the Russian General Staff as well, since they provided insight into the mechanism of Chinese armed forces operations as well as their current capabilities. The formal exercise objectives had little to do with warfare against terrorism, as declared, but were actually nothing other than practise of conventional warfare, employing all services with the exception of nuclear forces. Therefore, the most likely real main objective of the manoeuvres was for China and Russia to show to the (Western) world that both nations considered themselves to be in control of the Asian-Pacific region and that others were not to interfere in their sphere of influence.

In August 2007 the SCO, but predominantly Russian and Chinese troops, once more conducted large military exercises in China and Russia, under the title ‘Peace Mission 2007’. Now, the war games were to be conducted mainly in Russia – in the vicinity of the town of Chebarkul, in the Chelyabinsk region of the Ural Mountains – after starting in China, in the northwest city of Urumqi. Russia and China had different opinions on some aspects of the 2007 exercises. Regarding the size of the force contributions, China more than once pressured Russia during the consultation rounds to accept a bigger Chinese contingent. Although Russia agreed with this, they did not agree with the Chinese request to participate with tanks and other heavy equipment, in order to keep the operation along the lines of the intended anti-terrorist scenario. The SCO ‘Peace Mission’ 2005 and 2007 drills proved that the organization had two lead nations, which publicly cooperated intensively, but which were often involved in a struggle for power behind the curtains.

Arms

One of the Russia’s aims for the Sino-Russian SCO ‘Peace Mission 2005’ exercises was arms export, as the demonstration of the capabilities of Russian military equipment was expected to encourage China to buy them. This assumption was strengthened by the fact that right after the closure of the exercises, China announced that it was interested in acquiring 30 Il-76 transport aircraft. In 2006, some 45% of Russia’s arms export belonged to China. Since 2000, Russia has delivered weapon systems to China – including fighter aircraft, submarines and destroyers – amounting to an average of $ 2 billion annually. Hence, China was the biggest buyer of Russian military equipment. Russia’s arms export to China was an important factor in the cooperation between the two countries. However, Russia seemed to be well aware that China would like to obtain its most sophisticated military technology, which, in case of deteriorating relations, might be turned against Russia. For that reason Russia was reluctant to provide China with its state-of-the-art products.

Moreover, there were indications that China was steadily acquiring enough knowledge to have a solid military industry of its own. In spring 2008, information was released that in 2007, Russian arms export to China had dropped by two-thirds because the size of Beijing’s military industry was approaching that of Moscow’s. Subsequently, in the coming years China would buy less and less arms from Russia, thus diminishing the value of this cornerstone of bilateral relations. Furthermore, as of 2007, reports circulated that China was copying Russian arms technology for its own exports. Hence, another reason for the reduction in arms’ sales was that China sought more sophisticated technology than Russia was willing to offer. With  regard to copying, once China had mastered the technology of Russia’s Su-27SK Flanker fighter, it produced its own version, the J-11B, to sell to other countries, and subsequently ended the license-contract with Moscow. Beijing even exported the J-11B to Pakistan without a permit from the Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi. China was eager to do the same with the Su-33 Flanker-D carrier-based fighter, but the Russians were now aware of this attempt.

Energy

China has recently become the world’s largest oil importer. Hence, a consistent element of Chinese policy is searching for energy resources. In August 2005 during a visit to Bejing, Mr. Putin stressed bilateral economic ties. He emphasized especially the work of Russian energy companies in China, and resulting bilateral projects that would distribute those supplies to other countries, as well as the delivery of Russian oil and gas to China. Furthermore, in November 2005, Russia and China agreed to double Russian oil exports to the latter and to consider constructing an oil pipeline from Russia to China and a gas-transmission project from eastern Siberia to China’s Far East. However, China also focused on Iran and Kazakhstan in its need for energy. It received 13% of its oil imports from SCO-observer Iran, whose share it intended to increase. Additionally, in due course a Sino-Kazakh pipeline was to be expanded and would eventually provide China with some 15% of its crude oil needs. In this way China wanted to diminish its energy dependency on Russia.

Another argument was that by redirecting Kazakh oil pipelines through China instead of through Russia, China’s influence over Kazakhstan and Central Asia would increase at the expense of Russia’s influence over the region. However, although cooperative with China in energy, Kazakhstan had a considerable Russian minority and therefore would be hesitant to follow an anti-Russian political course. In addition to decreasing energy dependency on Russia, China’s alignment with Kazakhstan was allegedly also caused by its disillusionment with Russian policy. Beijing had failed to achieve a position on Russia’s energy market after trying to build an oil pipeline from Angarsk to Daging with Yukos. After Yukos’ director Mikhail Khodorkosky was arrested, this project was stopped, much to the annoyance of China. In 2008 Russian oil exports to China were decreasing because China was reluctant to accept Russia’s prices. The differences on export volumes and prices of oil also prevented the intended construction of an oil pipeline from Eastern Siberia to China, and also that of the Altai gas pipeline. In October 2008, after long negotiations, Russia and China finally agreed upon the oil pipeline to China, (to be operational in 2011), whereas the gas pipeline project was still suspended due to disagreements over gas prices. In April 2009, both parties finalized a deal under which Russia would supply China with oil for 20 years. Clearly, both parties were tough negotiators when it came to energy deals.

Future

Although under Mr. Putin the Russian-Chinese cooperation initially seemed quite promising, in due course this relationship showed some cracks. Nevertheless, under Mr. Medvedev, the cooperation between the two states was further reinforced, as long as it served mutual interests. China and Russia remained focused on maintaining closer cooperation not only in the field of security policy, but also in areas such as energy, (arms) trade, and foreign policy. Russia has stated more than once that intensification of the relations with China is a geopolitical objective to reinforce Russia’s global position.

Yet this strategic cooperation with China might only last for a specific period of time, before contradictory interests become too important to ignore. For instance, this may occur in regard to China’s use of Moscow’s military technology and energy sources. Once China is independent of Russia’s arms industry and receives sufficient supplies from other energy producers in the region – such as Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – Beijing might well ‘dump’ Moscow as its strategic partner. Although taboo prevents one from stating this publicly, the Kremlin is well aware of the fact that the growing political, economic, and military stature of China could develop into a threat to Russia. However, Moscow can do little more than to seek alliances with China’s other ‘competitors – in effect with the descending power of the United States as well as rising India. In that situation it is not unthinkable that the Chinese threat will ultimately force the Kremlin to a genuine ‘reset’ of its relations with the West.

The post Russian-Chinese Security Relations: Friends or Foes? appeared first on Fair Observer.