Israel’s leadership articulates that their immediate goals likely include securing the release of captives held by Hamas, deterring future rocket attacks from Gaza and mitigating the risk of a wider regional conflagration with Iran and Hezbollah. To achieve these objectives, Israel has a range of potential military options, each with its own set of challenges and potential consequences.

One option under consideration is a full-scale occupation of the Gaza Strip, which would necessitate a significant deployment of Israeli military forces to establish control over the territory. Alternatively, Israel may seek to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure and leadership, with the aim of deterring future attacks, and withdraw from Gaza. Finally, Israel may contemplate facilitating the emergence of a new governing body in Gaza following the removal of Hamas. All potential options present significant drawbacks, entailing high costs and risks for Israel and the surrounding region.

The occupation debate: security vs stability in Gaza

Starting in 1967, the Gaza Strip, which hosted approximately two million Palestinians, remained under Israeli governance. In 2005, after nearly 40 years, Israel executed a withdrawal of its military and settler population in accordance with the Disengagement Plan. After 2007, the governance of the territory transitioned to Hamas. This Islamist militant faction is deemed a terrorist entity by several nations, including the United States and Israel.

Advocates for the reoccupation of Gaza posit that such a measure would facilitate Israel’s management of security dangers originating from the region, notably rocket barrages and the excavation of tunnels for incursion purposes. They contend that a military campaign to disband the armed factions in Gaza would mitigate these perils, thereby bolstering the safety of Israeli nationals.

Conversely, an occupation of Gaza is likely to provoke opposition from both the local populace and militant groups, potentially precipitating an extended conflict. The prospect of serious civilian casualties, coupled with the ensuing humanitarian crisis, could further damage Israel’s international reputation.

Furthermore, occupation would compel Israel to assume the mantle of providing indispensable services to the Gazan populace. It exerts a fiscal strain on Israel. This responsibility would extend to the provision of fundamental necessities such as water, electricity, healthcare and education. Additionally, Israel would have to tackle the challenges of unemployment and impoverishment within the territory.

In a broader perspective, the occupation of Gaza could have enduring ramifications for the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. It discourages the pursuit of a consensual two-state resolution. Such an action infringes upon Palestinian self-governance and national ambitions. Occupation would intensify hostility towards Israel and escalate the cycle of bloodshed and instability across the region.

Israel’s exit and the power vacuum

Alternatively, Israel may decide to withdraw almost completely from Gaza. This proposition presumes Israel’s strategic elimination of Hamas, followed by a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip without establishing subsequent governance.

Such a departure could precipitate a descent into chaos as disparate factions contend for dominance in the absence of Hamas. Entities such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad might emerge as a more formidable threat to Israel than Gaza’s rulers. The resulting anarchy would resemble the situation in Iraq after the United States’ 2003 overthrow of the Baathist regime.

Notwithstanding its history of violent engagements with Israel, Hamas has demonstrated a propensity towards compromise. This is evidenced by its endorsement of a two-state solution along the 1967 borders within its 2017 charter. Should Hamas’s control wane, Gaza would risk becoming a sanctuary for still more dangerous extremist militias, drawing elements from North Africa, Syria and Iraq.

Shifting sands of governance in post-Hamas Gaza

Should Israel succeed in ousting Hamas and asserting control over the Gaza Strip, the strip will be incumbent upon it to identify a local partner to assist in the area’s governance.

Israel would endeavor to foster relationships with various Palestinian factions and entities within Gaza to aid in the establishment of a fresh governing coalition. Potential partners may include tribal chieftains, civil society organizations, municipal dignitaries or eminent members of Fatah, the party at the helm of the Palestinian Authority that governs the West Bank. Fatah represents the most feasible or rational option for Israel’s Tel Aviv. Prior to the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, the Palestinian Authority was Gaza’s governing body until Hamas deposed it following a coup d’etat.

The principal obstacle in this scenario is the waning support for Fatah and the Palestinian Authority amongst the Palestinian populace. In the West Bank, there is a growing perception that Fatah is collaborating with Israel’s military occupation. Palestinians regard them as corrupt, ineffectual elites lacking a coherent political strategy. This attitude paves the way for alternative narratives and forms of resistance to the occupation, such as Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

As it stands, none of these three scenarios can come to fruition unless the Israeli army completely wipes out Hamas, which is highly unlikely. The group’s extensive network of underground tunnels and the realities of urban warfare in the densely populated strip would pose enormous military challenges for any conventional army.

More fundamentally, even if Israel destroys much of Hamas’ infrastructure, its ideology will persist. Hamas is more popular now than ever. Its public support soared in both Gaza and the West Bank after the October 7, 2023 airstrikes.

Israel’s intentions for the Gaza Strip following its potential removal of Hamas are these: Israel may consider occupying Gaza post-Hamas, despite the economic and human costs and global disapproval. Leaving Gaza post-conflict could lead to a power vacuum and extremism. For now, joint governance of Gaza by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, similar to the present situation in the West Bank, seems to be the only plausible option. Achieving even this, however, would be a Herculean undertaking.

[Ali Omar Forozish and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Israel’s Great Dilemma: Its Three Choices in the Gaza War appeared first on Fair Observer.

Consequently, the vehement reactions of Putin and the Russian authorities to the last NATO summit, held in Vilnius in July, should not be regarded as vacuous threats or political bluffs but should be approached seriously. Western leaders must convince the Russian authorities that NATO does not intend to engage in a direct military confrontation with Moscow.

Ukraine’s dream of joining NATO did not come true at the summit, but the members of the organization, particularly the European ones, committed to augmenting their military assistance for Ukraine considerably. France’s promised to provide long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine. This certainly did not sit well with Moscow.

For Britain’s part, Richard Moore, the head of the British Intelligence Service (MI6), made unprecedentedly bold statements. He encouraged Russian citizens to turn information over to the MI6. This understandably provoked Russian intelligence forces.

The West is ignoring Russia’s reactions

Irrespective of the European side’s intentions, statements like these elicit a hazardous perception on the Russian side, a perception that will have severe repercussions for Europe if it is disregarded. In an article in 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin repudiated the notion of a country named Ukraine. The article could have warned of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine if it had been scrutinized more closely.

After the 2023 NATO summit, the Russian authorities and media exhibited vehement reactions. One of the most drastic reactions was on a 60-minute program on Russian TV, where the presenters construed the augmentation in NATO forces and the enhancement in the organization’s aid to Ukraine as an indication that NATO is preparing to initiate war with Russia. Also, the spokesperson of the Russian Foreign Ministry explicitly asserted that the summit was a manifestation of NATO’s intention to commence a major European war with Russia.

Furthermore, the Russian authorities intensified their nuclear threats, and Dmitry Medvedev, the vice-chairman of the Russian Security Council, alluded to the possibility of a calamitous nuclear war scenario. It should be noted that these comments are not merely hasty and emotional, but rather stem from the apprehension within Russia that Europe and NATO are on the verge of engaging in a direct military confrontation with Russia.

Therefore, the Europeans’ disregard for Russia’s threats has been an egregious mistake that should not be repeated again. In fact, Russia will use all its military might and act more aggressively NATO gives it the impression that it is about to start a direct war.

If we find Moscow difficult to predict now, it will be far more challenging to foresee its behavior in such a situation, and it will therefore be almost impossible to manage the tension with Russia. Furthermore, another large-scale war would impair Europe’s relations with the countries of the so-called “Global South” and push these developing countries further and further away from the continent.

What does Russia intend?

The messages Russia is conveying are drastic. Nevertheless, Russia has several aims in conveying such messages to the West. First, Moscow intends to assess the willingness of the West and especially NATO to employ nuclear weapons and initiate a nuclear war.

Second, Russia intends to ascertain if the West is prepared to maintain dialogue and diplomacy or if it has renounced diplomatic communication with Moscow. Of course, the recent statements of European leaders that Europe does not aspire to humiliate Russia or even Putin personally, and only aspires to grant Ukraine leverage in the peace negotiations and terminate the war, indicate that the West does not desire to sever the connection with Russia. But Russia will not simply trust the West on its word.

Third, Russia intends to have the authority to intensify or alleviate the tension and does not want the West to assume the responsibility for this matter. By showing that it still has options for escalation, then, Russia is reaffirming its control.

Ultimately, Russia intends to examine the West’s readiness to partake in a new round of arms control discussions, which is an opportunity that Europe should not forgo. Of course, Russia will undoubtedly demand concessions in exchange for partaking in such discussions.

Therefore, Europe and the West should cease neglecting Russia’s signals. They are no empty threats, but part of a calculated and intentional strategy. Europe must avoid crossing Russia’s red line by getting involved directly — no matter how tempting that might be as it becomes increasingly clear that Ukraine will not defeat the Russians on its own. Russia would not refrain from using any weapon in an existential war with NATO.

Of course, the non-approval of Ukraine’s membership request at the last NATO summit indicates that European and American intellectuals have perceived the danger and are cognizant of the limits of escalating tensions with Russia. Accentuating peace talks and a cease-fire as the sole solution to terminate the war in Ukraine and granting the green light to governments that aspire to mediate in this war aim to avert the apocalypse scenario that Medvedev cautioned of.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The post Ignoring Russia’s Threats Would Be a Monumental Mistake appeared first on Fair Observer.

Many in Brussels hailed the emergence of this unified Europe. After decades of decline, Europe has come to the scene in response to the threat of Russia and showed off its abilities to play the role of a powerful geopolitical actor before the eyes of the world. The Russian war has awakened the sleeping giant. As Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy put it: “In the week since Russia’s invasion, we have also witnessed the belated birth of a geopolitical Europe. For years, Europeans have been debating how the EU can be made more robust and security-conscious, with unity of purpose and capabilities to pursue our political goals on the world stage. We have now arguably gone further down that path in the past week than we did in the previous decade.”

However, there are limitations to this apparently decisive response of the Europeans to the Russian invasion. The member states of the European Union have so far avoided direct military conflict with Russia. They have refused to send the types of weapons that can lead to a change in the course of the battle. They have not demonstrated any concerted effort aimed at the gradual elimination of energy imports from Russia. Moreover, a number of European companies are still present in Russia, despite the imposition of extensive sanctions on Moscow. In addition, while Brussels bureaucrats like Borrell are busy honoring and praising the so-called birth of geopolitical Europe, Ukraine’s frustration and dissatisfaction with its European allies is increasing as the situation on the battlefield deteriorates and casualties and damage continue to rise.

European Solidarity: illusion or reality?

There is good reason to suspect that the announcement of  the birth of geopolitical Europe is little more than posturing by its leaders. The question on everyone’s mind should concern whether this vaunted unity will be maintained as the Ukraine battle proceeds.

Eight months into the Ukraine crisis, many signs of concern have appeared on the horizon. It is now becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the cohesion of a single Europe against the multiple consequences of the continuation of the crisis the war has spawned. Inflation, recession, and a growing energy crisis have worried European leaders, as have  the unforeseeable wide-ranging political and geopolitical effects of the war in Ukraine. Behind this apparent unity, differences of opinion and growing tensions about how to manage the conflict among the members of the union are already emerging.

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Germany is hesitant about sending arms shipments to Ukraine. With the fall of the coalition government in Italy and the election of the populist Brothers of Italy led by Giorgia Meloni, the future of Italy’s role in Europe has become an enigma. Political opposition to military support for Kyiv is growing among populist parties throughout Europe. And although the previous five sanctions packages were approved quickly, the Europeans took weeks to reach an agreement on the sixth package of sanctions targeting Russian oil.

In the early stages of the war, the European Union showed significant determination and cohesion. Within a few weeks, Brussels passed the widest possible sanctions against Russia. European governments accelerated their defense measures. Germany added 100 billion euros to its military budget, and the European Union facilitated the transfer of arms to third parties for the first time. The Union also agreed to provide temporary protection to millions of Ukrainian citizens, including the possibility of their movement and employment throughout the territory of the European Union. In June, the Council of Europe supported the granting of candidacy status to Ukraine and Moldova to join the European Union. In early spring, Europe seemed more united than ever and ready to face the challenge of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This show of solidarity did not last long. Growing economic pressure has led to worrying political consequences for Europe. In countries such as Italy and France, right-wing populist and nationalist parties have been exploiting the costs of war to influence public opinion. They promote the idea that by sanctioning Russia, European governments and institutions will only fuel the fire of inflation, bankrupt industries, and destroy jobs. The continuation of the Ukraine crisis feeds this trend. In the French presidential elections in April, the radical right and left parties put in a strong performance, a result that was confirmed in the parliamentary elections in June. The fall of Draghi’s government in Italy in July led to a victory in September for the populist Brothers of Italy party.

Europe’s double divide

A return to the old fault lines within the European Union in the event of the continuation of the Ukraine crisis appears increasingly likely. First, there is the growing divide between the east and west of the continent, with countries bordering Ukraine, such as the Baltic states and Poland, demanding the imposition of the most severe sanctions on Russia and increased military support for Ukraine. On the other hand, Western European countries such as Italy, France, and Germany, appear more inclined to compromise and interaction with Russia. The intensification of the energy crisis and the aggravation of economic hardship make it likely that the western countries far from the front line of the conflict will pressure the Union to open the door to reconciliation. However, Eastern European leaders, even as they grapple with the fallout from the war, are likely to maintain that peace is only possible if Russia is forced to withdraw and Russian President, Vladimir Putin, is held to account. 

The second gap is the North-South divide, which nearly split the Eurozone in two during the Greek debt crisis a decade ago. With the possibility of a recession and even stagflation in the short term, the difference in the cost of interest payments on debt between the northern and southern member states of the European Union – especially between Germany and Italy– is increasing. France, Spain, and Italy, despite having less room for financial maneuver, are pushing Brussels to focus on Europe’s post-pandemic recovery fund as well as defray some of the economic costs caused by war. 

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Germany has seen its energy costs triple. It is much more exposed to Russian energy blackmail than other members due to its heavy dependence on Russian gas. The German government, instead of offering its financial resources to help solve the economic problems of other members, will most likely request help and support from other members of the European Union to reduce its energy crisis.

To conclude, there is so far no evidence that the EU has become a stronger or different power internationally than it was before the war. In other words, there is no substance to the claim that Europe has undergone a geopolitical rebirth. The populist trend is clearly gaining strength in several European nations. The traditional fault lines within the Union have not disappeared and are likely to reemerge if the war continues. Russian President Vladimir Putin is certainly aware of this. The apparent unity of Europe in the face of the Russian invasion may soon prove to be a chimera.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is the Façade of European Unity Already Full of Cracks? appeared first on Fair Observer.

But there was no nefarious scheme. In reality, Japan had made significant investments in its own education and infrastructure, allowing it to produce high-quality goods that American customers desired. In the case of China, American businesses and investors are covertly profiting by operating low-wage factories and selling technologies to their “partners” in China. American banks and venture capitalists are also active in China, funding agreements. Furthermore, with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China’s infrastructure investment extends far beyond its own borders.

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The BRI is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s hallmark foreign policy initiative and the world’s largest-ever global infrastructure project, funding and developing roads, power plants, ports, railroads, 5G networks and fiber-optic cables all over the world. The BRI was created with the goal of connecting China’s modern coastal cities with the country’s undeveloped heartland and to its Asian neighbors, firmly establishing China’s place at the center of an interlinked globe.

The program has already surpassed its initial regional corridors and spread across every continent. The expansion of the BRI is worrying because it may make countries more vulnerable to Chinese political coercion while also allowing China to extend its authority more widely. 

Infrastructure Wars

US President Joe Biden and other G7 leaders launched a worldwide infrastructure plan, Build Back Better World (B3W), to counterweight China’s BRI during the G7 summit in Cornwall in June. The plan, according to a White House statement, aims to narrow infrastructure need in low and middle-income countries around the world through investment by the private sector, the G7 and its financial partners. The Biden administration also aims to use the plan to complement its domestic infrastructure investment and create more jobs at home to demonstrate US competitiveness abroad.

The US government deserves credit for prioritizing a response to the BRI and collaborating with the G7 nations to provide an open, responsible and sustainable alternative. However, it seems unlikely that this new attempt would be sufficient to emulate the BRI and rebuild America’s own aging infrastructure, which, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, “is both dangerously overstretched and lagging behind that of its economic competitors, particularly China.”

On the one hand, it’s unknown if B3W will be equipped with the necessary instruments to compete. The Biden administration has acknowledged that “status quo funding and financing approaches are inadequate,” hinting at a new financial structure but without providing specific details. It remains to be seen if B3W will assist development finance firms to stimulate adequate new private infrastructure investments as well as whether Congress will authorize much-needed extra funding.

Even with more funding, B3W may not be sufficiently ambitious. While the World Bank predicts that an $18-trillion global infrastructure deficit exists, the project will be unable to make real progress until extra resources are allocated to it.

Also, the United States still lacks an affirmative Asia-Pacific trade policy. To compete with the BRI, the US will need to reach new trade and investment agreements while also bolstering core competitiveness in vital technologies such as 5G. It will also need to devote greater resources to leading the worldwide standards-setting process, as well as training, recruiting and maintaining elite personnel.

On the other hand, China is often the only country willing to invest in vital infrastructure projects in underdeveloped and developing countries, and, in some cases, China is more competitive than the US as it can move quickly from design to construction. 

Desire to Invest

Furthermore, China’s desire to invest is unaffected by a country’s political system, as seen by the fact that it has signed memorandums of understanding with 140 nations, including 18 EU members and several other US allies such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. Even the United Kingdom, as a member of the G7, had a 5G expansion deal with Huawei that was canceled owing to security and geopolitical concerns. Nonetheless, the termination procedure will take about two years, during which time the Chinese tech behemoth will continue to run and upgrade the UK’s telecoms infrastructure.

As a result, the BRI has fueled a rising belief in low and middle-income nations that China is on the rise and the US and its allies are on the decline. The policy consequence for these countries is that their future economic growth is dependent on strong political ties with China. 

Unlike the US and European governments, which only make up for part of the exporters’ losses, Beijing guarantees the initial capital and repays the profits to the investing companies and banks. In addition, since there is no transfer of power and government in China, there will be virtually no major policy changes, meaning that investors will feel more secure. So far, about 60% of the BRI projects have been funded by the Chinese government and 26% by the private sector. 

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For far too long, the US reaction to the BRI has been to emphasize its flaws and caution countries against accepting Chinese finance or technology without providing an alternative. Until now, this haphazard reaction has failed to protect American interests. The United States is now presenting a comprehensive, positive agenda for the first time. Transparency, economic, environmental and social sustainability, good governance and high standards are all emphasized in Build Back Better World.

While providing a credible US-led alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative is desirable, the US must commit adequate financial and leadership resources to the effort. This is a good first step, but Washington must be careful not to create a new paranoia by demonizing economic and geopolitical rivals such as China and Japan to the point where it distorts priorities and leads to increased military spending rather than public investments in education, infrastructure and basic research, all of which are critical to America’s future prosperity and security.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Infrastructure: The Key to the China Challenge appeared first on Fair Observer.