With all these developments, onlookers are now considering the possibility of a long-term stalemate. Many sources last year conceded that this was more probable than an outright Ukrainian victory.

Speculating further, we may begin to consider not only a stalemate but a general collapse of the Ukrainian line. Although the fortunes of war are always murky, we must consider the trajectories the nation may take if that collapse occurs. What outcomes could we see for Ukraine?

The scenario of little change

One plausible scenario, there would be very little change.

As I noted in a previous article, Russia already controls enough Ukrainian territory to achieve most of the key objectives that drove it to war. Russian forces need relatively limited advances to occupy the remainder of the Ukrainian territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, which would fulfill Russia’s promises to its allies in the Donbas region. Russian control of the Kherson region has already allowed it to break Ukraine’s blockade of Crimea, addressing the economic and water supply issues which that blockade presented.

Even if Russia interpreted its annexation decree as requiring the full occupation of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, as well as Donetsk and Luhansk, the new conquest would be limited. Russia simply has no need to occupy vast tracts of Ukraine to fulfill its war aims.

Of course, even if such an occupation would be superfluous, Russia’s goals could grow more ambitious as its situation improves. Russia could be tempted to snatch unneeded gains as their costs plummet. However, two factors combat the potential for an increased Russian appetite: the threat of Western confrontation and Ukrainian insurgency.

First, the West’s reaction remains an unpredictable variable. Quick, massive Russian gains could renew Western investment in the war. It could even lead NATO to deploy in Ukraine. Indeed, French President Emmanuel Macron left the possibility open in comments last Monday. His NATO allies, however, do not appear to be as keen.

Although direct NATO involvement seems far-fetched, note that the West, especially the United States, has already crossed several of Russia’s red lines in support of Ukraine. Though deployments near the front line are unlikely, NATO forces could very well deploy in cities like Odesa or Kyiv, limiting any increase in Russia’s appetite. Putin has a history of caution concerning potential Western confrontations, so it is highly unlikely that Russia would risk direct combat with Western forces in such a scenario.

Second, anti-Russian Ukrainian nationalism is prevalent in western Ukraine. The further one travels west, the stronger it becomes. Thus far in the war, Russia has managed to avoid difficulties with insurgency, administering its conquered territories at relatively low cost. This would probably cease if Russia took significantly more land. The gargantuan extent of such conquest and the more hostile population in these regions would render Ukrainian resistance more difficult and expensive to suppress. Given that public support in Russia for such ambitious war goals is already waning, extensive territorial conquests would be a political albatross around the administration’s neck, not a desirable asset.

The scenario of a delegitimized Ukraine

However, in another plausible scenatio, a Ukrainian military collapse would be catastrophic for the nation’s integrity. Failure to stand up against Russia would compromise the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state, since the current regime derives its legitimacy from the nationalist appeal of its resistance to Russia. It has little else to stand on, given its failure to deliver in any other respect.

The Revolution of Dignity, also known as the Maidan Revolution, has been an unmitigated disaster for Ukraine’s economy. The disorder resulting from the political turmoil has created a steep economic decline. This gradually and painfully reversed between 2015 and 2021, when gross domestic product (GDP) per capita nearly recovered to 2013 levels — until Russia’s invasion in February 2022 caused economic collapse

 Even with economic and military aid from the US, EU, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other donors, the invasion’s impact was severe. Ukraine’s GDP per capita is currently lower than it has been since 2003. Meanwhile, the poverty level has skyrocketed.

Ukrainian endurance has been conditioned by unrealistic but ingrained expectations that a comprehensive victory over Russia would yield other amazing perks. The people desire sustained Western aid, quick integration into the EU and rapid advances that would quickly restore Ukraine’s economy to its former level and well beyond. A military collapse would definitively prove that no such revival is coming. Additionally, it would demonstrate the nation’s lack of utility as a proxy to use against Russia, which would dampen Western motivation to support Ukraine.

In such a scenario, Ukraine’s population would have only one remaining hope: the possibility of a slight and gradual alleviation of its misery, devoid of the pride that comes from resisting a powerful opponent. How can any government, especially the notoriously corrupt one ruling Ukraine, maintain legitimacy then?

Such a scenario could see the West intervene. Such intervention would not aim to repel Russia, but rather shore up the failing Ukrainian state on the EU’s eastern border.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Could the Ukrainian State Survive a Complete Military Collapse? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Although it is not yet certain, it is beginning to appear that Ukraine’s much-anticipated spring offensive has become bogged down. If the coming weeks bear out the same results, the war may become a stalemate. Why would Russia keep fighting a war that seems ready to drag on forever, with neither side able to vanquish the other? For this, we must take a look at Russia’s wider strategic outlook.

What motivates Russia?

To discern what long-term objectives Russian President Vladimir Putin might have in Ukraine, we need to begin in 2014. Then, a series of clashes between protestors and government forces resulted in the ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych. The events became known as the Maidan Revolution. If we can understand why Russia considered Maidan a threat, we can understand Russia’s fundamental objectives in its subsequent relations with Ukraine.

From the Russian point of view, the first problem with Maidan was that the movement threatened to result in an eventual accession to NATO. While the primary goal of the protestors was the integration of Ukraine into the EU, not NATO, Russia saw this as a slippery slope. Moscow—whether during the Empire, the Soviet Union, or the Federation—has always considered threats from the territory of modern Ukraine, and particularly from the part of it east of the Dnieper River, to be absolutely unacceptable. It will strive to remove hostile forces from the area at almost any cost. The thought of NATO forces east of the Dnieper, especially in Crimea, is absolutely unthinkable in Moscow. Moscow thus perceives NATO enlargement as a threat of the most existential kind.

Secondly, Russia has a positive interest in Crimea, since the Russian coast of the Black Sea has no good sites for year-round naval ports. The Russian Black Sea fleet must thus rely on the Crimean port of Sevastopol to stage its operations. Retaining the use of Crimea for the navy is a condition for the maintenance of Russia’s status as a Black Sea power. Strategically, Crimea is the only part of Ukraine’s territory that holds positive value for Moscow (as opposed to negative value, i.e. the deterrence of possible threats). However, Russia’s experience after the annexation of Crimea in 2014—particularly Ukraine’s economic siege of the peninsula and cutting of its water supply—has suggested that control of the territory immediately opposite Crimea on the Ukrainian mainland is key to the support of Crimea itself.

Finally, Russia has sought to avoid the loss of face that would result if the pro-Russian rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts were comprehensively defeated. This is not only a matter of vanity for Russia, but an important strategic objective to maintain its influence in the post-Soviet space. Russia exercises influence by playing the role of protector of ethnic Russians and other pro-Russian ethnic groups, such as the Ossetes and Abkhaz in Georgia. To be seen as weak and ineffective in this role would be a serious hindrance to Russia’s continued influence in its neighborhood.

Russia still has much to gain from fighting on

In spite of its heavy physical and reputational losses in the Ukraine War, these three goals provide Russia ample reason to cling tenaciously to its current position. Holding on to the land bridge between Crimea and the Donbas addresses Crimea’s post-2014 strategic vulnerabilities, and the expansion of Russian territory to a significantly increased portion of Donetsk and virtually all of Luhansk demonstrates effective support of the rebels. As long as things do not change, two of Russia’s main assets in the region—the port of Sevastopol and its reputation as protector—remain substantially intact.

If battle lines do remain mostly fixed, the main downside for Russia will be the significant areas east of the Dnieper that remain in Ukrainian hands. As international relations scholar John Mearsheimer has noted, Russia’s second-best alternative to controlling strategic territory is to “wreck Ukraine as a functioning state”, and this Russia has been doing very effectively.

Compared to Russia, Ukraine is older, poorer, more demographically unstable—with lower birthrates and negative net migration, and vastly smaller. The war has greatly aggravated these problems, as young men die in battle and young women and children become refugees. What’s more, Ukraine’s infrastructure has been systematically destroyed. A country with a demographic crisis like that of Ukraine needs to develop its economy quickly and maximize its resources to deal with an aging and shrinking population. This war has instead severely damaged Ukraine’s economy, and every month that passes is a crucial month in which Ukraine fails to get on the road to recovery, while the likelihood of refugees returning falls.

Simply by holding the current lines, Russia is making good on its protection of its friends, securing the long-term viability of its outpost in Crimea, and bleeding Ukraine further, making it increasingly likely that Ukraine will become a dysfunctional, impoverished state over the long term, without the capacity to be an effective base for NATO assets. Meanwhile, sanctions have not had nearly the impact on Russia’s economy that was hoped, and Russia’s large population, bolstered by millions of refugees from Ukraine, means that any demographic effects of the war on Russia are likely to be minuscule.

Putin is well aware that Russia can bear the losses of the war longer than Ukraine can. Even a costly victory is still a victory if Russia can keep its foothold. Eventually, the West may find its resolve wavering before Russia’s. On the present trajectory, Russia may end up holding onto its gains in spite of everything.

If the current offensive fails, and it begins to appear that a long-term stalemate is developing, Western countries will have to rethink their willingness to underwrite a war whose continuation is destroying the viability of Ukraine, while only helping Russia to cement the achievement of its strategic goals.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Russia’s Plan Might Be Better than We’ve Been Hoping appeared first on Fair Observer.