Before the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Islamic terrorism was not well organized. Mohammad Reza Shah, Iran’s last monarch, laid the groundwork for the rapid growth and spread of Islamic terrorism by severely suppressing progressive and liberal forces in the country.

With liberal and progressive forces weakened, Islamic terrorist forces led by the cleric Ruhollah Khomeini seized control of the Iranian government in 1979 in a massive coup against the inhumane Pahlavi Dynasty. With Iran’s resources at their disposal, Islamists were able to establish terrorist organizations in countries across the Middle East.

Iran Supports Islamic Terrorism

The attack on the American embassy and the suicide bombing on the headquarters of the US Marine barracks in Beirut on October 23, 1983, was a major turning point in how Islamists carry out terrorist operations. 241 US soldiers, 58 French soldiers, and six civilians were killed in the attack on the barracks. The culprits were affiliated with Iran.

These attacks ushered in an age of unending Islamic terrorism. But who is responsible for this disaster?

Inaction from Western governments regarding terrorism, especially from the US, sent a direct message to Iran’s leaders: you are allowed to establish and arm terrorist organizations. Western leaders did not have the determination and courage to respond to the new terrorist threat because they did not recognize or understand the ideological nature of the other side.

After these attacks, a joint plan to attack the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah’s centers in Lebanon was planned and approved by the presidents of the US and France. However, the US Secretary of Defense lobbied against and successfully stopped it, claiming there was no clear evidence of Iran’s role in the previous attacks.

The leaders of the free world, especially the US, continue to be double-minded and indecisive in dealing with Iran and its terrorist regime. This wrongheaded policy created a suitable environment for the growth of Islamic terrorism and turned our world into a less safe place.

The formation of al-Qaeda and its September 11 attacks, the rise of ISIS and its assault on the Yazidi Kurds — including the abduction and sale of thousands of Kurdish women as sex slaves — numerous terrorist attacks across the West, and the profound sense of insecurity in these nations, culminating in the October 7 terrorist attack against Israel and Iran’s subsequent missile attacks against Israel in April and October 2024, highlight the consequences of failing to address Tehran decisively.

The Appeasement Policy

After almost five decades of appeasement toward Iran, the October 7 invasion of Israel by Iran’s proxy, Hamas, pushed Israel to take a defensive posture and cut off the arms of the Islamic terrorist regime by attacking the source of the satanic ideology: the Islamic Republic of Iran itself.

Unfortunately, the international community and the free world still insist on this appeasement policy. For this reason, Israel is alone in the fight against terrorism, bearing the weight of the world in its struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Poor policy choices concerning Iran’s support of terrorism do not end there. On September 28, the US announced an agreement with Iraq to withdraw American troops from parts of the country. This is likely the beginning of another global disaster produced by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The withdrawal will mean the complete handover of Iraq to Iran, providing a safe space for Hezbollah, Hamas and other terrorist organizations affiliated with Iran to hide from Israel by moving to Iraq. If this agreement is implemented, Iraq — with all its riches — will become a hub for the growth and spread of Islamic terrorism supported by Iran.

This will nullify all Israeli efforts to combat terrorism supported by Iran, as well as all Western efforts to create a secure Middle East. If Western countries are not more decisive in dealing with Islamic terrorism, our future will be more uncertain.

History has shown that Iran is the head of a snake. To kill a snake, you have to cut off its head. This is not an endorsement of an all-out war with Iran. Instead, free countries, especially the United States, should support liberation movements in the region. This support should be extended to the Kurds, who may be powerful enough to destroy the Islamic Republic but presently lack international support.

The lack of support from Western countries for the Iranian popular uprisings in December 2017 and November 2019 and the Kurdish Woman, Life, Freedom movement that started in 2022 sent a message to the Islamic Republic that it can carry out its crimes domestically and continue its terrorist activities internationally without fear of retribution.

The West must end the appeasement policy with Iran and crush the snake’s head in Tehran by supporting the progressive and liberal movements of the Iranian people, thereby ending five decades of terrorism fostered by Iran.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Islamic Republic of Iran Should Be Overthrown appeared first on Fair Observer.

As of now, Egypt does not seem to have followed the IMF’s policy recommendations. In making the recommendations, the IMF demonstrated a systemic misunderstanding of the fundamental dynamics of Egypt’s political economy. This misunderstanding is bound to exacerbate Egypt’s economic problems and exacerbate the current crisis.

The Military Likes Moolah

For decades, the military has had first claim on Egypt’s resources. The IMF recommends that the military give up its privileged economic position. It also calls for leveling the playing field between the public and private sector. Yet signs abound already that the regime is circumventing these recommendations. In fact, it is deepening the economic footprint of the military.

In January, Sisi issued a presidential decree assigning prized land to the military. The military now has land two kilometers wide on both sides of 31 roads. The military uses this tactic to gain control over commercially viable pieces of land, which it then uses for profit-generating activities. 

Sisi’s government has also instituted an amendment of the 1975 Law 30, which regulates the operation of the Suez Canal Authority. This came only a few days after the IMF deal. Prima facie, this amendment carries out the IMF’s recommendations. It creates the “Suez Canal Fund,” which will invest surplus revenue from the canal’s operations. This fund will also be able “to lease, sell, and purchase assets, establish companies, and invest in financial instruments.”

However, the devil lies in the details. A statement from the president reveals that the new fund will be under the control of a “sovereign entity,” a euphemism for the security services. Furthermore, the amendment provides for no parliamentary supervision for the fund. This means that the military will be able to siphon off hard currency from this fund, which could prove critical for meeting both Egypt’s debt obligations and the import needs of the population. 

Finally, the government has no real plan to sell off state-owned assets as part of the effort to meet its debt obligations. Of the 32 companies it is selling off, only two of them are military-owned. Watanya, the petrol station chain, seems to have been subjected to asset stripping. Most of Watanya’s assets have been moved to ChillOut, another military-owned chain. Deals that have been done are also in trouble. In February, ADNOC acquired half of Total’s fuel stations . There are reports that this Emirati state-owned company is backing out of the deal.

It is clear that, as many predicted, the IMF’s recommendations are meeting stiff resistance. Hence, their implementation is extremely unlikely.

Increasing Inflation and Rising Debt Spell Trouble Ahead

Inflation rose from 21.9% in December to 26.5% in January. Food prices are up. Bread, meat and poultry cost a lot more. The IMF recommended “a shift to a flexible exchange rate while taking measures to help shield the Egyptian population from a mounting cost-of-living crisis.” Inherent in this recommendation is an admission. This shift will exacerbate inflation and worsen the cost-of-living crisis.

In January, Al Jazeera reported that the Egyptian pound had lost half of its value since March. Bloomberg has observed that devaluation has already hurt the Egyptian economy. As of February, the private sector had declined for 26 consecutive months. Scarcities persist and the private sector is struggling. Business sentiment has sagged to its third lowest level since April 2012. Remember, this was a time when the Muslim Brotherhood was in power. 

Finally, Egyptian debt is showing worrisome trends. Even though external debt has declined by 0.5% on a quarterly basis, short-term debt has increased from 11.48% in September 2021 to 27.4% in September 2022. This rapid increase is alarming. Sisi’s regime faces pressure to repay its debt even as investor confidence remains low. So, the regime is relying on short-term borrowing to solve the problem. This debt comes at a higher price. It is issued with higher interest rates, driving up Egypt’s cost of servicing this debt. Unsurprisingly, Moody has downgraded Egypt’s credit rating from B2 to B3, piling up even more pressure on the Sisi regime.

In essence, the prospects for IMF’s policy recommendations are poor. Indeed some of its recommendations will only deepen the crisis and increase poverty. The only possible and durable solution to the crisis is a radical transformation of Egypt’s model of crony capitalism. The IMF economic policy recommendations cannot succeed under the country’s current political system, which the institution implicitly supports.Without a comprehensive understanding of Egypt’s political economy, the IMF will continue to throw good money after bad and its loans will only enrich elites in Sisi’s military regime while inflicting pain on Egypt’s long-suffering people.

[Arab Digest first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Egypt’s IMF Loan Now Shows Sure Fire Signs of Failure appeared first on Fair Observer.

As the truce expired, Houthi military spokesman, General Yahya al-Sareh, and Houthi delegate, Mohammed Abd al-Salam, published statements threatening foreign oil companies and vessels operating in Yemen. The threats were in line with Houthi demands for a larger share of oil revenue as part of failed negotiations with UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg to extend the six month long ceasefire. The incidents temporarily suspended production and exports. Only a week later, Cal Valley Petroleum declared force majeure and suspended all work starting November 1.

Who Are the Houthis?

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After eight years of conflict between the IRG and Houthi rebels, the listing by the NDC came a week after Saudi Arabia urged the UN Security Council (UNSC) “to designate Houthis as terrorists.” Calls at the Security Council by Saudi Arabia aimed to expand on language used in UNSC Resolution 2624 (2022), where at the urging of the UAE the Council referred to Houthis as a “terrorist group.” These efforts by members of the Arab coalition to restore legitimacy aim to pressure the US and the EU to officially designate the Iran-backed militia a “terrorist organization.”

An Increasing Threat

The accuracy and velocity of the latest drone strikes by Houthis are an indication of increasing capabilities, including intelligence resources. This should not come as a surprise following months of recruitment and deployment of troops and weapons by Houthis, who organized a dozen military parades throughout northern Yemen during the period of the UN-brokered truce.Their recent choice of targets also indicates a clear shift in strategy since the truce expired. Prior to the start of the truce in April 2022, Houthis focused on cross-border strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The shift to oil facilities within Yemen fits the Houthi narrative, calling the IRG mercenaries and the coalition members “thieves”, looting Yemen’s oil.

Demands by Houthis for a bigger share of oil revenue appears to extend from decreasing sources of income this year. The UN donors conference in March 2022 only delivered $1.3 billion from the requested $4.2 billion. This has affected humanitarian operations across Houthi-held territory. It was a major blow from the rebels who profit from the entire cycle: from collecting taxes at the port, to the control of ground transport and warehousing, to the local civil society organizations in charge of distribution of aid, and now to the banks and foreign exchange shops. The decrease in the flow of aid has affected the entire cycle, which also maintains a complex patronage of networks, sustaining the elite down to tribal levies.

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By targeting the Rudhum terminal at al-Nushayma, Shabwa, the rebels also sent a message to the Southern Transitional Council (STC), whose ally is now governor of Shabwa province. The aim is to prevent the STC from profiting off oil exports. In al-Dhaba port, near al-Rayyan airport, the drone strikes on the South Korean Nissos Kea vessel were called a warning by Houthis to foreign companies, more specifically, those that are linked to members of the coalition. Al-Masirah media reported Houthis used Samad-3 drones for the strikes in al-Dhaba.

New Targets   

While Houthi drone strikes within Yemeni territory are not new, the locations and distance show a shift amid a new balance of power. Aden has been a target along with nearby military bases and high-ranking security officers, but the reach to facilities along the coastlines of Hadramawt and Shabwa with such accuracy represent new threats to rising powers like the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The stalemate in al-Dhale province between Houthis and pro-STC forces remains months after southern Giants Brigades expelled Houthis from Bayhan, Shabwa. 

In January 2022, the clashes along Shabwa’s western mountains delivered the first major victory over the Houthis, reversing territorial gains beyond the old north-south divide. A fractured national army and a weakened al-Islah party had placed pro-STC forces at the forefront in the fight against Houthis. This new balance comes with a high price for southerners, and Houthi strikes on oil facilities in southern provinces aim at dragging STC forces into direct confrontations along new frontlines.

Houthis know southern forces are stretched along multiple fronts. Security Belt Forces continue to advance across Abyan against terrorist elements, while Amalaqa and Shabwa Defense Forces cleanse Shabwa of rebellious elements that oppose governor Awad al-Awlaqi. Attacks on vital energy infrastructure come at a minimal risk and cost for Houthis. They are gambling on either instigating a wider response by the National Army or the coalition, which leads to a return of cross-border strikes on Saudi Arabia and the UAE, or a mobilization by southern forces that are already stretched thin.

The government of Yemen echoed members of the coalition and has called for the international community to strengthen its stance on Houthis to designate the militia a terror group. Statements by western governments following the attack on al-Dhaba ports have also come under criticism for their weak stance since the truce expired. In absence of compromise on a new ceasefire threatens an escalation across battlefronts under new conditions with higher stakes for warring parties.  

[Charlize Cheesman edited this article]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post A Surge in Attacks: Houthi Rebels Exploit Oil Infrastructure appeared first on Fair Observer.

When I shared with him the fact that I came in second place, he informed me, strangely enough, that in case of an injury to the first place winner, I might be called upon to represent Morocco. I immediately dismissed the idea as I had no wish that such a thing might befall on Fatima Zahra, our newly crowned Miss Morocco. She carried the title beautifully, and we were all so proud of her. I arrived home and spent that evening telling my aunt and mother about the emotionally-charged experience the pageant had been for me. I felt the presence of my grandmother hovering above me the entire time.

Call it a premonition or fate. The taxi driver’s words later became a reality, which meant I would be going to Israel to represent Morocco during the Miss Universe 2021 competition. Life’s events are not as arbitrary as they seem, after all. Although Fatima Zahra’s injury was unfortunate, I think it served to teach us different lessons. She kindly expressed her trust in my abilities, her benevolent candor reflecting  her inner radiance. Today, she continues to personally and professionally blossom, and it has been a true pleasure witnessing that evolution  from afar.

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Not everyone was supportive. The political climate around Israel and Palestine has always been delicate, and the topic is still as sensitive as ever. When the location of the Miss Universe event was initially announced, people immediately began to express their discontent on social media. At the same time, the political relationship between Algeria and Morocco had also become a sensitive topic. My grandmother’s Algerian roots created an additional issue for some people. As soon as I was announced as the newly crowned Miss Morocco, someone unearthed a video depicting me sharing my grandmother’s life story meant to demonstrate the power of choice. This provoked a public debate about my legitimacy as an ambassador of Morocco.

I instantly became a name  in the news, as some journalists evidently sought to exploit the story. Others working in the media described the phenomenon as a strategic maneuver designed to generate more “buzz”, in other words, a publicity stunt. In my own thoughts I continued to ponder the notion of identity.

Discovering familiarity in a foreign land

Jerusalem is described as the city of peace, yet it contains the pain and passions of diverse peoples. We walked along its storied streets marked with the remnants of a diverse religious patrimony, a pattern of temples, churches, mounts, and mosques spread across its surface, mapping out something like a constellation. This route of sacred sites held more than nominal significance for me. As my ears rang to the greetings of “shalom” and “salam,” I wished for just that: peace.

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With approximately 700,000 in Israel with Moroccan Jewish ancestry, I was frequently approached by individuals who proudly expressed their families’ Moroccan origins. They generously offered me tokens of appreciation, even  my evening gown. They shared various types of food with me as well as smiles, hugs, songs, dances, and cheers. It produced the effect of a deeply rooted sense of amity. With a declining Moroccan Jewish population, these stories felt like echoes from a distant past. I had educated myself on this aspect of my country’s history, but the experience of being exposed to the number of people who came to me and made clear how widespread remembrance of the Moroccan Jewish past remains. I found the fact that it is  still celebrated eye-opening and, quite simply, wonderful.

One evening, Miss Universe 2020, Miss USA, Miss Israel, and I had the pleasure of dining together at the home of Eli Lankri, mayor of Eilat. His wife, whose joie de vivre was contagious,  had prepared an array of familiar dishes—couscous and shebakiya among them. The melodies of an oud accompanied us as we spoke of the memories the hosts had formed during their childhood in Morocco.

Stories that came into being long before my existence were thus  transmitted created an intergenerational as well as intercultural link. What had previously felt to me like random echoes of the past instead took the form of artfully composed symphonies. During my stay in Israel, I became fascinated by the land, by its capacity to juxtapose faiths, and the fact that the Dead Sea happens to be the lowest point on Earth. I contemplated that maybe, just maybe, this mix of the high and low has created a unique midpoint, one that celebrates difference, coexistence, and understanding.

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Growing up, I attended an American school in the morning and returned home to speak Darija and French. I then extended my academic journey in France while pursuing an anglophone program. Exploration was my native language, and the cultural dichotomy I grew up in was where I felt most comfortable. The people I met during my stay, though they had not been to Morocco in years, considered themselves to be as Moroccan as any other Moroccan citizen. So, how does one measure Moroccanness?

I mean that, to me, being Moroccan means creating space for both yourself and the other. It means respecting your beliefs as much as any other individual’s beliefs, demonstrating tolerance and coexistence. It means equally valuing two seemingly opposing thoughts, making the desire to understand the underlying force behind our eclectic relationships.

Being Moroccan means having freedom inculcated into our biological blueprint. Adorned with colorful intricacies, our tables, tapestries, ceilings, floors, and living rooms continue to celebrate our innate vibrance. The Moroccan man walks to the end of his sentences with hope and gratitude. The Moroccan woman wears courage on her sleeve as she gracefully embodies liberty. Morocco is where despair surrenders to faith and where cynicism is replaced by a wise smile or a warm piece of homemade bread. It is a place where empathy is the  local currency, giving value to everything.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Experiencing the World as Miss Universe Morocco appeared first on Fair Observer.

Among the cascading effects of inflation on the global economy is the negative impact it has on the market dynamics that drive illicit trade. Specifically, high levels of inflation can have a disastrous impact on consumer purchasing power. In turn, reduced purchasing power coupled with increased poverty reduces consumer “product affordability,” which is widely regarded as the primary driver for illicit trade. When prices rise faster than incomes, people can afford to buy fewer goods and services and cheaper goods including illicit and black-market products become more tempting.

Inflation leads to illicit trade

This phenomenon is playing out in real time in Turkiye, where inflation is at a 25-year high of 86%, causing a notable erosion of consumer purchasing power that further incentivizes consumers to consider illicit products. Recent interviews with Turkish consumers of both legal and illegal products showed that the most important determinant for choosing illicit goods over legal equivalents was the lower price of the illegal goods.

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Turkiye already faced challenges from illicit trade on multiple fronts. For example, it is an important source country for illicit plant protection products, counterfeit goods are widespread, and it grapples with the harmful effects of illicit tobacco, alcohol and petroleum products. Moreover, the government’s goal of making Turkiye a top pharma hub by 2023 is threatened by a growing market for illegal pharmaceuticals.

The consequences of this illicit activity can be dire. In December 2021 a mass poisoning caused by illicit alcohol claimed the lives of at least 75 people. In November 2020, the World Health Organization  (WHO) issued a medical alert cautioning that batches of falsified Harvoni, an antiviral medicine used to treat chronic Hepatitis C, were discovered in Turkiye.

The challenge for Turkiye lies not just with mitigating illicit trade at home, but due to its geographical location as a gateway to Europe, it must also address illicit trade across its borders. It is known as a critical transshipment point for counterfeit and pirated finished goods and components across a variety of industry sectors. It is, for example, the leading source of fake clothing and accessories seized at EU borders in addition to being an established transshipment route of illicit alcohol and related packaging from Russia and neighboring countries (who are manufacturing at scale) to the Middle East.

The situation is exacerbated by the sizable depreciation of the Turkish lira, which drives international demand for exported Turkish fakes, as such items became cheaper to traders buying in US Dollars and Euros. Meanwhile, recent government-imposed price hikes and tax increases on alcohol, tobacco and petroleum products have put upward pressures on retail prices for these products, making them more expensive to consumers and incentivizing demand for cheaper, unregulated illicit alternatives.

The Turkish government must step up

Given these dynamics, the problem of illicit trade in Turkiye can only be expected to intensify. Consequently, the Turkish government will necessarily need to be more vigilant in its efforts to root out this illegal activity.

A new report, Inflation, product affordability, and illicit trade: Spotlight on Turkiye, by TRACIT, aims to increase awareness on these issues and proposes several policy recommendations that target some of the main illicit trade issues facing the country.

For the government to succeed, controls to fight illicit trade will require concerted, sustained and joined up efforts between all responsible government bodies and law enforcement agencies. These efforts must be supplemented with adequate budget allocations and clear objectives to ensure long term successful implementation of anti-illicit trade efforts.

The notoriously slow adjudication process must be streamlined and criminal penalties strengthened to deter repeat offenders. The government must also commit to tackling pervasive corrupt practices that continue to facilitate illicit trade, especially at the level of customs, local officials, law enforcement authorities and the judiciary. As long as corruption persists within government agencies, any attempt to improve and strengthen enforcement actions will have limited effect.

Finally, partnerships with the private sector should be encouraged, as these can play an important role in improving enforcement actions. With real-time access to commercial data and private sector intelligence, enforcement agencies can improve the effectiveness of their operations and risk assessment techniques. Rights holders can also be more effective partners in investigations when they are informed by authorities of potential illicit trade affecting their brands, resulting in more deterrent criminal proceedings.

It is our hope that the report and its recommendations will provide the Turkish government and other impacted stakeholders with practical examples of reforms and controls they can implement to more effectively mitigate illicit trade in Turkiye.

[Read the report and full set of recommendations at https://www.tracit.org/publications.html.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Soaring Inflation in Turkiye Is Now Boosting Illicit Trade appeared first on Fair Observer.

Currently, Iran is ruled by mullahs. Iran’s theocratic regime is disliked, if not despised, by the US and its allies. Many, including prominent Iranians, blame the mullahs for all of Iran’s ills. However, few are aware of an inconvenient truth. It was the British who paved the path to power for the mullahs with the Americans constructing the mile.

Over the years, the mullahs have faced many protests. In the current wave, protesters have attacked government officials such as the police, ambulance attendants  and bank officials. They have also targeted mosques, clerics and religious people. Many protesters chant “marq bar dictaator,” a phrase that literally translates as “death to the dictator.” Some of them have a soft spot for Mohammad Reza Shah whom we will subsequently refer to as the Shah.

Sadly, the Shah so beloved by some Iranians was an oppressive dictator. His secret police SAVAK kept an eye on the people. Hence, a famous proverb was born: divar mush dare, musham gush dare — the wall has a mouse, the mouse has ears. Under the Shah, Iran was a surveillance state much like the Soviet Union and East Germany. If you said the wrong thing to the wrong people, SAVAK would throw you into prisons like Evin and Qasr. You also faced the risk of torture and murder. After all, the US had taught SAVAK the tricks of the trade.

Young women who wish for a return to the halcyon days of absolute monarchical rule do not know that the Shah was deeply sexist. He believed that women were less intelligent than men. In his interview with Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci, the Shah remarked, “You may be equal in the eyes of the law, but not, I beg your pardon for saying so, in ability.” Hence, it is unsurprising that the Shah objectified women and saw them purely through the lens of sexual pleasure.

A Classic Comprador

When the Portuguese pioneered European colonization of the colored peoples, a term came into being. A comprador or compradore came to signify a “person who acts as an agent for foreign organizations engaged in investment, trade, or economic or political exploitation.” The Shah was a comprador who ruled Iran first as a British vassal and then as an American one.

The circumstances of the Shah’s accession to the throne are most instructive. The British deposed Reza Shah for cozying up with the Germans in 1941. After sending the father packing, they placed the weak, callow 22-year-old son on the throne. They chose the young Shah precisely because they were convinced that he would do their bidding.

The Shah proved to be a good pick. The British and the Soviets occupied Iran. The British used Iran’s north-south railroad to supply the Soviets against Germany. In 1942, both promised that they would withdraw their forces within six months of the end of the war. This promise was intended to appease Iranian nationalists. In 1943, American troops arrived in Iran too. When the war ended, the Soviets troops failed to leave the country as per their promise. Only American pressure made them leave by May 1946. Iranians were appreciative of American commitment to the integrity of Iran and its right to self-determination.

Foreign occupation fuelled national pride and democratic discourse in Iran. Once foreign troops left, this continued. While foreign troops left, foreign influence did not stop. The British continued to extract and export oil from Iran for a pittance. They treated Iran as a de facto colony and the Shah acted as their comprador.

Naturally, dissent emerged. Mohammad Mosaddegh emerged as the key leader. Reza Shah had put him under house arrest. Once the bloodthirsty ruler was deposed in 1941, Mosaddegh returned to public life and was elected to parliament. Protests in 1949 against fake elections led to the founding of Jebhe Melli, which literally translates as National Front. As its leader, Mosaddegh promised to end the British control of Iran’s oil industry. He demanded that the British share profits equally with Iran. At the time, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) was paying more money to Britain as taxes than to Iran as a share of the proceeds.

The British opposed Mosaddegh tooth and nail. They refused to share profits equally with the Iranians, claiming it would be a breach of contract. The very British idea of duress invalidating a contract did not apply to Iran. The Iranians had signed a deal that gave them 17.5% of AIOC’s profits when the British held a gun to their head. The AIOC cooked its books and Iran never really got the promised 17.5% either.

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In late December 1950, the American-owned Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) agreed to share profits with Saudi Arabia on a 50-50 basis. The British rejected the idea of any similar agreement for AIOC with Iran. This left the Iranian parliament with no choice but to pass a bill nationalizing the oil industry in March 1951. The Shah did not sign the bill. Mosaddegh was elected prime minister in April and the Shah was now forced to sign the nationalization bill.

The British responded by manipulating the Americans to conduct a military coup in 1953. The Cold War was on and the Americans were turning paranoid about communism. Nationalization allowed the British to paint Mosaddegh as a potential Soviet ally. Like a wily old uncle manipulating a sinewy nephew, the British got the Americans to do their dirty work for them. Mosaddegh was packed off to prison and the Shah emerged as an absolute ruler just like his father.

Until the 1953 coup, the Shah had one master: the British. From now on, he had two masters: the British and the US. As the American star rose, they came to dominate Iran. The British debacle in the 1956 Suez Crisis strengthened the American hand. As part of the Cold War, the US began beefing up the Shah’s regime. Washington provided the regime with military advisers, intelligence agents, and arms and ammunition worth millions of dollars. The Iranian taxpayer paid for such help most generously. American oil companies got a share of the Iranian oil pie.

The Shah’s Oppressive Police State

After 1953, life in Iran deteriorated. For Washington, the Shah was a key Cold War ally. Iran was a frontline state against the Soviet Union. So, in 1957, CIA and FBI helped the Shah’s regime to set up the dreaded Sazman-e Etelaat Va Amniat Keshvar (SAVAK), a secret police to cow his people into submission. The US and, later, Israel coached Iranian military, police and intelligence officials in the arts of surveillance, coercion and torture.

By 1960, the Shah had a vise-like grip on the country. He had eliminated, imprisoned, and silenced the opposition. Nobody dared to protest. SAVAK routinely scrutinized students, civil service employees and industrial workers. It censored and controlled all forms of media and professional associations. SAVAK also monitored Iranian communities abroad. It had over 5,000 full-time employees and many part-time agents around the world.  SAVAK used all forms of torture necessary to extract information and punish dissenters. Nobody felt safe in Iran.

Such was the brutality of SAVAK that American public opinion began to turn. The US put pressure on the Shah to reform. In 1963, the Shah announced a plebiscite for an ambitious program of social, political and economic reform that has come to be known as the White Revolution. The most important element of this revolution was land reform. He broke down large land holdings to give away land to poor cultivators. In theory, this sounds like a good egalitarian measure. In reality, it led to disaster.

Poor cultivators did not have money to run their small farms. The government gave them land but did not give them farming implements, seeds, fertilizers, irrigation and funds. Unsurprisingly, they abandoned their farms to become landless laborers in cities, particularly Tehran. The urban population exploded and, in due course, so did discontent.

It was in 1963 that the then relatively obscure Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini spoke out against the White Revolution. Khomeini was teaching at the prestigious Fayẕiyyeh Madrasah in Qom. He was already a prominent ayatollah. The Shah arrested Khomeini and killed many students at Fayẕiyyeh. Luckily for Khomeini, the Shah did not kill him or confine him to an Iranian prison. In 1964, Khomeini publicly criticized the Shah for awarding the US capitulation and called him a lackey of US and Israel. The Shah first arrested Khomeini but, after 19 days in Qasr and a another few days in a military base, packed off the ayatollah into exile who ended up living in Turkey, Iraq, and, eventually, France.

Extravagant Opulence by Foreign Lackey

When the Shah was not oppressing his people, torturing dissidents or locking up his opponents, he was lavishly blowing up Iranian tax money on obscenely extravagant events. In 1967, the Shah crowned himself in an occasion that still lives on in Iranian memory. This American lackey assumed the resonant but meaningless title, “His Imperial Majesty The Shāhanshāh of Iran,” and wore a crown that was studded with a mere 3,380 diamonds. He gave his wife Farah the title, “the Empress of Iran,” an unprecedented act in Iranian 2,500-year history. 

In most monarchies, coronation is held soon after the king or queen ascends to the throne, as the coronation of Charles II in the UK demonstrates. In the case of Iran, the coronation ceremony was a reflection of the Shah’s perverted narcissism. He wanted the world to see him as a secular reformer, a great modernizer, a savior of an ancient civilization, the resuscitator of ancient Persia and a historic emperor beloved by his people. Four years later, he threw what has come to be known as “the world’s greatest party” to celebrate 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy.

In 1971, the Shah held this party in the ancient ruins of Persepolis, which now lies in the middle of a desert. An airport, a highway and an entire tent city were built for the occasion. This “billion-dollar party” has come to be known as “the Devil’s Feast.” As his people toiled in poverty, the Shah and his foreign guests were quaffing the fanciest of champagnes and gorging on caviar. 

Many kings and queens, presidents and prime ministers were impressed by this ostentatious desert party. However, canny observers were not entirely convinced. The most memorable of these was US diplomat George Ball who attended this party and saw the spectacle of the crowning of the “Sun of the Aryans.” His words sum up this 1971 incongruous big bash: 

“What an absurd, bathetic spectacle! The son of a colonel in a Persian Cossack regiment play-acting as the emperor of a country with an average per capita income of $250 per year, proclaiming his achievements in modernizing his nation while accoutred in the raiment and symbols of ancient despotism.”

While the Shah was good at throwing lavish parties, he was not as savvy at retaining Iranian territory. Bahrain had been overwhelmingly Shia and was under Iranian suzerainty before the British took over. The British were supposed to return this island to Iran. Instead, the British pressured the Shah to let Bahrain become an independent state in 1970. They had installed a comprador Wahhabi Sunni dynasty just as they had installed the Pahlavis in Iran. This Wahhabi dynasty still rules over Bahraini Shias with an iron hand.

While the Shah projected himself as a mighty emperor, in reality, he was the gendarme of the Persian Gulf for Uncle Sam. The US relied on Iran as its leading security partner in the Gulf. Iranian oil revenues were spent to protect American interests in the region. The Shah also supported the US in the Vietnam War.

A Sordid and Dissolute Despot

Today, many Iranians see the Shah as a liberator of women. During his time, glamorous women in elegant dresses sashayed down his red carpets. This is in stark contrast to the current regime of mullahs that imposes draconian dress codes on women. The nostalgia for the more permissive pre-1979 era obscures the fact that the Shah did not really see women as equals. He made his wife regent but did not think she would be able to rule as well as him.

The Shah led a famously dissolute life, visiting nightclubs across Europe and chasing beautiful actresses. One of them was Grace Kelly who became the Princess Grace of Monaco in 1956. The Shah spent millions on Kelly. He gifted her “three pieces of Van Cleef & Arpels jewelry: a gold birdcage housing a diamond and sapphire bird, all fashioned into a perfect pin; a gold vanity case with a clasp set with thirty-two diamonds; and a gold bracelet with an intricate pearl and diamond face.” He gifted others ancient jewelry from the treasury. Tragically, the poor, toiling Iranian taxpayers funded this libertine lifestyle. They also paid for the Shah’s gambling addiction. This magnificent emperor often lost about 50 million tomans ($42 million) in a single night as peasants went hungry in his homeland.

More importantly, the Shah was the Harvey Weinstein of his day. In fact, he was much worse than Weinstein. Not only pimps but also government officials were supposed to procure beautiful women for the Shah. Some of these women were underaged. The Shah was a serial sexual offender who preyed on vulnerable women and got away with it.

Given the Shah’s lack of loyalty to his nation, his excessive ostentation, brutal oppression and moral turpitude, a revolution was inevitable. Monarchs cannot eat cakes forever when their people struggle for bread. Even though SAVAK had imprisoned, tortured or killed opposition leaders like Mosaddegh, the Iranian people were seething in rage against their “Playboy Shah.” Iranians revolted in 1979, exactly 190 years after the 1789 French Revolution. Once the dust settled, the mullahs led by Khomeini took charge.

Today, the Shah’s eldest son Reza lives in the US and continues the family tradition. Reza dreams of the restoration of the Pahlavi dynasty and a return to good times for his family. He has been financed not only by the CIA but also the Saudis. Like his grandfather and father, Reza is also a lackey. The apple has not fallen far from the tree.

Today, people are out on the streets protesting against the mullahs who run a theological state. Most of them are very young with some barely 15. Some of them are vulnerable to myths about a glorious past and look favorably upon the Shah. Even in 2022, there are Iranians who glorify and glamorize the Shah. They must remember that he was a corrupt tyrant who stole from his people, gave territories away, helped foreigners destroy Iranian democracy, killed innocents and sexually abused innumerable women. The Shah belongs to the dustbin of history. Iran’s future has to be about liberty, equality, human rights, freedom and democracy.

[The authors corrected and updated this article on November 9, 2022.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Revolution Erupted in Iran Because of Mohammad Reza Shah appeared first on Fair Observer.

In the recent protests, unknown assailants have attacked banks, police, ambulances, other government officials, mosques, clerics and religious people. During their attacks, protesters often yell, “Reza Shah ruhat shad,” a phrase that literally translates to “Reza Shah, may your soul be happy.” These protesters are totally ignorant about the fact that, if Reza Shah was in power, he would have all of them killed. History tells us that Reza Shah dealt brutally with his opponents and crushed any sign of dissent.

British Domination and Exploitation

The British began interfering in Iran as early as the late 18th century. At that time, Persia, as Iran was then called, was under pressure from the Ottomans and the Russians. To Persians, the British seemed a countervailing power. To Britain, Persia was like Egypt, a buffer state to protect the jewel in the crown: India. The British did not rule Iran directly but dominated the country through bribery and intimidation. A cadre of collaborators helped the British Empire to run Persia as an informal colony. The British drained the Persian bullion to support their Indian ventures. Unlike Egypt though, Persia never became a protectorate thanks to the resistance of Shia religious leaders.

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Persia became increasingly important to British interests in the early 20th century. While Egypt had the Suez Canal, Persia had oil. In 1914, before World War I broke out, the House of Commons backed Winston Churchill’s proposal for the British government to acquire 51% of the shares of Anglo-Persian. Churchill was determined to keep Anglo-Persian an absolutely “all British Company” and spent a then princely sum of £2.2 million to do so. The goal was to ensure energy security for Great Britain where the Royal Navy switched from coal to oil to compete against the fast-rising German navy.

After World War I broke out, Persia remained neutral but supplied oil to Britain. In fact, Persian oil arguably led to Allied victory. The “conversion of the British fleet to oil… [gave them] advantages over the German fleet powered by coal–greater range and speed and faster refueling.” In keeping with their imperial tradition, Britain paid a pittance to Persia for oil.

Britain not only exploited Persia for oil but also grain. This led to the 1917-18 famine. About nine million Persians died, an estimated 40% of the population. Scholars have called this a genocide and, arguably, it was the biggest tragedy of World War I, exceeding the loss of life in Somme and Verdun. The British skilfully blamed the Russians and the Turks, and the genocide remained unknown for nearly a century.

The British Enthrone Ruthless Reza Mirpanj

After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Persia became a frontline state for the British Empire to counter the Bolshevik menace. As in other countries, the Soviets tried to foment trouble in Persia. Britain countered by propping up Reza Mirpanj, an officer in the Persian Cossack Brigade. He went on to depose the Qajar dynasty in 1925 and declare himself shah. The rubber stamp parliament approved Reza Mirpanj’s power grab. 

Once he became shah, this opportunistic officer changed his name to Reza Shah Pahlavi. Importantly, the Persian language was called Pahlavi during the Sasanian Empire. The Sasanian dynasty centralized Persia and made it a great power. Choosing Pahlavi was a very clever public relations stunt. Not everyone bought into Reza Shah’s sham. Four courageous legislators opposed the new shah. One of them was Mohammad Mosaddegh who would go on to become prime minister years later. The British managed Reza Shah’s coronation using the coronation of George V as their guide. 

Reza Shah presided over the greatest loot of Iranian historical and cultural relics. In 1931, he allowed foreign archaeologists to explore Iran and excavate Persepolis, the capital of the ancient Persian Achaemenid empire founded by Darius the Great in the 6th century BCE. His regime looked the other way as they loaded invaluable ancient artifacts onto big trucks. Then these trucks made their way from Persepolis to the Persian Gulf. Eventually, these artifacts ended up in the US and other prosperous countries of the West. Many relics ended up at the University of Chicago where they are housed in the appositely colonial sounding Oriental Institute.

The new shah turned out to be a classic British lackey. He stamped out Soviet influence and built the Trans-Iranian Railway connecting the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf. Built at ruinous cost to the Iranian taxpayer, this allowed British troops to deploy faster to counter the Soviets. Most importantly, the shah increased oil concessions to the British. The British increased their oil production in Persia from around 5 million tons (37 million barrels, equivalent) in 1932 to 10 million tons (over 74  million barrels, equivalent) in 1938. Note that very little of this old money trickled down to the Persian treasury and oil revenue comprised merely 10% of the budget.

In 1936, protests against Reza Shah’s policies erupted in Mashhad. The security forces cracked down the protesters. The protesters sought sanctuary in the holiest place in Iran: Imam Reza’s mausoleum. On the shah’s order, security forces entered the mausoleum and viciously massacred people. After that slaughter, Reza Shah became damned to eternity to most Iranians. After that incident, many people feared to even say his name, but referred to him as sag, which means dog—considered the most derogative of abuses in the Farsi language.

For increasing military might and expensive projects, Reza Shah had to increase the tax burden on the people. He also pursued a policy of centralization and Persianization. This meant ethnic minorities had no place in Persia, which he named Iran — the name used by natives of the land. Reza Shah’s detribalization and Persianization led to ethnic cleansing and genocide. William Douglas, a noted American judge, had the following to note about one community that fell foul of Reza Shah:

“Lur after Lur was beheaded. Again and again, the plate was heated red hot and slapped on the stub of a neck….The colonel started betting on how far these headless men could run…. Every man, woman, and child had been killed. Not a living soul was left.”

Overall, Reza Shah was a disaster for Iran. He banned all newspapers, organizations, and any opposition. Intellectual and political expression was censored. This undid the remnant of reformist efforts kicked off by Amir Kabir, the remarkable modernizer of the mid-19th century. who preceded him about 80 years earlier. This reformer had started Vaqaye Etefaqieh, Iran’s first newspaper whose name literally translates as “The Happened Events.”

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İnspired by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk of Turkey, Reza Shah banned Iranian traditional dress. Both men and women now had to wear Western clothing. If they did not do so, they were beaten and even taken into custody. This policy caused a massive rupture with tradition. In small towns and villages, people ignored the shah’s edict. In cities, people suffered, especially the women. Many women stopped going to public places to avoid harassment and became involuntary prisoners within their own homes. Like many other policies, the shah’s policy on clothing was an unmitigated disaster. It led to resentment across the country and had unintended consequences. Today, the mullahs enforce rigid rules of dress on women in much the same way as the shah. Then too, women protested as they are protesting today.

Bloodthirsty at Home, Weak Abroad

Reza Shah might have been ruthless to ethnic minorities and desenters but he was always subservient to the great powers. He gave away many parts of Iran to buy peace. Scared of the Soviets, he gifted them the Firoze region, which lies today in Turkmenistan and is home to its capital Ashgabat, in 1933. Later, Reza Shah succumbed to British pressure and parted with more land. In 1937, the wily Brits convened a meeting to unite Muslims against the Bolsheviks. The Saadabad Treaty was signed. As per this treaty, Reza Shah gave  the Helmand wetland to Afghanistan, full rights of Shatt al-Arab to Iraq and the strategic Ararat Mountain to Turkey. This Iranian that Reza Shah gave to Turkey allows Turkish troops access to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, which is an enclave of Azerbaijan within Armenia. Consequently, Turkey has replaced Iran as the natural ally of Azerbaijan even though the country is 85% Shia and Azeri culture has been deeply influenced by its Iranian counterpart. 

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In World War II, Reza Shah overplayed his hand. The rise of Nazi Germany swayed his head. By engaging with the Nazis, he began playing a dangerous game. Once the Germans invaded Russia in 1941, the British and the Soviets invaded Iran to secure oil supplies and continued access to warm waters. Reza Shah’s troops capitulated. The reason was simple. Reza Shah had started as a cavalry gendarme. These gendarmes were backed by landlords and their main job was to keep the peasants in check. They were bullies who lived off the fat of the land and not patriots who were serving to fight for their country. When the British and the Soviets invaded, most of Reza Shah’s top officers simply fled. Reza Shah himself proved to be a coward who did not resist the invading powers in the slightest. The military historian Robert Lyman observed that the British victory was, “one of the fastest capitulations in history.”

Part of the reason Reza Shah lost was because he was a corrupt, cruel and incompetent autocrat. He was a lowly cavalry officer who was part of a coup and then conducted a coronation. Once on the throne, this autocrat engaged in a massive land grab across the country. By the time the British packed him off to exile in 1941, Reza Shah had become Iran’s largest landowner. He also deposited a fair bit of cash at British Barclays Bank. The money that should have been used to build roads, schools and hospitals became the private property of a bloodthirsty upstart.

Fundamentally, Reza Shah was a narcissist, not a patriot. When the British took over Iran, he was more worried about preserving his private wealth instead of fighting for his country. By this time, this king had lost the trust of his people. The canny British had been keeping an eye on him. About 15 years ago, the imperial diplomat Harold Nicholson observed, “He [Reza] is secretive, suspicious, and ignorant; he appears wholly unable to grasp the realities of the situation or to realize the force of the hostility he has aroused.” Nicholson proved prophetic.

The Modern Reza Shah Myth is a Lie

When Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah ruled, writers and teachers lied to survive. Flattery was the order of the day. Reza Shah was glorified as a “social, economic, and political” reformer who laid the foundation for modern Iran. He was even given credit for reforms instituted by Amir Kabir. The regime kept Iranians in the dark about Reza Shah’s paranoid, violent and oppressive rule. Iranians did not realize how this corrupt king betrayed Iran to the British and stole from the exchequer. 

Apologists for the Pahlavis claim that Reza Shah brought modern medicine to Iran. The truth is that the Pasteur Institute of Iran had begun in 1919, many years before he seized power. It was the first public health institution in the Middle East, producing vaccines for the region. Hospitals existed even in ancient Iran. Reza Shah was not the first to build hospitals in the country. To be fair, he did build a few but so did almost every colony from Nigeria to Vietnam.

The most incongruous myth pervasive in the Iranian diaspora is that Reza Shah ended capitulation and expelled foreign forces from Iran. History tells us that Iranians had always opposed foreign troops. Amir Kabir had called for their expulsion 80 years ago. The British saw the writing on the wall, withdrew their troops but exercised power behind the scenes. British troops did not march down streets in Tehran in contrast to New Delhi. Instead the British used Reza Shah to do their dirty work in Iran.

Some give credit for railways, roads, industries and instituting a civil registry in Iran. The railways were for British strategic interest and cost the Iranian taxpayer a fortune. The roads were few and terrible. Industries came because Iranians have traded for centuries. Entrepreneurs learnt from Europeans and set up factories. Besides, Iranians had been producing sugar and textiles, two industries showcased by his supporters, for centuries. The registry was demanded by the parliament five years before Reza became shah.

Reza Shah’s regime failed to serve Iran. At the moment of reckoning, he and his troops just ran away. He was a thug in uniform who looted the country and killed innocents. He served imperial powers, not his people. Ayatollah Khomeini was not wrong when he said, “The Pahlavi monarchy was against the law from the day it was established. They formed a fake Constituent Assembly and forcefully made him [Reza Khan] the ruler over Iran. ”Today, protesters in Iran chanting “Reza Shah ruhat shad” need to study their history. Iran needs freedom, democracy and equality, not the glamorization of a paranoiac, cowardly, murderous, and traitorous shah.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Dirty Secrets About How Reza Shah Destroyed Iran appeared first on Fair Observer.

The BBC tells us that women around the world are now cutting their hair to show their solidarity with their Iranian counterparts. Abir Al-Sahlani, a Swedish Member of the European Parliament, cut her hair in the midst of her speech, giving a rallying cry: “women, life, freedom.”

Why are women protesting?

Since 1979, Shia clerics have ruled Iran. They have imposed strict moral codes and restrictive rules on society. Women are supposed to dress modestly and cover their hair in accordance with clerics’ strict interpretations of Islam. As education levels increase, Iranian women are increasingly unwilling to play by such rules.

Irshad can stop and intimidate any woman for the most arbitrary of reasons. Over the years, Iranian women have become highly educated. The percentage of females in higher education increased from 3% in 1978 to 59% in 2018. Women have entered almost all professions now. Their expectations have risen similarly. Even when there have been no protests, there is a simmering discontent among women about the restrictions they face on a daily basis. Many women hate the morality police. 

So unpopular is irshad that conservative president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad proposed to parliament to get rid of this morality police but he was shot down by those far more conservative than him, led by Parliament’s members Mutahari and Pizishkiyan. He explained that the police are also young people and they cannot make a correct diagnosis. Overall, Ahmadinejad opposed forcing people to observe the hijab rule. He held that people had rights to choose and they must be given choices so he was accused by ultra-conservatives of supporting indecency. 

While women may have done well in gaining an education, jobs have been hard to find. Glass ceilings remain thick and strong. Few women make it to top positions. They also find it difficult to get married because educated men with good jobs are in short supply. Furthermore, strict rules make it difficult for women and men to socialize. Like women elsewhere, Iranian women want some choice when it comes to their life partners.

Last year, Ebrahim Raisi was elected president. He is a conservative cleric who has sought to reinvigorate the old cultural revolution. Irshad have stepped up patrols and taken women away for “re-education” because of their supposedly improper dress. A hijab-and-chastity decree bans women without headscarves from posting pictures of themselves on social media. Naturally, women are dissatisfied with the tightening of restrictions and Amini’s death has set off a powder keg.

Why are men protesting?

Not only women but also men have taken to the streets. If Iranian women are dissatisfied, so are the men. They are really frustrated with the lack of opportunities. Many have lost hope in the future. In particular, educated men are most discontented. They are unable to get decent well-paying jobs. This restricts their marriage opportunities.

Young people are increasingly influenced by western media. They think of the US as a land of milk and honey. Alumni of the elite Sharif University of Technology leave the country in the search of a better life. Those who remain behind are frustrated by the lack of jobs in Iran. They access western media and want similar lifestyles to what they see on screen. This exacerbates their discontent.

American sanctions have taken their toll on the Iranian economy. Since 2012, per capita income has stagnated. After the Russia-Ukraine War, inflation has further soared. To make matters worse, Iran is facing an environmental crisis. Rivers have run dry, groundwater is falling, lakes are drying up and farmland is parched. A growing population has led to wanton felling of forests. In turn, deforestation has exacerbated desertification. As in India and China, pollution is choking cities. Young men find it very difficult to be hopeful about the future.

Over 60% of Iran’s 84 million population is under 30. Historically, young single men have been a source of instability in any society. Iran has millions of discontented young men. During the recent protests, unknown assailants have attacked banks, police, ambulances, other government officials, mosques, clerics and religious people. The 1979 revolution may not yet be at risk but Iranian society is volatile and could erupt in a volcanic eruption given the slightest provocation.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Why Are Young People Protesting in Iran? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Even as the UAE has a historic relationship with the US, it has been deepening its relationship with Russia. Both countries target periphery nations for discreet joint involvement. Shared interest across Africa has seen the UAE-Russia partnerships from Senegal to Sudan.

A power struggle in Sudan

The UAE has significantly increased its involvement and direction of affairs within Sudan since the resignation of the civilian prime minister Abdalla Hamdok in January. He had already been ousted in a coup led by the generals in October last year and his brief return was due only to international pressure, primarily from Washington.

Since Hamdok’s departure, a power struggle between the chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and his deputy, General Mohamed agalo, “Hemeti”, has developed. As competition between Burhan and Hemeti quietly intensifies, Sudanese actors are courting the UAE. Abu Dhabi is receptive to such overtures and Tahnoon bin Zayed, UAE’s national security advisor and Mohammed bin Zayed’s brother, has decided to back Hemeti. So has Russia.

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Burhan has attempted to consolidate his position by centralizing power within institutions, such as the ministry of defense, and by maintaining formal relationships with regional allies. This has seen the ministry increase its stake in the control of Port Sudan as well as other industrial ventures in the eastern region. By doing so, Burhan seeks to reduce the potential for Hemeti and his principal backer, the UAE, to secure access for themselves and Russia to the area. 

Moscow has long been trying to secure naval access to Port Sudan, a deal that continues to be delayed as Khartoum tries to secure greater financial and political support. It is important to note that Burhan is not overtly opposed to the UAE and Russia but is driven by the principal requirement to secure his own grip over Sudan. Burhan has tried to balance internal power dynamics while managing the tainted legacy of former president Omar al-Bashir with the whims and expectations of the international arena.

Burhan has recently visited Egypt, Libya, and Chad in an attempt to reinforce his own centrality in the future of Sudan. This has been conducted through high level relations with regional actors. Additionally, Burhan deployed Gibril Ibrahim, the leader of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), to Saudi Arabia to secure short-term funding for Sudan.

Even as Burhan is making his moves, Hemeti is countering them. The chief of staff to Chad’s president is his first cousin and a prominent negotiator with leading figures in the Darfur region. There are even reports that the governor of Darfur, Minni Minawi, is preparing to leave Burhan’s coalition and side with Hemeti. However, this dynamic is extremely delicate as Hemeti was the leader of the Janjaweed who perpetrated mass violence in the Darfur region. The implications of these power struggles for Sudan’s domestic scene are extremely perilous. After several coups, there is a real risk of another civil war.

The UAE and Russia join hands for a common cause

Sudan is still suffering from continuing US-led sanctions imposed after the coup that removed Hamdok. In such a situation, the UAE has assumed the role of facilitator and provider of urgently needed funds. In doing so, the UAE is bolstering the military-led administration in Sudan, developing its network in Khartoum and averting any potential shift of power to civilian government. 

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While  supporting the role of the military within Sudan’s  political structure, Abu Dhabi has sought to develop ties with key civilian actors. The UAE is cultivating Osama Daoud, a billionaire businessman with close ties to the military. He is the chairman of the DAL Group, which has an office in the UAE.  It has been reported that Daoud maintains a very close relationship with Tahnoon bin Zayed, and it is through this dynamic that a $6 billion investment project came through. 

The Abu Dhabi Ports Group will construct a new port, just north of Port Sudan, with an accompanying free zone. In addition, the Sudanese Central Bank will have $300 million deposited which should help to smooth over the condemnation the country faces over the lack of progress towards a civilian government. The UAE has also signed an agreement to develop a large agricultural project in Eastern Sudan that will export its produce through the new port. While the West has been trying to force the military to cede power, the UAE has been concluding deals with key military and military-backed players that will only further their influence in Sudan.

The timing and decision to increase financial assistance to Sudan is crucial. It is now clear that the UAE backs Hemeti. In the past, he has proven his loyalty to Abu Dhabi by supplying a large contingent of soldiers to South Yemen where Hemeti’s soldiers helped secure key areas from Houthi forces. Now, Russia may be joining hands with the UAE to back Hemeti. The Wagner Group, Russia’s shadowy mercenaries, could intervene should civil war in Sudan break out. Hemeti has visited Moscow on several occasions, securing military assistance and intelligence support from Russia’s Internet Research Agency. 

To counter Hemeti, Burhan has tried to win the UAE’s support. In March 2022, Burhan visited the UAE but did not gain Abu Dhabi’s backing. Therefore, he recently ordered the release of some Islamist prisoners, a move that has irked the UAE and made it move closer to Hemeti.

The US is watching the UAE’s involvement in Sudan with concern, especially as Abu Dhabi and Moscow are working together to back the same horse. In essence, Washington’s long-term project to install a civilian government in and bring peace to Sudan is being undone by Abu Dhabi. The UAE is not only eradicating the last vestiges of Sudanese democracy but it is also enabling Moscow to extend its reach far beyond the Eurasian sphere. Washington would not be pleased if Moscow gains naval access in Sudan. Yet it can do little as Abu Dhabi and Moscow cooperate to achieve a common goal. Dynamics in Sudan reveal clearly the UAE’s centrality in a shifting power dynamics in the Middle East, both in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea.

Sudan has been on the periphery of international attention. The new democratic government was poorly supported by the international community. This made the country vulnerable to external designs. The transition to civilian rule failed when the UAE and Russia backed military elites to achieve their strategic interests. Should Sudan succumb yet again to civil war, Russia is likely to provide security assistance to Hemeti while the UAE will provide the money. In the process, Abu Dhabi will acquire economic assets whose value would have depreciated due to conflict. Any internal conflict and civil war will enable Russia and the UAE to secure their long-term interests in the Horn of Africa and beyond.

[Arab Digest first published this article and is a partner of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Civil Strife Could Further Advances by Russia and the UAE in Sudan appeared first on Fair Observer.

Now, Israel’s most recent soft power tool is audiovisual culture, especially TV shows. The main goal may not be peace or just profits to the country’s production companies. Over the long term, those productions are made to seduce the hearts and minds of the worldwide population that watches these shows in streaming services, creating a positive perception of  Israeli narratives concerning several issues shown in the series.

The most important ingredients to make a nation’s audiovisual products a tool of a soft power exist in abundance in Israel today. There’s enough money and international co-production agreements to make good-quality TV shows, full of special effects, different locations and talented screenwriters, directors and stars. There are enough interesting real stories happening every day in the region, inspiring writers to deliver products about religion, politics, sex, culture, corruption, violence, prejudice, social injustices and more. And the most important ingredient: Israel is a democracy with freedom of speech, an essential tool for touching sore spots concerning their own failures and regrets and favoring the production of compelling audiovisual art and entertainment.

The story of Israeli TV success

The kickoff of the Israeli audiovisual boom was the HBO psychotherapy drama BeTipul (2005-2008), that generated the HBO adaptation ‘In Treatment’ (2008), winner of two Primetime Emmys. Gideon Raff’s Prisoners of War (2009-2012) was adapted in Hollywood as ‘Homeland’ (2011-2020), winning eight Primetime Emmys. But Hollywood’s adapting and winning more awards than the original stories is just the tip of the iceberg. The new trend of Israeli audiovisual culture’s soft power are TV shows spoken in Hebrew and Arabic, shot in the Middle East and distributed all over the world by streaming giants like Nefflix, HBO Max and AppleTV+. Success of the original productions internationally and in festivals facilitates shaping the world’s preferences toward narratives in which Israel controls the content, the moral of the stories and, of course, the profits.

The first non-English TV show on AppleTV+ — the International Award Emmy winner Tehran’(2021)  — is spoken in Hebrew and Arabic. It is considered the new Homeland among TV shows, with the special participation of Hollywood star Glenn Close. After an explosive Season 2 finale late last June, fans are demanding its renewal for Season 3. The story follows a Mossad agent in her first mission as a hacker in Tehran.

With lots of political critique among the amazing scenes of car chases, explosions and betrayals, the show also emphasizes a “fictional” underground life in Iran, where women drink, have uninhibited sex and young people, including the son of the most powerful general of Iran, party with drugs and alcohol.

Ori Elon’s show ‘Shtisel’ (2013-2021) became an international hit on Netflix using a different strategy designed to strengthen Israel’s cultural soft power. Its brilliant screenplaytries to demystify religious orthodoxy by following the lives of Shulem Shtisel (Doval’e Glickman), a teacher, and his son Akiva (Michael Aloni), who discuss moral issues such as arranged marriage, pride, feminism and religion. With its style that combines the influence of This is Us and Downton Abbey’, ‘Shtisel’ generated so many debates over the internet about fundamentalism – not only Jewish, but also Christian and Islamic – that Marta Kauffman, co-creator of Friends and Grace and Frankie, is now developing the American version for Amazon Prime.

Just like Hollywood, Israel’s new boom of TV shows don’t target only on Israeli cultural specificities. They seek to conquer the world thanks to stories with universal themes. One such is the psychological thriller Losing Alice (2021), premiered by Israeli channel Hot 3 in June 2020 and internationally on Apple TV+ in January 2021. The series follows a frustrated film director, Alice, mother of three daughters, and tracks her obsession with Sophie, a young screenwriter. Alice is played by Israeli star Ayelet Zurer, known for Angels & Demons and Munich.

The Israeli TV drama The Lesson competed in the 2022 edition of the prestigious TV Series Festival in Berlin and won two awards in the Canneseries Longform Competition. Co-starring Doron Ben David (Fauda), it tells the story of a high school teacher and the conflict with his students over racism following a social media post. 

Soft power collateral damages

Controlling the narrative means owning the morals of the stories. But even if talented screenwriters try to make it as realistic as possible, collateral damage is almost certain. TV shows that are mega-hits like Netflix’s The Spy (2019), Fauda (2015) and Hit & Run (2021) show ordinary Israelis recruited by Mossad or the Israeli Air Force, who become effective agents in infiltrating and capturing even the most difficult enemies, a clear message celebrating Israel’s invincible secret service and its technologies. HBO’s Valley of Tears (2020) goes further by turning the arrogance of the Israeli army in the initial moments of the Yom Kippur War into an overall lesson in overcoming adversity.

Another type of collateral damage to soft power occurs when its own citizens reject the show’s perspectives. The HBO-Keshet co-production Our Boys (2019) was called “anti-Semitic” by Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who urged a boycott of the production. The show emphasized the death of a Palestinian boy rather than the Israeli victims whose death led to the Gaza conflict in 2014. The producers tried to show the violence caused by three ultra-orthodox Jews from the perspective of the Palestinian boy’s family, but part of the Jewish audience in Israel and around the globe complainedthat the series left the deaths caused by Hamas in background.

Last but not the least, the collateral damage to soft power is competition. Everyone wants to claim a slice of the result of cultural increased soft power influence over the global population. Producing a full season of a TV show is usually more expensive than producing a film., Palestine is thus getting help from streaming services like Netflix to tell their stories told in movies. Palestinian Stories, released last October by the streaming giant, is a collection of 32 award-wining films either directed by Palestinian filmmakers or recounting Palestinian stories. Most of them are about the life of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, both occupied by Israel since 1967. But there’s also one TV show that aims at competing with Israeli narratives. After watching Fauda, Palestinian director Mohammed Soraya is making his own version of the conflicts in a Gaza TV studio. 
Qabdat Al-Ahrar (Fist of the Free) will revisit the 2018 Israeli operation in the Gaza Strip that resulted in the deaths of seven Hamas fighters and an Israeli officer. It is a modest,low-budget production with poor salaries for artists and crew. That helps to account for even the biggest problem of the Hamas TV series: Its lack of realism.: Local actors play Israelis and say they are exposed to real-world hostility. Israeli characters speak only in Arabic and, at the request of the Hamas mufti, women wear headscarves even if they are portraying Jewish characters. The perfect ingredients to turn Qabdat Al-Ahrar into a propaganda preaching to their own choir and not a soft power instrument to the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The ICG report details the apparent ease with which small units of ISIS fighters, in groups of four or five, conduct raids on Syrian troops and SDF forces, conduct assassinations and mete out other forms of punishment on those deemed to have “collaborated” with any enemy. The report also details how ISIS runs lucrative smuggling and extortion rackets. These provide the funds to recruit and pay fighters and to equip them with weapons.

Of Prisons and Prisoners

The report points out the vulnerability of the 27 prisons holding ISIS fighters scattered throughout the northeast of the country as well as the holding camps for women and children, the most notorious of which is al-Hol. There, militant hardline women control much of the camp. The SDF, already stretched, is charged with policing and holding the prisons, the holding camps as well as IDP camps. “Our ticking time bomb” is how a senior SDF commander, citing a lack of personnel and resources, describes al-Hol where 15 murders were committed in the first three months of this year.

The SDF’s vulnerability was on full display in January when ISIS launched a full-scale attack on Ghowayran Prison in Hasakah:

“The attack showcased the shortcomings of existing security mechanisms. A prison holding thousands of ISIS fighters was guarded by members of unarmed self-defence units who had received minimal training before being deployed.  The inmates quickly overran this under-trained and under-equipped force.”

It took nearly two weeks to bring the attack to an end and it was only achieved with the aid of US and British airstrikes and special forces on the ground. The ICG estimates that 200 SDF soldiers died in the fighting along with hundreds of ISIS fighters and inmates. Hundreds more escaped.

Guerrilla Tactics

That sort of full frontal assault as on Ghowayran Prison has been something of an anomaly. ISIS tactics in Syria by and large are classic guerrilla engagements of the hit and run variety: attacks on checkpoints and convoys by small mobile cells operating independently of a central command.

ISIS conducted an ambush on a bus of Syrian army soldiers in Jabal Bishri, Raqqa, on June 20, killing at least 13 soldiers. The insurgency flourishes in a climate of suspicion, resentment and fear that the Arab population holds for the Kurdish-dominated SDF. Add to that the extreme climate conditions that have significantly damaged harvests as drought conditions and high temperatures prevail and the elements for constant insurgency are all in place.

Details of the severity of the agricultural crisis are available in a report from the Turkish-based Operations & Policy Center which notes:

“Since the latter months of 2020, Syria has yet again fallen into a severe drought. This new drought is occurring in a country whose agricultural capacity has already been decimated by decades of  agricultural and water misgovernance, as well as an 11-year war, making it less capable of coping with a drought than at any point in its modern history.”

In such dire conditions, ISIS recruits new fighters easily, especially as its well-organized smuggling infrastructure provides the cash to lure desperate young men to become ISIS foot soldiers.

The ICG sheds light on a sophisticated and well-oiled machine that includes the bribing of elements both in the regime and the SDF:

“The north east has become a pillar of ISIS finances. The SDF-held territory is rich in natural resources, including oil and gas, and has longstanding economic links to other parts of Syria, as well as Iraq. ISIS relies on three primary funding sources: racketeering, taxation and smuggling. With this money ISIS buys weapons and supplies, offers stipends to its members’ families, bribes SDF guards to secure detainees’ release, recruits new fighters and pays the occasional hit man.”

The report continues:

“In many ways, ISIS operates like a mafia, preying on governing institutions and businesses through extortion and blackmail. In some cases, it has recruited local council employees to collect protection money from their colleagues. It also shakes down traders, artisanal oil refinery owners, bakers and smugglers. It is unclear how ISIS determines the amount of money to demand from each target, but SDF officials claim that oil investors and refinery owners pay thousands of dollars per month to avoid ISIS attacks on their businesses.”

The ICF report, though it paints a bleak picture, does not foresee the restoration of a caliphate. Rather it sees an ongoing insurgency, one that harasses and destabilizes, all the while building on the economic miseries that the still-unresolved Syrian civil war  and the drought have unleashed. Integral to any strategy to finally see off ISIS is cooperation between the many factions, both internal and external, that bedevil the conflict. With such cooperation seeming more a pipedream than reality, the ISIS insurgency will remain a constant threat within Syria, neighbouring Iraq and well beyond as it inspires the next generation of jihadist terrorists.

[Arab Digest first published this article and is a partner of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The designation conformed to a statement that Biden made to His Highness Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani, the emir of Qatar, during his visit to Washington in late January 2022.  During the visit, Biden had sent a letter to the US Congress indicating his intention to give Qatar the designation of  a major non-NATO ally. In the letter, the president acknowledged “Qatar’s many years of contributions to US-led efforts in the US Central Command area of responsibility” and recognized that the US had a “national interest in deepening bilateral defense and security cooperation with the State of Qatar.” 

BIden’s designation for Qatar has a historical basis. For years, Qatar has supported US foreign policy objectives. The country has hosted and provided substantial financial support for the Al Udeid Air Base and engaged with the US on issues of strategic importance, including its recent assistance in relocating thousands of Afghans and its ability to serve as an effective mediator in critical situations. The designation  promises to deepen US-Qatar ties in the future.

What Does This Designation Really Mean?  

What are the legal foundations for the designation and its implications for Qatar? Under a federal statute, the US president has the unilateral power to designate a country a major non-NATO ally with the requirement that Congress receive notice in writing at least 30 days before this designation. As aptly noted, the designation alone does not make Qatar a NATO member and thus the collective security obligations and mutual defense benefits under NATO are not applicable to this GCC country.  

Yet, in addition to recognizing the close military ties between Qatar and the US, the designation as a major non-NATO ally ensures defense trade and security cooperation benefits. Qatar is now eligible for loans, research, training, and development, as well as gaining priority access to US military equipment and the ability to bid on certain US Department of Defense contracts. 

In the past, other regional players have benefitted from the designation. Their experience highlights the importance of a military and defense relationship for any GCC state with the US, especially given recent events. For example, Kuwait has benefitted from arms sales through the Foreign Military Sales Program. This strengthened the capabilities of the Kuwaiti military and enhanced the country’s security. 

The Biden administration has given $1 billion to the US Army Corps of Engineers and other US companies to build Kuwait’s new defense ministry headquarters. A training initiative, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, enables Kuwaiti students to be trained at US military institutions at a discounted rate.

Capacity building is one of the main incentives for US-Qatar cooperation, which is of great importance to this GCC state. Its defense regime is relatively young and capable of playing an influential role due to the country’s proximity to both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Qatar can also play a key role as a mediator in the region. In the light of the above, the designation as a major non-NATO ally has critical long-term benefits to the country.

The new development also certainly signals closer cooperation between the US and Qatar. Historically, these designations tend to be mutually beneficial. In the case of Qatar, increased engagement with the US promises to strengthen its status as a security leader in the Middle East and benefit both the region as well as its superpower friend.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Biden called Saudi Arabia a pariah state during his presidential election campaign. He has since effectively boycotted MBS because of the crown prince’s alleged involvement in the 2018 killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. MBS has denied any involvement in the killing but accepted responsibility for it as Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler.

A Symbolic Visit to the UAE

MBS waited for his 86-year-old father to return from the hospital before traveling to Abu Dhabi to offer his condolences for the death of United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Khaled bin Zayed and congratulations to his successor, Mohamed bin Zayed, the crown prince’s one-time mentor. MBS used the composition of his delegation to underline his grip on Saudi Arabia’s ruling family. In doing so, MBS was messaging the international community at large, and particularly Biden, that he is in full control of the kingdom no matter what happens.

The delegation was made up of representatives of different branches of the ruling Al Saud family, including Prince Abdulaziz bin Ahmed, the eldest son of Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, the detained brother of King Salman. Even though he holds no official post, Abdulaziz’s name topped the Saudi state media’s list of delegates accompanying MBS. His father Ahmed was one of three members of the Allegiance Council not to support MBS’s appointment as crown prince in 2017. The 34-member council, populated by the many parts of the Al-Saud family, was established by King Abdullah in 2009 to determine succession to the throne.

MBS has detained Ahmed as well as Prince Mohamed bin Nayef, the two men he considers his foremost rivals, partly because they are popular among US officials. Ahmed was detained in 2020 but never charged, while bin Nayef stands accused of corruption. Ahmed returned to the kingdom in 2018 from London where he told protesters against the war in Yemen to address those responsible: the king and the crown prince.

Abdulaziz’s inclusion in the Abu Dhabi delegation fits a pattern: MBS appoints to high office the younger relatives of people detained since his rise in 2015. Many older powerful royals were arrested in a mass anti-corruption campaign that often seemed to camouflage a power grab. A consultative government among members of the ruling family has now been replaced with one-man rule. MBS probably takes pleasure in driving the point home as Biden mulls a pilgrimage to Riyadh to persuade the crown prince to end his opposition to increasing the kingdom’s oil production and convince him that the United States remains committed to regional security.

The MBS and Joe Biden Dance

So far, the crown prince not only rejected US requests to help lower oil prices and assist Europe in reducing its dependency on Russian oil as part of the campaign to force Moscow to end its invasion of Ukraine but also refused to take a phone call from Biden. Asked a month later whether Biden may have misunderstood him, MBS told an interviewer. “Simply, I do not care.”

Striking a less belligerent tone, Mohammed Khalid Alyahya, a Hudson Institute visiting fellow and former editor-in-chief of Saudi-owned Al Arabiya English, noted this month that “Saudi Arabia laments what it sees as America’s wilful dismantling of an international order that it established and led for the better part of a century.” Alyahya quoted a senior Saudi official as saying: “A strong, dependable America is the greatest friend Saudi Arabia can have. It stands to reason, then, that US weakness and confusion is a grave threat not just to America, but to us as well.”

The United States has signaled that it is shifting its focus away from the Middle East to Asia even though it has not rolled back its significant military presence. Nonetheless, Middle Eastern states read a reduced US commitment to their security because Washington has failed to respond robustly to attacks by Iran and Iranian-backed Arab militias against targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is not to mention the Biden administration’s efforts to revive a moribund 2015 international nuclear agreement with Iran.

Several senior US officials, including National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and CIA Director Bill Burns, met with the crown prince during trips to the kingdom last year. Separately, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called the crown prince. In one instance, MBS reportedly shouted at Sullivan after the US official raised Khashoggi’s killing. The crown prince reportedly told Sullivan that he never wanted to discuss the matter again and that the US could forget about its request to boost Saudi oil production.

Even so, leverage in the US-Saudi relationship goes both ways. Biden may need Saudi Arabia’s oil to break Russia’s economic back. By the same token, Riyadh, despite massive weapon acquisitions from the US and Europe as well as arms from China that the US is reluctant to sell, needs Washington as its security guarantor. MBS knows that he has nowhere else to go. Russia has written itself out of the equation, and China is neither capable nor willing to step into the shoes of the US any time soon.

Critics of Biden’s apparent willingness to bury the hatchet with MBS argue that in the battle with Russia and China over a new 21^st-century world order, the US not only needs to talk the principled talk but also walk the principled walk. In an editorial, The Washington Post, for whom Khashoggi was a columnist, noted that “the contrast between professed US principles and US policy would be stark and undeniable” if Biden re-engages with Saudi Arabia. Yet, with oil prices soaring and inflation rising, interests might trump values and a Biden-led US might kiss and make up with an MBS-led Saudi Arabia to attain its realpolitik ends.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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No Story Is Worth Dying For

In most Kenyan media schools, the phrase “No Story Is Worth Dying For” is quite a common saying. However, what happens when you fall in love with your work?

Describing herself as a “product of Jerusalem,” with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict shaping much of her life, Shireen Abu Akleh has shown the world what it means to be a journalist and what it means  to tell stories that  affect you as a journalist and your community. In her own words, her only mission was to be close to her people, and within her people she was killed.

“I chose to become a journalist to be close to people. It may not be easy to change reality, but I was at least able to bring their voice to the world,” Abu Akleh said in a video taped for the Qatari channel’s 25th anniversary. 

Journalism in Africa Has Become a Travesty

When I was growing up, I listened to Kenya Broadcasting Corporation’s Radio Taifa and watched KBC Channel 1 —  that’s what we had at that time and I must say that the type of journalism exhibited was mind-blowing. A type of journalism that can only be compared to Abu Akleh’s.

Today, African journalists have turned their craft into a very ordinary career reserved for cool kids, who spent most of their time in big cities or overseas. After spending time overseas, these cool kids return to their homeland and land jobs in major newsrooms, thanks to their polished English. Sadly, most of them have zero journalism skills or storytelling abilities.

While journalists like Ahmed Hussein-Suale,a renowned investigative journalist from Ghana, was killed in 2019 for his role in exposing the corruption in his country,and Jamal Farah Adan of Somalia, Betty Mtekhele Barasa of Kenya, and dozens were killed in Ethiopia covering the Tigray conflict, it is very unfortunate that some journalists still find it right to use journalism for fame, power, and build future political careers.

Today, some Kenyan journalists engage in uncalled-for social media wars with critics who point out their lack of skills and unreasonable theatrics for clout chasing.

We have lost the basics of journalism such as good storytelling. Instead, journalists are thirsty for social media numbers, likes, and retweets. We don’t verify anymore. As long as it helps increase the number of followers, it goes for publishing. Right now, distinguishing a professionally trained journalist from a socialite is becoming an uphill task.

African Governments Must Learn from Palestine

Shireen Abu Akleh was shot dead by Israeli forces just eight days after the world marked the World Press Freedom Day on May 3. With such events, African governments need to step up and steer clear of Israeli-like behaviors of gagging the media, and instead, just like Palestine gave Abu Akleh the freedom to tell her people’s story, they should also give the same freedom to their journalists.

In March, Ugandan authorities raided the offices of Digitalk, an online tv station known for airing critical views of President Yoweri Museveni and his family. Other than confiscating the TV’s production and broadcasting equipment, they also arrested and charged its reporters with cyberstalking and offensive communication. The charges could see them facing up to seven years in prison. 

The killing of this brave journalist who dared to tell the stories of the oppressive Israeli should not kill the spirits of journalists worldwide. Instead, this should be an inspiration to every reporter to work even harder,  to help give voice to the voiceless, uphold justice and make the world a better place for every person whether in Gaza, Tigray, Libya, Syria or Afghanistan among other countries and regions experiencing instability.

(Senior Editor Francesca Julia Zucchelli edited this article.)

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Over the years, the Lebanese have lost faith in the state. A recent poll from Zogby Research Services showed that the people had much higher confidence in civil society (85%) and the October 17 Revolution (65%) than in parliament (29%) or traditional political parties (19%). For these reasons, US policy has rightfully focused on combating corruption and providing aid directly to the Lebanese people.

Lebanese Americans Urge Crisis Resolution

Fortunately, over the past few weeks, three encouraging developments in Lebanon have dominated the news. The first was an announcement that the country had reached a staff-level agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The second was that opposition groups have assembled their candidate lists for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The third highlighted that Lebanon took a courageous step in condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The US has made resolving the crisis in Lebanon a priority. The Lebanese American community has stood firmly behind these efforts to aid the Lebanese people and enact necessary reforms. On the eve of the most recent IMF negotiations in March, a delegation of Lebanese American business and civic leaders undertook a trip to Lebanon, where they met people in the government and the political opposition, as well as religious leaders from all major sects, and those who ran NGOs. The delegation carried a message for key leaders: Lebanon is on the verge of collapse. They urged authorities to conduct upcoming parliamentary elections in a timely, fair and transparent manner. They also found that the prime minister and his economic team were eager to conclude an agreement with the IMF speedily. 

The delegation also met the minister of interior who indicated he was prepared to hold elections on time. He also said that the parliament had allocated the resources necessary to hold fair and free elections. Separately, the UN has pledged aid to support the internal security forces across more than 6,000 polling stations across the country. 

The IMF Staff-Level Agreement Is Promising

It is encouraging now to see that the IMF staff-level agreement concluded quickly. In religiously diverse Lebanon, agreement can be hard to reach. This time, the Maronite Catholic president, the Sunni Muslim prime minister and the Shi’a Muslim speaker of parliament speedily agreed. Hopefully, this might start the process of implementing badly-needed reforms to support the economic and social needs of the people. 

The staff-level agreement is a good start, but the next hurdle for the Lebanese government will be to follow through with necessary legislative actions to implement this deal. Therefore, the coming elections that choose a new parliament on May 15 are critical. The new parliament will have to rebuild the economy, restore financial sustainability, strengthen governance and take anti-corruption measures, remove impediments to job-creating growth, and increase social and reconstruction spending, initially in the electricity sector. Without such actions by the new parliament, no IMF relief will be forthcoming.

May 15 Parliamentary Elections Are Tricky

The upcoming elections offer Lebanese citizens the chance to vote for reformist candidates who advocate change and good governance. As a first order of business, a new parliament will be faced with enacting reform legislation in order to meet the requirements of the IMF and bring badly needed economic relief. But how “new” the new parliament will be after the elections is in question. Will it be dominated by Hezbollah and its allies who will resist change and reform or by new leaders who will move a reform agenda forward? 

The Lebanese American leadership delegation met with a diverse group of reformist candidates. While it is clear that the Lebanese people have more political options, the visiting delegation found an opposition movement that is divided about how to best engage politically. The proof of this division came out recently when political party lists were finalized on April 5. Instead of joining together, most opposition groups announced lists competing with one another.  

The lack of coordination among the opposition diminishes the chances of the reformists. The good news is that if the opposition can take away 10 of the 128 seats up for election from the current Hezbollah-Christian coalition, the balance of power in parliament will shift decisively away from the old guard. This is not a big figure but even this may prove hard to achieve.

A New Opening in the US-Lebanon Relationship  

Both elections and the deal with the IMF have come at a time when the US has turned its attention to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The war has caused shortages of wheat and fuel. Inflation has spiked. Yet Lebanon has taken the courageous decision to condemn Russian atrocities and voted with the US at the UN. No other country in the Middle East has been so clear and forceful in its condemnation of Russia. 

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The IMF staff-level agreement and Lebanon’s condemnation of Russia are creating a new opening in the US-Lebanon relationship at a time when both countries can be helpful to one another. Thanks to the US, Lebanon could possibly come to a historic agreement on its maritime border with Israel. It could import electricity and natural gas from Jordan and Egypt to overcome its electricity and energy shortages. However, all of this is contingent on voters electing a reformist parliament. 

The agreement with the IMF could mark a turning point in Lebanon’s history, or it could turn out to be yet another disappointing tactical maneuver by Lebanon’s ruling elite. The future is now squarely in the hands of the Lebanese voters to elect a government that is willing to take the risks necessary to save the country. It is certain that Lebanon’s actions so far have caught the attention of the Biden Administration and the Congress. They would be more than willing to help a government and people courageously standing up to Russia and embracing reforms.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Is Bosnia-Herzegovina Next on Russia’s Radar?

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“All experts,” the avowed Erdogan supporter continued, agreed that Washington was escalating the crisis to solidify its dominance in Western Europe. With that, Barlas also echoed the general mood in Turkey. It is fortunate, he said, that Russia’s president is much more reasonable and wiser than his American counterpart, Joe Biden.

The Bond Between Erdogan and Putin

This positive image of Putin and Erdogan’s familiarity with the Kremlin leader is no accident. Particularly since the failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016, Erdogan has, with Putin’s help, been able to position himself independently of — and sometimes even against — the United States and Europe on key foreign policy issues.

In Syria and Azerbaijan, Ankara and Moscow succeeded in marginalizing Western actors. In Libya and the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey acts as a competitor or even adversary to member states of the European Union.

Turkey’s flirtation with Moscow led to concerns that Ankara might turn away from Europe altogether. That contributed to the EU’s kid-glove approach to Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. It also resulted in Washington’s belated reaction to Turkey’s acquisition of Russia’s S-400 missile defense system with sanctions. It is true that Turkey has experience with Putin as a cool strategist and ruthless power politician in conflicts such as the one in Syria. But Erdogan has always seemed to succeed in avoiding escalation.

Despite all of Ankara’s tension with Moscow, Erdogan’s rapprochement with Russia has brought him much closer to his goal of strategic autonomy for his country from the West. Turkey skillfully maneuvered between the fronts of global rivalry and was able to considerably expand its scope and influence in just a few years.

In this seesaw policy, however, Turkey is behaving much more confrontationally toward Western states than toward Russia. For years, the government press has painted a positive picture of Russia and a negative one of the United States and Europe. This is not without effect on Turkish public opinion. Around a month before Russia attacked Ukraine, in a poll carried out by a renowned opinion research institute, a narrow relative majority of 39% of respondents favored foreign policy cooperation with Russia and China instead of Europe and the United States.

In the first days after Russia’s invasion, Ankara’s policy followed exactly the aforementioned pattern. Turkey condemned the attack, but it is not participating in sanctions against Russia. In the vote on suspending Russia’s representation rights in the Council of Europe, Turkey was the only NATO state to abstain and, as such, is keeping its airspace open to Russian aircraft.

The West is paying particular attention to whether and how Turkey implements the Treaty of Montreux. The 1936 treaty regulates the passage of warships through Turkey’s Dardanelles and Bosporus Straits into the Black Sea. It limits the number, tonnage and duration of stay of ships from non-littoral states in the Black Sea. In the event of war, the convention stipulates that the waterways must be closed to ships of the parties to the conflict, and it entrusts Ankara with the application of the treaty’s regulations

Ankara Swings Around

It took Turkey four days to classify the Russian invasion as “war.” However, Ankara is still reluctant to officially close the waterways — as the treaty stipulates — to ships of parties to the conflict, Russia and Ukraine. Instead, Ankara is warning “all countries, Black Sea riparian or not,” against sending warships through the straits.

In the literal sense, this step is not directed unilaterally against Moscow, but it also makes it more difficult for NATO ships to sail into the Black Sea. According to the treaty, however, the waterways may only be closed to warships of all countries if Ankara considers itself directly threatened by war. Consciously creating ambiguity, Turkey has triangulated between the West and Russia.

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Almost imperceptibly at first, however, a reversal has now set in. There are four reasons for this. First, the West is showing unity and resolve unseen since the Cold War, and its sanctions are undermining Russia’s standing in the world. Second, Putin is losing his charisma as a successful statesman and reliable partner. Third, Ankara realizes that Putin’s vision of a great Russian empire could provoke more wars. Fourth, the ranks of the adversaries are closing and it is becoming more difficult for Turkey to continue its seesaw policy.

Thus, strongly pro-Western tones have emerged from Ankara in recent weeks. Turkey will continue to support Ukraine in consultation with the West, according to the president’s spokesman. Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu now claims to have contradicted Russia’s wishes for the passage of warships through the Bosporus “in all friendship.” President Erdogan is also in favor of admitting Ukraine to the European Union and Kosovo to NATO.

Moreover, Ankara is not contradicting reports by Ukrainian diplomats that Turkey is supplying more armed drones and training pilots to fly drones. On March 2, Turkey joined the vast majority of states in the UN General Assembly’s condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine that asked Russia to “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces.” Two days later, during the extraordinary meeting of NATO’s foreign ministers, Turkey supported the deployment of NATO’s Response Force to NATO countries neighboring Ukraine.

It looks like Putin is not only bringing long-lost unity to the EU, but he is also reminding Turkey of the benefits of its Western ties. Western states should realize that only more unity among themselves and more determination will make Turkey reengage with the West.

*[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Is Ukraine Likely to Join the EU Any Time Soon?

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The inclination will be to put China in the same basket as Russia, even if China is still being cautious about its next steps. Many other countries will be pushed to choose. One country, Turkey, will soon face difficult choices, since balancing acts may not be enough this time around.

A Tough Balance Between the West and Russia

Turkey has been trying to diversify and balance its alliances between the West and others for a long time now. Turkey is a NATO member that possesses Russian anti-aircraft missile systems, namely the S-400. This purchase not only led to CAATSA sanctions by the United States — which was a first against a NATO ally — but also the removal of the country from the F-35 program.

These measures did not hinder Turkey’s special relationship with Russia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan always maintained personal relations with his counterpart in Moscow, Vladimir Putin. Even when they were at opposite ends of the theater of power — in Syria or Nagorno-Karabakh, for example — they kept talking. This did not change even after Turkey shot down a Russian plane in November 2015. Turkey’s dependence on Russian gas and tourism has also been a reason for their continued dialogue. Turkey also awarded the construction of its nuclear power plant — the Akkuyu plant — to Russia.

Today, Turkey is staying out of the sanctions schemes of the European Union and NATO. It has also tried juggling the Ukrainian demand to close the Turkish Straits to Russian warships — even if the Montreux Convention upholds the demand. Turkey stated that the Russian attack “is a grave violation of international law and poses a serious threat to the security of our region and the world.” It has hesitated, however, to move beyond that declaration. When the pressure mounted — masterfully and publicly handled by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky — and other actors continued to announce historic decisions one after the other, Turkey had to make a decision on the Straits.

It is important to remember that Turkey has also sold drones to Ukraine in the recent past and signed a free trade agreement, meaning that it was in a strong position to claim that it has supported Ukraine. Turkey even offered to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, but the offer has not been accepted as of yet.

The longer Russian aggression continues, the more Turkey will be pushed to move more decisively. Even Switzerland declared that it will apply the EU’s sanctions on Russia. Candidate countries are also encouraged to follow the course. Soon, there will be no more room for strategic ambiguity.

And When the Dust Settles?

However, there is even a broader question that requires strategic thinking. When the dust settles, where would Turkey like to stand when the European security architecture of the 21^st century is being discussed? Where it was in the 20^th century — a member of NATO, the Council of Europe, an integral element of the so-called Western order — or with the “others”? Turkey has spent recent years trying not to choose and playing all sides against each other when necessary.

The year 2022 was going to be decisive with regard to the European security architecture, even without a war on the continent. Europeans are already working on the publication of the “strategic compass” in addition to NATO’s strategic concept, which will be discussed in Madrid in June. These thought-provoking exercises have become even more significant in light of recent developments.

The historic steps that both the EU and some of its member states are taking will set the tone when it comes to the European security architecture. In addition to the sanctions package, the EU is sending lethal weapons to a third country under the European Peace Facility. Germany is increasing its defense spending to more than 2% of its GDP while facilitating a one-off investment of €100 billion ($109 billion) for the Bundeswehr.

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One should also underline the exemplary coordination between the EU and NATO. Nothing strengthens the transatlantic bond more than a Russian threat to the continent. Geopolitical challenges that were not expected in the 21^st century are going hand in hand with the necessity for drastic moves. Concepts such as sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, which are protected under international law, have become even more visible. One thing to expect now is that different camps across the world will close ranks.

Will Turkey’s importance increase for the West, as it had during the Cold War? Maybe. It will surely play an important role in the Black Sea, especially when it comes to the Straits. However, once the cleavages between democracies and autocracies deepen, the state of affairs in Turkey will be even more important.

Right now, these changes have caught Turkey off guard. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) is tired after 20 years in power. The government it leads is mostly seen as authoritarian by many in Europe. The Turkish economy is in never-ending decline. It is hard to look for long-lasting consensus in a society once it has become extremely polarized. This is not necessarily the best time to set directions for the decades to come. But the country may have no choice.

Last but not least, the Ukraine crisis has demonstrated the importance of well-functioning relations with neighbors for European sovereignty. It is important to underline once again that European security is not only about the EU, but also its neighborhood. As an integral piece of European security architecture in the 20^th century, Turkey will need to define where it stands very clearly. It is not only about who wins and who loses, but also about who will adapt to the changes that Europe is going through. It is time for reaffirmations for everyone. It would be beneficial for the European continent as a whole if Turkey also closed ranks with its traditional allies.

*[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions relating to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is There Any Place Strategic Ambiguity in Europe? appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Unthinkable: War Returns to Europe

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The immediate answer is there are very few today outside of Russia itself, hence the large rise in gas prices witnessed lately. Over the medium term, however, Libya and Algeria have ample opportunity to increase their supplies to the EU.

Supplies From Libya and Algeria

Libya boasts proven gas reserves of 1,500 billion cubic meters (bcm). Its production is a modest 16 bcm. Algeria has 4,500 bcm of proven reserves and 20-25 trillion cubic meters (tcm) of unconventional gas reserves, the third-largest in the world after the United States and China (and Argentina whose proven reserves tie with Algeria). How much gas that could produce is anyone’s guess, but we are speaking of a figure in the tens of bcm.

Algeria today produces 90 bcm, of which 50 bcm were exported. Another feature of Algeria is the huge storage capacity — 60 bcm — of the Hassi R’Mel gas field, its oldest and largest compared with the EU’s storage capacity of 115 bcm.

Pierre Terzian, the founder of the French energy think-tank Petrostrategies, points out that four underwater gas pipelines link these two producers directly to the European mainland: the first links Libyan gas fields with Italy; the second Algerian gas fields to Italy via Tunisia; the third Algerian gas fields to southern Spain; and the fourth the same gas fields to southern Spain via Morocco.

The latter has been closed since November 1, 2021, due to deteriorating relations between Algeria and Morocco, but this has not affected the supply of gas to the Iberian Peninsula. Algeria also has two major liquified natural gas (LNG) terminals, which adds flexibility to its export policy. Its exports to France and the United Kingdom are in LNG ships.

The leading cause of the current crisis is structural as, according to Terzian, EU domestic gas production has declined by 23% over the last 10 years and now covers only 42% of consumption, as compared with 53% in 2010. That decline is the result, in particular, of the closing of the giant Groningen gas field, which is well underway and will be completed by 2030.

Europe has done a lot to expand the gas transmission grid among EU countries, but some major gas peninsulas remain. In 2018, it was suggested that connections between the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe needed developing. Spain boasts one-third of Europe’s LNG import capacity, much of it unused, and is connected to Algeria by two major pipelines that could be extended.

As Alan Riley and I noted four years ago, the “main barrier to opening up the Iberian energy market’s supply routes to the rest of the EU is the restricted route over the Franco-Spanish border. Only one 7-bcm gas line is available to carry gas northwards … The main blocking factor has been the political power of Electricité de France, which is seeking to protect the interests of the French nuclear industry.” An Iberian solution, we added, would not only “benefit France and Spain, but also Algeria, creating additional incentives to explore for new gas fields and maybe kick start a domestic renewables revolution,” which would encourage a switch in consumption from gas to solar in Algeria.

Germany, the Netherlands and Italy

Germany, for its part, has never put its money where its mouth is with regard to Algeria. In 1978, Ruhrgas (now absorbed in E.ON) signed a major contract to supply LNG to Germany. Germany never built the LNG terminal needed to get that contract off the ground. So far, it is the only major European country to have no LNG import terminals, although it can rely on existing facilities in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In 1978, the Netherlands also contracted to buy Algerian gas. Algeria dropped the contract in the early 1980s because of Germany’s refusal to go ahead. Later in the 1980s, Ruhrgas again expressed its interest in buying Algerian gas, but the price offered was too low and because Ruhrgas wanted to root the gas through France, which insisted on very high transit fees. By discarding Algerian gas, Germany has tied itself to Russian goodwill.

Italy, like Germany, a big importer of Russian gas, has positioned itself much more adroitly. In December 2021, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state oil and gas monopoly, increased the amount of gas pumped through the TransMed pipeline, which links Algeria to Italy via Tunisia and the Strait of Sicily at the request of its Italian customers. This followed a very successful state visit by Italian President Sergio Mattarella to Algeria in early November. On February 27, Sonatrach confirmed it could pump additional gas to Europe, but contingent on meeting current contractual commitments.

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Relations between the Italian energy company ENI and Sonatrach are historically close because of the important role played by the Italian company’s founder, Enrico Mattei, in advising the provisional government of the Republic of Algeria in its negotiations with France, which resulted in the independence of Algeria in July 1962.

The pursuit of very liberal energy policies since the turn of the century by the European Commission overturned the policies of long-term gas and LNG purchase contracts, which were the norm in internationally traded gas until then. Yet security of supply does not rest on such misguided liberalism. New gas reserves cannot be found, let alone gas fields brought into production if producers and European customers are, as Terzian points out, “at the mercy of prices determined by exchange platforms which have dubious liquidity (and can be influenced by major players).” This is an attitude, he adds, “that borders on the irresponsible.”

German energy policy has mightily contributed to the present crisis. It has blithely continued to shut down the country’s nuclear plants, increased its reliance on coal in the electricity sector and with that a consequent increase in carbon emissions.

Serious Dialogue

When considering Caspian gas as an alternative to Russian gas, I would add another country, Turkey, which has a very aggressive and independent policy as a key transit for gas. However, few observers would argue that such a solution would increase Europe’s security.

Engaging in serious long-term strategic dialogue with Algeria would provide Spain and the EU with leverage. This could help to build better relations between Algeria, Morocco and also the troubled area of the Sahel. When trying to understand the politics of different nations, following the money often offers a good guide. One might also follow the gas.

*[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Iberian Solution Could Offer Europe More Gas appeared first on Fair Observer.

Why Now?

The raid comes after IS conducted an attack on al-Sinaa prison in the northeastern city of Hasakah in January in an attempt to break free its fighters. In the assault, several Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters were killed. According to SDF officials, IS was planning the attack for six months. Nevertheless, the US-backed SDF recaptured the prison about a week later. 

Lieutenant Colonel Rick Francona suspects that the attack on the prison “was the catalyst that led to the decision to act on what was obviously already known location intelligence on … al-Qurayshi.” Francona, who served as the US military attaché in Syria from 1992 to 1995, notes that “Over the past few months, there has been an increase in ISIS activity — more widespread and bolder in nature. This also comes at a time when Iranian-backed militias have also stepped up attacks on US forces in Syria and Iraq.”

Both Qurayshi and his predecessor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, were eliminated in Idlib province, in areas under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Previously, HTS was known as Jabhat al-Nusra, affiliated with al-Qaeda and initially aligned with IS. In 2013, however, it split from IS and has been at war with the group since 2014. In 2016, it also broke relations with al-Qaeda and rebranded itself as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS). The following year, JFS assumed its current iteration as it merged with other groups. 

During much of the past decade, Idlib served as a hideout for extremists. In 2017, then-US envoy to the coalition fighting the Islamic State, Brett McGurk, stated that “Idlib Province is the largest Al Qaeda safe haven since 9/11.” Following Baghdadi’s elimination in 2019, former US President Donald Trump suggested Baghdadi was in Idlib as part of a plan to rebuild IS. Indeed, it was surprising to see Qurayshi hiding in Idlib as well. 

According to David Lesch, professor of Middle East History at Trinity University in Texas and author of “Syria: A Modern History,” “it seems strange that al-Baghdadi and al-Qurayshi were killed in [a] province largely controlled by its rival HTS and overseen by Turkey, but on the other hand it is the only area not under the control of the Syrian government and its allies or the US-supported SDF, all of whom are opposed to ISIS.”

“Idlib is now home to thousands of IDPs, therefore it was easier for the two to blend in, live secretively, and not be identified as outsiders since most everyone in certain areas of the province are outsiders,” Lesch explains. “Yet they were still found because despite all this they lived in an area still teaming with enemies who were obviously directly or indirectly assets to US intelligence.”

The recent US operation in Idlib, which was reportedly planned over several months, has been the largest of its kind in the country since the 2019 raid that eliminated Baghdadi. Although Qurayshi was less charismatic than Baghdadi, the fact that he was targeted in the US raid confirms his importance.

It is worth noting that Qurayshi was named as the leader of IS in 2019, following the death of Baghdadi. While IS called on all Muslims to pledge allegiance to Qurayshi as the new “caliph,” it did not provide much information about his bona fides. The use of the name “Qurayshi” seemed to be an attempt to trace his lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. This is a tactic that was also used vis-à-vis Baghdadi with the aim of legitimizing his leadership role. Qurayshi’s real name is Amir Muhammad Said Abdal-Rahman al-Mawla but he is also known as Hajji Abdullah and Abdullah Qaradash.  

As the US continues to create an impression that it is minimizing its presence in the region, especially following its withdrawal from Afghanistan last year, the raid seems to have been used to demonstrate US reliability to reassure Washington’s partners. It also comes as a needed win for Biden at a time when the Ukraine crisis remains unsolved. 

However, while Qurayshi’s elimination is a positive development, it may simply be a “symbolic victory,” as Sean Carberry suggests in The Hill. While the operation against Qurayshi may create internal chaos within IS, ultimately, the terror group is likely to name a new leader and move on, which is what took place following Baghdadi’s assassination. Although IS was militarily defeated, the group has not been eliminated and remains a threat. In fact, there have been increased indications, such as the attack on al-Sinaa prison, suggesting that the group is in a state of resurgence. The militants might also seek to use the recent US raid to encourage revenge attacks. 

US Policy in Syria

The Biden administration’s policy vis-à-vis Syria seems to indicate that the official approach will be “markedly timid,” as Abdulrahman al-Masri and Reem Salahi suggest. It should not be surprising to learn that Syria does not constitute a top diplomatic priority for President Biden. Yet while the US does not want to remain engaged in endless regional wars, it seems to believe that a political settlement in war-torn Syria would only empower President Bashar al-Assad, whom Washington would never back. 

Moreover, the US and the Kurds are partners, and Washington would not want to portray an image that it has abandoned those who have shouldered the fight against the Islamic State. This was the overall perception when Trump announced the withdrawal of US forces from Syria in 2019, and Biden seems keen to remedy that controversial decision. 

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It is worth noting that during President Barack Obama’s tenure, Vice President Biden was one of the skeptics when it came to what the US could achieve in Syria. Nevertheless, it should not be taken as a given that as president, Biden may be in favor of removing all US forces from the country. For instance, he criticized Trump’s decision to withdraw forces from Syria, saying it granted IS “a new lease on life.” In the same year, Biden also said he supports keeping some forces in eastern Syria for the foreseeable future. 

Middle East expert and former US State Department analyst, Gregory Aftandilian doesn’t see the US leaving Syria anytime soon. Aftandilian, who is also a non-resident fellow at Arab Center Washington DC, thinks “It is doubtful [Biden] will do more than the anti-ISIS campaign and humanitarian aid. In light of the attempted prison break in northeastern Syria he may put pressure on some countries to take back ISIS prisoners.”

For the US to play a role in stabilizing Syria, there needs to be a clear strategy. Unfortunately, at the moment, that strategy is largely lacking. While the elimination of Qurayshi is a positive step, much more work needs to be done to stabilize the country.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Elimination of IS Leader Is a Positive, But Not a Final, Step appeared first on Fair Observer.

Water World: Is Climate Change Driving Our Future Out to Sea?

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Burning fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that trap heat in the atmosphere, making them major contributors to climate change. On the other hand, high industrial activities, alongside rapidly increasing populations, put growing pressure on energy demand.

The Example of Qatar

Qatar has made remarkable economic achievements over the past few decades. Yet Qatar is facing a trade-off between boosting its economic growth and lowering its carbon dioxide emissions. Its strategic mandate to boost economic development, along with other areas related to sustainability, makes Qatar an interesting country to analyze.

The World Bank defines Qatar as one of the richest countries in the world in terms of GDP per capita. Its economy is highly dependent on oil and gas production, which accounts for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 70% of government revenues. The country is also a major player in liquefied natural gas. Nonetheless, Qatar’s high dependence on fossil fuels has resulted in an increase in the CO2 emissions level when compared to global averages.

To combat the rising carbon emission percentages and lower environmental pressures, Qatar is introducing strict policy measures to achieve sustainable development through four central pillars: economic, social, human and environmental development. While many disruptions have occurred over the past few years, including fluctuations in oil and gas prices, economic downturns and a deadly pandemic, nobody expected an economic blockade.

The Diplomatic Rift

In June 2017, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt cut diplomatic relations with Qatar. They prohibited Qatar-registered planes and ships from utilizing their airspace and sea routes, and the Saudis also blocked Qatar’s only land border.

This point is of particular importance as the deterioration in relations among the Gulf neighbors urged Qatar to rethink its sustainable development goals while meeting local demand. At the beginning of the blockade, the country relied heavily on importing several commodities, especially food items. Later, it accelerated initiatives and programs to diversify the economy and reduce reliance on imports.

Achieving carbon neutrality is also factored into all Qatar’s initiatives. For example, by the end of 2022, Qatar aims to deliver the first carbon-neutral FIFA World Cup in the history of the event. All stadiums and infrastructure are subjected to rigorous sustainability standards. Several air quality monitoring stations and extensive recycling programs are being introduced, along with the construction of the eight stadiums that will be used during the football tournament.

Qatar has since become much more independent across several sectors, including food production and transport, making it a case study on how to transform challenges into opportunities for growth.

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This was also evident with total carbon emissions. According to my own analysis, carbon emission per capita fell by 13% as of 2018 from a historical record in 2000. Since then, total carbon emissions have increased as the economy has grown but at a slower rate, meaning that Qatar is undergoing expanding relative decoupling. In the 2008 to 2018 period, a 1% change in GDP resulted in a fall of CO2 emissions, from 0.65% to 0.44%. This drop is very relevant to Qatar as several measures have been applied, particularly over the last 10 years, to reduce emissions.

A Reduction in Emissions

While Qatar’s total emissions have declined over recent years, policies to increase energy efficiency, diversify the energy mix by introducing more renewables, support technological development to improve energy efficiency in a desert climate, and implement energy demand management programs to maintain the same trend of decline and achieve climate change objectives have been increasingly crucial.  

The heightened pressure caused by the blockade on Qatar is now over, but what is needed are more synergies and collective efforts across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to stimulate economic diversification and minimize carbon emissions. Member states of the GCC are sharing multiple environmental, social and economic factors that should incentivize them to cooperate to meet their climate change objectives and economic development goals.

*[Saad Shannak is a scientist at Qatar Environment and Energy Research Institute, part of Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU) in Qatar. The views expressed are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the university’s official stance.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How Qatar Manages Economic Growth and CO2 Emissions appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Taliban Use Violence Against Women as a Bargaining Chip

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The theme for the 2022 International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation, which took place on February 6, was accelerating investment to end FGM. With the COVID-19 pandemic seriously impacting efforts to eliminate this harmful practice, it is crucial for governments, international actors and donors to scale up investments in global efforts. 

What Is FGM?

FGM involves the partial or complete removal of external female genitalia for non-medical reasons. It is not recommended in any religious texts, has no health benefits and can cause serious lifelong physical and psychological harm. 

With an increase in investment to end this harmful practice, it is important to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated to the Middle East and Asia, which have not been traditionally prioritized, partly due to the absence of official data on the practice. The impact of low investment is felt by women’s rights activists, whose work in both regions is woefully underfunded and lacks sufficient international support.

Globally, an estimated 200 million women and girls have experienced some form of FGM, which is a human rights violation and form of violence against women and girls. However, this data is based only on 31 countries from which national prevalence data is available and does not reflect the true scale of the problem. This has been documented in various reports, including FGM/C: A Global Response by the US End FGM/C Network, the End FGM European Network and Equality Now. This report found that FGM occurs in more countries around the world than widely acknowledged and that the number of women and girls who are affected is being woefully underestimated.

FGM in Iran

In Iran, the lack of sufficient resources and international assistance has impacted the work of organizations such as Stop FGM Iran. This organization, in particular, does not have big statistical studies to provide reliable data on the scale and nature of FGM in Iran. It also faces challenges due to little support and limited media coverage.

FGM has been documented in Iran for almost a century. In 1928, a travel report by pediatrician Dr. Rastegar, writing about Lorestan, a province in Western Iran, was published in the magazine Nahid:

“Another important point that is common among women living in tents is the circumcision of girls, which must be done from the age of five to nine; for until a girl is circumcised, she is not a Muslim and no one will take bread from her. As it was heard from the Lors, the method of circumcising girls is that they put the girl to sleep and cut the outer part of the clitoris, which is out of the small lips, with a sharp razor. Due to the weather and other environmental qualities, the genitals of the nomadic girls are different from urban girls. As is understood, this practice is also common among the Arabs and the tribes of Khuzestan also believe in this practice. To stop the bleeding, the girl has to sit in the river up to her waist, and if she bleeds again, she has to move in the water for a while.”

Despite such early reports, the Iranian press has been reluctant to report on FGM. Homa Sarshar, a pre-revolutionary journalist, said in an interview that she noticed the spread of FGM 50 years ago during a trip to southern Iran. In a report, she tried to make the news public. However, she says, the media outlet’s editor did not publish her piece as he had been instructed by authorities that the government was aware of the situation and was deciding what to do about it.

Although FGM continues to be practiced in western and southern Iran, the lack of news coverage has been a challenge. For over a decade, activists were unable to convince Iranian news outlets to report on FGM, but some journalists have now begun to cover the issue. Reporting on the issue is key as gender-sensitive media coverage has an important role to play in increasing public understanding about human rights violations, holding duty bearers to account and instigating positive change.

Small-scale studies in Iran have found FGM prevalence ranging from 16% to as high as 83% in some communities, and there are still many unknown places in the country where FGM may be happening.

Stopping FGM

At one point, the government, at the suggestion of Stop FGM Iran, attempted to conduct a pilot project. The project was launched and provided unprecedented insight, but government cooperation was abruptly paused and, despite a follow-up, never resumed.

Efforts to draft a specific law against FGM in Iran continue. Although some legal provisions refer to the issue of amputation of genitals and allocation of blood money, they are incomplete and should be reconsidered to effectively address the issue. A law explicitly banning FGM in Iran would make it clear to the public that FGM is a human rights violation and provide a deterrent effect to would-be offenders. It would also grant specific legal recourse to survivors within the criminal justice system.

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Many gynecological centers in Iran advertise under the pretext of genital cosmetic surgery, sometimes even under the name of female circumcision, and exploit the lack of public awareness. No government authority is responsible for raising public awareness against this human rights violation, and with very low costs, women are encouraged to have cosmetic surgery on their genitals.

A recent study on attitudes toward FGM in southern Iran found the continued prevalence of misconceptions about FGM amongst women in the region, including that FGM prevents infertility, reduces the chances of divorce, protects girls from rape and ensures that women deliver more sons.

How can we stand against female genital mutilation without government intervention, changing the law and raising awareness? Today, in addition to the above, activists need to receive financial and other assistance from government and international actors so they can work toward reducing FGM prevalence and, ultimately, eliminate it.

*[Rayehe Mozafarian is the founder of Stop FGM Iran. Divya Srinivasan is a legal adviser at Equality Now.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Ending FGM in Iran Needs International Support appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Evolution of National Security in the UAE

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The killings, ordered by then US President Donald Trump, have served to exacerbate the severe security challenges the government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi already faces. The PMF, without al-Muhandis’ leadership, is becoming increasingly splintered, threatening even more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis who are trying to recover from nearly two decades of war and terrorism.

Growing Security Challenges

Security is a prerequisite for the prosperity, welfare and economic development of any society. However, as long as Iran continues its extensive influence over Iraq and uses Iraqi territory as a venue to play out its conflict with the United States, security cannot be achieved.

After the assassinations of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, the PMF appeared to be even more aggressively pursuing Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s strategic goal, namely the withdrawal of all US troops from Iraq. The US Embassy, the Baghdad Green Zone and US military bases have been repeatedly targeted by PMF militias. The US responded in kind and bombed PMF positions in various parts of the country, further escalating an already fragile security situation.

Meanwhile, al-Kadhimi, viewed by his critics as catering to Washington, blamed the US for violating Iraqi sovereignty by launching unilateral operations inside the country. At the same time, he faced strenuous demands from the Americans for his government to do more to stop PMF attacks on US targets.

The withdrawal of foreign military forces had been approved by the Iraqi parliament just two days after the high-profile assassinations. Following the US–Iraqi strategic dialogue that launched in June 2020, the US evacuated some of its bases that have been in place since 2003, handing them over to the Iraqi army. But a final withdrawal agreed to be completed by the end of last year has stalled, and the remaining 2,500 US troops have stayed on, no longer in a combat role but rather to “advise, assist and enable” the Iraqi military.

This quasi-exit was met with a stern reaction from the PMF, who threatened to treat the US forces as aggressors if they did not withdraw completely from Iraq. “Targeting the US occupation in Iraq is a great honor, and we support the factions that target it,” was how a spokesperson for one of the PMF militias put it. Such threats underline the risk of further confrontations between the militias and the US and the potential for more insecurity for ordinary Iraqis.

The targeting of Baghdad’s airport on January 28, with at least six rockets landing on the runway and areas close to the non-military side, causing damage to parked passenger planes, underlines just how fragile the security situation remains.

The PM and the PMF

The conflicts over differences between the PMF and the government are another reason for growing insecurity in the post-assassination period. The PMF has a competitive relationship with the prime minister’s government, and this competition has only intensified over the past two years. PMF groups consider al-Kadhimi to be pro-US, seeking to reduce the influence of Shia militant groups in Iraq.

Initially, in March 2020, major Shia factions rejected his nomination, accusing him of being inordinately close to the US. The Fatah Coalition, composed of significant Shia groups close to Iran, later accepted his candidacy. Still, tensions remain as al-Kadhimi strives to strike a balance between Iran on the one hand and the US and its allies on the other.

The prime minister believes that the PMF should exit the political stage. He also believes that the PMF should be freed from party affiliation and be fully controlled by the government. This would mean that their budget would come from the federal government and not from private sources or other states. In this regard, al-Kadhimi is seeking to strengthen government control over border crossings to fight corruption and smuggling.

The crossings are used by militias, including those reportedly active at Diyala’s border crossing into Iran. If the government effectively controls these vital channels, financial inflows from smuggling, which strengthens the militias, will decrease in the long term while federal coffers will directly benefit.

The dispute between the PMF and the prime minister escalated in May of last year when police arrested Qasem Mosleh, the PMF commander in Anbar province, over the assassination of a prominent Iraqi activist. In response, the PMF stormed and took control of the Green Zone. Al-Kadhimi, not wanting to escalate the conflict, found no evidence against Mosleh and released him after 14 days.

In November 2021, al-Kadhimi himself was targeted in an assassination attempt following clashes between various Iraqi parties during protests against the results of the parliamentary elections. Despite its failure, an armed drone attack on the prime minister’s Baghdad residence presented a disturbing development for contemporary Iraq and was attributed to a PMF militia loyal to Iran.

Internal Struggles

The assassination of al-Muhandis had a huge impact on the PMF. He was a charismatic figure able to mediate more effectively than anyone else between various Iraqi groups, from Shia clerics in Najaf to Iraqi government politicians and Iranian officials. After his death, the militia groups in the PMF face internal division.

The PMF’s political leadership, including its chairman, Falih Al-Fayyadh, has tried to present itself as committed to the law and accepting the authority of the prime minister. In contrast, two powerful PMF factions, Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, have taken a hardline stance, emphasizing armed resistance against US forces. Tehran’s efforts to mediate between the leaders of the two factions and the Iraqi government have yielded few results.

Meanwhile, internal disagreements over the degree of Iranian control caused four PMF brigades to split off and form a new structure called Hashd al-Atabat, or Shrine Units. Their avowed intention is to repudiate Iranian influence while supporting the Iraqi state and the rule of law.

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Another divide in the PMF has opened up between groups such as Kataib Hezbollah on the one hand, and Badr, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Saraya al-Salam on the other, due to poor relationship management by Kataib Hezbollah in the PMF Commission after Muhandis’ death. While it is unsurprising that a number of critical PMF functions like internal affairs and intelligence are controlled by Kataib Hezbollah given that Muhandis founded the group before assuming the PMF’s leadership, he managed to exercise control in a manner that kept other factions onboard.

But Kataib Hezbollah’s imposition, in February 2020, of another one of its commanders, Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi, to succeed al-Muhandis on the PMF Commission alienated key groups such as Badr and Asaib. Clearly, a severely factionalized and heavily armed PMF continues to pose a significant security threat in the country.

Announcing the assassinations on January 3, 2020, Donald Trump said of Soleimani that “we take comfort knowing his reign of terror is over.” Two years on from the killing of the IRGC general and the PMF boss, ordinary Iraqis beset by violence and insecurity take no such comfort.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

*[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner of Fair Observer.]

The post Iraq Still Feels the Consequences of US Assassinations appeared first on Fair Observer.

In recent years, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, especially the UAE, have recognized that trusting foreign governments, such as the United States, cannot offer them the best possible protection. The US has had a presence in the Persian Gulf since the 1990s and the Gulf Arab countries have relied on it to provide security. However, events in recent years have shown that the Gulf Arab states cannot rely solely on Washington.

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Such developments include the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan amid the US withdrawal; the US pivot to Asia; the US retraction of most advanced missile defense systems and Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia; and the lack of a US military response to threats, missile and drone attacks on Saudi oil bases by the Houthis in Yemen.

This has encouraged the Arab countries in the Persian Gulf to pursue security autonomy. The UAE, in particular, has sought to transform its strategy from dependence on the US and Saudi Arabia to a combination of self-reliance and multilateral cooperation.

Self-Reliance Security Strategy

Although the UAE is an important ally of America in the Persian Gulf, over recent years, the US has sought to push the Emiratis toward security self-reliance. Sociopolitical events in the Middle East over the last decade following the Arab Spring of 2010-11 have made it clear to the UAE that the primary goal of ensuring national security, in addition to benefiting from international cooperation, should be the use of national facilities and resources.

Hosni Mubarak’s ouster from Egypt during the Arab Spring protests and the reluctance of the US to defend him as an ally — which led to the rise of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood — further demonstrated to Abu Dhabi that it should not exclusively depend on the US for security assistance. Thus, the UAE began to develop a professional army.

The UAE‘s self-reliance strategy is divided into different branches, but most of all, its military security efforts have been given the highest priority. The UAE‘s determination to create an independent and professional military is evident from its years of investment in the defense industry.

Indeed, security is a top priority for the United Arab Emirates, and defense spending continues to make up a large portion of the national budget. The UAE’s defense spending typically accounts for 11.1% to 14% of the total budget. In 2019, the UAE’s defense spending was $16.4 billion. This was 18% more than the 2018 budget of $13.9 billion.

The UAE has invested heavily in the military sector and defense industry in recent years. In November 2019, the UAE formed the EDGE Group from a merger of 25 companies. The company has 12,000 employees and $5 billion in total revenue. It is also among the top 25 advocacy groups in the world, ahead of firms such as Booz Allen Hamilton in the US and Rolls-Royce in the UK.

EDGE is structured around five clusters: platforms and systems, missiles and weapons, cyber defense, electronic warfare and intelligence, and mission support. It comprises several major UAE companies in the defense industry, such as ADSB (shipbuilding), Al Jasoor, NIMR (vehicles), SIGN4L (electronic warfare services) and ADASI (autonomous systems). The main goal of EDGE is to develop weapons to fight “hybrid warfare” and to bolster the UAE’s defense against unconventional threats, focusing on electronic attacks and drones.

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The UAE has also come up with detailed plans to improve the quality of its military personnel, spending large sums of money each year on training its military recruits in American colleges and war academies. It also founded the National Defense College; most of its students are citizens of the UAE, because of its independence in military training. In addition, in 2014, the UAE introduced general conscription for men between the ages of 18 and 30 to increase numbers and strengthen national identity in its military. As a result, it gathered about 50,000 people in the first three years.

Contrary to traditional practice, the UAE’s growing military power has made it eager to use force and hard power to protect its interests. The UAE stands ready to use military force anywhere in the region to contain Iran’s growing influence and weaken Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Participating in the Yemeni War was a test of this strategy.

The UAE‘s military presence in Yemen began in March 2015. It sent a brigade of 3,000 troops to Yemen in August 2015, along with Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Arab countries. Over the past five years, the UAE has pursued an ambitious strategic agenda in the Red Sea, building military installations and securing control of the southern coasts of Yemen along the Arabian Sea in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Socotra Island. Despite reducing its military footprints in Yemen in 2019, the UAE has consolidated itself in the southern regions. It has continued to finance and impart training to thousands of Yemeni fighters drafted from various groups like the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami Elite Forces, Abu al-Abbas Brigade and the West Coast Forces.

The UAE‘s goal in adopting a self-reliance strategy is to increase strategic depth in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. Thus, along with direct military presence or arms support for groups engaged in proxy wars, it affects the internal affairs of various countries in the region, such as Yemen, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Libya. With its influence, the UAE can turn the tide in its favor in certain areas.

Multilateralism Security Strategy

The United Arab Emirates faces a variety of security challenges in the Middle East, and addressing them requires cooperation with other countries. Currently, the most significant security threats in the UAE are: countering Iranian threats and power in the Middle East, especially in Arab countries under Iranian influence, such as Yemen, Syria and Lebanon; eliminating threats from terrorist groups and political Islam in the region, the most important of which — according to the UAE — is the Muslim Brotherhood; and economic threats and efforts to prepare for the post-oil world.

In its multilateral strategy, the UAE seeks to counter these threats with the help of other countries in the region or beyond. It has used soft power through investments or providing humanitarian aid, suggesting that economic cooperation is more important than political competition and intervention. In this regard, the UAE has cooperated with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Britain and France, as well as normalized relations with Israel.

On August 13, 2020, the UAE became the first Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel. The UAE‘s goal in normalizing relations with Israel is to counter threats from Iran and the region. The Abraham Accords have not only a security aspect, but also an economic one. Following the signing of the accords, on October 20, 2020, the US, Israel and the UAE announced the establishment of the Abraham Fund, a joint fund of $3 billion “in private sector-led investment and development initiatives,” aimed at “promoting economic cooperation and prosperity.” In addition, it outlined a banking and finance memorandum between the largest banks in Israel and Dubai, and a joint bid between Dubai’s DP World port operator and an Israeli shipping firm for the management of Israel’s Haifa port.

Through the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates seeks to invest and transfer Israeli technologies to the UAE through mutual agreements. The UAE has discovered that Israel is one of the bridges to the US economy and high technology. If the UAE intends to have an oil-free economy in the future, Israel may be the best option to achieve this by pursuing a strategy of multilateralization.

UAE relations with Turkey also have a multilateral dimension to reaching common security goals. The two countries had good relations until the Arab Spring protests jeopardized ties between them. Abu Dhabi and Ankara began to defuse tensions after a phone call in August 2021 between UAE Crown Prince Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The nations mainly have differences around issues in Libya, Syria and Egypt. The UAE is trying to resolve its disputes with Turkey by investing in the country.

Turkey is the largest backer of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. The Turks claim the UAE participated in the failed coup of July 2016 against the Turkish government. Nonetheless, the UAE wants to end frictions with Turkey and has attracted Ankara by investing and increasing commercial ties. The Turkish lira has depreciated in recent years and Erdogan’s popularity has plummeted due to mismanagement in Turkey. Erdogan will not miss this economic opportunity with the UAE and welcomes Emirati investments. In this way, the UAE will likely easily resolve its differences with Turkey.

The current tendency to use force is contrary to traditional Abu Dhabi policy, yet increasing the strategic depth of the UAE is one of Abu Dhabi‘s most achievable goals in its strategy of self-reliance. This plan is the exact opposite of multilateralism. Unlike the use of force and hard power, Abu Dhabi seeks to achieve its objectives by using soft power, investment and humanitarian aid. In this situation, the tactical exploitation of economic cooperation takes precedence over political competition and military intervention in the region.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Evolution of National Security in the UAE appeared first on Fair Observer.

Since 2005, as part of a power-sharing agreement, the Iraqi presidency has been set aside for a Kurd. Within the Kurdish community itself, the post has been informally reserved for a candidate of the PUK. Meanwhile, the speaker of parliament is held by a Sunni and the job of prime minister by a Shia.

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The two main Kurdish parties have also agreed that in return for the Iraqi presidency being earmarked for the PUK, the KDP takes nearly all significant positions within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This includes the positions of president, premiership and the deputy of parliament as well as several ministries within the Iraqi federal government.

Losing Support

Recently, the KDP has made political gains and the PUK has lost significant support since the 2018 elections. Currently, the KDP has 31 members in the Iraqi national council, while the PUK has only 16. This has led the KDP to eye the position of the Iraqi presidency. If the party insists that President Salih should not be elected again, it could lead to a significant change of the political map of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Both the PUK and KDP have lost the trust and confidence of the public. This was particularly reflected three years ago in the last parliamentary election when only around 40% of registered voters participated. The PUK and KDP have lost over 700,000 voters in the Kurdish region itself. Their legitimacy is declining day after day and smaller parties are emerging. This is because citizens do not believe the people and parties in power are competent enough to represent them and or deliver the basic services they need.

The KDP is strongly against the reelection of Salih because, in 2018, he ran for the presidency without the blessing of Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP; he went on to beat Barzani’s candidate, Fuad Hussein. Today, if the PUK and Barham Salih win the presidency again, it would have significant implications on intra-party, Kurdish, federal and regional politics.

The KDP has nominated Hoshyar Zebari as their candidate to challenge the PUK’s Salih, according to Rudaw. Zebari served as the Iraqi finance minister from 2014 to 2016 before he was removed from his position following a secret parliamentary vote of no-confidence over alleged corruption and misuse of public funds. At the time, Zebari denied the allegations against him and said they politically led, and he was later cleared of charges.

The KDP wants the PUK to nominate a new candidate. Currently, it appears that the PUK is leaning toward Latif Rasheed, a former Kurdish minister in Baghdad and a close relative of the Talabani family as an alternative person for the presidency should Salih not win the support he needs when parliament votes on February 5.

The KDP claims that Salih has not succeeded in resolving the political differences and disagreement between the KRG and the federal government of Iraq. The budget for the Kurdistan Regional Government has also not been settled. It is hoped that Salih can find a solution to the economic and monetary issues between Erbil and Baghdad.

Salih Is the Only Real Candidate

There are currently five people who have nominated themselves for the job. Yet it is clear that the only powerful candidate is Barham Salih and the others are only competing against him to enrich their resumes and or undermine the position of the presidency.

Across Iraq, Salih is known for his international and diplomatic experience and for being a politician with a vision. It was during his premiership that the KRG had boomed with a strong economy that saw the development of real estate. Hundreds of thousands of people rebuilt their homes, students went abroad to continue their studies and many others started small entrepreneurial projects thanks to his good governance and meritocracy.

During his time as prime minister of the Kurdistan region between 2009 and 2012, Salih laid the foundations for several strategic projects, namely the American University of Iraq in Sulaimani, the airport, the new University of Sulaimani campus and the Hawari Shar, one of the greatest national parks in Iraq. Salih has also built many strategic projects like the underground water and sewage system of Sulaimani, along with dozens of other useful initiatives. Salih is widely known among the Kurdish people for his dedication to working in the public interest.

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At a regional level, many anticipate that Salih’s presidency will play an important role in maintaining Baghdad’s balance between the United States and Iran. On the one hand, Salih has a good working relationship with the Iranians and speaks Farsi. On the other, he has maintained a decade-long relationship with influential figures in Washington. The hope is that Salih will strive to minimize the damage done to Iraq as a result of the rivalry between the US and Iran. The election of Salih, in terms of person and approach, is a crucial step toward stability in the new government. The hope is that he will play a more positive and engaged role and fulfill the expectations the Iraqi people have of him.

Barham Salih has also strongly advocated for the rights of the ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq and is a great defender of the Iraqi Constitution, which has given the Kurds certain rights. Salih has a good reputation and has political experience. He is also well known for his integrity, righteousness, fairness and loyalty to the homeland.

The president’s role is to serve as a symbol for the country. Their job is to represent Iraq’s sovereignty, safeguard the constitution and preserve its independence, unity and security. Many believe that Salih’s reputation, political demeanor and balanced stance enable him to implement these tasks of the presidency.

Salih is a moderate politician and can lead Iraq as a mediator, rather than a nationalist, sectarian and or populist. If he is given a second chance as president, Salih could deescalate the existing tension and dispute between Erbil and Baghdad, and among Shia factions as well. After all, he was once the protégé of the late Jalal Talabani, the president who united Iraq and prevented further conflict. Hence, Salih meets the qualifications that the people and also his regional allies would prefer in an Iraqi to become a president. As it stands, Salih has the best chance of retaining his position, but not without encountering many challenges.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Why Barham Salih Deserves a Second Term in Iraq appeared first on Fair Observer.

Throughout the war, international policymakers have overemphasized the role of the private sector in addressing Yemen’s severe food crisis, insofar as they have tirelessly insisted since the late 1960s that opening the local market to unrestricted food imports would feed a growing population and drive economic growth. Commercial staple food imports — as well as food assistance — are vital during the war.

Indian Farmer Protests Explained (Interactive)

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However, be that as it may, the role of commercial food importers in postwar, post-neoliberalism Yemen must not be blown out of proportion. Reducing Yemen’s deep agrarian and rural social crisis to wartime and postwar commercial food import issues shows that the root causes of the country’s severe food crisis continue to be gravely misunderstood or deliberately overlooked.

To begin with, Yemen’s absurd, inordinate dependence on staple food imports is but a consequence of bad policy. Regrettably, it was a policy that failed to preserve the rural sector’s productivity, let alone stimulating it and accumulating wealth. Rehashing past failed agricultural development policies is evidence of two distributing realities.

The first is Yemeni elites’ lack of capacity to imagine alternative paths of development in Yemen. The second is international policymakers’ position that developed countries exclusively can adopt national agricultural policy frameworks that avowedly control food supply through production and import controls and pricing mechanisms, whereas developing countries cannot do the same to support their agriculture sector.

Inspiration and Lessons

To end this long deadlock between Yemen’s autonomy and global capitalism, perhaps one ought to draw attention to India’s social struggle for inspiration and lessons.

It is not in Yemen’s national interest to continue ignoring its small and marginalized farmers. In a rural society like Yemen, they are the engine of a healthy economy. The vast majority of the population continues to live in rural Yemen. Current official estimates put Yemen’s rural population at about 70%. This reality limits the role of the private sector in sustaining rural livelihoods. While some might argue that Yemen’s private sector should not be viewed as a monolith, consisting only of large conglomerates, to lump smallholding agriculture and agricultural commercialization together under the umbrella of the private sector is fundamentally flawed.

Small farmers in Yemen are subsistence households, each representing a domestic unit of agricultural production that is economically self-sufficient and combines production and consumption functions. This rural social organization is not the same as one where farmers are reduced to landless, wage earners. Thus, small and marginalized farmers cannot be pigeonholed as private sector actors. Worse is to drop them from the economic equation altogether, especially in so-called developing countries.

Without making this fundamental distinction between smallholding agriculture in Yemen and private sector activity, and without understanding why domestic food production is a matter of national priority to Yemeni citizens, Yemeni elites and international policymakers alike will continue to bungle the task of putting the country on the right path to development.

Food Sovereignty and Security

Many seem to think of Yemen as a big chicken farm that only needs to be fed somehow. They do not understand, or do not want to understand, that at issue is food sovereignty as well as food security. Yemen is a sovereign nation. Yemenis are a people who have the right, needless to say, to choose what to farm, how to farm and how to define the relationship between their local market and the international market. Choosing whether to eat homegrown sorghum or imported wheat is a fundamental national question of utmost importance, not a trade finance problem.

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Private sector activity is not an economic activity that occurs in an empty space; it occurs within social spheres. It impacts domestic production, changes the modes of production within a society and, consequently, remolds all social formations and economic relations. Agrarian changes are social changes. One cannot discuss private sector activity and commercial food imports in isolation from their long-term social impacts. This is lesson number one from five decades of steady economic decline and social regress. It is Yemen’s rural population that has marched down the road to impoverishment and starvation, and they know exactly how — but not why — they got there in the first place. In rural Yemen, lives and land are at stake.

Millions of people in Yemen are famished neither because of the war nor because the private sector is unable to import enough staple foods, in spite of significant and critical wartime challenges. Yemenis are starving because the country has systematically lost its long-standing ability to produce food, particularly staple grains. The magnitude of production losses in Yemen’s agriculture sector has fundamentally limited the economy’s resilience to shocks. Economic resilience is the ability of the country’s main productive forces to cope, recover and reconstruct. How can you cripple a country’s most tangible, corporeal and immediate branch of production and, at the same time, foster resilience? Speaking of resilience of an incapacitated agriculture sector is a logical fallacy and is, therefore, meaningless and a distraction from the real problem.

Causing Alarm

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization Corporate Statistical Database (FAOSTAT), Yemen produced on its domestic soil on average 98% of its grains during 1961-65; namely, sorghum, millet, barley, maize and wheat, in this order. Sorghum production in Yemen peaked at 921,000 tons in 1975. In sharp contrast, the country domestically produced on average only 18% of its total supply of the same grains during 2011-15 and imported the rest. By 2015, the production of sorghum had plummeted to 221,510 tons. To make an already alarming situation unmanageable, the ongoing war more than halved Yemen’s total domestic grain production. Most notably, sorghum production reached a record low of 162,277 tons in 2016, followed by another record low of 155,722 tons in 2018. Yet, some still argue that this decline is due to population growth, not policy.

In a country that primarily produces and consumes sorghum — the traditional staple of man and beast in Yemen — millet and barley, an over 80% dependency on imported wheat is evidently catastrophic during war and peace. This is a well-documented socioeconomic problem. In its 2004 edition of “The State of Food and Agriculture,” the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) noted that the long-term damaging impact of the loss of domestic food production and exposure to price volatility on individual countries outweigh the plausible short-lived collective benefits: “Lower international prices have moderated the food import bills of developing countries, which, as a group, are now net food importers. However, although lower basic food prices on international markets bring short-term benefits to net food-importing developing countries, lower international prices can also have negative impacts on domestic production in developing countries that might have lingering effects on their food security.”

The heart of the matter is that the agriculture sector is the country’s main productive force. Unchecked private internationally integrated capital has destroyed Yemen’s rural capital and silenced the interests of the country’s sizable rural population. Further, the malintegration of Yemen’s local food market with global markets has jeopardized the country’s economic independence and prevented any real development in Yemen.

The Issue

There is great, non-monetary economic and social value in reclaiming and revalorizing Yemen’s domestic food production and rebuilding its basic rural infrastructure. Domestic food production is too important to Yemenis to be addressed as an afterthought. At issue is not how to procure wheat from international markets, but how to stop the hemorrhage of surpluses out of the agriculture sector.

What serves Yemen’s national interest is to refrain from calling for increasing the country’s dependency on speculative, volatile international food markets; imposing in the guise of development and economic resilience policies that undermine the country’s ability to domestically produce adequate food for local consumption; overstating the benefits of export-oriented agriculture and cash cropping more broadly; and overlooking or downplaying the role of smallholders in generating abundant jobs and sustaining rural infrastructure. In a nutshell, any serious discussion of Yemen’s food security crisis must take into account ecological sustainability, rural livelihoods and both food security and sovereignty in the long term.

Yemeni farmers do not yet fully understand why policymakers and development practitioners insist on promoting imports and more broadly large commercial activity, at a time when the whole world is prioritizing the opposite of these dictates: strengthening self-reliance, planning and regulating limited resources, and minimizing local markets’ exposure. Yemeni struggle has not yet reached the level of political awareness seen in India during its 2020-21 farmers’ protests. To get there, we must understand one point: tying the rural sector’s destiny to large commercial organizations cannot lead to any real growth and prosperity of the entire population.

Indian farmers inspire us to rethink development paradigms in Yemen, for there is more to farming than exporting bananas and onions to Saudi Arabia, and there is more to the role of the private sector in national development than flooding local markets with wheat from Australia, Russia, the United States, France and other international source markets, or even import substitution.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post What Yemenis Can Learn From the Indian Farmers’ Protests appeared first on Fair Observer.

However, after signing the deal, the government in Madrid never formalized its political and diplomatic position regarding Moroccan sovereignty over Spain‘s former colony in Western Sahara. A geopolitical matter of vital importance for Morocco, the question of Western Sahara remains an unhealed wound in the relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

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In 2021, this wound was reopened after Spain, in a somewhat secret and irregular move, welcomed Brahim Ghali, secretary-general of the Polisario Front, a nationalist movement seeking independence for Western Sahara vis-à-vis Morocco. On top of the fact that Ghali is wanted in Spain for crimes against humanity, rape and torture, among others, he is also a staunch enemy of the government in Rabat.

This politically embarrassing situation, a product of a diplomatic miscalculation by the Spanish government, created a feeling of betrayal in Rabat. Morocco quickly conveyed its discomfort, considering Spain’s harboring of Ghali a challenge to the kingdom’s sovereignty and interference in an internal state matter. Thus, Morocco issued a warning that continuing to host Ghali would have consequences.

Spain in North Africa

Despite these warnings, the government in Madrid decided not to make any political or diplomatic overtures to Morocco, declining to resolve the misunderstanding in a consensual manner. Therefore, in a way, the Spanish government forwent its diplomatic relationship with Morocco and disregarded the important role that Rabat has always played as a critical partner in the fight against illegal trafficking and terrorism stemming from the Maghreb and the Sahel.

Though the relationship between Morocco and Spain has lived through ups and downs, the tensions last year felt much different. Through relaxation of its military controls, Rabat‘s threat became a reality in May 2021 when Morocco effectively opened its border with Ceuta, a Spanish enclave and autonomous city located on the African continent, which made it easier for waves of irregular migrants to reach Tarajal beach. Around 8,000 people, including more than 1,500 estimated minors, tried to cross the Spanish-Moroccan border on foot and by swimming to enter Spanish soil illegally.

As crude as it may seem, this political move by the government in Rabat, using Moroccans and Africans in general as a weapon against Spain, is not new. For years, Morocco has used this modus operandi as a diplomatic weapon to pressure and obtain concessions from its European neighbor. However, there has not been such a mass arrival of people, especially such a high percentage of minors, to the Spanish border in recent history.

The diplomatic crisis last May led to authentic moments of chaos and siege along Ceuta‘s border, making the passage of many of these immigrants to the European territory possible. Through its actions, Rabat sent a message without palliatives and implored the Spanish government to back down from political moves, such as open invitations to regional nationalist leaders.

The Existential Issue of Territorial Integrity

Morocco’s red lines related to Western Sahara have been drawn, and the kingdom has reiterated that interferences with its national sovereignty will not be tolerated. The crude political response at the Spanish border of Ceuta represents the harshness of Rabat‘s diplomatic relations, choosing, yet again, to weaponize its population.

Spain needs Morocco; indeed, Europe needs Morocco. Rabat is a crucial partner in Africa, especially given the many challenges in the region. However, Spain and the European Union should not allow the pressure and blackmail from their North African neighbor to stand because they embolden others. Spain and the EU should impose strict red lines on Morocco as well as clear and intelligent economic sanctions concerning development, education and health funds.

Political, and diplomatic issues can be resolved with class and delicacy without cheap blows and without trivializing despair and compassion. For this, Spain needs to reach a rapprochement with Morocco regarding the status and future of Western Sahara.

Energy and Copycats

In tandem with Morocco’s migrant valve vis-à-vis Spain, Algeria started leveraging its gas valve to counter France’s escalation on matters like issuing visas to Algerian citizens. In this latter issue, Spain and Morocco, neither of whom are particularly close with Algeria, are collateral damage to the Paris-Algiers feud whether in the form of declining pipeline revenues or a higher power bill.

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Since these episodes toward the middle of last year, the same playbook has been used by Moscow’s client in Minsk, who has fostered a migrant cul-de-sac along the EU’s Polish border. In doing so, Russia and Belarus are feeding the euroskeptic spirits within the Visegrad countries and beyond, which are particularly sensitive to migration and border sovereignty issues. Moreover, Alexander Lukashenko and Vladimir Putin are playing good cop, bad cop on the issue of Europe’s gas supply by offering both threats and assurances that further highlight the EU’s vulnerable dependency on external providers when it comes to energy.

On the migration front, the European Union needs to reinforce its external borders and FRONTEX agency, particularly within the Schengen area, and formulate a common framework to tackle both migration quotas and allocation throughout Schengen member countries. Not only is the migrant reality in places like Spain, Greece, and Poland a human tragedy, but it is also increasingly a geopolitical lever weaponized by Morocco, Turkey, Belarus and other adversaries to destabilize the EU and bolster internal chaos to the benefit of figures such as Viktor Orban, Geert Wilders, Santiago Abascal, Marine Le Pen, and Eric Zemmour.

Whether nuclear, solar or wind, a common and comprehensive European defense framework urgently requires a holistic approach that tackles the issue of energy independence, in addition to that of border security, particularly in an increasingly hostile and multipolar neighborhood.

Building Solutions Where Possible

Along the Maghreb, one of the best solutions would be a new pragmatic and flexible bipartisan agreement between Spain and Morocco. An agreement that commemorates the golden jubilee of the Tripartite Agreement provides a firm solution to the Western Sahara dispute in a framework that benefits coexistence in the region and maintains collaboration in critical matters such as the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and human trafficking.

In the same way, Spain and the EU must encourage the good behavior of Morocco with humanitarian aid and fruitful commercial relations to definitively close the post-colonial wound that sometimes reopens between the two countries.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post From the Maghreb to the East, Poking the EU Has an MO appeared first on Fair Observer.

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So, when on November 30, 2021, a court in Frankfurt, Germany, handed down a life sentence to an Iraqi man who joined the Islamic State (IS) group for genocide against the Yazidi minority — the first time a former member of IS had been convicted of genocide and the first verdict for genocide against Yazidis — it was celebrated as a landmark case in the fight for justice and accountability. Taha al-Jumailly was found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity resulting in death, war crimes, aiding and abetting war crimes, and bodily harm resulting in death.

“Today, ISIS member Taha AJ was convicted of genocide and sentenced to life in prison. This is the first genocide verdict against an ISIS member. This verdict is a win for survivors of genocide, survivors of sexual violence, & the Yazidi community,” tweeted Nadia Murad, a 2018 Nobel Peace Prize winner and a Yazidi survivor of IS enslavement.

Universal Jurisdiction

The trial was also the first in Germany based on the principle of universal jurisdiction addressing crimes under international law committed abroad by a perpetrator who is not a German citizen and was only extradited on the basis of an international arrest warrant. Universal jurisdiction is the principle that some crimes are so serious that states should be allowed to claim jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where they were committed or any other relation with the prosecuting entity. None of the crimes in the Jumailly case were committed in Germany, and neither the victims nor the suspect were German nationals.

Though universal jurisdiction has been practiced in just a few countries in recent years, it has become an increasingly important tool for achieving accountability and justice for the survivors and victims of international crimes. Hundreds of investigations are ongoing and dozens of convictions have been obtained.

The blossoming of universal jurisdiction is attributable to several factors, one of which is that the alternative route to prosecuting international crimes through the UN Security Council and the International Criminal Court (ICC) has effectively been closed by geopolitics. The Syrian conflict, for example, has never been appraised by the ICC because Russia backs President Bashar al-Assad.

The Pursuit of Cases

In recent years, there has been a greater capacity and willingness on the part of some domestic authorities to pursue cases involving international crimes, at least in certain circumstances. More and more countries have also passed laws allowing them to conduct the kind of landmark prosecution that took place in Frankfurt. More countries are following the Dutch example in setting up specialized units within the police, prosecution and even immigration services dedicated to identifying perpetrators of international crimes and bringing them to trial.

Another important factor in the power of universal jurisdiction is that victims and their advocates can contribute to investigations and prosecutions, and sometimes even influence the direction they take. In some countries, such as France and Belgium, victims and NGOs can initiate criminal proceedings. Even where this is not possible, victims and their advocates can still drive cases forward in other ways, such as by tracking perpetrators’ movements, sharing information with the authorities and exerting pressure on them to act.

Dutch authorities have even issued directions for Syrians in the Netherlands on how to file a criminal complaint against other Syrians relating to violations in Syria. In February, after Germany’s top court ruled that war crimes committed abroad can be tried in the country, a court in Koblenz became the first court outside of Syria to rule on state-sponsored torture by the Assad regime when it sentenced a former member of the secret police to four and a half years in prison for being an accomplice to crimes against humanity. Another former Syrian intelligence officer is currently on trial in Germany for overseeing 58 counts of murder and at least 4,000 cases of torture, rape or sexual abuse.

Many Challenges

Despite this recent progress, enormous legal, evidentiary and logistical challenges remain before international criminal cases can be brought to trial. Investigating and prosecuting international crimes in domestic courts is not straightforward, especially in a complex conflict such as the Yemen war where crimes have been committed over many years by different actors.

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Foreign investigators cannot easily gather evidence on the ground, so they have to rely on the cooperation of different parties to the conflict to build cases. UN bodies like the group of eminent experts, international organizations, local NGOs, and organizations such as Airwars assist with investigations.

Even if evidence linking an individual perpetrator to war crimes can be established, the suspect still has to be apprehended. In some countries practicing universal jurisdiction, those accused of committing war crimes do not need to be within reach of authorities for an investigation to be opened, but they need to be physically brought to court before any trial can take place.

Though international cooperation can be used to apprehend and extradite international pariahs like IS militants, pirates and slave traders, war criminals who are still serving members of Arab regimes are not about to be handed over. Only when they set foot in a country practicing universal jurisdiction — whether for work, vacation, claiming asylum or for any other reason — can they be arrested immediately, providing they do not benefit from immunity.

Jumailly’s conviction “sends a clear message,” said Natia Navrouzov, a lawyer and member of the NGO Yazda, which gathers evidence of crimes committed by IS against the Yazidis. “It doesn’t matter where the crimes were committed and it doesn’t matter where the perpetrators are, thanks to the universal jurisdiction, they can’t hide and will still be put on trial.”

*[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How the Legal Landscape Is Changing for War Crimes appeared first on Fair Observer.

Biden’s New Culture of Brinkmanship

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Carter considers his time in office to be peaceful, but his record says otherwise. Under his one term as president from 1977 to 1981, the US was still instigating conflicts across the world. The most notable was the Iran-Iraq War, which the US, the Soviet Union and their allies were heavily involved in by supporting the Iraqis.

Causing Trouble

The Civility Report 2021, a publication of the Peace Worldwide Organization, labels the US the world’s worst troublemaker. The evidence for this is clear.

First, the US maintains at least 750 military bases in around 80 countries. It also has more than 170,000 troops stationed in 159 countries. Second, in 2016, The Washington Post reported that the US has tried 72 times to overthrow governments of sovereign nations between 1947 and 1989. These actions were in clear violation of the UN Charter. Third, the US continues using economic sanctions against numerous countries to force their leadership to bow to Washington’s demands.

The worst example is Iran, which the US has sought to use a policy of “maximum pressure” against. Sanctions are also in clear violation of the UN Charter and affect civilians more than the political leaders they seek to squeeze. These unwarranted interventions in Iran have brought pain and suffering to people in a country that is not known for its human rights.

The US, meanwhile, is known well as a country that pays lip service to human rights, democracy and peace. It talks about a lack of democracy in some nations but favors tyrannical rulers in others. This includes countries like Bahrain, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The US today is the world’s only superpower, and with such power comes great responsibility. If the US is truly interested in human rights, democracy and peace, then it too must change its actions. It must begin by complying with the UN Charter and respecting international law. Washington must right its many wrongs — particularly in the Middle East — not because it is forced to do so, but because it is the right thing for a world in which peace can prosper. For this to become a reality, there are a number of areas for the US to consider.

Never Forgotten

The first area is addressing the US relationship with Iran. In the 1980s, in violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the United States and its European allies provided assistance to Iraq when it leader, Saddam Hussein, ordered the use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops. Most victims of that attack in 1988 died instantly, while many others are still suffering from the consequences. Some survivors of the chemical warfare now struggle to find inhalers in Iran, which is scarred by sanctions. The US should acknowledge the role it played in the war and provide reparations for the injuries and damage it caused. 

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Today, the draconian sanctions the US has placed on Iran has deepened a rift with the European Union, Russia and China, all of which signed a nuclear agreement with Tehran in 2015. The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018 under US President Donald Trump led to the reintroduction of crippling sanctions that have hurt the Iranian middle class and the poor, causing hardship and death.

Washington must lift its unlawful sanctions, which Trump introduced to bring Iran to its knees. The US thinks that Iran is meddling in the affairs of countries like Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, and that a policy of “maximum pressure” will force it to rethink its foreign policy. The Trump administration used this as an excuse to pull out of the nuclear deal, despite the Iranians complying with all of its obligations under the JCPOA. The US under President Joe Biden should also comply with the JCPOA by rejoining the agreement and lifting sanctions.

In the long term, a détente between the US and Iran could pave the way for the Iranians to forgive the 1953 coup d’état against the democratically elected government of Mohammad Mossadegh. During the Cold War, a US-orchestrated campaign led to the overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh. He was replaced with Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the brutal last shah of Iran, who himself was overthrown in the 1979 Revolution. In a country struggling under US sanctions, memories of the coup have never been forgotten.

Lies Over Iraq

Iraq is another country where US actions have not been forgotten. If you attack anyone without being provoked, any court with an ounce of justice would require you to repair the inflicted damage. Relations between nations work in the same way. If a nation harms another without provocation, the aggressor is expected to repair the damage caused.

In 2003, under the false pretext that the Iraqis had weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ties with al-Qaeda, the US under President George W. Bush invaded Iraq. The result was the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and his government, the destruction of infrastructure, the death of hundreds of thousands in the years to come and the displacement of 9.2 million Iraqis.

The US invasion inevitably led to the rise of radical groups like the Islamic State (IS), which in 2014 seized territory in Iraq and Syria. The trillions that American taxpayers paid for the Iraq War could have been well spent in the US on addressing poverty, building high-speed rail networks or repairing infrastructure. Instead, the dollars were spent on bombs and bullets to counter insurgents like IS.

When Iraqis led by Iranian General Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Mahdi al-Muhandis formed a resistance against IS militants and expelled them from Iraq, many people were jubilant that their country was freed. Instead of congratulating Soleimani and Muhandis for the role they played, the US violated Iraq’s territorial integrity. In a US drone strike at Baghdad airport in January 2020, both men were assassinated in violation of international law. The US action was not only unlawful, but it also puts all foreign diplomats in danger by setting a precedent for other countries to assassinate enemies.

There are two ways the US can make up for its illegal actions of 2003. First, holding those responsible to account for the invasion and human rights violations would show the world that the US is serious about the rule of law. That includes the likes of Bush and his accomplices, who lied and betrayed the trust of the American people, as well as security and military personnel who went beyond the rules of war. Holding such persons to account would restore respect for the US across the world by demonstrating that no one, not even the president or American soldiers, is above the law. Second, providing reparations for the loss of Iraqi and American lives, the injuries caused, the people displaced and the property destroyed is essential.

Famine in Yemen

Yemen is another place where bombs have destroyed the country under the watchful eye of the Americans. In 2015, a Saudi-led coalition supported and armed by the United States, Britain and France began indiscriminatingly bombing Yemen in response to a takeover by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. The destruction of Yemen has led to accusations of war crimes by all parties involved. It has also resulted in 5 million people being on the brink of famine and millions more facing starvation.

The US must promptly stop all military and intelligence support to the coalition. As the one nation with such political power, the US must work on bringing the combatants together by implementing the UN Charter that calls for respecting “the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.”

As citizens in a free world, we must assume responsibility for our political leaders’ actions. First, as a bare minimum, we should realize that the problems we cause for others, sooner or later, will come back to haunt us. The example of US support for the mujahideen during the 1980s in Afghanistan is well known. Second, electing the right political leaders who strive for freedom and peace will not only benefit people in faraway lands, but also in the US itself. Instead of taxpayer dollars being spent on weapons, cash can be reinvested into our society to educate children, improve access to health care and do much more.  

United, we can put “maximum pressure” on the US to become a leader in creating a world free from war, oppression and persecution.

*[The author is the founder and president of Peace Worldwide Organization, a non-religious, non-partisan and charitable organization in the United States that promotes freedom and peace for all. It recently released its Civility Report 2021, which can be downloaded here.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post US Foreign Policy in the Middle East Needs a Rethink appeared first on Fair Observer.

Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

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But times have changed. Three recent presidents — Barack Obama, Donald Trump and now Joe Biden — have made efforts to distance the US from its endless, exasperating entanglements in the Middle East. Those efforts had distracted the United States from its principal challenges in the world — China and Russia — and sapped it of its military, economic and political might and influence. America received very little in return on its investment. Furthermore, years of US involvement in the region had also fractured the American public’s support for the more critically important role it must play in anchoring the international order.

Enter the Others

Downgrading America’s involvement in the Middle East isn’t necessarily a bad thing. For decades, many in the Middle East and in the US had argued that the region’s problems must be tackled by the governments and people of the region. Outsiders can play a supporting role, but the tough decisions can only be made by the governments themselves. That may now be happening.

But handing off the task of addressing the region’s manifold challenges got off to a poor start. Neither the US, nor the international community, nor the states of the Middle East seemed able to solve the conundrum of the region’s three failed states.

Then, starting around 2015, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman started ordering others around — imposing a blockade on Qatar, detaining the Lebanese prime minister, jailing courageous dissidents and largely harmless millionaires, ordering a hit job on journalist Jamal Khashoggi and jumping into the Yemeni Civil War. And it all went bad, very bad in fact. Additionally, it provoked other would-be movers and shakers to get in the act, including the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, China, Russia and even Israel. And not always with good intent or positive results.

After years of misdirection, however, governments now seem to be taking a more sober and responsible approach that could prove genuinely beneficial for the region. For starters, they have embarked on a simple approach: dialog. They are talking about their problems, especially those between and among one another. Dialog leads to understanding, which can lead to shared interests. Ultimately, to be effective, dialog must lead to compromise. That involves the inevitable give-and-take that allows nations, especially those close to one another, to live and thrive in peace and prosperity.

It’s a Start

One of the most encouraging initiatives may be the most unexpected: dialog between the Middle East’s two major powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and hosted by perhaps the most unlikely state, Iraq, unquestionably the region’s most conflict-ridden for decades. The issues are many between these two historic rivals, separated by a narrow gulf on whose name neither seems able to agree. But the larger gulf lies in their differing views of the other, their competing religious sects — the Saudi uber-conservative Wahhabi Sunni Islam vs. Iran’s clerically-led, conservative Shia Islam — perceptions of the other’s role and intentions in the region, their wealth, and relations with and ties to the broader international community, almost non-existent in the case of Iran.

One especially neuralgic issue for both is their respective roles in the Yemen War. It is now abundantly clear that the Saudis’ overwhelming military power, bolstered by the US and some European nations, cannot defeat the Houthi rebels. Nor can it end either the war or even its costly intervention in it. The Saudis need help. Enter the Iranians, who have been supporting the Shia-affiliated Zaydi Houthis in this war since 2013. With ideology and much-needed weapons and funding, though much less than what Saudi Arabia has expended, the Iranians have empowered the rebels to the point where they are now an established power in a future Yemen, whether unified or bifurcated.

So, the two regional powers are talking it out. The Saudis want out of the war, but they also want reliable security along their southwestern border. The Iranians want a Shia power on the Arabian Peninsula, but preferably one at peace.

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Yemen may be the most immediate challenge for the two states. But there are others. More broadly, Saudi Arabia and Iran need to reach a modus vivendi in the region. On-again, off-again formal relations, menacing behavior toward each other’s oil and shipping interests, and verbal assaults do little more than increase the temperature in a region plagued by heat, literally and figuratively.

Brothers Reconcile?

Saudi Arabia has also launched a campaign to repair the frayed relations among its Arab neighbors. Last week, Mohammed bin Salman week began a PR campaign to demonstrate a new and improved political environment. In a swing through the neighboring Gulf states of Oman, the UAE, Bahrain and, most importantly, Qatar, he seems to be trying to rebuild what once had been the region’s preeminent multilateral organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Mohammed bin Salman single-handedly fractured the Gulf alliance when he imposed his 2017 blockade on Qatar, joined by the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt. It backfired. Qatar remained in the good graces of the US, drew the political and military support of peripheral power Turkey and earned the support of Iran. Consider it the young prince’s on-the-job training in global as well as regional politics. He is now devoting particular attention to Doha in the hope of what yet we aren’t quite certain. But this repair work and goodwill tour cannot help but create progress.

And not to be outdone, the Gulf’s other power, the UAE, has embarked on its own diplomatic repair mission. Like the Saudis, the Emiratis want to lower the temperature in the Gulf, and their position as the region’s prime economic entrepôt gives them special heft. The UAE’s ties to the US, still the unquestioned but now quiescent power in the Gulf, also lend special weight.

Could It All Be for Naught?

Looming over all of these laudable efforts, however, is Iranian behavior in the region. All eyes are now on the recently restarted talks over the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna, Austria. Following a near-six-month hiatus at Iran’s request, the P5+1 group and Iran renewed negotiations to reinstate the JCPOA — aka the Iran nuclear deal.

But it is the critical non-dialog between the US and Iran — the two countries are still not meeting face-to-face but rather communicating through the intermediation of the other P5+1 countries — that bears the most serious watching. Unless they can agree on a way forward that puts Iran’s nuclear weapons potential well into the very distant future while also lifting America’s onerous and inescapably crippling sanctions on the Islamic Republic, the heat in the Middle East will become white hot.

Judging from the US State Department’s uncharacteristically downcast semi-official readout of the first round of the negotiation restart, there is cause for concern. Iran’s counterproductive, albeit predictable, maximalist opening gambit soured the P5+1, even China and Russia. Negotiators met again last week. Unless there is a greater attitude toward compromise, however, pessimism will win out. Positions will harden. And more extreme (and dangerous) measures will become viable.

President Biden has reiterated the US pledge that Iran will not get nuclear weapons. But neither he nor his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, will state what the consequences of failed talks might be.

Israel, however, is not so coy. Recent Israeli statements confirm that the military option is very much in play. As if to put an even finer point on the matter, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin visited Jerusalem late last week for meetings with his Israeli counterpart, Defense Minister Benny Gantz. Both men are retired top generals of their respective armed forces and will have discussed military and other options.

Military action would be an unspeakable disaster for the Middle East. But so would a nuclear-armed or even nuclear-capable Iran. Even an approach that stops short of armed conflict will impose extraordinary hardship on the region, certainly prompting other states to consider acquiring nuclear weapons and further isolate Iran.

It would be unfair to place the entirety of the burden for the success of these talks on Tehran. However, unless Iran understands the futility of its mindless pursuit of nuclear weapons, no effort at fostering understanding elsewhere can temper the region’s mercury-popping political heat.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Can Self-Help Diplomacy Lower Political Heat in the Middle East? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything?

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After years of conflict that have caused one of the biggest migration crises since World War II, it is clear that the Assad government, with the support of Russia and Iran, will maintain its grip on power. The question now is what a post-war Syria will look like with President Assad and his regime still in office.

In order to understand what may lie ahead, it is necessary to understand the origins of the Assad family, their Alawite background and their influence on Syrian identity over the past 50 years.

The Alawite Community

The two largest sects in Islam are Sunni and Shia. Both sects overlap in most fundamental beliefs and practices, but their main difference centers on the dispute over who should have succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as leader after his death in 632. Today, between 85% to 90% of Muslims are Sunni and around 10% are Shia. Sunnis live in countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan. Shias are largely located in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan, with significant minorities in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen.

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Alawites, although not doctrinally Shia, especially venerate Ali ibn Abi Talib, one of the earliest Muslims and the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet. Shias consider Ali to be the first imam and rightful successor to Prophet Muhammad, while Sunnis see him as the fourth rightly-guided caliph who made up the Rashidun Caliphate. Before the French took control of Syria in 1920, members of the Alawite community considered themselves to be Nusayris. The French “imposed the name ‘Alawite,’ meaning the followers of Ali,” to emphasize the sect’s similarities with Shia Islam.

Syria is ruled by Alawites, but the community itself is a minority making up around 12% to 15% of the pre-war Syrian population. Sunnis account for the majority of the country.

The Rise of the Alawites

After Syria attained independence in 1946, the Alawite community began to play an active role in two key areas: political parties and the armed forces. On the one hand, the Baath party, founded in 1947 by Arab politicians and intellectuals to integrate Arab nationalism, socialism, secularism and anti-imperialism, was “more attractive to Alawites than the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni religious organization” founded in Egypt with a large base in Syria.

Furthermore, Alawites and other minorities continued to be overrepresented in the military due to two main factors. First, middle-class Sunni families tended to despise the military as a profession. Alawites, on the other hand, saw the army as an opportunity for a better life. Second, many Alawites, due to their difficult economic situation, could not afford to pay the fee to exempt their children from military service.

The Alawite presence in the army culminated in a series of coups in the 1960s. Supporters of the rising Baath party were a minority in Syria at the time. As scholar Rahaf Aldoughli explains, the regime embarked on a course of “rigorous state-nationalist indoctrination to consolidate Baathist rule and establish” its popular legitimacy. Among other efforts, “the Baathists sought to manipulate tribal and sectarian identities, seeking patronage by” upgrading the status of previously marginalized groups. This included the Alawite community.

The last coup d’état in Syria was carried out by General Hafez al-Assad, who had been serving as defense minister and was an Alawite. His actions brought the minority to power in November 1970. Three months later, Assad became the first Alawite president of Syria.

Once in office, “his project centered on homogenizing these diverse [marginalized] Syrians into a single imagined Ba’athist identity.” More broadly, Aldoughli adds, the overall aim of “nationalist construction was to subsume local identities into a broader concept of the ‘Syrian people,’ defined according to the state’s territorial” boundaries.

The Sectarianism of the Syrian Civil War

Shortly before the outset of the US-led war on terror, Hafez al-Assad died in 2000. His son, Bashar, took over the reins and continued in his father’s footsteps. This included policies of coopting the religious space and portraying a moderate Islam under the guise of a secular state that sought to curb Islamism and blur religious differences. Despite these efforts, the confessional fragmentation of Syrian society provided a factor of tension and instability for a state that ultimately never succeeded in addressing these differences in the political arena.

The Arab Spring consequently arrived in Syria at a time marked by a crisis of legitimacy of secular ruling parties such as the Baath. The crisis of governability meant the secular balance imposed by the regime in society began to crack, exposing anger around the Alawite minority’s overrepresentation in the state apparatus and the Sunni majority’s underrepresentation. The result was anti-government protests that began in March 2011.

Ultimately, the ensuing sectarianism of the Syrian conflict only makes sense if we also incorporate the geopolitical rivalries affecting the region. On the one hand, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iran are the Assad government’s main supporters and are interested in propping it up. On the other hand, Sunni actors such as the Islamic State group, the al-Nusra Front and Saudi Arabia want the government to fall.

That has failed. After 10 years of war, military forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad have retaken the vast majority of Syrian territory with the support of Iran and Hezbollah. As a result, both repression of the Sunni-dominated opposition and the strengthening of the Alawite community in the state apparatus are likely to remain part of a post-war Syria. How the Sunni majority reacts to the fact that Assad and the Alawites remain at the center of Syrian politics is unknown.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Assad Family Has Been Shaping Syria for 50 Years appeared first on Fair Observer.

How Date Farming Helps Yemenis on Soqotra

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Until now, the negotiations have reportedly revolved around two main issues. The first is the restoration of diplomatic relations between both countries. Bilateral ties were cut off in 2016 when Saudi Arabia executed Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, a Saudi dissident who was a Shia cleric, and protesters in Tehran stormed the Saudi Embassy in retaliation. The second topic of discussion is the Yemen War, which entered a new phase with the 2015 Saudi-led intervention against Houthi rebels who had taken over the Yemeni capital, Sanaa.

For more than one year, the Saudis have been looking for a way out of Yemen. The enormous economic costs of the conflict became more problematic when oil prices fell as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing lockdowns.

Even after the recovery of the hydrocarbon market, the fact remains that six years of war have not brought Saudi Arabia any closer to its two major goals in Yemen: reestablishing Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and constraining the Houthis’ influence. Furthermore, US President Joe Biden, while not as tough on the kingdom as promised in his election campaign, has been less conciliatory with Saudi Arabia than his predecessor, Donald Trump.

Who Are the Houthis?

The Saudis often present the Houthis as little more than Iranian puppets. Iran’s official position is that the Houthi movement only receives ideological support from Tehran. Both narratives are inaccurate, to say the least.

The Houthis are a homegrown movement that successfully resisted the Yemeni government’s military offensives from 2004 to 2010 without any external assistance. Hussein al-Houthi, the movement’s early leader and from whom its name is derived, was an admirer of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and was influenced by its symbolism and ideology. His brother and current leader of the movement, Abdel-Malek al-Houthi, has also expressed his admiration for the Islamic Republic.

The first credible reports of Iranian military support for the Houthis date back to 2013. Until 2016, weapons transfers were largely restricted to light arsenal. In the following years, Tehran started to supply the Houthis with increasingly sophisticated missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components. Furthermore, a contingent of Iranian Revolutionary Guards on the ground has been training Houthi fighters. The Yemeni movement’s capacity to target key strategical interests within Saudi Arabia, such as oil extraction facilities, pipelines and airports, cannot be understood without accounting for Iran’s role in the conflict.

At the same time, and contrary to Saudi claims, the Houthis are largely independent from Iran. Their territorial expansion in 2014 was politically built on its Faustian bargain with the former Yemeni president and arch-rival, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the unpopularity of the Hadi government, which was backed by Saudi Arabia.

Moreover, most of the Houthis’ current arsenal has not been sourced from Iran. It has rather been acquired in the local black market — which is well-connected to the Horn of Africa’s smuggling routes — captured in battle or as a result of the defection of governmental military units to the Houthis. Before the war began, Yemen was already a country awash with small weaponry, coming only second to the US in terms of weapons per capita.

According to the official Saudi narrative, the Houthis necessitate Iranian help to maintain their military effort. While this is most likely the case when it comes to the group’s capability to strike targets within Saudi territory, an abrupt end of Iranian military assistance to the Houthis would make little difference in Yemen’s internal balance of power.

What Saudi Arabia and Iran Need to Do

Saudi Arabia needs to come to terms with the fact that its attempt to impose a military solution in Yemen has failed. It has done so because of counterproductive airstrikes, support for unpopular local actors and a misunderstanding of internal dynamics. If Yemen has become Saudi Arabia’s quagmire, this has little to do with Iran’s limited support for the Houthis.

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Iran, for its part, should understand that its claims of non-interference in the Yemen War have gained a farcical nature over the years, as growing evidence has piled up on Iranian–Houthi ties. Iranian leaders cannot impose on the Houthis an end to attacks against Saudi territory. However, they can decisively constrain them by stopping the flow of UAV and missile technology to the Houthis, as well as ending their military training on the ground. In conjunction with this, Iran can support the direct Houthi–Saudi talks that began in late 2019.

For Saudi–Iranian negotiations to bear fruits in relation to the Yemen conflict, both sides need to show a realistic appraisal of Iran’s role in the war. It comes down to acknowledging two key facts. On the one hand, Iran has leverage over the Houthis because of its military support for the group. On the other hand, this leverage is inherently limited and cannot be used to grant Saudi Arabia a military victory in Yemen.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Will Saudi-Iran Talks Lead to Anything? appeared first on Fair Observer.

The price tag of €17 billion ($19.1 billion) means that Dassault Aviation, which exists to supply France itself, has for the first time sold more equipment to six foreign countries than to the French armed forces. Macron may think of it as an act designed to spread the lethal wealth, making the world a more equitable place — at least as far as lethality is concerned.

The New York Times Manages the Unknown

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Some human rights organizations in France that have taken the time over the past six years to notice what Mohammed bin Salman was up to in his chosen approach to the use of lethal weapons (which include bone saws for use in Saudi consulates) dared to criticize the encounter. Unfazed by the reproach, Macron had the perfect reply, quoted by Le Monde: “What’s good for French women and men, I will ardently defend.”

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

What’s good (for):

Anything that produces cash, whether in moral terms it serves the cause of good or evil or just the multiplication of consumer goods.

Contextual Note

Anything Macron ardently defends is by definition part of France’s defense policy. In the land of “liberté, égalité, fraternité,” the “liberty” of French women and men to earn their salaries by producing lethal weapons is fundamental. It sustains the liberty of their bosses and politicians — skilled at what could be called diplomatic marketing — to sell those weapons to despotic regimes across the globe. This, in turn, promotes the “equality” (of class) and the “fraternity” (of culture) shared by wealthy business leaders, successful French politicians, bankers and foreign despots. As Voltaire’s Pangloss would say, “all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds.”

Unlike US President Joe Biden, who, bullied by moralists at home, refuses to talk to the Saudi crown prince, treating him as an international pariah, Macron has earned Mohammed bin Salman’s undying respect. And he has done so in the name of what’s good for the French people. He is of course riffing on the old chestnut, “what’s good for General Motors is good for the United States,” but he has the good sense to associate it with democracy rather than the corporate oligarchy Americans have adopted as their form of democracy. The US is, after all, the land in which “corporations are people.”

Le Monde appears to accept as a fatality Macron’s logic that focuses on “jobs created in France by this unprecedented purchase order.” By the same token, when Adolf Hitler took the unprecedented initiative of launching Auschwitz or George W. Bush building the Guantanamo prison, they were creating jobs.

Neither does the French journal critique Macron’s claim that it is all about their common commitment to fight terrorism, a pretext that over the past two decades has served to legitimatize ever brutally authoritarian policy of both liberal democracies and the world’s worst tyrants. The fact that Saudi Arabia has consistently encouraged terrorism and appears, at some level, to have facilitated the 9/11 attacks, doesn’t seem to bother Macron. After all, tyrants with stable governments have the same need as liberal democracies to ensure their security against malcontents tempted by terrorism.

Macron has another argument to explain his intent to develop good relations with Mohammed bin Salman, when he claims that “one might decide, following the Khashoggi affair, not to have any policy in the region … but I believe that France has a role to play. It doesn’t mean we’re complacent or that we are willing to forget. It means we must be a demanding partner, but we must keep the dialogue open and remain engaged.” What France is “demanding” can be measured in billions of euros.

Just to bring home the point that cynicism trumps moral scruples, Macron insists that the current standoff between Mohammed bin Salman and Joe Biden could be “good for” France (creating “favorable opportunities”). If the Biden administration finds itself obliged to demonstrate a new-found sense of moral sensibility after four years of Donald Trump’s brazenly naked cynicism, that provides a pragmatically cynical European country with a significant occasion to exploit.

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In the article, Philippe Ricard, Le Monde’s correspondent in Dubai, allows himself a touch of irony aimed at deflating Macron’s pretentions. He cites Macron’s own lame attempt at self-serving irony as he asserts, “Saudi Arabia organized the G20 over a year ago and I haven’t noticed that many powers have boycotted the G20.” Seizing the opportunity, Ricard comments, “Mr. Macron failed to specify that the meeting, in November 2020, was held by video conference, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.”

In fairness to Le Monde, by quoting Macron’s shoddy justifications for his good relations with totalitarian regimes without reframing them, Ricard knows that most of the paper’s relatively sophisticated French readers will understand the hypocrisy. The typical Le Monde reader gets the message. Unlike most Americans, the French have been trained not to take most political discourse at face value. Politics is never about sincere expression. This capacity to deconstruct political discourse may be the last remnant of the ancient European educational tradition, where the study of rhetoric was a major component of the liberal arts curriculum.

Historical Note

Emmanuel Macron typically used one other somewhat more substantial rhetorical tool to justify his rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. He insisted on pleading on behalf of Lebanon, a nation suffering from a deepening crisis, literally a failed state, thanks in part to the refusal of Mohammed bin Salman to assist a fellow Arab nation that has impertinently failed to follow his orders on multiple occasions and, more recently, openly criticized the Saudi-led war in Yemen. Macron is cleverly using the historical relationship between France and Lebanon, despite its admitted ambiguity, to affirm a moral position aimed at humanitarian assistance.

After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, as the West set about divvying up the spoils, Lebanon became effectively a French protectorate. Now, following Joe Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and his conscious distancing himself from Mohammed bin Salman, Macron sees an opportunity for France and perhaps Europe to assume a more proactive role in a Middle East that is no longer as clearly attached to the American empire.

Mandated by the League of Nations following World War I, according to the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot agreement, France assumed control of what was then the region of Syria. France immediately sought to separate Lebanon from Syria to ensure the existence of a state with a Christian (Maronite) majority. This led to friction in the following decades but turned the newly created state of Lebanon into a zone known for its diversity and tolerance and its strong ties to France. All that changed, of course, after the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine (formerly controlled by the British), especially after the fiasco of the Suez crisis in 1956 that resulted in a major humiliation for France and the UK, while opening the door to mounting US influence in the region.

Al Jazeera quotes Macron as asserting that France and Saudi Arabia together “want to commit ourselves to supporting the Lebanese people and therefore do everything possible to ensure that trade and economic reopening can take place.” The article concludes that “there’s no doubt that a new page has been opened in the relationship between Lebanon and Saudi Arabia.”

Al Jazeera’s Zeina Khodr notes that Macron’s initiative “will help revive brotherly relations.” There may be neither liberty, nor equality in Saudi Arabia, but Macron apparently has done something to promote fraternity in Lebanon, a country that was once known for that virtue. This could prove to be a minor moment in what is turning out to be a series of acts that signal a major historical shift in the region. In the absence of the US as the indefectible ally of Saudi Arabia, Sunnis and Shias may begin seeking to rediscover their own sense of fraternity.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Iran’s ethnic minorities endure double discrimination — from the ruling regime and from the Iranian human rights community. While the regime and human rights organizations both at home and abroad disagree on many issues, they share a disdain for Iran’s ethnic minorities, unwilling to see them gain national rights. Thus, the government and its mainstream opposition share a common cause that strengthens the regime’s ability to stay in power and prevent democracy from taking root in Iran.

Repression Is No Longer Enough to Stem the Anger of Iran’s Minorities

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Iran’s ethnic minorities undergo extreme discrimination beyond the restrictions imposed on all Iranians. They are not allowed to operate schools in their native language, are forced to use Persian in all formal settings, and are regularly subjected to mockery and ridicule in the official media and school textbooks. Ahwazi Arabs face state-sponsored suppression of any expression of their ethnic identity and culture as well as open anti-Arab racism.

Ahwazi Arabs, who number around 8 million, suffer from water shortages, environmental degradation, discrimination in employment, and high rates of poverty despite being the majority population in the oil and gas-rich Khuzestan province. The Persian ruling class reaps the profits from these abundant natural resources while the local Ahwazi people suffer the health implications and pollution from their production.

Shared Prejudice

Despite being formally committed to advancing democracy, Iranian human rights organizations share the regime’s prejudices and racism. These organizations rarely report on the distinct discrimination against Iran’s ethnic minorities, the specific goals of Ahwazi Arab protests or the political prisoners who have campaigned for the rights of ethnic minorities.

For instance, when listing the names of activists who have been abducted from their Western exiles by Iranian operatives, they neglect to mention Habib Chaab, an Ahwazi activist and Swedish citizen kidnapped by the regime in Istanbul. Chaab is being held in Tehran’s notorious Evin Prison and is in imminent danger of execution.

I personally have experienced this double discrimination. As an Ahwazi Arab human rights activist, I was jailed and tortured almost to death for supporting the right of Ahwazi children in Iran to learn their native language, Arabic. I was lucky to escape and settle in the US in 2015. My fellow activists Hashem Shabani and Hadi Rashedi were not so lucky — they were executed in 2014. The physical scars from that torture, which run from my sternum to my groin, will never leave me. Even after multiple operations, I will be on medication for the rest of my life.

Yet despite all the available evidence, I was shocked to discover that the Persian-dominated human rights organizations in the US opposed recognizing the rights of the Ahwazis and other minorities, co-opted our struggles and blocked reporting on our plight.

Social Media Wars

With Iran’s regime imposing a total media blackout on the Ahwazi issue, social media remains the only option for activists to raise awareness. But even here activists face constant abuse and threats not only from the regime, which deploys trolls and bots to mass-report activists’ accounts in an effort to shut them down, but also from Farsi-speaking Iranian dissidents. At one point, I had three Twitter bans in under 20 days. 

Due to this media war, most people in the West are not aware of Iran’s ethnic diversity, where Turkish, Ahwazi Arabs, Balochi, Kurdish and Caspian minorities account for nearly 40% of Iran’s population. Most Iranian human rights organizations in exile focus on abuses against Persian dissidents while barely giving any coverage to the systemic racism against the ethnic minorities.

When our young men die for their rights in the streets of Ahwaz, the Persian-dominated groups report on these protests as anti-regime activity, intentionally disregarding the ethnic factor. This was the case in the widespread November 2019 protests and the recent wave of demonstrations this July, which were led by Ahwazi youth. Such co-opting of our activism adds insult to the injury of the brave sacrifices made by our young people.

Refused Recognition

The country’s Persian opposition is reluctant to recognize that Iran is a fundamentally diverse country and that its people have both a national identity and local sovereign claims. These Persian opposition groups have succumbed to the idea that providing support to the Ahwazi cause and recognizing its ethnic demands is a prelude to secessionism. Instead, they continue to turn a blind eye to the demands of ethnic minorities in their own regions in order to promote one nation, one centralized rule, one culture and one language — all Persian.

With this denial by Persian oppositions groups both at home and in exile, and with the regime continuing its brutally repressive, restrictive and racist rule, the outcome of subjugating the country’s ethnic minorities and disregarding their rights is predictable. The civil war that ravaged former Yugoslavia serves as a terrible warning of how states can fracture along ethnic lines. 

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To avert such a catastrophe, Iran must abandon its antiquated supremacist mindset and acknowledge its non-Persian minorities as equal stakeholders and partners who form a power base in their own right. The creation of a federalized democratic system would defuse tensions and mean the possibility of a fair, genuinely progressive, modern state.

Even without its regressive theocratic foundation, the current supremacist system in Iran is an inadequate and outdated relic reflecting a mindset based on 19^th-century colonialism. In reality, the Iranian state is a patchwork of ethnicities, faiths and doctrines. As a result, Iran can choose between creating a fair, stable, democratic and progressive 21^st-century state — which reflects this vibrant and diverse melting pot where each group can elect its representatives to share in an equal, fair and federalized system — and collapsing into factionalism and civil war.

This double oppression to which Ahwazis and other ethnic minorities are subjected and the refusal of the Persian Iranian opposition in exile to even acknowledge both the regime’s or its own deep-seated antagonism toward Ahwazis and other ethnic minorities ultimately only benefits the regime, which can easily thwart a splintered opposition. In the end, we can only dismantle oppression in Iran — and globally — through unity and mutual respect.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Chaos Makes a Comeback in Southern Yemen

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As the economy continues to deteriorate in war-torn Yemen, with widespread protests from Lahj to Shebwa and Hadhramawt, there has been little to no hope. Devaluation of the Yemeni rial is a prominent issue driving protests across southern provinces, while the mass displacement of civilians from northern provinces is driven by violence and unpaid salaries by Houthi authorities. The humanitarian crisis deepens as unemployment grows and donor funds are insufficient to meet demand by international nongovernmental organizations. Opportunities for job creation are minimal, but small initiatives led by local actors, with direct assistance from state donors, have made progress as economic activity contributes to local stability.

In a micro-environment like Soqotra, political stability over the past seven years of conflict has come at a high price. While fighting at a scale similar to the Yemeni mainland has not reached the Soqotra archipelago, the political conflict managed to disrupt life until a degree of order was established over a year ago. Humanitarian assistance has flowed into Soqotra for years following devastating cyclones, but with recent political stability on the island, assistance has shifted to more permanent projects — from hospitals and a power station to the island’s first factory.

Small Steps Forward

While industries struggle through a moribund economy, the agriculture sector has received much-needed investment, mostly from aid agencies. Challenges remain, like annual storms, drought, pests and shortage of labor. From Hodeida to Hadhramawt, agriculture has struggled. Date farming is a particular example. This sector has suffered across the mainland, but it is being resurrected on Soqotra.

In August 2020, a group of women led now by Wafa Mohammed was hired to operate the first factory on Soqotra island. Built in the outskirts of Hadibu, with funds provided by the UAE’s Khalifa Bin Zayed Foundation, the date factory became the first major project of its kind on the island. The factory can deliver nearly three tons of dates per day from a harvest of around half a million palm trees. According to Mohammed, this factory collects produce from around 500 farmers and has a direct impact on the economy of nearly 2,000 families on the island.

Prior to the construction of the factory, production was only for local consumption. Saeed Othman, a date farmer in Soqotra, said that in the past, “production was very weak because it was just for daily consumption.” The island also lacked other agricultural products and dates were often used as feed for livestock. Production at the factory has also created a competitive environment among local farmers as demand for higher quality increased for export, said Othman.

The factory project instantly provided unexpected opportunities to a group of college graduates, who simply had no hopes beyond the usual “routine at home, cooking, cleaning, doing the other home chores,” said Mohammed. Farmers across the island also highlight the opportunities created by the factory, primarily through an increase in income impacting their daily life. Farmers and factory workers alike enjoy the benefits from a stable environment that allows economic activity outside a war economy that prolongs the armed conflict on the mainland.

Conflict and Aid

As local, regional and international organizations jockey for their share of available funds since the donors’ conference on March 1, the debate continues over alternative approaches. UN organizations requested nearly $4 billion this year, only to receive pledges for $1.7 billion, of which an undisclosed amount has been dispersed so far.

Corruption, low-impact and reduced funding have all contributed to wide-ranging debates in recent months over alternatives to the current process. The multilateral approach has failed to deliver sufficient funds to meet demand, while warring parties continue to capture aid and obstruct delivery. In an environment like Soqotra, isolated from the armed conflict on the Yemeni mainland, direct delivery of aid by a state actor has proved efficient, delivering long-term impact on the ground.

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The date factory project came as the political conflict in Soqotra settled. Under the current circumstances, the situation in Soqotra could offer an alternative. For example, in contrast to affected areas in Hadhramawt or Mahra, soon after Cyclone Chapala struck the Soqotra in 2015 and following Cyclone Makunu in 2018, the United Arab Emirates delivered life-saving assistance directly to the people on the island. During the length of the conflict, the UAE has delivered over $110 million in aid to the Soqotra archipelago. The aid has targeted areas in public and health services, transport and storage, fishing sector, construction, public education, energy and potable water.

Aid provided over the years also targeted farmers, who not only benefit from the funds provided for their crops, but also from projects like the date factory. The factory, for example, has provided an outlet for farmers to export goods rather than relying on local consumption alone. The aid provided has allowed the farmers to expand and stabilize harvests, improve the quality of products and increase revenue. In addition, the power plant in Hadibu, with a capacity of 2.2 megawatts, provides facilities like the date factory with a sustainable power supply that contributes to local economic security. The UAE also provided the Qalansiya area with 800 kilowatts. Other projects include a distribution network for more than 30 sites and solar-powered street lighting.

Development projects in Soqotra account for a fraction of funds requested by aid agencies every year, but the impact so far is wide and sustainable. Other environments could emulate the process in Soqotra, but deeply rooted political conflicts remain an obstacle. Aden, the interim capital, continues to suffer from a lack of sustainable power source, unemployment is high despite efforts by Aden authorities and the political conflict easily escalates to armed clashes. On the mainland, it is more difficult, but opportunities abound across southern provinces.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How Date Farming Helps Yemenis on Soqotra appeared first on Fair Observer.

How Will the UAE Cope With Growing Environmental Insecurity?

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Exposure to extreme heat can be fatal for those who have no access to air conditioning. Apart from being a direct threat to human life, the effects of climate change and high temperatures have the potential to spill over and impact all sectors of the economy.

It has been long understood that economic activity and climate conditions are related. This relationship between the climate and the economy has defined the magnitude and scope of markets in several countries, including in the Middle East. In 2020, the World Economic Forum concluded that climate change is ranked as the biggest risk to the global economy.

The Climate and the Economy

While greenhouse gases have no geographical boundaries, their impact differs significantly across the globe. A paper published in Nature indicates that under current climate policies that are on course for an average temperature rise of 2.9˚C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century, the world’s most vulnerable countries would suffer an average GDP loss of around 20% by 2050 and in excess of 60% by 2100. In the Middle East, Sudan is expected to suffer the most: Its GDP is projected to drop by around 32% by 2050 and by more than 80% by 2100 as a result of climate change.

One sector in the economy that would struggle the most is agriculture. Exposure to high temperatures could cause losses to agricultural production as heat stress negatively affects plant growth and animal productivity. Over time, heat stress is likely to increase vulnerability to disease and reduce dairy output. According to a 2018 UNDP report, crop production in the Middle East region is expected to drop by 30% in case of 1.5˚C-2˚C warming by 2025. Additionally, extremely high temperatures might aggravate an already bad situation in this sector.

On the one hand, agriculture is the largest consumer of water in the Middle East, using between 78% to 87% of all resources. Higher temperatures will add more stress to irrigation schedules in terms of both frequency and amount. On the other hand, farming activity and businesses could be wiped out as they do not contribute significantly to the regional economies, whether in terms of GDP or exports, in proportion to the amount of resources it uses. This translates into a potential risk of economic instability and disruptions in the food supply chain.

Similarly, the tourism sector in the Middle East would lose a significant share of the market due to climate change. In 2018, tourism contributed $270 billion to the region’s GDP, or around 9% of the economy. In the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, as of 2020, the tourism sector had, on average, a 13% share of the GDP. Although the pandemic has slowed down travel, the sector is now attempting to recover.

The impact of climate change on the sector could be irreversible. In Jordan, the Dead Sea, which used to attract some 1.5 million visitors every year, now welcomes just a few thousand after it had shrunk by almost a third due to low rainfall and high temperatures. Alexandria, in Egypt, home of one of the Seven Wonders of the World as well as a storied library, faces flooding, building collapse and loss of life as a result of sea-level rise.

Furthermore, some of the driest countries in the region suffered from flooding as a result of sudden heavy storms. For example, Jeddah, in Saudi Arabia, was hit by abrupt storms that killed 30 in November 2018. Long periods of dry weather increased fire risks in Algeria, which suffered devastating wildfires that took 90 lives in August.

The Impact on Energy Systems

Energy systems are no different than the tourism and agriculture sectors in terms of susceptibility to climate change. For example, energy demand for space cooling will rise due to average temperature increase. In 2015, it was estimated that 80% of total energy in the Middle East is used for cooling systems. These countries face challenges meeting growing energy demands, particularly during the summer months, and they could experience frequent grid failures and subsequent power blackouts.

Power shortages and blackouts would in turn cause negative societal and economic impacts. Cooling systems are necessary to sustain life during extremely high temperatures, and blackouts could significantly affect the everyday activities of the local populace.

Given the negative impact of high temperatures, in order to combat growing greenhouse gas emissions, GCC policymakers should consider an integrated climate change policy that helps enable decision-makers to allocate natural resources in a sustainable and integrated manner as well as achieve net-zero carbon emissions. The Middle East and other countries around the world must factor climate change into their strategic planning in order to secure economic development alongside a climate-resilient economy. Unfortunately, the concept of integrated climate policy is relatively new to Middle Eastern countries in particular.  

Lastly, and most importantly, GCC members and other countries in the region have launched climate change initiatives to reduce emissions and adapt to high temperatures. For instance, at the end of October, Sheikh Khalid bin Khalifa of Qatar unveiled the national environment and climate strategy in an effort to mitigate climate change impact. Under the plan, the country hopes to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 25% by 2030.

Other targets include reducing groundwater extraction by 60%, reducing daily household water consumption by a third and the doubling of desalination via reverse osmosis as well as prioritizing high yield and sustainable agriculture production by driving more than 50% improvement in farmland productivity.

The initiative emphasizes the importance of balancing the different goals and interests among resource consumers. This will improve security and accelerate the transition toward a climate-resilient economy as well as drive climate change adaptation and mitigation strategies for Qatar, the Middle East and the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy or HBKU’s official stance.

The post What Does 60˚C Mean for the Middle East? appeared first on Fair Observer.

In 2001, a US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan to dismantle al-Qaeda and search for its leader, Osama bin Laden, who were harbored by the Taliban government. The presence of foreign troops sent al-Qaeda militants into hiding and the Taliban were overthrown.

How 9/11 and the War on Terror Shaped the World

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In declaring his war, Bush gave the international community an unequivocal ultimatum: to either be “with us or against us in the fight against terror.” In 2003, he took this a step further. He leveraged his power and convinced US allies that Iraq was a state sponsor of terror and its president, Saddam Hussein, had developed weapons of mass destruction, which posed an imminent threat. It wasn’t long before the world found out that this narrative was constructed by the White House as the Bush administration was determined to attack Iraq. The results were devastating: hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths, the displacement of over 9 million civilians and the political mayhem that continues to this day.

It has been argued that Islam has been conflated with terrorism not only in the media, but also in much of the political discourse. As a direct result of the war on terror, studies show that an attack by a Muslim perpetrator receives 375% more attention than if the culprit was a non-Muslim.

As these patterns grew with time, countries started to employ their deterrence capacity under the guise of the “war on terror,” only to undermine those who were resisting regimes or seeking self-determination. This was seen in countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Even Russian leader Vladimir Putin, in 2001, quickly persuaded Western leaders that his country faced similar threats from Islamists and was dealt a carte blanche to crack down with brute force on insurgents and civilians alike.

The foreign occupation of Afghanistan ended in August 2021. After 20 grueling and miserable years, the US pulled out from Afghanistan amidst a Taliban takeover, setting a range of events into motion. Chaos filled Kabul Airport as scores of people were desperate to leave the country. The IMF suspended Afghanistan’s access to hundreds of millions in emergency funds due to a “lack of clarity within the international community” over recognizing a Taliban government.  

The war led to irreparable damages and hundreds of thousands of Afghans paid with their lives. The US spent over $2.2 trillion on the conflict and had thousands of its soldiers returned in body bags. Today, starving families in Afghanistan are selling their babies for money to feed their children and the world only looks on.

To understand how we got here, I spoke to Anas Altikriti, a political analyst, hostage negotiator and the CEO of The Cordoba Foundation, an organization aimed at bridging the gap of understanding between the Muslim world and the West. In this interview, we discuss America’s handling of the occupation and examine Afghanistan’s next steps now that the Taliban has assumed authority in the country.

The transcript has been edited for clarity.

Kholoud Khalifa: Joe Biden has received a certain amount of backlash from both sides of the aisle for withdrawing abruptly from Afghanistan. What do you make of his decision?

Anas Altikriti: Looking from an American perspective, I believe Biden had no choice. We tend to forget that the president who actually signed the agreement to leave Afghanistan was Donald Trump and his deadline was May of this year. Technically, you can state that Biden was carrying out a decision made by his predecessor. However, in reality — and I think that this is what’s important — any American president would have found it extremely difficult and utterly senseless to carry on a failed venture. Afghanistan and Iraq were utterly horrendous mistakes. If not at the point of conception and theory, the implementation was horrid.

However, from a purely analytical political point of view, Biden had absolutely no choice. The fact that he was going to come in for so much criticism, and particularly from the American right, is no surprise whatsoever. I would like to assume that Biden’s administration had the capacity to foresee that and to prepare for that, not only in terms of media, but also in terms of trying to argue the political perspective. Although in America today, I don’t think that is really useful.

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So, generally speaking, I’m not surprised by the fact that he got attacked, because ultimately speaking, on paper, this was a defeat to the Americans. It was a defeat to the Americans on the 20^th anniversary of 9/11, the day in which the idea started to crystallize in terms of those who wanted to see American basis spread far and wide, and the whole intermittent 20 years has been nothing but an utter and an abject failure. Thousands of American troops have been killed, but on the other side, probably more than a million of Afghan lives have been absolutely decimated — either killed or having to flee their homes and live as refugees elsewhere. The cost has been absolutely incredible, and for that, I think the Americans can contend with themselves, as history will judge this to be a failed attempt from start to finish.

Khalifa: What are your thoughts on the Taliban as a political actor in today’s geopolitical landscape?

Altikriti: Well, we’ll wait and see. There is no question that from the military point of view, the Taliban won. They achieved the victory, and they managed to expel the Americans and to defeat them not only on the ground, but also at negotiating. For almost the past 12 years, there had been negotiations between the Taliban and the Americans either directly or indirectly, whilst at the same time, the Taliban had been fighting against the American presence in Afghanistan and never conceding for a moment on their objective that they wanted a full and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. That, itself, is something to be taught at political science departments across the world, and it has definitely affected my own curriculum that I teach to students.

Negotiations, as well as being backed by real power, are things that have proven to be extremely beneficial and quite successful in this particular time. Now, that might be easy in comparison to catering to a nation of 40 million that have been devastated for almost three generations — from oppressive regimes to conflicts, to wars, to civil war, to occupation, to absolute and utter devastation to the rise of violence, ideological militancy, to all sorts of issues that have ravaged that nation.

Governing Afghanistan is going to be a totally different kettle of fish. It’s not the same as fighting. You can say that actually fighting a war from mountain tops and caves is relatively easy in comparison with the task ahead. Whether they’re going to be successful or not is something that we wait to see, and I hope for the betterment of the Afghan people that they will be.

The reality is the Taliban have won and in today’s world, they have the right the absolute right to govern. Hopefully, within the foreseeable future, the Afghan people will have the choice to either hold them to account and lay the blame for whatever economic failures, for instance, or otherwise.

This struggle between nations and their regimes is a continuous one. Thankfully, where we live, in the West, that struggle is mostly done on a political plane. So, we fight politically and we hold our politicians accountable through the ballot boxes. That is not present in many, many developing countries. Afghanistan is definitely a country that needs to find its own model as to how to govern and how to create that kind of balance between people and regime. I think it is utterly hypocritical from the West to prejudge them and hold them to ransom via mistakes that happened in the past. Every administration commits mistakes of varying sorts. Our own government in the UK is now being investigated by an independent inquiry staff as to how it dealt with COVID and whether some of its decisions led to the death of thousands of people. So, mistakes can happen.

The West needs to contend with why they left Afghanistan after 20 years of absolute misery and suffering no better than when they came to it in 2001. That’s a question that the West, including the UK, need to ask themselves before passing judgment on to the Taliban.

Khalifa: You mentioned something very interesting. You said we’re waiting to see and we cannot judge them right now. Do we see any hints of change? Has today’s Taliban changed from the Taliban of the pre-US occupation? For example, the Taliban issued a public pardon on Afghan military forces that had tried to eradicate them.

Altikriti: Well, the hints are plenty and the hints are positive. The fact that the Taliban, as you put it, issued that decree that there won’t be any military trials or court marshals being held. The fact that from the very first hours, they said that anyone who wants to leave could leave and they won’t stop them, but that they hope everyone will stay to rebuild Afghanistan. I think from a political and PR point of view, that was a very, very shrewd way to lay out the preface of their coming agenda.

The fact that Taliban leaders spoke openly, and I’ll be honest, in quite impressive narratives and discourses to foreign media — to the BBC, to Sky — and, in fact, took the initiative to actually phoning up the BBC and intervening and carrying out long and extensive interviews. This has never happened before. We could never have imagined that they sit with female correspondents and presenters and spoke freely and openly. Also, the fact that they met with the Shia communities in Afghanistan at the time when they were celebrating Muharram and assured them that everything was going to be fine.

I think a big part of whether Afghanistan succeeds or not lies in the hands of the West. For instance, in the first 24 hours of the Americans leaving in such a chaotic manner, which exemplified the chaos of the Taliban as we know it, the IMF said that funds to Afghanistan would be withheld. Therein begins that kind of Western hegemony, Western colonization that I believe is at the very heart of many problems in what we termed the Third World or the developing world.

The fact that sometimes nations aren’t allowed to progress, they aren’t allowed to rise from the ashes, they aren’t allowed to recover, they aren’t allowed to rebuild, not because of any innate deficiency on their part, but because of the international order that we have today in the world. We have so many restraining legal organizations — from the UN downwards, including the IMF and the World Bank — that hold nations to ransom. Either you behave in a particular way or we’re going to withhold what is essentially yours. It’s an absolute travesty, but unfortunately, this goes across all our radars. There is very little response in terms of saying, hang on, that is neither just nor fair nor democratic.

If you really, really want the betterment of Afghanistan and Afghan people, countries should be piling in, in order to afford help, to afford aid and to make absolutely sure that the Afghan people have everything they need in order to rebuild for the future.

But, unfortunately, the opposite is happening. We’re tying the nation’s hands behind its back and saying, we’re just going to watch and see how you do in that boxing ring, and if you don’t fare well, that will be justification for us to maybe reintervene in one way or another sometime down the line.

Khalifa: After seizing the country, the Taliban promised an inclusive government, with the exception of women. Yet the current government only comprises Taliban members. What are the chances that they deliver on forming an inclusive government?

Altikriti: I’m sort of straddling the line between being an academic and an activist, and I have a foot in both, so it’s sometimes a little bit difficult. However, I would suggest that when the Conservative Party in Britain wins an election, it’s never assumed that they include people from the Labour Party or Liberal Democrats in their next government. The same goes in America: When the Republicans win an election, you can’t reasonably ask or expect of them to include those with incredible minds and capacities from the Democratic Party — you simply don’t.

So, the hope for inclusivity in Afghanistan needs to take that into consideration. The Taliban are the winning party — whether by force or by political negotiations — and therefore, they have the right to absolutely build the kind of government they see fit. For them to then reach out to others would be an incredible gesture.

But I think it’s problematic and hypocritical if the West doesn’t allow the winning party to govern. If after some time it doesn’t manage to, then maybe you’d expect it to reach out to others from outside its own party or from outside its own borders and invite them to come and help out. But that’s not what you expect from day one.

The fact that they haven’t done what many people expected, and I personally have to say I feared would happen, and it hasn’t. So, until we find that media stations closed down, radio stations barricaded and people rounded up — and I hope none of that will happen, but if it does, we hold them to account.

Khalifa: Imran Khan, the prime minister of Pakistan, says the international community must engage with the Taliban, avoid isolating Afghanistan and refrain from imposing sanctions. He says the “Taliban are the best bet to get rid of ISIS.” What’s your view on that?

Altikriti: If we’re looking back at their track record, they were the ones who managed to put an end to the civil war that broke out after the liberation from the Soviet Union. I mean, for about five to six years, Afghanistan was ravaged with a civil war, warlords were running the place amok. I remember an American journalist said the only safe haven in Afghanistan was something like a 20-square-meter room in a hotel in the center of Kabul. The Taliban came in and created a sense of normality, once again in terms of putting an end to the civil war. There remained only one or two factions that were still in resistance, but otherwise, the Taliban managed to actually bring Afghanistan to order.

It was only after 9/11 and the US intervention that returned the country back into a state of chaos. So, if we’re going to take their track record into consideration, then it’s only fair to say that they do have the experience, the expertise and the track record that shows that they can bring some semblance of normality and peace.

Now, obviously, we understand that Afghanistan is not disconnected from its regional map and from the regional politics that are at play, including the Pakistani-Indian conflict. It’s no secret that the Taliban were looked after and maintained by the Pakistani intelligence. I understand from the negotiations that were taking place since 2010 that there was almost always a member of the Pakistani intelligence present at the table. So, it’s not a secret that Pakistan saw that in order to quell the so-called factions that represented the mujahideen, the Taliban were its safest bet.

In that sense and from that standpoint, you would suggest that the Taliban are best equipped. Much of what was going on in Afghanistan was based on cultures, traditions and norms that Americans were never ready to embrace, understand or accept. That’s why they fell foul so many times of incidents, which could have been easily appeased with only a little bit of an understanding and of an appreciation of fine cultural or traditional intricacies and nuances. The Taliban wouldn’t have that issue.

So, you would suggest that what Imran Khan said has some ground to stand on. It’s a viable theory. But everything that we’re talking about will be judged by what see is going to happen. But before we do that, we need to allow the Taliban the time, so that when we come to say, listen, they fail, we have grounds and evidence to issue such a judgment.

Khalifa: I want to shift to the US. So we know that there was a US-led coalition, and its presence for over 20 years in Afghanistan and in the Middle East led to very little change in the region. You already alluded to that at the very beginning. The US spent trillions of dollars and incurred the highest death toll out of the coalition members. What has the US learned from this experience?

Altikriti: I think that’s the question we should be focused on. I fear that it has learned virtually nothing and that’s very worrying. Just like we were passing pre-judgments on the Taliban, we need to do the same everywhere. If that’s the kind of ruler that we’re using to judge a straight line, it’s the same ruler we need to judge every straight line.

We heard the statements that emerged from Washington, and to be perfectly honest, very, very few were of any substance. Ninety-nine percent, and this is my own impression, were about America looking back and how they let down the translators and the workers in the alliance government and left them at their own fate. The tears were shed, both in the British Parliament as well as the American Congress, which actually shows that these people didn’t get it. They didn’t get it and that is what worries me the most.

If something as huge as Afghanistan and what happened — this wasn’t a car crash that happened in a split second. This was something that was led over the course of the last 17 years and definitely since President Trump signed the agreement with the Taliban in 2020. This should have been a time for politicians and analysts to actually read the situation and read the map properly. But it seems that they never did and they never bothered to see if there was any need or inclination to take lessons from it.  

I’m yet to come across a decision-maker, a lawmaker, a politician, a senior adviser to come out and say there were horrendous mistakes carried out by the occupation and by the other alliance governments that led to this, and as a result, we need to learn what to do and not do in future. But there is this arrogance and pride that forbids us from doing so, and as such, they’re inclined to make the same mistake time and time and time again.

Khalifa: Given that the so-called war on terror, and more specifically the occupation in Iraq, was an utter failure, what is the probability in your opinion that America will engage in another foreign intervention?

Altikriti: From a purely political view, I find this extremely far-fetched in the foreseeable future. The reasons being that Americans had to endure bruising at every single level and because of the crippling economic crisis. So, it’s extremely difficult to launch an intervention or military intervention in the way that we saw in Iraq, Afghanistan or Panama in the next two to three years. But the thing is, often, American politics is driven by corporate America.

I mean, we talk about the trillions spent, but like someone said in an article I read in The Washington Post, that those trillions were more than made up by American corporations, by American oil, by getting their hands on certain minerals in Afghanistan. Even the drug trade itself, which Britain and America thought they would quell, it was actually the Taliban who brought it under control, who actually went around and burnt the poppy seed farms. The West reinvigorated that tradeline and stabilized it. Therefore, as a friend of a friend tells me, he says many of those who were scrambling for airplanes in Kabul Airport were poppy seed farmers because they knew that they had absolutely no future under the Taliban.

So, once we count the trillions incurred by the taxpayer, we forget that there is another side that you and I probably don’t even know that is gaining riches at the expense of the Afghans.

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The beast now is to try out new weapons. Lockheed Martin and others will always have a vested interest in trying out the new technology, and what’s better than to try it out in real-life situations? If I was to speak to any modern, contemporary, 30-something-year-old military analysts, they’d laugh me off because I’m speaking about a bygone age. We’re talking now about wars where we don’t involve human beings. I mean, in terms of the assailants, they’re flying drones, and there’s an intelligence level to it that I can’t fathom nor understand.

Another aspect that no one is talking about almost is the privatization of militaries. We’re coming now to find brigades, thousands of troops that are mercenaries, people who fight for a wage. Now, this is the new way to fight wars: Why would Britain employ some of its brightest and youngest when it could pay £100 a day to have someone else fight wars on its behalf? And this is now becoming a multibillion-dollar industry. It first started out as a reality in Iraq, when we had the likes of Blackwater who were guarding the airports, presidential palaces and government officials. You’d try to speak to them only to realize they were from Georgia or Mozambique or elsewhere, and they don’t fall under the premise of local law. Therefore, if they kill someone by mistake, you can’t take them to court and that’s the contract you sign. That is where I think the danger lies.

Khalifa: In 2010, you appeared on Al Jazeera’s “Inside Iraq” alongside the late Robert Fisk and Jack Burkman, a Republican strategist. Burkman described Arabs and Muslims as a “bunch of barbarians in the desert” and the Bush administration as the savior bringing change. With its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, has the US perceptions of Arabs and Muslims changed, and if so, how?

Altikriti: I’d love to have a chat with Jack right now to see what he thinks 11 years on. To answer your question, it saddens me to say that yes, it’s changed, but only because America and American society are so polarized and so divided. It only took Donald Trump to become president or 50% of Americans to defy everything that Trump said. Being anti-Trump meant standing up for Muslims when he issued the Muslim ban for flights. So, people from their standpoint of being anti-Trump said, no, Muslims are welcome. It’s absolutely the wrong way to go on about it. That’s not how we recognize, for instance, that racism is wrong or evil.

However, the fact is that in the past, anti-Muslim sentiments were everywhere and the feelings that Jack Burkman expressed so horribly in that interview were widespread. I personally believe they still remain because 9/11 has become an industry and that industry has many facets to it. Part of it is ideological, part is media, part is educational and obviously part transpires into something that is military or security-based.

We still have Guantanamo. Why is it that the American people aren’t talking about Guantanamo to the extent that they should be? This is something that is on the conscience of every single American citizen — it is paid from their own taxes. Why no one talks about it is simply because no one dares touch the holy grail — the industry of 9/11. It’s a huge, huge problem.

I still believe that those sentiments expressed by Jack back then are still prevalent, but like I said, they were mitigated by the advent of Trump and by his declaration against Arabs and Muslims. This, as well as the highlighting of certain issues by the left in America, such as the gross crimes committed by the Saudi regime and that’s helped in two ways. Firstly, you expose the crimes committed by Saudis, but it’s also cemented that view that Arabs are barbarians.

Khalifa: Afghanistan wasn’t the only country that suffered. Iraq suffered more dire and devastating consequences from the so-called war on terror. What does a future look like for Iraq now that the US has withdrawn?

Altikriti: Oh, very grim, very, very grim. The Americans haven’t withdrawn — they’re less visible. There are current negotiations regarding the next Iraqi government in the aftermath of the elections that we’ve just had, which shows that the Americans are heavily involved.

Iraq is the playground of Iran. So, therefore, any policy of America or Britain or Europe that involves Iran has to have Iraq in the middle.

There are still about three or four American military bases, and from time to time, we hear the news that certain militias targeted this base or that base where Americans lie. Now, the personnel who are there within the bases might carry ID cards as construction workers, advisers, legal experts, bankers or whatever. But ultimately, they’re all there to represent the best interests of the United States. So, America is still there.

However, Iraq is in dire straits. I think the indices that go around every year that show us levels of corruption, levels of transparency, levels of democracy, levels of happiness of people and satisfaction — Iraq is regarded as one of the 10 worst countries on every single level. I think that shows what’s been done to Iraq and what’s been done to the Iraqi people.

The fact is that we have at least 30% of the Iraqi people living as refugees, either within Iraq or outside of Iraq. The fact that in an election only 20% of the people choose to take part.

You have to ask serious questions. You have to say, OK, so when the Americans accused Iran — and I’m a believer that Iran is the worst of all players in Iraq. But you have to ask: So you occupied the country, why did you allow it to happen? So, you can’t just brush it off and say, well, the Iranian militias and its people and its proxy agents in the sun. Well, what were you doing there? So, I think that, again, what has been done to Iraq and to all Iraqis — regardless of their faith, regardless of their sect, regardless of their ethnicity — all of what has happened is a stain. A huge, huge one on the consciousness of everyone in Britain, America, Spain and all the countries that signed up for this and took part in this, everyone has a responsibility to answer.

I mean, obviously, when we spoke about Afghanistan, we didn’t speak about the crimes, the actual crimes that were committed. The one that we come to recognize and know about is the crimes committed by the Australians, where they actually trained the young cadets to shoot at people and kill them to be acknowledged as soldiers. We didn’t talk about that because there are so many of those that were committed. To speak not of Arab and Muslim barbarity, but of Western barbarity — that’s something I think should be discussed.

Khalifa: In Egypt, it was a military coup in 2013 that overthrew a democratically elected government led by the Muslim Brotherhood. In Tunisia, a constitutional change led to the fall of Ennahda, an Islamist party. In Morocco, it was the people who voted out the Justice and Development Party, which ruled the country for 10 years and suffered a massive defeat in September; they went from having 125 seats to only 12. To juxtapose this, in Afghanistan, the Taliban conquered the country overnight from the US, the most powerful country in the world. What message does this send to Islamist parties in the Muslim world?

Altikriti: Only yesterday, I was discussing this with a group of colleagues, and someone repeated a statement that was sent to me by a fellow of Chatham House. He said to me something quite interesting. He said: “Don’t you see that many around the world, particularly young Muslims, will be looking to Afghanistan — and three months ago in Palestine and what happened there — and think to themselves that the way forward is to carry guns.” I said: “Listen, my friend, you’re saying it. I’m not.”

But in reality, it’s unfortunate that many of my own students are saying, “It’s been proven.” I mean, they say, “you academics, you always talk about empirical evidence. Well, here it is: Politics doesn’t work. Democracy doesn’t work. The ballot box does not work. What does work? There you go, you have Taliban, you have the militias. So go figure.” Unfortunately, that is the kind of discussion that I think will dominate the Muslim scene, particularly the political Muslim scene.

For the next few years, I believe, whilst we analyze political Islam and Islamic parties, whether in Egypt, Morocco or Tunisia, that will be the question. Is it a viable argument to say that these parties will have absolutely no chance, either immediately in the short run or in the long run? In Tunisia, they were allowed to run for about 10 years. In Morocco, they were in government for about 10 years. Before that, they were in opposition and they were thriving. But in Egypt, they weren’t allowed to stay for more than a year. So, ultimately, the end is inevitable. So, is it the need to shift and change tactics? It’s going to be quite an interesting and, at times, problematic discussion, but it’s a discussion you need to have.

And last, by the way, on this particular point, the West did not allow democracy, particularly in Egypt and in Tunisia, to exist. We spoke of democracy, we spoke of human rights, we spoke of freedoms, but when they all came to be crushed, the West did absolutely nothing, which told the others well, you know what? They don’t care, there are no consequences, and that is why it is that many, many Muslim youth today will say, well, there’s only one way to go there.

Khalifa: And lastly, what do you believe are the core causes for Islamic extremist groups, i.e., Daesh or al-Qaeda, to still have a foothold in the region, and in your opinion, what is the best way to combat these groups?

Altikriti: Their biggest arguments, and which works well for them, is the fact that democracy failed and that they got nothing from buying into Western values of how to run their societies.

Their biggest argument now will be the Taliban and how they won. So, those are the main standpoints [for] these extremist groups; they lie on people’s frustrations and their feelings that there is no other way out. That’s essentially the argument. I’ve seen it in groups where someone is trying to recruit for that idea. Their bottom line is it doesn’t work. There is no other way — that’s their only argument.

It’s not theological, by the way. People think they are basing it on these Quranic verses or on hadiths [sayings of Prophet Muhammad], but they absolutely do not, because on that particular front, they lose, they have no ground to stand on. [For them,] it’s the fact that, in reality, it doesn’t work — democracy doesn’t work. Human rights doesn’t work. Because ultimately, your human rights mean nothing to those in power. So, killing us is as easy as killing a chicken. It’s nothing. That is their argument.

So, it’s going to be a struggle, it’s going to be a big, big, big struggle for people who want to advocate democracy, want to advocate civil society and diversity. It’s a struggle we can’t afford not to have, we can’t afford not to be in there, because the outcome, the costs will be so hefty on every single part and no one will be excluded.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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The Intercept authors describe the complex game of cat-and-mouse played between the two leaders, one known for ordering the gruesome murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi, the other more conventionally engaged throughout his career in a form of organized mass murder called war. Since the responsibility for killing in war is shared across an entire nation’s political structure, and since war is supposedly regulated not by personal command but by “rules of engagement,” Biden and his predecessors, whose policies have led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands, cannot be compared with the kind of bloodthirsty assassin Mohammed bin Salman has become.

The Democratic Party vs. Its Voters

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This contrast has created a problem for Biden, who — unlike his predecessor Donald Trump, the ultimate opportunist — has the obligation of consolidating his image as a man of solid moral fiber. Biden has repeatedly insisted that the US must lead by the power of its example rather than the example of its power. He has no choice — in contrast with the abject Trump — but to avoid being seen as the puppet of a Middle Eastern powermonger.

The long and the short of The Intercept’s story is that Biden has adamantly avoided accepting to have a private conversation with the Saudi crown prince. In retaliation, bin Salman has refused to listen to an American president’s predictable requests to expand oil production to ease the tension on global oil prices. There is of course more to the story than that, but the only thing Biden has attempted to explain to the American public is that oil prices have risen “because of the supply being withheld by OPEC.” The fact that Saudi Arabia has a predominant voice in OPEC spared Biden the trouble of mentioning Riyadh itself.

To clarify Biden’s dilemma, Grim and Klippenstein reached out to Ali Shihabi, a man who describes himself on Twitter as an author and “commentator on Middle Eastern politics and economics with a particular focus on Saudi Arabia.” Grim and Klippenstein offer a bit more precision, calling Shihabi “a voice for MBS in Washington.” This became evident when Shihabi tweeted: “Biden has the phone number of who he will have to call if he wants any favours.”

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Favors:

Something people who understand the effective role of obsequiousness and servility in international relations can seek and eventually obtain by simply sabotaging their own ideals to please the person capable of granting favors

Contextual Note

Shihabi turns out to be an excellent stylist when it comes to using irony disingenuously. Grim and Klippenstein quote a statement Shihabi made in response to The Intercept’s request for comment: “Saudi has put a lot of work into getting a cohesive OPEC+ to work over the past 15 months since the crisis that dropped oil futures below zero so will not break ranks with the consensus or Russia on this. Also, the kingdom resents being blamed for what is essentially a structural problem not of its own making in the US which has hampered its own energy production. Finally, I hear that the price of Thanksgiving Turkeys has doubled in the US so why can oil prices also not inflate?”

The capitalized “Turkeys” quip might be a sly (or possibly unintended) allusion to the 2018 murder of Khashoggi in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. Everything else in Shihabi’s explanation has some historical merit. But throwing the spotlight on consumer prices in the context of what is perhaps the most “sacred” American holiday is equivalent to giving Biden a quick karate kick in the family jewels.

What can Biden do, other than capitulate to bin Salman and improve the consumer index? Doing so would brand him as weak and cowardly. In the end, Americans and political analysts all over the world are left wondering what the US stands for or is capable of standing for. Because a democratic consumer society’s political system is dependent not on the ideals of good government reflected in its constitution and repeated endlessly by demagogic politicians, or even on the “national interest,” but instead on the reaction of consumers to the prices of the goods they buy, the question must be asked: Who controls US politics?

Is it the people? No, because their dual role is simply to show up to vote every couple of years and to consume on a daily basis. What about the president? No, because presidents are in a constant battle with Congress. So, is it Congress? Not really, because Congress is known for debating everything and accomplishing nothing. The entire superstructure of government functions as a machine to find excuses for maintaining the status quo.

With regard to today’s news cycle, if we are seeking the answer to the question by naming individuals, the best candidates would be Joe Manchin and Mohammed bin Salman, who have demonstrated the power to create situations from which there is no exit.

Historical Note

The key to understanding Biden’s problem with bin Salman is of course neither the crown prince nor the West Virginia senator. It’s Donald Trump. Grim and Klippenstein quote Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute, one of the most astute observers of the Middle East in Washington. Parsi “said the move by MBS is aimed at boosting Republicans, whom the crown prince sees as a more reliable ally.”

More specifically, Parsi claims that it isn’t about oil revenues or even the arms sales to the kingdom that Biden had promised to halt on moral grounds but eventually accepted. According to Parsi, bin Salman has long-term geopolitical considerations in mind. “MBS calculates that a Republican president,” according to Parsi, “will reinvest in the idea of dominating the Middle East militarily, which makes the relationship with Saudi Arabia critical once more.”

Parsi further notes that under Trump a new coalition had grown up, bringing together the interests of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Israel, in lockstep with traditional US policy aimed at dominating the entire Middle East. Trump’s innovation was to delegate some of US power to its unconditionally supported allies Israel and Saudi: “MBS wants to return to the days when Saudi Arabia was fully immune from any criticism and had U.S. support with no questions asked.”

This situation that has resulted in Biden’s helplessness was created by Trump. It highlights the embarrassing decline of US prestige, if not also of US power in the world. Because of the way US democracy has evolved, the national interest — that of the people as a whole — will always be mediated if not dictated by local and corporate interests rather than any expression of the “will of the people.” In an officially decentralized and privatized social and economic structure, all decisions tend to be conditioned by “favors.”

For the politicians and political operators who hope to play their role in Congress or even intervene in the executive branch, getting elected or selected requires not just accepting, but soliciting favors from wealthy corporate donors and establishing what may be called “intimately interested” relations with them.

Trump succeeded at this game because of his talent for letting his personality eclipse the consequences of his politics. His voters and members of his party followed his lead because of his ability to play the role of a “winner.” That meant that Trump could let scoundrels like Mohammed bin Salman have their way while appearing to be the dominant personality in the couple. Biden had no chance. Not only did he not look like a winner, he gave the impression that the only thing he was interested in winning was the election.

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In short, when the Democrats forced Biden’s selection as their candidate in 2020, they did Biden the favor of allowing him to be elected by circumstance (thanks to COVID-19) but did themselves no favors if they really had the hope of using Biden’s presidency to govern the nation.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Algeria and Morocco: The Conflict on Europe’s Doorstep

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The revoking of the emergency law does have some positive consequences, namely the suspension of the infamous “state security court,” which offered no avenue for appeal and was notorious for its harsh sentences. However, these positive impacts are mitigated by a myriad of repressive laws, heavy use of pre-trial detention, extrajudicial killings and the heavy politicization of the judiciary, which make the state of emergency mostly redundant.

Two Laws

The most notable example of the repressive laws issued by the regime is the 2015 Anti-Terrorism Law. This law has a few notable features.

First, it provides a very vague definition of what constitutes terrorism to include acts that affect “social harmony and national security,” an expansion of which allows the Egyptian regime to crack down on dissent and charge activists with terrorism at will. Second, the law provides immunity to the security forces stating that “members of the security forces cannot be prosecuted in case force was used in the line of duty.” Finally, the law gives the president the power to take “necessary measures” in specific geographic areas in response to a terrorist threat, including isolating specific regions, depopulating them and the imposition of curfews for a period of six months, which can be extended.

In addition, on November 1, after the state of emergency was revoked, parliament approved an amendment to the law that expanded the power of the president, giving him the right to designate the security agency responsible for imposing his directives, a thinly veiled reference to assigning the military as a domestic security force to repress dissent.

The consequences of this law are significant. Besides the use of terror charges against peaceful activists, there has been a sharp rise in extrajudicial executions, reaching 755 alleged killings in 143 shootouts between 2015 and 2020. In some cases, the families of those killed have attested that their relatives were detained at the time of the alleged shootout. The immunity provided to the security forces by this law has emboldened them to commit killings, with no real investigation or consequence.

Another law that is seldom discussed is the Law for Protection of Public and Vital Entities. This law, issued in 2014, stipulates that the military is responsible for providing security to public institutions in cooperation with local police forces. The law says these buildings and institutions belong to the military, hence any acts of protest affecting their functioning fall under the jurisdiction of military courts, notorious for harsh sentencing and lack of due process. The definition of vital entities includes roads, bridges, railways, power lines and public institutions, essentially almost all of the public space.

This law was supposed to be temporary. However, in the same session where the amendments to the terror law were approved, it was made permanent. In effect, this permanently militarizes the public space by extending the jurisdiction of military courts to cover most public spaces and transforming the military into a domestic security agency, responsible for the repression of dissent and protest.

Pre-Trial Detention and the Judiciary

The lawful quashing of dissent is also coupled with the heavy use of quasi-legal methods of repression, the most prominent of which is the application of pre-trial detention. Egyptian criminal procedure law states that pre-trial detention should be limited to six months for misdemeanors, 18 months for felonies and two years for offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment. In reality, there are a number of cases where detainees remained in custody even after they surpassed their pre-trial detention limit. This practice has allowed the regime to arbitrarily detain its opponents for prolonged periods of time on vague charges, with little evidence and in complete disregard of due process.

In addition to this, the regime institutionalized the practice of “rotation,” where once the pre-trial detention period on one charge lapses, the detainee is charged in a new case, with very similar charges. The most notable example is Abdel Moneim Aboul-Fotouh, the head of the Strong Egypt Party, who was arrested in February 2018. He has remained in pre-trial detention after new charges were brought against him in February 2020.

The noose of repression is complete with the heavy politicization of the judiciary, which has been a feature of the regime since the coup of 2013. This is reflected in a number of mass trials, which have shown little regard for due process. The most notable is the trial of 735 defendants in the case of Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya Square sit-in, during which hundreds of protesters were killed by security forces. The final verdict, issued in June 2021, saw the confirmation of the death sentence of 12 prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders; out of 75 death sentences issued by the lower terrorism court, 31 death sentences were commuted to life in prison.

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The cooption of the judiciary was formalized with the constitutional amendment of 2019, which gave the president the power to appoint the heads of judicial institutions, as well as stipulating the creation of a higher judicial council — headed by the president — which oversees appointments, promotions and secondments within the judiciary.

The Permanent State of Repression

Hence, the suspension of the state of emergency in Egypt does not signal a real easing of repression, rather, under another guise, its permanence is extended. The amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Law for Protection of Public and Vital Entities made the state of emergency redundant. This, combined with the actual practices of the security forces and judiciary of using pre-trial detention, extrajudicial killings and torture, means that repression has been deeply institutionalized within the state apparatus, in essence turning it into a modus operandi.

One can speculate that the suspension of the state of emergency was a feeble attempt to claim progress aimed at the Biden administration, which withheld $130 million in aid over human rights concerns. However, the regime’s strategies point to the opposite, namely that brutal repression in Egypt will be a feature of daily life for years to come.

*[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Not All Quiet on the Western Sahara Front

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The latest episode in this tense relationship between the North African nations took place in August when Algeria severed diplomatic relations with Morocco. The move came after a series of wildfires swept through the Amazigh-speaking Kabylie region in what Algeria claims was a covert Moroccan operation to bolster the MAK.

For Algeria, this was a delicate time for the government due to an economic crisis exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, political unrest since 2020, and the ill health and subsequent death of the country’s former leader, Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Tension in the Maghreb

Algeria and Morocco have been antagonistic neighbors since their respective independence from the French. Border discord gave rise to a tenacious rivalry that worsened with the Western Sahara dispute when Algeria became the main supporter of the Polisario Front. This unfinished conflict and the decades-long closure of the land border between Algeria and Morocco are the most tangible examples of the enmity that keeps the Maghreb divided.

Diplomatic spats and mutual accusations of instigating internal turmoil have been frequent. One area where the tense calm in bilateral relations has been the military. The two countries have engaged in a rapid arms race fueled, in Algeria‘s case, by generous hydrocarbon revenues in the first decade of the century. Despite its efforts, Morocco’s military budget has been outstripped since 2006. Only as a result of Algeria‘s economic fragility has Morocco been able to make a significant recovery.

Recent years have been characterized by Morocco’s impetuous diplomatic activity, particularly in the Gulf and throughout Africa. In the face of Morocco’s increased international projection, the Algerians have tried to respond despite the country’s poor economic situation.

In particular, the Algerians have sought to build closer relations with African nations. Algeria has strengthened ties with its traditional ally Nigeria, restarting talks on the construction of the trans-Saharan gas pipeline. It has also reinforced cooperation with countries such as Mali and Libya.

Implications for Spain

Europe overlooks North Africa and is separated by mere miles from Morocco. As a result, the Europeans have a direct stake in the tension south of the Mediterranean. The European country most affected by the recent escalation between Morocco and Algeria is Spain.

Taking a position in favor of one party could have direct consequences on either the security of Spain’s southern border that is close to northern Morocco or the supply of natural gas that it receives from Algeria. This comes at a time when the flow of migrants across the Mediterranean is increasing and the price of gas, coal and electricity is rising.

The closure of the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline on November 1 has direct implications for Spain since the route was a major source of supply for over two decades. The pipeline also passes through Morocco, which retained part of the gas in exchange for allowing the line to operate via its territory. Morocco used the gas to produce around 12% of the country’s electricity. The Medgaz pipeline is seen as a replacement, which would allow Algeria to get rid of intermediaries and also strike a blow against Morocco.

Yet this will not spare Spain, which has no voice in regional disputes despite its desire to present itself as a strong European country. It is unclear how long this new episode of tension in the Maghreb will play out, but it could have serious implications for Europe.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Algeria and Morocco: The Conflict on Europe’s Doorstep appeared first on Fair Observer.

Can the Taliban Govern Responsibly?

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In a fast-changing environment where international donors are less capable to meet funding requests from humanitarian organizations, the United Arab Emirates has taken a unique approach. The Gulf state’s method, which could be modeled on the logistics of major transnational corporations or a large military logistics operation, provides a glimpse into the future orientation of special humanitarian capabilities.

Establishing a Hub

The establishment of the first UAE hub in 2003 reflected a top-level and very strategic foreign policy judgment by the United Arab Emirates. It leverages the UAE’s highly developed status as a global node for airfreight and transit entrepot activity. It has gained an impressive list of committed partners — from UN agencies and major humanitarian organizations to charities and commercial suppliers of humanitarian-related services.

On this point alone, any regional replicant will find it difficult to duplicate the model exactly. The status of the international hub was reflected by being represented well after its launch and during its transition from a valuable strategic geographic location to an independent official humanitarian crisis response agency within the international community, according to a member of the royal family at the time of its founding. 

The EHC and its widening range of services, no longer only a regional storage hub for faster deployment of humanitarian supplies, but an expanding hub for humanitarian workers heading to the field, has also become more networked into international coordination mechanisms and processes. These national and often highly budget-driven and bureaucratic processes and their informal and formal international coordination are now well established in the EHC modus operandi, reinforcing it as a leading model for contemporary large and rapid humanitarian action.

An example of UAE pre-engagement with the club of donors was in the South Pacific. The UAE, in 2015, through EHC predecessor institutions, flew selected humanitarian supplies toward the region following cyclone disasters over the past decade. The supplies proved less absorbable than expected. The transit stop was Brisbane, in Queensland, Australia, the location of the Australian government’s main South Pacific logistical base.

Following this natural disaster, the UAE recalibrated its approach. It recognized that even if it was able to act independently, beneficiaries’ interests and international coordination facilitate the path to effectiveness. Notably, aid to the region was used following the UAE’s green agenda diplomatic initiative in the South Pacific on climate change and its leveraging of gas and nuclear in the greenhouse debate.

By late February 2020, as the world began to address the spread of COVID-19, the UAE government set out to extend the role of the EHC. The aim of the directive by the Abu Dhabi government was to deploy the UAE’s “medical care capabilities at a time of crisis,” the Emirates News Agency reports. Its first task was to receive 215 citizens from neighboring countries evacuated from Hubei, China, as the pandemic began to interrupt international air travel. The EHC was to serve as a hub, receiving evacuees and providing necessary monitoring and preventive medical care, ensuring “privacy and dignity” throughout the process.

The EHC Today

Operations at the EHC now compliment an image of the UAE as a globalist and progressive international influencer through what some have called the world’s largest humanitarian hub. The additional success of the EHC in 2020 was a product of public and private sector cooperation that manifested the UAE’s foreign policy commitment to delivering and helping others deliver rapid crisis responses. The development of a hub for people affected by the COVID-19 pandemic continues to manifest itself in the role played by the UAE during the evacuation of Afghan refugees in August 2021.

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This support service, directly addressing people in danger, need and fleeing their country will require deep thinking and careful management. Like most sovereign states, the UAE itself, despite its fast-growing capability to balance its interests with the effects of its wealth and financial leverage, will face increasingly larger and more complex judgments about how to respond to incrementally higher demands for aid and human succor. These decisions will always come with distressing media coverage of human and environmental disaster events.

The success of the EHC is based on local capacity to deliver logistical infrastructure, a highly developed transport node and interest by an A-List of global humanitarians for a center close to several disaster-prone regions. These include the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean rim.

It will now need to deal with the deep and difficult policy problem, at least for humanitarians, of where to consolidate infrastructure and resources for rapidly accessible assistance to people suffering under complex situations. Here we will see realist foreign policy and the place and role of humanitarian assistance collide. Other wealthy states in the region will face the same problems under their current models of humanitarian support.

Humanitarian assistance, unless coupled with other incentives, rarely leads to a particular and favorable bilateral policy response. After all, the recipient state captures assistance from many quarters. Assistance by states such as the United Arab Emirates, if routine and on a policy basis more regular than opportunistic, will set a strong floor under the UAE’s global model. But it will be difficult to move from one crisis response to another without some clear “stop/go” decision points that do not appear mercenary.

Inter-Arab aid engagement has not been readily seen in humanitarian relief under the same Western and international media gaze as that of other UN member states. For the UAE, the dilemma stems from a priority to make its contributions visible and to showcase the model exemplified by the EHC. Clearly, realist soft power requires more from actions to provide international humanitarian relief. This is where real strategy concerning the concentration of aid and effective delivery will pave the way for success and emulation.

The Case of Afghanistan

The crisis continuing to expand in Afghanistan is a perfect example of emerging challenges and opportunities for new strategies. A growing need for assistance will not decline in the near future, nor will the need from time to time for states to explain their policy approaches and their prioritization of crisis responses. There is already a focus on the realpolitik of humanitarian support as a tool to advance interventionist global agendas. China’s COVID-19 vaccine aid is a clear example, especially as the breadth of Beijing’s response was undermined by the relatively poor efficacy of its vaccines.   

The model working out Abu Dhabi’s EHC allows states to advance more multilateral-driven crisis response strategies. In the case of the August reception of over 8,000 Afghan refugees, the UAE did not engage in unilateral interventionism. Instead, it responded to rapid coordination of responses to international needs for transport and hosting facilities, allowing an increasing number of Afghan nationals to be extricated during the chaos caused by the Taliban advance into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.

The UAE offered facilities to house Afghan refugees en route to third countries, such as the United States. It also provided relief to overstretched militaries and civilian organizations in Europe and the US that were overwhelmed by the number of refugees. Facilities such as those found at Abu Dhabi’s EHC proved a more dignified alternative to military bases and public facilities such as town halls, schools, temporary shelters and, in some cases, church-based facilities in the West.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The UAE’s Approach to Humanitarian Assistance appeared first on Fair Observer.

Addressing Climate Change Impacts on the Sporting Calendar

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This, combined with flagging and in some cases stagnant yield increases in soil systems across the world, will soon require sweeping and rapid changes in growing methods. As the global population continues to increase, food production will rise and our methods of growing should change as well.

Better Methods

There are methods available to us today to not only change the way we grow produce for the better, but also increase yields in a smaller space. Vertical farming through hydroponics or aeroponics gives us the opportunity to grow larger amounts of produce in seemingly unavailable spaces. Rooftops and indoor areas such as old warehouses can be used to grow plants that are stacked on top of each other to farm a consistent crop that produces year-round and quickly. Such measures would require less water and energy, are more pest resistant and can help alleviate some of the logistical trouble of transporting produce to and from farms to cities everywhere.

Hydroponics and aeroponics are increasingly popular cultivation methods among both commercial growers and research scientists. They confer several advantages, with the foremost being their water use efficiency. Some studies suggest up to 70% and 95% less water usage for hydroponics and aeroponics, respectively. In a 2015 study conducted in Arizona, an extremely dry place in the United States, it was found that hydroponically grown lettuce required 10 times less water as a system than soil-based lettuce crops.

This is particularly important based on the similarities between the climates of Arizona and Marrakech, a city in Morocco. While this study found that energy usage of a hydroponic farm was significantly higher than soil-based farms, this could be nearly completely offset by reducing the amount of supplemental lighting used in favor of currently available solar power technologies.

Another advantage of greenhouse hydroponic production is season independence, where a grower would be able to produce several harvests year-round by shielding the crops from seasonal changes through the use of LED lighting and heating and cooling of the greenhouse space. By utilizing existing ideas for a closed-loop hydroponic system, which can be easily constructed in any area of the world, it is possible to reuse nearly all water and nutrients that are not taken up and transpired by plants.

One study conducted in Indonesia suggested the use of such a system to more actively regulate water usage and increase the cost-efficiency of hydroponic production in a nutrient film technique (NFT) hydroponic system. Water efficiency and full-year production and harvest are attractive, and depending on the design of the greenhouse, pest resistance can be built in as well through the engineering of the facility to not be conducive to insect or microbial population accumulation.

While reusing nutrients and water can be economically and environmentally attractive (in reducing agricultural runoff, one of the main sources of pollution in the world), care must be taken to ensure consistent yield through several cycles of harvest. If not properly treated, reused nutrient solution can accumulate several phytotoxic (plant-harming) organic acids that are released from the roots of any plant in order to regulate the microbial population of its roots. Studies have shown that the use of activated charcoal can help to mitigate some of the damaging effects of these chemicals, though further research is needed to determine a commercially viable solution.

Another promising area of research in hydroponics and aeroponics is a possible disease resistance conferred by the physical stress of constant flow or aerosolization. One study found that in aeroponic systems, the microbial population of the roots remained almost entirely distinct from the population of the nutrient solution reservoir, suggesting very little, if any, microbial population overlap.

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Another recent study attempted to use a chemical intervention solution to mitigate possible E. coli contamination of lettuce crops grown in NFT systems. Though the chemical intervention was unsuccessful, a notable result was the complete lack of colonization of root tissue and no uptake of harmful bacteria into the vegetative tissues of any of the tested crops. Though these studies are recent, they suggest that hydroponics may be much more pathogen-resistant than previously thought, leading to considerably lower contamination risk for hydroponic growers and safer food for consumers.

Benefits Are Many

The benefits of hydroponic and aeroponic farming are many, and emerging technologies are making the ease of access to such systems considerably lower, paving the way for a future generation of amateur and commercial growers to begin to farm in any place, at any time.

Africa has experienced wonderful agricultural and economic growth in some regions, but with current methods, this is not sustainable. At a recent pre-summit event of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) titled, “Agricultural Transformation for Sustainable and Resilient Food Systems,” there was a discussion regarding the need for change in the direction of agriculture in the future. There is a need for an increase in productivity in the land already used for agriculture, which will then lead to greater and more sustainable economic growth. Increasing productivity through new agricultural technologies would have lasting impacts on farmers, communities, and societies everywhere.

As per a 2020 World Bank report, “Harvesting Prosperity: Technology and Productivity Growth in Agriculture,” there is particular weight given to innovation and the need to support this innovation through connection to markets. We believe that using new hydroponic and aeroponic technology as well as vertical farming can increase productivity, foster a closer connection for city residents to their food production and experience continued growth in the agricultural sector.

From Africa to the World

Across the world, we are conducting unsustainable practices and the use of land for agricultural growth. The High Atlas Foundation (HAF), an organization for the lasting and prosperous development of Morocco, has been working to address this problem. It has been following responsible procedures and using new technology to increase efficiency primarily through women and youth-led campaigns. In addition, it has been working to address the problem of climate change through monitoring trees that HAF has planted for carbon offsets.

There is a necessity in not only Africa but across the world to accept and utilize new technology to help increase the productivity of the land we have while also saving our planet. The advent of hydroponics, aeroponics and vertical farming is a great method to try to combat the pressing issue of how we are going to grow plants when there is little water and little surface area. This gives the possibility for many methods of urban farming, including vertical and hydroponics in rooftops and many unused areas that could be used for growing.
 
We only have one world, so being good stewards and living sustainable lives is imperative. Expanding use of the technology of hydroponics and vertical farming can allow the small grower to have much stronger financial gain while also helping alleviate the burden agriculture places on the planet. There is only so much space in the world, but we can always grow up.

*[The authors are interns at the High Atlas Foundation.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Future of Farming in Morocco appeared first on Fair Observer.

Beirushima: What Lebanon Needs to Survive

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The interlocking political and banking elites who control the government based on sectarian power-sharing have so far ignored the pain of those affected and the need to have a national strategy of reconciliation and economic recovery. The economic erosion was furthered by the Beirut Port explosion of August 4, 2020. That incident destroyed much of the business area of the downtown. It also further set back the country economically and politically as the current government, headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati, has been unable to remove impediments to an independent investigation.

The people of Lebanon are suffering. The statistics on poverty, loss of education and quality of life, hyperinflation of essential goods, cost of living and health care, and emigration of skilled Lebanese are well known. The security and stability of the country are eroding as the families of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Internal Security Forces (ISF) share the depressing costs of a barely functioning economy.

The Governing Troika

The latest threats and violence demonstrate the fragility of the civil order as the Shia Amal-Hezbollah alliance, along with their Christian enablers in President Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement — now headed by his son-in-law and presidential aspirant, Gebran Bassil — feel free to ignore demands for change. The march on October 14, 2021, demanding the removal of Judge Tarek Bitar, who was calling current and former officials to testify about their roles in the Beirut Port blast, was the latest opportunity to demonstrate their dominance. This was too much of a provocation for those opposed to the governing troika, which led to bloodshed and a spike in instability. Despite the current calm, that chapter has not been concluded.

More damaging is the challenge that inaction poses on two fronts: to the new government and to the security services. Prime Minister Mikati supports an independent judiciary and an independent investigation into the blast. This could lead to the dissolution of his government, which depends on an agreement with the troika to survive. Hezbollah and company have not shown any concern for the integrity of the state up until now, so there are no assurances that they will tolerate an investigation that might expose some of their own friends.

The LAF and ISF are already struggling to hold together their forces, who have experienced a 90% drop in their salaries while facing hyperinflation in food, medicines and fuel. Desertion rates are increasing as soldiers look for other employment opportunities. With budgets decreased by 90% due to the currency devaluation, the LAF and ISF have to increasingly rely on external assistance from the United States and others to retain their operational readiness.

Time for Action

All the while, the people are on the sidelines, not able to promote changes that will improve their lives and save their country. At the core is the concern that Lebanon for the Lebanese may become an aspiration more than a reality. To avoid the demise of what was once the educational and intellectual center of the region, it is time for remedial action.

It is time to begin the process of negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and move toward a single exchange rate by reducing subsidies and public spending. Work must be done to ensure increased stable power supplies throughout Lebanon. The people’s trust needs to be earned through transparent and credible policies to restore a functioning government.

The international community is clear in its position: Clean elections, implementation of basic reforms, and a robust and sustainable social safety net are central to opening the country to outside support. Only then can Lebanon begin the process of reconstruction and recovery. Now, as the people remember the October 17 demonstrations, it is time to recommit to a process of reform and reconciliation that will provide a basis for Lebanon’s reconstruction.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Lebanon’s Future as an Inclusive Democracy in Doubt appeared first on Fair Observer.

During the past two years alone, six women have had their lives taken by either their male kin or other men. The women have been reduced to mere statistics thrown around to point out the rise of killings, without investigating the cause of their murder or providing insight into these high-profile cases.

Around the World, Femicide Is on the Rise

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The Family Protection Law, which was passed by Kuwait’s national assembly in August 2020, calls for the establishment of a national family protection committee. This committee would put measures in place to tackle the spread of domestic violence. The law stipulates that those taking part in the family protection sector should undergo the necessary training. It also calls for the activation of a domestic violence shelter, which would offer rehabilitation and advisory services to survivors of domestic violence.

At the time, these measures were hailed as a victory, one that abolished Article 153, which treated honor killings as a misdemeanor with a maximum three-year prison sentence and/or a small fine for the perpetrator. Experts argued that Article 153 all but legalized honor killings. Yet despite being passed more than a year ago, the Family Protection Law remains nothing but merely ink on paper. The failure to protect women from being victims of domestic violence continues unabated.

Violence Against Women

The absence of such protection is what ended Farah Hamza Akbar’s life. In April, Farah was gruesomely killed by a man she had previously filed two cases against for kidnapping and attempted murder. The perpetrator, Fahad Subhi Mohammed, who had been stalking the victim but was not known to her or her family, crashed into Farah’s car, kidnapped her and her two daughters. He stabbed Farah in the chest before dumping her body in front of a hospital, leaving her there to die.

Dana Akbar, Farah’s sister and lawyer, shared a video on social media saying she had warned the prosecutor several times that her sister’s life was in danger. According to Akbar, her sister’s perpetrator attempted to kidnap and harm Farah on multiple occasions. He was detained twice but released on bail each time. Mohammed was out on bail when he killed Farah.

The heinous crime sent shockwaves across Kuwait, resulting in a large protest during the height of summer in the holy month of Ramadan. Protesters called for reforming existing laws, putting in place better protection mechanisms for victims of violence and actually enforcing the Family Protection Law.

The debate following Farah’s death served to amplify the anti-sexual harassment movement that was brought into prominence early in the year by Ascia al-Shammari. The influential fashion blogger posted a powerful video venting her fury about the horror of being car chased by men, a common form of harassment in Kuwait. She called for a mechanism to report sexual harassment, saying “it is a necessary step in this country … So I don’t understand when you say you are against it.” The video went viral on social media platforms, provoking many women to comment and leading to “culturally sensitive” conversations about sexual harassment and gender-based violence.

Following Shammari’s video, a social media awareness campaign dubbed #Lan_Asket (I will not be silent) was launched by medical doctor Shayma Shamo. It served as a virtual safe space that gave women the opportunity to share anonymous testimonies of harassment or abuse, encouraging more women to speak up.

Empty Promises

But the outrage that took place and the different hashtags only resulted in empty promises made by several members of parliament. Former MP Yousef al-Fadhala, who resigned from parliament in April, proposed a government-sponsored mobile app designed to document and register instances of harassment. MP Abdulaziz al-Saqabi called for an amendment to the penal code, adding punishments that include up to a year in prison and a fine of 3,000 Kuwaiti dinars ($9,940). Lastly, MP Abdullah al-Mudhaf recommended adding punitive measures to the penal code, with a three-month window for the executive branch to activate these laws.

Almost eight months later, none of the proposals has been acted upon. However, in late September, the minister of commerce and industry and the chairman of the Public Authority for Manpower, Abdullah al-Salman, issued directives to end discrimination in the private sector and criminalize harassment in the workplace. While this step is long overdue, it is a promising one toward establishing a safer work environment for women. Yet there remains much to do.

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A recent statement from the male-only Women, Children and Family Affairs parliamentary committee suggests that femicide is not a legislative issue but a societal one. The committee added that preventing violence against women is the responsibility of the government. This muddled and inadequate response, especially when Kuwait is witnessing a disturbing increase in femicide, is not nearly enough.

Despite having a vocal parliament and a free press, in comparison to its Gulf neighbors, Kuwait lags behind when it comes to enacting legislation to protect the lives of its women. More than one year and six lives later, we still see the offhand attitude in parliament and society toward violence against women, a convenient way of condoning this tragedy without condemning and holding accountable those responsible.

*[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Wave of Femicides in Kuwait appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Relationship Between Football and Populism

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There’s not a country on earth where citizens will not know the name of at least three football teams, wear club regalia and watch, play and bet on football. Around 3.5 billion people viewed some part of the 2018 World Cup, with 1.12 billion watching at least one minute, according to FIFA, the sport’s global governing organization.

With over 3.5 billion fans, football’s faithful following is comparable to that of a major religion, like Christianity (2.38 billion) or Islam (1.9 billion). But, unlike religions, football, like other sports, isn’t expected to make pronouncements on torture, gay rights, labor exploitation, freedom of expression or any of the other moral issues of the day. The trouble is, it does.

Global Society of Inclusion

Football’s moral philosophy seems clear. FIFA expressed its two key directives in its policy document, “Making Football Truly Global: The Vision 2020-2023” as “Fight against Racism and all other forms of discrimination” and “Protect human rights.” To demonstrate its sincerity, in June 2020, England’s Premier League approved football players taking the knee before games to showcase a committed opposition to racism in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd by police in the US.

Other major sports organizations, including the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the National Football League (NFL) in the US, steadfastly refused to allow the gesture, recognizing it would compromise the traditional stance on political and partisan actions. Football was one of the first to adopt a “commonsense approach” to the controversial ritual and remains an enthusiastic supporter despite objections, some from black players. Other sports have grudgingly accepted kneeling, largely as a result of pressure from players. The NFL finally changed its position last year and the IOC prior to the Tokyo Olympics.

Football continued without compunction. “We remain resolutely committed to our singular objective of eradicating racial prejudice wherever it exists, to bring about a global society of inclusion, respect and equal opportunities for all,” a statement affirmed in August. “The Premier League will continue to work with our clubs, players and football partners to bring about tangible change to remove inequality from our game.” Yet two recent developments suggest that practical considerations complicate principles.

Eighteen months ago, an attempted takeover of Newcastle United by a consortium collapsed after the Premier League decided that, had the deal been allowed to proceed, Saudi Arabia would have effectively become the club’s owner. The Gulf state would be subject to the league’s owners’ and directors’ test. Failure to pass the test means potential buyers can be stopped if they’ve committed an act in a foreign jurisdiction that would be considered a criminal offense in the UK — even if the act is not illegal in their home territory.

The original potential buyers pulled out, the popular assumption at the time being the killing of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018. It was widely reported that Saudi agents were responsible for the murder.

However, it appeared that the real stumbling block was Saudi Arabia’s apparent involvement in a television network that streamed Premier League games. Qatar-based broadcaster beIN Sports had spent billions to acquire territorial rights for the games, but Saudis “permanently cancelled” its license and suspended its channels in 2017. Reduced to basics, the deal stalled because of money. So, when the dispute between Qatar and Saudi was settled earlier this year, the deal was revived.

Sportswashing

The completed sale of Newcastle United Football Club to the Saudi Public Investment Fund, which lists as its chair Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who is widely thought responsible for ordering Khashoggi’s murder, has horrified and disgusted critics. Amnesty International has stated that Saudi authorities are “sportswashing their appalling human rights record with the glamour of top-flight football.” Sportswashing is an attempt by odious political regimes to clean up their international image by associating themselves with prestigious sporting events or competitions.

Amnesty claims that Saudi Arabia regularly violates human rights in various ways, including using torture as punishment, banning freedom of speech and expression, and subjugating women. The Saudi government denies claims of rights abuses and claims its apparent excesses are designed with national security in mind. Presumably, the Premier League — and perhaps football generally — accepts this.

Saudi Arabia’s Gulf neighbors, all of which have questionable human rights records, have already acquired top-tier football clubs: Qatar Sports Investments owns Paris Saint-Germain; Sheikh Mansour, an Abu Dhabi royal, owns Manchester City. Qatar is scheduled to host next year’s FIFA World Cup.

The timing of the takeover is hardly propitious. In Saudi Arabia, women have essentially the same legal status as children, having to rely on husbands or male relatives to make nearly all decisions in their lives. Much of the workspaces in the territory are gender-segregated. In 2019, Saudi was rated the fourth most dangerous place in the world for gay travelers by Forbes magazine, which reported that the country “implements the death penalty for consensual homosexuality under their interpretation of Sharia law.”

Football ostensibly lauds freedom, equality and open-mindedness while indulging insular regimes that encourage practices it officially denounces. In the 1970s, Commonwealth countries prohibited sporting contacts with South Africa, then operating a constitutional racial segregation policy known as apartheid. The Gleneagles Agreement, as it was called, effectively closed down South African sport. Non-Commonwealth nations showed solidarity by supporting the ban, which was relaxed only at the end of apartheid in 1990. No one has dared suggest a comparable ban on the Gulf states.

Freedom or Dereliction of Duty?

But this isn’t the only dilemma football has faced in recent weeks.

West Bromwich Albion player Callum Robinson is among an unknown but probably sizeable number of professional football players who are opting not to get vaccinated against COVID-19. Robinson is worthy of attention because he’s contracted COVID twice, survived (obviously) and presumably decided the dangers of the virus are less significant than the potential side effects of the vaccine.

He isn’t, as far as we know, a QAnon affiliate, doesn’t subscribe to any known conspiracy theory and has not aligned himself with anti-vaccination campaigners. He enjoys the support of some teammates and not others. He is 26 and is probably expecting to play competitively for another 10 years, maybe more, if he avoids injury. His decision has drawn the ire of Liverpool manager Jurgen Klopp, who says that footballers “are role models in society.” Currently, 16 to 29-year-olds are the most vaccine-hesitant demographic in the UK and elsewhere; Klopp is 54.

We can only use educated guesswork to divine the reasons so many professional athletes choose not to vaccinate. Their bodies are, in a sense, the tools of their trade and they have presumably made a cost-benefit calculation, recognizing that, given the brevity of the development and trialing of the vaccine compared to other pharmaceuticals, the medium-to-long-term side effects are unknown and, without the benefit of a time machine, unknowable at present.

In the US, the National Basketball Association (NBA), when confronted with a similarly reluctant percentage of players, compelled them to get vaccinated or face suspension without pay. The order worked: 95% of NBA players are now vaccinated. Football’s governing organizations have eschewed this approach. FIFA instead issued a statement saying that “We encourage Covid-19 vaccinations.”

Depending on your perspective, this is either an admirable defense of freedom of choice or dereliction of duty. Those who believe the latter are maddened by football’s indecision, if that’s what it is. They consider public health a priority over personal freedom.

If FIFA had blocked the Newcastle takeover, people would probably accuse football of favoritism, pointing to the Manchester and Paris ownerships. If it followed the NBA mandate, people would accuse it of restricting freedom of choice. But football’s own piety invites these criticisms. Other sports see no need to make their moral philosophy so public, at least not as ostentatiously or in such a self-congratulatory manner. Why does football?  

No sport has struggled so painfully and for so long with racism, nor has any sport witnessed spectator violence on a comparable scale or duration. Bribery and corruption were once commonplace in boxing, but a 2015 expose revealed football’s epic history of venality and led to the removal of FIFA president Joseph “Sepp” Blatter.

Child abuse was once thought to exist only in gymnastics, but a recent investigation found that it has been in football since at least the 1970s. Australia’s female players have recently complained of a” culture of sexual harassment.” 

No other sport in history has been as popular as football or, alas, manifested so many pernicious, multiform wrongdoings. Football constantly struggles to map its way out of a maze of malevolence. Its visible attempt to occupy the moral high ground is perhaps football’s attempt to place itself above suspicion, making its morality clear to everyone. It’s a bold move, but one with serious drawbacks. It puts football’s hypocrisy in plain sight.

[Ellis Cashmore is a co-editor of Studying Football.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Can Football Find a Way Out of a Moral Maze? appeared first on Fair Observer.

The shaky pillar is the Gulf monarchies’ reliance on a powerful external ally that, in the words of Middle East scholar Roby C. Barrett, “shares the strategic, if not dynastic, interests of the Arab States.” In the first half of the 20^th century, the allies were Britain and France. Since then, the US has taken on the role. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan, the revered founder of the United Arab Emirates, implicitly recognized Gulf states’ need for external support. In a contribution to a book in 2001, he noted that the six monarchies that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) “only support the GCC when it suited them.”

Taiwan Becomes a Point of Strategic Ambiguity

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Going forward, question marks about the reliability of the United States may be unsettling. Yet the emerging outline of what a future US approach could look like is not all bad news for the region’s autocratic regimes. There have been efforts to dial down regional tensions and strengthen regional alliances. The factors driving this are the uncertainty over the US role in the region, the unwillingness of GCC states to integrate their defense strategies, a realization that neither China nor Russia would step into Washington’s shoes, and a need to attract foreign investment to diversify the Gulf’s energy-dependent economies.

Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid and his Emirati counterpart, Abdullah bin Zayed al-Nahyan, are headed to Washington this week for a tripartite meeting with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The three officials intend “to discuss accomplishments” since last year’s establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE “and other important issues,” Blinken tweeted. The Israeli Foreign Ministry suggested those other issues include “further opportunities to promote peace in the Middle East” as well as regional stability and security, in a guarded reference to Iran.

Good News for the Gulf

From the Gulf’s perspective, the good news is also that the Biden administration’s focus on China may mean that it is reconfiguring its military presence in the Middle East. The US has moved some assets from the Gulf to Jordan and withdrawn systems from Saudi Arabia, but it is not about to pull out lock, stock and barrel. Beyond having an interest in ensuring the free flow of trade and energy, Washington’s strategic interest in a counterterrorism presence in the Gulf has increased following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in August. The US now relies on an “over the horizon” approach, for which the Middle East remains crucial.

Moreover, domestic US politics mitigate toward a continued, if perhaps reduced, military presence, even if Americans are tired of foreign adventures. This is despite the emergence of a Biden doctrine that deemphasizes military engagement. The focus of US foreign policy is also now on Asia rather than the Middle East.

Various powerful lobbies and interest groups — including Israelis, Gulf states, evangelists, and the oil and defense industries — retain a stake in a continued US presence in the region. Their voices are likely to resonate louder in the run-up to crucial midterm elections in 2022. A recent Pew Research survey concluded that the number of white evangelicals had increased from 25% of the US population in 2016 to 29% in 2020.

Similarly, the fading hope for a revival of the Iran nuclear deal, from which former US President Donald Trump withdrew in 2018, and the risk of a major military conflagration makes a full-fledged US military withdrawal unlikely. It also increases the incentive to continue major arms sales to Gulf Arab countries.

That’s further good news for Gulf regimes against the backdrop of an emerging US arms sales policy that the Biden administration would like to project as emphasizing respect for human rights and rule of law. However, that de facto approach is unlikely to affect big-ticket prestige items like the F-35 fighter jets promised to the UAE.

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Instead, the policy will probably apply to smaller weapons, such as assault rifles and surveillance equipment that police or paramilitary forces could use against protesters. Those are not the technological edge items where the US has a definitive competitive advantage. The big-ticket items with proper maintenance and training would allow Gulf states to support US regional operations. Examples include the UAE and Qatar‘s role in Libya in 2011 and also the UAE in Somalia and Afghanistan as part of peacekeeping missions.

Nothing to Worry About

In other words, the Gulf states can relax. The Biden administration is not embracing what some arms trade analysts define as the meaning of ending endless wars such as Afghanistan. “[E]nding endless war means more than troop withdrawal. It also means ending the militarized approach to foreign policy — including the transfer of deadly weapons around the world — that has undermined human rights and that few Americans believe makes the country any safer,” said a group of experts in April.

There is little indication that the views expressed by these analysts, which stroke with thinking in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party, are taking root in the policymaking corridors of Washington. As long as that doesn’t happen, Gulf states have less to worry about.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post It’s Not All Bad News for the Gulf appeared first on Fair Observer.

Algeria to France: No Thanks for the Memories 

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Yet within the current situation, an important question arises: How much change can happen with newly elected parliament members when interrelated issues such as governmental corruption, Iranian influence in Iraqi affairs and the presence of armed militias seem less likely to change?

Religion and Politics

To understand what is taking place in Iraq, it is necessary to look back at recent developments. After the dramatic upheaval with the war in 2003, Iraqis witnessed the rise of religious authorities engaging in political activities, which is when the so-called theologico-political agenda began to develop. In political theories, scholar Leo Strauss introduced the “theologico-political problem” as an issue of authority — that is, political authority founded on religious revelations. This theory can explain age-old problems and help analyze the dynamics and parameters of political authority in the context of Iraq.

One significant issue that exists in Iraqi politics is the dominance of the Shia religious agenda in shaping the country’s affairs. Figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr, Ammar al-Hakim, Qais Alkhazaali and others are in charge. In fact, it is difficult to imagine or predict a change where Sunni or other secular political leaders arise, even within a climate of supervised fair elections.

This “theocratic” model has caused multiple predicaments that have worsened and complicated the existing conditions. It has simply proved dangerous. Such theologico-politicians who claim religious authority can be morally corrupt and disguised in a righteous mask. Yet such figures need to show they follow custom-interpreted religious doctrine. Their goal is to gain popular votes by convincing like-minded Iraqis of the importance of religion.

The consequences have intensified over the years. Theologico-political figures have established their own political parties and armed militias. The presence of militias in Iraq has become one of the most difficult issues to solve, particularly as militants operate autonomously with impunity. They have infiltrated government institutions where they have influence. They also maintain power and funding. Both of these issues make it difficult to dissolve such organized groups.

There has recently been an increase in assassinations, threats and targeting of “new” potential candidates, activists and proponents of change. In 2019, it was reported that a 700-name list was issued by the Iran-backed Shia militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) to target Iraqi journalists and activists, including those living overseas, who support the ongoing protests.

Iraqis Are Tired

The core problem of this theologico-politics is that its rhetoric is always divisive. In a religiously diverse country like Iraq, people of different faiths and sects should coexist and be considered in the decision-making process. This one-sect politics can never function when its agenda inherently dismisses, discriminates against and persecutes the “other” group.

But Iraqis are tired of this. The majority of Shia-led protests oppose the government’s agenda and Iran’s interference in Iraq. The people do not want sectarian ruling anymore. The status quo favors Iran over Iraq’s interests to ensure long-term existence. Protesters have demanded basic infrastructure services and reform of issues exacerbated by Iranian meddling and accompanying governmental failures in all spheres. This includes a failing economy, widespread corruption, deteriorating health care and education systems and, most significantly, rising civil unrest.

In contrast to this new form of dictatorship — theologico-politics — what Iraq needs are conditions that support true liberal democracy, secularity and the separation of religion and state. However, this may seem implausible, especially when speculation over the election results seems more inclined toward the domination of Islamist politics.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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Macron’s Campaign to Reveal France’s Historical Sins

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Out of frustration with Algeria’s lack of cooperation in repatriating its citizens illegally residing in France, Macron’s government decided to reduce the number of authorized visas for Algeria and Morocco by 50% and Tunisia by 30%. To justify this move, Macron accused the Algerian government of mental games. As reported by Le Monde, “Macron considers that since its independence in 1962, Algeria has based its development on a ‘memorial rent’ fostered by its politico-military system.”

Today’s Daily Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Memorial rent:

The only possible English equivalent of an untranslatable term invented by the French historian Benjamin Stora and hijacked by Emmanuel Macron, who believes that his 2017 election as president of the republic made him the nation’s and the world’s historian-in-chief

Contextual Note

In July 2020, seeking to resolve the conundrum of tense French-Algerian relations, Emmanuel Macron commissioned historian Benjamin Stora to prepare a report on “the memories of colonization and the Algerian war.”

In January, Stora delivered his copy. Eschewing the interpretation of specific events and facts, which will always remain controversial and painful to consider, the historian chose to focus on the cultural and psychological effects left by the memory of those events on both sides of the Mediterranean. Those whose lives were affected by the long war of independence, according to Stora, have remained constrained within a permanent state of mutual misunderstanding. 

Stora proposed the metaphor of “memorial rent” to characterize how the different groups have mobilized a set of recriminations concerning the injustice done to them in the past. They cite this as the psychological “rent” due to them by their adversaries. 

On the French side, there are those who can be either nostalgic or ashamed of their colonial adventure and France’s self-proclaimed mission civilatrice. This includes officials and soldiers, but also the Harkis — Algerian Muslims who fought alongside the French army — and the pieds-noirs or the Europeans settled in Algeria but repatriated after the war.

On the Algerian side, there are those who identified with the struggle for independence as a political cause and a less politically motivated majority, who appreciated independence without actively embracing the cause. Many Algerians were alienated by the political and ideological infighting that the revolution fatally produced.

After long decades of official hostility between France and Algeria, people in both countries welcomed Macron’s declared intention to resolve the inherited problems and define a new relationship. The task could never be easy since France, even when excluded in the most absolute terms from Algeria’s internal politics, has always been lurking in the background. Numerous economic, linguistic and cultural links have maintained a necessary but distant relationship between the nations and their peoples.

Anyone who lives and works in the business world in France realizes that generations of North Africans have found their permanent place within French culture, even if their presence in the social structure is subjected to a curiously ambiguous dynamic. North Africans have simultaneously been encouraged (and accepted) and discouraged (and rejected) from being fully integrated into the French social fabric.

Stora insisted on the notion of memorial rent as a way of accounting for the mentalities that still inhabit the two populations and their governments. The Algerians cannot forget the reality of colonization. Having definitively renounced its colonial mission, France seeks to live up to its ideals of “liberté, égalité, fraternité,” in the name of modern Western liberalism.

Macron, the maverick, wished to distinguish himself from his predecessors by finding some common ground and opening a new horizon of cooperation. He hoped that by honestly acknowledging what was reprehensible in France’s past in Algeria, the two nations could begin a fraternal dialogue that had been shattered by the revolution.

Macron now feels his act of good faith has not been reciprocated. He nevertheless insists that he maintains excellent relations with the current Algerian president, Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Perhaps he sees a kinship to Donald Trump’s account of his relationship with Kim Jung-un. It contains the idea that a sentiment of personal friendship — even if totally imaginary in Trump’s case — accompanied by a willingness to dialogue on a person-to-person basis, could lead to long-term understanding.

Macron is not alone in noting that Algeria’s system of government appears seriously sclerotic. A majority of Algerians appear to share his analysis. Massive protests last year by the pro-democratic popular movement known as Hirak permitted the destitution of the doddering, despotic and now deceased President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Last week, Macron dared to express his sentiment that Tebboune, for all his good intentions, was the prisoner of a system that he described as “very hard.” Though diplomatically delicate, it was a point worth making.

But after insisting that resolving the question of historical memory as described by Stora was the key to progress, Macron made a major mistake. Playing the amateur historian, he questioned whether Algeria had ever existed “as a nation” before French colonization, a period in which the region of Algeria was a precinct of the Ottoman Empire.

In other words, Macron implicitly called into question the historical legitimacy of Algeria as a nation-state. For Algerians, and other observers as well, that stands as a clear example of European political hubris.

To be fair, Macron cited a valid historical fact. But it implied a message not dissimilar to President Nicolas Sarkozy’s contention in a 2007 speech in Dakar that “the African has not fully entered into history.” In Sarkozy’s passably racist mind, Europe alone defined the drift and logic of history. At the time, Senegalese writer Boris Diop, remarked: “Maybe he does not realise to what extent we felt insulted.”

Many ordinary Algerians today feel the same way about Macron’s reflection on the status of Algeria. It clearly signifies that Macron thinks of Algeria as a second-class nation at best, lacking the dignity of European nation-states.

Historical Note

Le Monde’s editorial board believes that “Emmanuel Macron was right to make reconciliation between the painful experiences on both sides the axis of his ‘memorial policy.’” An outside observer might note that the idea a “memorial policy” would be unimaginable in most other cultures and historical contexts. The only significant precedents concerning national policies intended to produce an official account of the collective memory may be Israel’s remembrance of the Holocaust and South Africa’s truth and reconciliation commission.

But these three cases — Israel, South Africa and France — are all very different. In the Israeli case, there was no nation to reconcile with, Germany having been totally transformed after the war, followed by the subsequent creation of Israel. In South Africa, the formerly oppressed and their oppressors had to find a way of changing places by allowing a black majority to exercise its prerogatives.

Macron’s historicist approach, seeking to identify an entire people’s memorial content, may be seen, like so much else in French culture, as typically Cartesian. It transforms Descartes’ celebrated axiom, “I think, therefore I am” into “I remember, therefore I was.” This is as dangerous as it is potentially helpful because, while it seeks to reconcile, it creates false equations. Macron’s own discourse, when he invokes history to delegitimize Algeria as a nation, reveals the risk.

The president went even further when he accused Turkey of failing to recognize its own past as a colonial power. The mention of Turkey, whose president last year not only criticized Macron but called into question his “mental health,” would seem to indicate that for all his supposed Cartesian rationality, Macron can at times become unhinged, especially in the months before a presidential election.

Apparently aware of his mistake, Macron now is seeking to lower the tensions. But as political scientist Hasni Abidi observes, in the run-up to the election, Macron’s “mea culpa would be denounced by the parties of the right.” At the same time, Abidi believes the French may see Macron as a serial troublemaker adept at “creating multiple conflicts with Turkey, Mali, Australia or the US.” The election takes place in April. 

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce, produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of The Daily Devil’s Dictionary on Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Algeria to France: No Thanks for the Memories  appeared first on Fair Observer.

On September 28, the Global Organized Crime Index was published, the first report of its kind designed to assess levels of organized crime and resilience to organized criminal activity in 193 UN member states. (There is no data for the Occupied Palestinian Territories or Western Sahara.)

UAE Diplomats Accused in International Gold Smuggling Syndicate

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The index, a collaborative effort by over 350 experts worldwide funded by the US State Department and the European Union, provides the most comprehensive assessment to date of the pervasiveness of criminal markets, the influence of criminal actors and the effectiveness of resilience measures to combat the threat of organized crime. It is based on data from 2020, to be updated every two years in order to provide a global baseline for criminality and resilience over time.

Deeply Embedded

Overall, the index highlights the entrenched nature of organized crime, with more than three-quarters of the world’s population assessed as living in countries with high levels of crime and low levels of resistance to organized crime. State involvement in organized crime is shown to be a deeply embedded phenomenon globally, with state officials and their clients now the most dominant brokers of organized crime, not cartel leaders or mafia bosses.

While Western democracies come out on top, Arab countries generally score poorly, with Libya, Yemen, Syria, Somalia and Iraq coming bottom or near the bottom in several categories. Overall, the most criminal Arab country is found to be Iraq (ranked 8^th globally), followed by Syria (14), Lebanon (15), Libya (20) and Sudan (24).

The index evaluates every country according to two metrics: criminality, which is based on criminal markets and five different types of criminal actors, and resilience to organized crime, based on 12 factors such as good governance, law enforcement and witness support.

The most pervasive crime in the region is found to be human trafficking, which includes modern slavery and organ trafficking, as well as human smuggling — the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants (by land, sea or air) by an organized criminal group for the purposes of a financial or material benefit.

Three Arab countries — Libya, Yemen and the UAE — are ranked among the five worst countries in the world for human trafficking. Syria and Iraq are both rated as the third-worst countries globally for human smuggling. According to the index, in Libya “Smuggling is generally associated with high levels of violence and high death rates. The state has little control over the entire territory and many state officials reportedly benefit from the profits of migrant smuggling.”

Regarding the UAE, the index notes that “In combination with the continuation of the sponsorship (Kafala) system and a failure of the government of the UAE to meet the minimum standards for combating trafficking and smuggling, the demand for cheap labour enables both human smuggling and trafficking on a relatively large scale.”

Narco-States

After trafficking and smuggling humans, other crimes the index considers are the narcotics trade, arms trafficking, and wildlife and resource crimes. Libya is ranked as the worst country in the world for arms trafficking, followed by Yemen, Turkey and Syria. In Libya, “Most arms dealers are relatively small and play a mediator role between different actors.

Other enabling structures, such as offshore banking, offshore companies and jurisdictions with low levels of enforcement and high levels of corruption, play a much more significant role in facilitating arms transfers,” the index states.

“Yemen has widespread gun ownership and one of the largest arms-trafficking markets in the world, with weapons redirected from military stores or acquired from foreign actors. Ongoing conflict has resulted in an increase of light and medium weapons such as Turkish pistols and silencers, but tanks, ammunition, grenades, machine guns and light armoured vehicles are also sold in open-air arms markets.”

Iraq is ranked fifth-worst country globally for non-renewable resource crimes, meaning the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources. Morocco and Lebanon are ranked as the worst countries in the world (along with Paraguay and Jamaica) for the illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis. 

Sudan is the next-worst cannabis offender globally: “In 2015, cannabis cultivation in Sudan generated over 7 billion USD in profits and in 2019, Sudan reported the seizure of over 16 000 cannabis crops.”

Syria is now a full-blown narco-state ranked number one globally for the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs: “Syria’s cannabis and synthetic-drug trades are flourishing. … Synthetic drugs are also smuggled out of Syria to neighbouring countries and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as to Europe. Easy access to ingredients enables synthetic-drug production to flourish, and Captagon production in particular has been increasing in recent years.”

In terms of resistance to organized crime, Jordan is ranked as the most resilient Arab country (39^th globally), followed by Qatar (51), Kuwait (=55), Bahrain (=55) and the UAE (68). The countries ranked as having the least resistance to organized crime in the world are Libya, followed by Somalia, South Sudan and Syria.

“There is little to no political leadership and governance in Libya on organised-crime issues. … The approach of different governing entities in Libya is consistently characterized by a co-option approach. The state has been involved in a co-option strategy for activities such as human smuggling and fuel. … Libya has one of the highest corruption perception levels in the world.”

On Somalia, the index observes: “Most NGOs and all UN agencies are banned from territories that are controlled by al-Shabaab. On the domestic level, while Somalia has several laws related to organized crime, it is the worst-performing country in the world when it comes to rule of law. Somalia’s penal code has not been updated since 1964. Currently, there is no legislation that explicitly criminalizes sex trafficking and forced labour.”

Shortcomings

The Global Organized Crime Index is compiled by in-house researchers as well as external journalists, academics and members of civil society. It is innovative in how it assesses the vulnerabilities and resilience to organized crime in a quantitatively based and expert-led way.

But it has its shortcomings, notably in the kind of terminology used that does not reflect the reality of organized crime in today’s Middle East and North Africa. None of the index’s four types of criminal actors — mafia-style groups, criminal networks, state-embedded actors and foreign actors — accurately describe groups like al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, Gulf royal families, the Houthis or Hezbollah that are among the biggest perpetrators of organized crime in the region.

While the report considers a range of international crimes, it does not include international kidnap and assassination — such as those undertaken by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s personal Tiger Team group — even though Saudi dissidents in the UK are still forced to live under the protection of British counterterrorism police.

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Nor does the index include the crime of corrupting international and Western institutions, which Arab monarchies are known to be experts at. The case of King Juan Carlos who went into exile in the UAE in 2020 after Spain’s supreme court launched an investigation into his alleged involvement in a high-speed rail contract in Saudi Arabia is just one high-profile example.

The report also fails to consider the spreading of disinformation, the hacking of UK citizens, the infiltration and surveillance of the diaspora or election meddling — all activities Arab regimes busily pursue.

The index should highlight the key role Arab embassies and consulates play in perpetrating organized crime around the world, with Arab diplomats often linked to serious organized crime. This includes gold smuggling by UAE diplomats in India, Saudi threats against UN officials, as well as Saudi diplomats arranging flights for Saudi criminals who have committed very serious offenses in the West, including murder, to evade justice and abscond back to Saudi Arabia, undermining the Western judicial process.

*[This article was originally published by Arab Digest, a partner organization of Fair Observer.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Middle East and North Africa Top Organized Crime Report appeared first on Fair Observer.

Addressing Climate Change Impacts on the Sporting Calendar

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In 2011, the Turkish authorities, in the National Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan, realized that Turkey’s location in the Mediterranean basin made it more susceptible to arid conditions and heatwaves resulting from climate change, citing the 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In its sixth report, published in August this year, the IPPC concludes that climate change is already creating many extreme weather and climate events in all regions of the world and that they are intensifying in an unprecedented way.

Despite these bitter observations, Ankara has long refrained from ratifying the 2015 Paris Agreement. The legally binding international treaty was signed with the central objective of limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius and continuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius. But recently, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared the country’s intention to ratify the Paris accord before the UN Conference of the Parties (COP26) on climate change, which is to open in Glasgow on October 31.

The mindset of the Turkish government can help to explain its inadequate efforts to address the climate crisis. But to understand this resistance on the part of Ankara, one should look at Turkey’s problematic position in the global climate change regime.

Lack of Domestic Commitment

Climate change has never been a priority for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Its growth-oriented economic and energy policies of the past 20 years have followed a development model that prioritizes economic gains while ignoring their environmental consequences. Already realized projects such as Istanbul Airport or planned initiatives such as the Istanbul Canal are only a few examples of this vision.

Another is the priority given to the use of coal. It is still the third-largest source of primary energy in Turkey after oil and natural gas, and coal-related emissions have increased by almost 32% over the last decade. Total greenhouse gas emissions increased by 137% between 1990 and 2018, and the government does not currently have a target year for peaking emissions or for reducing emissions in absolute terms.

Moreover, Turkey contends, like many other less-developed countries, that it only has a negligible responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions — and hence should do less than fully industrialized countries, which have a huge historical responsibility for anthropogenic climate change.

Turkey’s Special Circumstances

In 1992, when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted, as a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development — and without any objection from Turkish officials at that time — Turkey was listed in both Annex I and Annex II of the UNFCCC. These countries, which are generally richer and more developed, are expected to take the lead in combating climate change. But most importantly, Annex II countries should also provide financial support to developing countries that are in the non-Annex I group and have fewer obligations.

Turkey was, therefore, theoretically obliged to reduce its emissions and help developing countries such as Brazil, South Korea and China. As a result of Turkey’s diplomatic efforts, the country was finally removed from Annex II in 2001, but it is still listed in Annex I, which means that Turkey is not obliged to contribute to climate finance, but it cannot benefit from financial support either.

As a consequence, during the Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015, Turkey said it would not sign the agreement if its demand was not taken into account. At the time, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande had to intervene to convince Erdogan to sign the agreement. But before ratifying the Paris Agreement, Ankara wanted to be removed from the list of developed countries of the UNFCCC and receive financial assistance for climate change mitigation. Obviously, Turkey’s behavior carries a cost in the form of ecological costs to the country and the surrounding region as well as negative impacts on the Turkish economy and global efforts against climate change.

Getting Turkey on Board

The effects of climate change will require significant changes in geo-economic policies at the European and global levels. The European Union is already progressively integrating climate factors into its external economic relations, which will change the way it trades with its partner.

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The EU’s planned carbon border tax, called the Border Carbon Adjustment Mechanism, would be a significant tool in this strategy and affect Turkey’s trade relations with the EU if Ankara fails to decarbonize its economy. Turkey conducts half of its trade with the EU. Decarbonization would, therefore, also be an economic and strategic requirement for Turkey in terms of its trade and other relations with the EU.

The ratification of the Paris Agreement will be the first positive step toward joining the international coalition to fight climate change, and it should also be seen as part of Turkey’s charm offensive toward the West. This effort will not be complete if Ankara does not make concrete mitigation commitments by submitting a new and more ambitious version of its nationally determined contributions.

It seems that Ankara can be motivated to take such moves and be actively involved in the fight against climate change through financial assistance. The EU can play an important role here. It should effectively use its financial and diplomatic powers to secure these outcomes.

After all, bringing Turkey on board in the global fight against climate change is also in the interest of the EU, which has the leadership role in achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. This would not only contribute toward global mitigation efforts, but also increase Turkey’s resilience and preparedness for the ecological crises that will only worsen with climate change.

*[This article was originally published by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), which advises the German government and Bundestag on all questions related to foreign and security policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey Prepares to Ratify the Paris Agreement appeared first on Fair Observer.

The United States and its G7 allies have called on Saied to appoint a prime minister and restore parliamentary functions. Washington should seriously consider withholding military aid to urge the Saied administration to remain within existing constitutional limits and prevent any potential military crackdown against protesters.

Tunisia and the Gulf

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The Biden administration should similarly consider revoking Tunisia’s designation as a major non-NATO ally, which provides it military aid that Saied could use to suppress the opposition. US failure to meet this challenge would represent a severe blow to President Joe Biden’s promotion of democracy abroad and would further diminish his administration’s credibility following the fall of Kabul to the Taliban last month.

For international observers of the Arab Spring, Tunisia was initially seen as a “relatively successful model” as the only country that had transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy during that period. However, 10 years after the overthrow of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, economic turmoil and political gridlock have worsened the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and have deeply polarized the Tunisian political landscape.

The current president, Kais Saied, was elected in 2019 as an independent candidate in a landslide victory. The retired law professor’s appeal was his outsider status and his strident anti-corruption platform. However, he repeatedly clashed with the deeply divided Tunisian parliament, which has no party majority. The Islamist Ennahda party, which is viewed by large swathes of the Tunisian public as deeply corrupt and ineffective and has even been accused of assassinating two leftwing politicians, currently holds the most seats.

Following months of political stalemate and a worsening COVID-19 spike, Saied invoked emergency powers to dismiss his former prime minister, Hichem Mechichi, freeze parliamentary functions and use the police to target Ennahda officials and Al Jazeera’s Tunis office. Saied has some support for his actions given the widespread unpopularity of the parliament.

Consequently, the United States and the rest of the G7 must follow through on its previous statements urging a return to constitutional processes. It is essential that they challenge Saied’s increasing anti-parliamentarian actions, especially his reliance on the military to cement his rule, to prevent continued democratic backsliding in Tunisia.

Freedom House has repeatedly warned about an alarming systemic shift toward autocracy across the world, something which the Biden administration was aiming to address with its commitment to democracy promotion. However, events like the “Summit for Democracy” will begin to ring hollow if the United States and its allies do not take a stronger stand against democratic backsliding, such as in the case of Tunisia.

The primary option that is available to the Biden administration and US allies is reducing military aid to Tunisia until Saied enters a dialogue with the parliament. Although President Saied and his supporters have been resistant to such suggestions and a mediation offer by a US Congress delegation has already been rebuffed, the United States and its allies should increase their efforts to support dialogue.

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Crucially, the influential Tunisian General Labor Union now openly opposes Saied’s unilateral plan to create a new constitution, demonstrating that dialogue is necessary to resolve this crisis.

Revoking Tunisia’s major non-NATO ally designation will send a strong message and remove Tunisia’s privileged access to US military aid. The measure would reduce the possibility of Saied continuing to use the threat of military force against protesters, an estimated 2,000 of whom have come out on Sunday in the capital to denounce the president’s power grab.

On September 29, Saied finally named a new prime minister, Najla Bouden Romdhane — the first woman to hold that office — and asked her to form a new government, whose main task would be to “put an end to the corruption and chaos that have spread throughout many state institutions.” Despite these positive steps, the United States and its democratic allies should remain vigilant and ensure the crisis in Tunisia is dissolved in a peaceful and democratic manner.

*[Fair Observer is a media partner of Young Professionals in Foreign Policy.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The US Must Keep Tunisia’s Slide Toward Autocracy in Check appeared first on Fair Observer.