“Both countries are focused very much on trying to be self-sufficient in science and less international, and this is the opposite of what the trends have been for a long time,” Glennon said. “There’s more of a nationalist shift. We think there hasn’t been as much consideration of what some of the side effects of that might be [on innovation].”

Glennon spoke to Wharton Business Daily about the working paper titled, “Building a Wall around Science: The Effect of US–China Tensions on International Scientific Research,” which was published by the National Bureau of Economic Research. (Listen to the podcast.) Her co-authors are Robert Flynn, doctoral candidate at Boston University’s Questrom School of Business; Raviv Murciano-Goroff, strategy and innovation professor also at BU Questrom; and Jiusi Xiao, doctoral candidate at Claremont Graduate University.

The downturn in US–China relations

When countries are actively at war, the wounds to science are clear: collaboration stops, less money is spent, foreign scientists are often deported and some are even killed. But the effect of a cold war on science is less understood. That’s what the research team wanted to explore.

The scholars analyzed resumes of more than 800,000 American and ethnically Chinese STEM graduates to determine how their careers fared since 2016, when there was a marked downturn in US–China relations with the election of President Donald Trump and the ramp-up of prosecutions of Chinese researchers under what was later known as the China Initiative program. They also examined the amount of published research coming from both groups since then. The results were threefold:

• Mobility — Between 2016 and 2019, ethnically Chinese graduate students became 16% less likely to attend a US-based PhD program, and those who did were 4% less likely to stay in the US after graduation. In both instances, these students were more likely to move to a non-US anglophone country, such as Canada or Australia.
• Building on Research — There was a sharp decline in Chinese usage of American science, as measured by citations. But there was no such decline in the propensity of US scientists to cite Chinese research.
• Productivity — A decline in Chinese usage of US science does not appear to affect the productivity of China-based researchers, as measured by publications. But heightened anti-Chinese sentiment in the US appears to have reduced the productivity of ethnically Chinese scientists in the US by 2% to 6%.

“There’s a huge increase in anti-Chinese sentiment during this time frame. We think that’s really impacting the ability of these scientists to continue to be productive,” Glennon said, noting a Pew Research Center report that found American adults with unfavorable views about the Chinese rose from 55% in 2015 to 66% in 2020.

Connecting science and politics

According to the paper, Trump stoked anti-Chinese hostility during his presidential campaign through consistent rhetoric that China’s rise came at the expense of the US. After taking office, he followed up with a trade war to reduce the US–China deficit and the theft of intellectual property. At the same time, the US Department of Justice launched the China Initiative, investigating Chinese and Chinese-American scientists suspected of stealing IP for the Chinese government. Chinese President Xi Jinping countered with retaliatory moves of his own.

Anti-Asian hate worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic, which is outside the time period of study for the paper. But Glennon said she expects to find a widening gap if the research is updated.

“The tensions are very much mutual. It’s not a one-sided thing,” she said.

The scholars said they understand that national security and economic prosperity are primary objectives for the United States. However, they are concerned about the chilling effect that current policies have on the kind of scientific collaboration that leads to broader benefits for America and beyond.

“There’s a lot of research showing a strong link between immigrants and innovation,” she said. “When you have more immigration, innovation increases quite a lot. It’s not just immigrants doing more patenting and more publishing and startups, but also their effect on Americans.”

[Knowledge at Wharton first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How Hostile US–China Relations Are Hurting Science appeared first on Fair Observer.

As a matter of fact, bureaucracy is often the Achilles heel of totalitarian systems. Analysis of certain Chinese data may suggest foul play; it is more eloquent on the situation in the Xinjiang region than Lu. That is unsurprising, as the ambassador is best known for his diatribes in defense of China, and he vigorously rejects everything that harms Beijing’s interests.

Official statistics suggest Uighur genocide

China is responsible for the mass internment of Uighurs in Xinjiang, which the country legitimizes by the needs of a firm and repressive anti-terrorist policy. In May 2022, Lu had already stood out by drastically downplaying the attacks on this population’s rights in prisons or detention centers. He called them “interns” in “educational and professional training centers.”

Beyond this, China is accused of torture and forced sterilizations against these populations. Committing these atrocities would act directly on the demographics of a particular ethnic group. As stated in Article II of the UN’s Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: “Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Murder of group members; (b) Serious attacks on the physical or mental integrity of members of the group; (c) Intentional subjection of the group to conditions of existence intended to bring about its total or partial physical destruction; (d) Measures aimed at hindering births within the group; (e) Forced transfer of children from the group to another group.”

The last two acts listed are likely to worry China, knowing that there is no need for murder or mass extermination to define a genocidal policy. The country has vehemently rejected these accusations for years. But to Lu and China’s chagrin, the most compelling evidence of their misconduct comes from China itself. The National Bureau of Statistics of China tells us, for example, that the natural increase rate — the difference between the birth rate and the death rate — in the province of Xinjiang increased from 11.08 per 1,000 in 2016 to 11.40 in 2017, and suddenly dropped to 6.13 in 2018, then finally fell to 3.69 in 2019.

As China rightly maintains, Xinjiang’s overall population continues to grow, but more slowly than before. The rate of natural growth of a region with 25 million inhabitants was reduced by roughly two-thirds in just two years. With the mortality rate barely changing, this decline is largely due to the drop in the birth rate between 2017 and 2019, falling from 15.88 per 1,000 in 2017 to 8.14 in 2019, a reduction of 47% in two years. The birth rate would have fallen below six per 1,000 in 2020, but this figure is difficult to confirm; China stopped detailing its statistics after 2020. The 2021 edition no longer provides birth rates by region, instead listing only the national rate for the entirety of China.

China’s unsourced explanation

China has an explanation for the decline: This drop of almost 50% would be the consequence of women’s minds being “emancipated” as “gender equality and reproductive health [have] been promoted.” This assertion is based on a single source: a 2021 report on Xinjiang. Special researcher Li Xiaoxia produced this report at the Xinjiang Development Research Center. General media owned by the Chinese state published it, not a peer-reviewed publication. The report provides no data or sources, simply stating, for example: “fertile women accept tubal ligation and IUD operation spontaneously.” It goes on to add: “In 2018, both fertility rate and natural growth rate of ethnic minority population (the [Uighur] population in particular) in Xinjiang decreased significantly. All of these can be attributed to the strict implementation of the family planning policy.” The terms “spontaneously” and “strict implementation” should be clearly and concretely explained.

Beijing’s line of defense can be summed up thus: China has succeeded in achieving an “accelerated demographic transition” in Xinjiang. Except that, normally, this type of phenomenon takes at least a few generations. One would hardly find a demographer that has witnessed such a major birth rate drop elsewhere in the world over such a short period. Not even Iraq in the 2000s, Syria since 2011, Yemen currently or Germany after 1944 compare.

There is currently no satisfactory, legitimate explanation for such a massive drop in the Uighur birth rate. This opens the door to accusations of genocide about which China is already beginning to erase its statistical traces. The country’s real intentions make this situation distressing. The birth rate risks becoming the Chinese power’s main problem for decades to come. Such repression of births of a particular ethnic group is a subject of international interest on which Chinese denials are now bordering on negationism.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Truth About Uighurs: Has China Really Committed Genocide? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Unresolved borders of territorial waters and conflicting claims among countries intensify competition between nations for fossil fuel fields underneath the seas. For example, the melting Arctic region sparks confrontations between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark. Discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean region create competition among Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, Lebanon and Egypt.

The South China Sea region is teeming with natural resources. With China emerging as a rival to the US, competition is rising between China, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Vietnam. To further complicate matters, the Malampaya offshore gas field, which supplies almost all of the Philippines’ natural gas needs and one-fifth of its electricity, is nearly depleted. The fact that it will run dry by 2027 adds heat to the already volatile region.

At this juncture, the Philippines faces two options to mitigate rising energy costs and bolster energy security: exploring new gas fields or transitioning towards renewable energy. Pursuing new fossil fuel reserves risks increasing tensions with China. As the Philippines is a key US ally, this move could escalate conflicts involving the United States. Conversely, investing in renewable energy offers a more sustainable and less confrontational path.

The Malampaya gas field

The Malampaya gas field was discovered in 1992 through a partnership between Shell Philippines Exploration BV and Occidental Petroleum. It boasts proven reserves of approximately 76 billion cubic meters of natural gas, 85 million barrels of condensate and 40 million barrels of oil. The oil field is strategically positioned 820 meters deep and 80 kilometers off the coast of Palawan Island. It was inaugurated in October 2001 and commenced commercial production in June 2002.

The Malampaya field plays a pivotal role in fueling 2,700 megawatts of gas-fired power plants in the city of Batangas, Philippines. It was designed to produce 4.1 billion cubic meters of gas annually. The field is the Philippine energy sector’s crowning achievement, as it represents a milestone in the nation’s natural gas industry and energy self-sufficiency.

This project marks a pioneering venture in the country. Since its inception, the Malampaya project has contributed over $12 billion in revenue to the Philippine government, making a substantial impact on the country’s energy landscape. Notably, it has met up to 20% of electricity demands in the island of Luzon. Being the largest island in the Philippines, its energy consumption is vital. The Malampaya field now faces a catastrophe: Its remaining supply is expected to be entirely spent by the first quarter of 2027. Even with an extended service contract, the projected exhaustion of reserves signals a looming energy crisis for the Philippines.

The ideal alternative: renewable energy and cooperation

The primary alternative to address the Philippines’ energy scarcity is twofold: The Philippines should make substantial investments in renewable energy and foster cooperation with key stakeholders, including China, to explore potential offshore gas fields. Unfortunately, this appears infeasible due to conflicting claims between the two nations. Additionally, the short-term substitution of current resources with renewable energy is deemed excessively expensive and, therefore, almost unattainable.

The anticipated depletion will impact energy prices. It will pose threats to and cause increased expenses for various sectors, including the general populace. The country’s current energy mix comprises coal (47%), natural gas (22%), renewable energy (hydroelectric, geothermal, wind and solar) (24%) and oil-based sources (6.2%). Despite the nation’s interest in clean energy, this commitment does not come at the expense of development, and there are no established incentives or penalties for utilizing different energy sources.

The Philippines’ current transition plan aims to achieve 35% renewable energy by the 2030s. However, nearly 97% of the country’s commitment is contingent on external funding. Without this support, meeting emissions targets becomes unlikely. Essentially, a complete transition to renewable energy is deemed impossible for the Philippines.

Other fossil fuel alternatives lack efficiency. The Marcos administration has expressed interest in reducing electricity prices, which hints at a continued role for coal in the energy mix. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) could serve as a transitional fuel from coal, but its introduction in the Philippines has been slow — it lacks a clear government roadmap for its incorporation as a baseload source. Despite the approval of seven LNG terminal projects, those expected to become operational this year will not significantly contribute to meeting the country’s targets. Long-term contracts for LNG terminals also remain unconfirmed.

The expected alternative: escalation

In the near future, the Philippines’ most reliable and cost-effective energy source is likely to remain natural gas. This runs in contrast to the high cost of transitioning to renewable energy and the challenges posed by other fossil fuel sources. However, the absence of onshore reserves compels the Philippines to turn to the waters of the South China Sea, escalating conflicts with China. Energy companies are hesitant to bid on offshore blocks offered by the city of Manila — not because of concerns for their economic viability, but rather the security risks of energy exploration in waters around China’s nine-dash line.

The US expresses concern for the Philippines’ claims despite existing tensions with China in the South China Sea. This animosity has roots in the past. In 1994, China occupied the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. In response, then-Philippine President Benigno Aquino increased military spending to defend Malampaya, seeking assistance from the US. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in favor of the Philippines in 2016, but subsequent policy changes under President Rodrigo Duterte aimed at accommodation with China rather than confrontation.

Duterte’s policy shift involved setting aside the PCA ruling, “separating” from the US and exploring joint energy exploration with China in the South China Sea. However, China’s cooperation has been limited, particularly in regard to acknowledging Philippine sovereignty and sharing resources. Furthermore, China has contributed to ongoing tensions through numerous actions. These include the nation’s militarization of islands in the Spratly archipelago, routine naval and coast guard activities within the Philippines’ territorial waters and harassment of Philippine fishing boats.

Considering the whole situation, the Philippines’ pursuit of alternative energy sources is domestically urgent and geopolitically imperative. However, the prohibitive cost of switching completely to renewable energy renders this shift unrealistic for the Philippines’ short-term policy. The Philippines evidently is seeking new offshore resources, a move that will have political consequences. Moreover, the ongoing strain between China and the US is likely to intensify due to energy disputes in the South China Sea. The complex interplay of territorial claims, international arbitration and major power rivalry heavily affects the Philippines’ energy landscape.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Philippine Energy Crisis Threatens to Escalate Tensions With China appeared first on Fair Observer.

Corporate executives traveling to China on business have been pulled out of line in airports or confronted in their hotels by government officials and held for undetermined periods. These unannounced exit bans on travelers are a byproduct of China’s expanded espionage law, which gives the Chinese government an incredible amount of authority over business executives and the information, technology and other personal items they bring. The law’s passage and enforcement are the latest in many threatening Chinese government actions.

Overlooking these threats is not an option. Corporations are responsible for protecting their employees and must respond strategically to China’s actions. Failing to prepare for the uncertainties thoroughly and ignoring the risks of travel to and from China is an inexcusable oversight that threatens the security of essential personnel.

Businesses must face the threat that the Chinese Communist Party presents with a three-pronged approach that addresses the short-, medium- and long-term contingencies of doing business in China. This strategy is the only way to mitigate Chinese interference with foreign travel and protect our national economy now and in the future.

The first step in risk mitigation is working with vendors to conduct a risk assessment of every employee considering travel to China. The Chinese government’s sophisticated surveillance system includes reviewing travelers’ professional and personal pasts. A job with the US government or a social media post that references Taiwan as a country is enough to flag a business executive as a threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and could lead to detainment and questioning.

Companies should partner with vendors that specialize in deep-dive background checks, open source and dark web capabilities to comb through traveling executives’ previous jobs and past comments on topics related to China, looking for anything that the CCP might flag, whether a career in intelligence or a comment about the Uyghurs. The Chinese government will do the same when US executives enter its borders.

Cyber threats and the importance of mitigation technology

Even for executives deemed low-risk, there is still an inherent threat that they must be aware of when traveling to China. Professionals traveling with sensitive information should be aware of cyber threats that may compromise their data. Leaders must guide their subordinates on keeping information safe.

China’s vast cyber capabilities can significantly endanger proprietary information, even for those not detained. Hostile actors wield various tools — such as inspections, insecure networks and even public USB charging ports — to gain access to mobile devices and private documents. Business leaders should invest in cyber crime mitigation technology such as burner devices, dedicated email accounts for travel, encrypted messaging and portable USBs with hardware-based encryption for their workforce.

These short-term safety measures alone don’t solve the medium- and long-term realities of doing business in China. They merely provide some breathing room while leaders reassess what is best for their employees and their business in the long term. In tandem with these immediate steps, corporations and their leaders must consider the medium- and long-term realities of doing business in China.

Building out avenues of extraction today is the only way to guarantee corporate security, employee safety and financial longevity in the years to come. Businesses must prepare for the possibility of losing the entire supply chain or being shut out of the Chinese market. Otherwise, they may find themselves forced to make sudden shifts and lose billions in the process, as BP did when it pulled out of Russia after the invasion of Ukraine.

The door to business in China is closing, and executives must begin minimizing their profile before it slams. Exit bans are the most recent example of geopolitical tensions bleeding into the corporate world, but there is no indication that it will be the last. We owe it to our employees, stakeholders and nation to be prepared for further escalation and greater instability.

Leaders must develop robust plans that minimize risk in the short term and Chinese dependence in the months and years to come. Those who don’t will run to catch up when tensions finally come to a head.

[Liam Roman edited this article]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post China’s Exit Bans Are the New Normal: Executives Must Prepare appeared first on Fair Observer.

Xi has cleverly cast China as a defender of the status quo, pledging support for “true multilateralism” guided by the UN Charter. Ultimately, however, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) wants to preserve only those elements of the existing order that helped China to rise over the past two generations — such as the world trade rules that enabled it to become the manufacturing epicenter of the world by encouraging inflows of foreign capital and technology.

Beijing instead shuns or undermines those principles that do not directly benefit China or that stand in the way of its rise. Xi’s declarations for a “global security initiative” or a “community of shared future for mankind” are really more of a call for the continued rise of the CCP and China. “Shared future” is another way of saying ‘“development first” while rejecting any order guided by universal values.

Rejecting the West’s moral high ground

Defenders of Chinese ambition would argue that communist leaders have a justifiable right to reject or reshape global rules written decades ago when they were not part of the discussion. Other analysts question just how disruptive China could actually be. But China does not need to replace every current rule in order to make its mark. What is important is that China is undermining the legitimacy upon which those rules are based. According to Chinese rhetoric, the international rules-based order touted by the United States is nothing more than power politics, a bid to replace commonly accepted international laws and norms with the rules of a few countries.

Xi rejects the premise that World War II granted liberal democracies a mandate to create the world in their image. arguing that Western advocacy of universal human rights — in Xinjiang and elsewhere — is a new form of colonialism.

In 2022, Xi gave Western leaders an insight into China’s human rights outlook. President of the European Council Charles Michel had argued that Europe’s dark past, notably the Holocaust, obliges its leaders to call out human rights abuses across the world, including, of course, in China. Xi retorted that the Chinese have even stronger memories of suffering at the hands of colonial powers. He cited treaties forcing China to open its markets and cede territory in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and racist bylaws banning Chinese people and dogs from parks in European-run enclaves. Xi recalled the massacre of civilians at Nanjing by Japanese invaders in 1937. He claimed that such aggression left the Chinese people with strong feelings about human rights and foreigners who employ double standards to criticize other countries. The Chinese government seeks to reopen old arguments about how to balance sovereignty with individual freedoms.

That is an important aspect of the human rights debate — China has indeed suffered at the hands of foreign powers. And the US government is indeed in the habit of lecturing to other governments about human rights when it has its own litany of human rights abuses, from the slaughter of American Indians and slavery to racism, alleged war crimes, and the treatment of immigrants under Trump.

A Machiavellian strategy

Xi believes in the inexorable decline of the American-led world order, with its professed concern for rules and human rights. He would like to see world order become a more transactional system of bilateral agreements between great powers.

We can see how this outlook plays out in practice by looking at China’s response to the Russia–Ukraine war. There, China has played an awkward hand ruthlessly. In short, its goals are to ensure that Russia is subordinate to China, but not so weak that Putin’s regime implodes; burnish its own credentials as a peacemaker in the eyes of the Global South; and undermine the perceived legitimacy of Western sanctions and military support as a tool of foreign policy. 

Xi’s campaign extends to the Middle East as well. In 2023, China skillfully brokered a detente between Iran and Saudi Arabia that served to emphasize the West’s reduced clout in the region over the past two decades. Xi unveiled the Global Civilization Initiative, which argues that countries should “refrain from imposing their own values or models on others and from stoking ideological confrontation.”

Xi’s slogans seek to subvert the normative language of the twentieth century so that multilateralism becomes synonymous with a world that rejects universal values and is run by balancing great-power interests. By doing so, China is pushing back against efforts to contain the perceived military threat it poses as well as promoting an economic growth model which embraces autocratic states without imposing conditions on them.

Of course, the real point of Xi’s approach to foreign policy is to ensure the supremacy and permanence of the CCP. Yet the agglomeration of China’s bilateral relationships with some of the world’s most reprehensible regimes creates contradictions. For example, China supports Iran but chooses to ignore its ongoing nuclear escalation which threatens China’s other client states in the region.

China sees itself as superpower that can attain influence without winning affection, obtain power without trust, and have a global vision without universal human rights. Most of the world’s people do not identify with such a vision, but that has not prevented the Chinese government from proceeding apace with its warped orientation to the rest of the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Explaining China’s Perspective on the World appeared first on Fair Observer.

Italy has just announced it will withdraw from China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), complaining that trade and investment have benefited China inordinately, while damaging the Italian economy.

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Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Strategic Genius, Arrogant Overreach or Something Else?

Brussels has called for an investigation into subsidization in the Chinese electric vehicle sector as European automobile companies are losing market share to cheaper, more advanced Chinese electric vehicles (EVs). Beijing wants to further the China-EU détente to maintain Europe as some form of counterbalance to its dependence on the US market and imports of US technology, but the barriers to this are high. European commissioners are demanding greater access to China’s domestic market while, in step with the US, banning exports of dual-use (civilian/military) technology to China, including advanced semiconductors, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence.

Meanwhile, European public opinion towards China has continued to sour due to China’s choice not to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Many in Europe and the West do not consider China’s own need to maintain reasonable relations with Russia, with which it shares a border of nearly 4,200 kilometers (2,600 miles). As the war in Ukraine drags on, it appears that each side is too strong to lose and yet too weak to win, and European politicians will lean more towards Washington than Beijing.

The EU is unlikely to try to decouple economic links with China as ardently as the US, and European companies will invariably resist trade restraints. The global economy will suffer profoundly if China becomes estranged further from the world’s two great trading blocs. It is in the interests of smaller trading nations to resist pressure to pick sides and avoid adding to the larger players’ intemperate rhetoric.

Despite all of the considerable challenges, China will continue to offer the strongest and most investable market for the rest of the decade. All those nations, firms, and people around the world who benefit from peace and stability should not treat disengagement and conflict as our unavoidable future.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post China Watch: The EU Is Falling out of Love appeared first on Fair Observer.

The drought is over, mate. We can sell our wine in China again. Albo’s visit was the first step in a new era. And you blokes shouldn’t read too much into the subs and all that AUKUS stuff. We only care about the Pacific because you do. The stand-off was all about nothing.

— Australian wine company sales manager

Easy for you to say. The ‘subs’ you mention will get deployed off the Chinese coast. How would you feel if we sent nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles to cruise in international waters just off Perth?

— Chinese distribution manager 

China President Xi Jinping and US President Joe Biden were motivated in part by a mutual requirement to repair the economic damage resulting from prolonged political estrangement and the imposition of trade tariffs. Biden asserted that the US was not trying to decouple from China, perhaps acknowledging tacitly that attempts to do so have been unsuccessful. Both economies need each other’s markets to ensure future growth. Yet there are powerful people in Beijing and especially Washington who are prepared to mortgage economic stability and growth for what they perceive as wider geopolitical advantages, even at the risk of military conflict.

In early December, the US House of Representatives China committee recommended Congress legislate to allow it to sanction the Chinese Communist Party economically and diplomatically if China engages in military action against Taiwan or other US allies and partners (partners could mean any country). The committee also advised the administration to revoke licenses that currently allow US companies to supply Huawei.

Politics and geopolitics override economics

Whatever conciliatory statements Biden made in San Francisco, he will likely be forced to repudiate next year as he fights to win the support of Americans who have been conditioned to see China as an enemy and want to see him ‘stand up’ to Beijing. The Democrats and Republicans are unified in their characterization of China as the architect of America’s domestic ills. When both American political parties unite over foreign commercial and political conflicts, Washington has sometimes made its worst mistakes, such as the escalation of the Vietnam War and recent military interventions in the Middle East, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and the diminution of American power and legitimacy.

While the Chinese economy will strengthen in 2024 and Beijing has enjoyed some rapprochement with both Washington and Canberra, global geopolitical threats have not diminished. The dangerous jousts between the US and Chinese navies along the fringes of China’s territorial waters continue. Although Taiwan and Vietnam are not the potential flashpoints they appeared to be a year ago, Biden’s military guarantee of the Philippines has created a new theater for a proxy conflict with China. France just announced it will conduct joint exercises with the Filipino military and that it intends to garrison soldiers in the country. The US and China continue inching towards a Second Cold War, evidenced by the AUKUS pact, the QUAD, Papua New Guinea’s security agreements with both Canberra and Washington, and the recent US announcement that it will deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles in the region soon — probably on Guam.

China remains committed to globalization; it has no choice, for it depends on imports for so many essential materials and components. As the Chinese economy recovers, so will the global economy, hopefully prompting many of its trading partners to restrain Washington’s paranoid struggle to contain China’s inexorable rise.

Foreign investors will need to consider geopolitical risks more carefully now and, in the years to come, as the US is likely to impose more restrictions on Chinese technology and continue to highlight selective (Chinese, as opposed to its allies’) human rights issues, all in the attempt to slow China’s growth. Chinese defensive rhetoric will only intensify in response, and it will continue to increase its military spending.

We hear a lot about China’s political tensions, but at least Xi is talking to foreign leaders again. I fly to the US next week to buy oranges. If we just do business as normal, hopefully things will become more normal again.

— Beverage company supply-chain manager, southwest China

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post China Watch: Tensions With the US Will Persist appeared first on Fair Observer.

The overarching purpose of Xi Jinping Thought, or Xi’ism, is “upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics to realize socialist modernization and national rejuvenation.” Xi’ism promotes 14 fundamental principles, which include “a people-centered approach,” “law-based governance,” “upholding core socialist values,” “ensuring harmony between humans and nature,” “upholding absolute Party leadership over the people’s forces,” and “promoting the building of a community with a shared future for humanity” amongst others.

While most of these principles seem worth pursuing, their implementation results in stringent restrictions on individual freedoms.

China’s ethnic policy

Western governments and media have extensively criticized President Xi and the Communist Party of China (CPC) for their forceful assimilation of ethnic Uyghurs, Tibetans and Mongolians into China’s majority Han culture. In recent years, Beijing has indeed intensified the pressure on Chinese ethnic minorities not just to integrate, but to fully assimilate into the Han culture. Those who resist are forcefully assimilated using any means deemed necessary by the CPC.

The West’s central contention is that ethnic minorities should be granted the right to preserve their distinct cultural, religious and social identities. They should be also allowed to manage their own regions as real autonomies, with only limited intervention from the central government in Beijing. While these ethnic and political rights are enshrined in the Constitution of China, the fact is that Beijing has ignored them for the sake of engineering a new Chinese nation.

What is less well-known in the in the West is that one central objective of Xi’ism is to assimilate the approximately 1.2 billion culturally eclectic ethnic Hans into a new Chinese national identity. The values, objectives and structure of this new nation are meticulously defined by Xi’ism and implemented in a country-wide social engineering program supervised of the CPC. By implementing this social engineering program, Beijing intends to strengthen the social cohesion of the 1.4 billion Chinese to ensure that the country will continue prospering as a nation-state. In turn, this prosperity should safeguard the legitimacy of the CPC’s absolute leadership in the eyes of the Chinese people.

Xi’ism has had its share of success

So far, the CPC leadership has been successful in turning a failed country into a prosperous one. As per the World Bank’s assessment, “Since China began to open up and reform its economy in 1978, GDP growth has averaged almost 10 percent a year, and more than 800 million people have been lifted out of poverty.” This growth continued under Xi’s tenure, which began in 2013. From 2013 until the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Chinese economic growth averaged around 7%.

Without question, Xi’s program has restricted numerous individual and social rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly. Nevertheless, the CPC’s success in providing a prosperous life for most of the 1.4 billion Chinese cannot be denied.

It is Xi’s belief that one of the cornerstones on which to build this success is China’s social cohesion To achieve this, Beijing is implementing a social engineering program. Every society, in reality, is a construct. Still, the idea of socially engineering a society is not welcomed in Western societies. This is because of deep-rooted Western beliefs and values such as the assumption that each individual should be allowed to freely define his identity and choose his way of life. Still, much like any structure, every society has to be engineered.

Western societies are engineered, too. Otherwise, they would not be societies at all. An obvious fact showing that this is the case is the public education systems that for 15 years brainwash — benignly or not — our younger generations with homogeneous values, objectives and ways of thinking. Additionally, the fact that Western national or regional societies gravitate around common ideologies, values and objectives indicates that they have been engineered. So, the question is not whether it is necessary to social engineer a society, but how to do it to maximize its prosperity.

How can the West approach social engineering consciously and productively?

There are numerous problems with the current Western social engineering paradigm. Among them is the fact that Western political elites do not explicitly acknowledge the use of social engineering, making it difficult to engage in public and academic debates to analyze and improve it. Another problem results from some of the deeply rooted values and beliefs common in the West that grant almost unrestricted individual freedoms and the right to everyone to have a say in almost everything. Yet another problem is the common fallacy of attributing most of Western prosperity to freedom and democracy, rather than to scientific and technological development, discipline and commitment. These beliefs and values are not only weakening Western societies’ social cohesion and robustness, but are also masking the need for a fundamental change in the current social paradigm.

Guided by Xi’ism, the CPC is socially engineering a new Chinese national identity by forcefully assimilating ethnic minorities and homogenizing the eclectic Hans. This does not mean, of course, that the West should follow China’s lead and attempt to stamp out ethnic diversity. What it does mean is that the West needs to be open about the need to be proactive in socially engineering its own societies based on values and objectives that are not always popular.

It is time for the West to take a honest look at its current social engineering paradigm and fundamentally redesign it to build a society that will be in a strong position to overcome the challenges of this century and ensure the future prosperity of its peoples.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How Xi’s Social Engineering Is Creating a New Chinese Nation appeared first on Fair Observer.

Six months ago, Beijing appeared flummoxed by the complexity of guiding the economy back to growth and stability. There was no mention of big reforms and only scant references to the private sector, with considerable focus instead on the state. This seems to have changed, and policies announced over the last eight weeks have the potential to facilitate stronger private sector expansion and confer greater autonomy on the provinces.

Beijing cannot lead Chinese entrepreneurs out of their present uncertainty and skepticism by policies alone; they must also relax some of the rules that constrain them.

Finance to fuel economic recovery

Having partially curtailed loan sharks and shadow banking schemes, Beijing now needs to fill the funding vacuums this has created for the private sector to expand significantly. Over the last two decades, the government has been slow in allowing the development of private retail and investment banks, and now when it needs private sector growth urgently, there are inadequate means to fund that growth. At USD 3 trillion, China’s shadow banking sector remains a systemic risk to the economy, but it is also a resource to be converted into a regulated, stable source of private lending and investment, for many of the institutions within it are already adequately managed and hedged. China’s lack of financial diversity and flexibility has inhibited its recovery from three years of COVID and the collapse of the property bubble, which have inflicted major costs on public confidence and finances.

Despite improved macroeconomic indicators in the industrial and service sectors, consumers are still feeling uncertain and overly cautious in their spending on everyday items, waiting for proof that asset prices are rising again.

We have good salaries and savings and most of us are in steady jobs. But I admit: although unemployment is not widespread, I have friends who have lost their jobs and know that many working for the state have had to accept pay cuts. This is making me feel a bit insecure. Everyone is buying cheaper products, even when it comes to essentials. Frugality seems natural in hard times. The middle class is supposed to be hundreds of millions of people, but many were not born into it, so remember some form of poverty. They are conservative. This is a factor behind China’s slow recovery.

— Manager of a private trading company in Shanghai

Global economists are hoping for the worst

Most leading global economists have written off the Chinese economy and forecast a long decline, on the assumption that China rose on the basis of an unsustainable growth model driven by non-market factors over recent decades and is paying for it now. Western commentators tend to view Chinese economic data through distorting political lenses. Chinese economic gains are often reported as ill-gotten and tools of coercion, while economic contraction is presented as evidence of inherent instability and political illegitimacy. Much commentary is more akin to war rhetoric than rational economic analysis. It is true that China’s present economic recovery will likely continue to be uneven and any growth incremental. The risk of setbacks due to administrative blunders and external factors is ever-present, there are deflationary trends in many sectors, but the current recovery has momentum, and the policy direction is encouraging.

In October, Chinese industrial value-added (net manufacturing gains) rose 22% and retail sales were 14% higher than in October 2019. Supply and demand are both expanding, and apart from the residential property sector, prices are stable. New residential property purchases are still down in China’s 20 top cities, while existing homes are being purchased at significant discounts. Buyers across China fear they will lose their deposits on new apartments if developers fail. If the government were to establish a real estate deposit insurance scheme, similar to that which exists in banking, buyers would have more confidence in the better, medium-sized developers.

The economy’s winter awakening

Beijing appears to be initiating good policies to spur small and medium enterprises (SME) growth in particular, and there are signs that provinces are being given more fiscal autonomy, allowing them to restore their finances beleaguered by the costs of fighting the pandemic and the collapse of property prices. The appearance of monolithic power projected by the CCP means outside observers often miss the fragmented nature of China and the degree to which the government generally rules more by consultation and compromise with local officials — particularly in the wealthier regions — than by fiat. There were more political checks and balances before President Xi Jinping’s era, but the scale and diversity of the Chinese economy today create an economic equilibrium of sorts. The messages from the leaders in China’s top 20 cities to policymakers appear to constitute a unanimous demand for the central government to pay attention to the private sector and not expect to drive reform and repair through state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as much as in the past.

Few governments today seem to be managing their country’s markets well — understandable given the world is recovering from one of the greatest shared economic calamities since the Great Depression.

Public confidence after crises tends to return gradually, often imperceptibly, as individuals overcome their fears and make ordinary economic decisions again, each influencing the other, until hope becomes a subtle, steadily rising tide. This shift is now palpable in China, not so much among the wealthy in the major cities where people have more to lose, but among poorer folk in lesser coastal towns and significantly in the interior cities and rural areas.

New engines of growth

Beijing has announced it will increase support for the private technology sector. Although Chinese state bankers will continue to favor lending to SOEs over riskier private enterprises in an effort to avoid making mistakes that might cost them their jobs, the impact of more flexible credit practices is already apparent. In late November, Xi visited the Shanghai Futures Exchange and a number of technology companies in an attempt to demonstrate the government’s priorities. 

Adequately funded, the technology sector will become a significant driver of the economy, replacing some of the impetus previously supplied by the real estate sector. In the foreseeable future, the Chinese property sector will not return as a prime driver of the economy, and it must not become the forum for the reckless speculation of previous decades. In 2022, the tech sector grew 10% year-on-year, contributing 41% to China’s GDP. Year-on-year credit growth to SMEs could increase by as much as 20% by the spring of 2024.

Despite Washington’s embargoes on technology exports to China, Huawei developed a cutting-edge smartphone with chips supplied by a relatively obscure Shanghai company, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp — ironically blacklisted by the US in 2020. Huawei and other tech companies have demonstrated that trade restrictions designed to cripple have instead spurred a greater impetus to innovate and become more independent of global supply chains, faster than they would have aspired otherwise. From space stations to trans-oceanic fiber optic cables and fourth-generation fighter aircraft, China is matching and often exceeding its Western peers.

US tech companies are losing billions of dollars each year due to lost sales to China. US President Joe Biden’s conciliatory tone when meeting his counterpart Xi in San Francisco in November could well have been due in part to US tech companies lobbying Washington to ease sanctions.

Crisis is the mother of reform

The World Bank and the IMF are forecasting that China will achieve GDP growth in excess of 5% this year, recording the second-highest GDP in the world in 2023. Even with 4.5% GDP growth in 2024, it would be second only to India. China’s accumulated GDP growth over the last three years is approximately 20%, while US GDP grew by 7.7% and Europe by 3%. The fact that Chinese GDP growth will reach or exceed 5% this year without significant government stimulus should encourage foreign investors. They should, however, assess each sector carefully, as recovery will be patchy and there is little evidence that nationwide public trust in government will be restored soon. Confidence is especially low in cities like Shanghai which suffered stringent, extended lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic, and this in turn depresses household consumption. Consumption of nutritional supplements and quality food products in coastal cities is still strong, especially of imported premium-quality fruit, as the upper middle class remains willing to pay for established brands of reliable provenance. 

Although some in the local government have speculated that Beijing will resort to subsidizing households if consumption does not recover by the spring, it is more likely to pay subsidies to companies expanding in key sectors enabling them to employ more people. Despite China’s communist past and the current administration’s commitment to poverty alleviation, there are no traditions of welfare as there are in the West. The government will invest less in poverty alleviation programs and infrastructure projects in the poorer central provinces over the next 12 to 24 months as it concentrates on the areas of the economy that can offer better short-term yields. Critical poverty alleviation programs will nevertheless continue, particularly where they support the improvement of agriculture.

I know this may sound selfish, but the government spent too much on developing western China in recent years. If they had focused more on the middle class in the coastal cities they would have achieved greater economic and social returns, and the economy would be stronger.

There is some truth in critics’ assessments of China’s social investments, but over the past 50 years, most trickle-down economic strategies have failed. Beijing will focus its future fiscal reforms on coastal cities to restore middle-class citizens’ confidence in the system, but unless these are complemented by relaxing hukou (residency) reforms to allow greater internal migration — so rural workers can enjoy some of the benefits of urban life — they will only bring temporary prosperity and ultimately exacerbate the already large gap between rich and poor.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post China Watch: The Chinese Economy Is Now Down, but Not Out appeared first on Fair Observer.

Given the time and access restrictions, this article does not intend to enter the discussion of whether Chinese policies in Xinjiang can be considered “cultural genocide” or if there is forced labor in the region. Neither does this article intend to explain why no women were seen to wearing the hijab, or the fact that only very few older men were seen to attend prayers. These radical changes can hardly be explained by natural and voluntary internal changes in the Uyghur community, but an objective assessment of these issues is not feasible with the available information. However, the information collected during the 7-day visit is sufficient to assess the validity of claims made by Western scholars and media regarding strict restrictions imposed on the use Uyghur language and the ubiquitous presence of security checkpoints in the region.

Where are all the checkpoints?

The Council on Foreign Relations, a reputed American think tank, states that, “In some cities, such as western Xinjiang’s Kashgar, police checkpoints are found every one hundred yards or so.” Under the headline, “The Police Region of Xinjiang: Checkpoints, Camps, and Fear,” the author declares that “an Uyghur I know was stopped 34 times one day.” In a similar vein, the Uyghur Academy states that “Each square has a police station that closely monitors inhabitants by regularly scanning their identification cards, taking their photographs and fingerprints, and searching their cell phones.” The New York Times’ piece “How China Uses High-Tech Surveillance to Subdue Minorities” affirms that “the online records indicate that a network of about 10,000 checkpoints in Urumqi made more than six million identifications in 24 hours.” 

These statements about security checks in Xinjiang are either outdated or grossly inflated. 

Indeed, what struck me the most on our first day in Kashgar was the total absence of checkpoints and paramilitary patrols on the roads and streets, which had been common during my last visit to the region in 2016. After landing in Kashgar, we drove to our hotel downtown and went to one of Kashgar’s night markets. To my surprise, there were no checkpoints at all, neither for traffic nor for pedestrians. In the following two days, we crisscrossed the city and went to the countryside several times. Not a single time had we to go through a checkpoint or saw anyone having to do so, no checkpoints or police patrols were visible and police presence on the streets was minimal. We only spotted one police van in a park where there was a large congregation of people dancing and a few traffic police cars on the roads. Moreover, this absence checkpoints continued for the whole 7-day trip to Kashgar, Aksu, Kuche and Urumqi, during which did not encounter or see a single checkpoint. 

So, at least in these four cities, there were no visible checkpoints and the police presence was minimal. The general atmosphere in the streets was relaxed, which was in itself a positive change from the situation we saw seven years ago, when interethnic tensions were obvious and extensive security measures were visible. Over the entire period of our visit, we didn’t see any security checkpoints at all and didn’t witness anyone having his ID checked in the streets, strongly undermining the Western media’s claim that checkpoints are omnipresent in Xinjiang.

Language issues

Another controversial issue discussed extensively in the Western media is that the use of the Uyghur is extremely restricted in Xinjiang. The United Nations Human Rights assessment from August 2022 found that some Uyghurs and Kazakhs “were not allowed to speak their own language.” The Uyghur Human Rights Project’s brief January 2019 piece “Assault on the Uyghur Language in East Turkestan” stated that “official policies discourage speaking and writing in Uyghur in public” and that “shops must clear the shelves of anything written in Uyghur script and Uyghur scrubbed from street signs and signboards.” 

The first hint that made me question the validity of these statements was the fact that the announcements on the plane from Urumqi to Kashgar were made in three languages: Mandarin, Uyghur and English. After landing in Kashgar, most signs in the airport were in Uyghur too. And most Uyghurs spoke to each other in Uyghur. While driving from the airport to the city, we tuned into different programs on the radio and we found that approximately half of them were in Mandarin and half in Uyghur. In the following days, we stayed in several hotels and the local TV programs were also half in Mandarin and half in Uyghur. 

Street and store signs were always written in Chinese characters and most of them had Uyghur, too. The font of the Chinese characters was larger, and sometimes the Uyghur script was not shown or not illuminated at night. From the observations I made over the 7-day trip, I gathered that signs are required to be written in Chinese characters and that people have the choice to add the Uyghur version. In predominantly Uyghur areas, the Uyghur script was practically always added.

Most Uyghurs talked to each other in the Uyghur language on the streets, in restaurants, aboard planes and in the countryside. School-aged children talked to each other in both Uyghur and Mandarin. It is relevant to mention that two of the Uyghurs we talked to (aged 30–40 years old) were unable to maintain a conversation in Mandarin, indicating that they had not spent time in the “vocational schools” or “camps.” Numerous Uyghurs we talked to had still very limited command of the Mandarin language.

Uyghur might not be taught in schools, but it seems to be the dominant language used among Uyghurs, both young and old, and the large majority of the signs seen were both in Uyghur and Chinese. Hence, the restrictions on the use of the Uyghur language are also grossly overstated in the West. Also, we didn’t see any indications that the use of the Uyghur language was restricted.

It is important that Western media and scholars adjust their claims to the current realities in Xinjiang, otherwise, they will strongly undermine their efforts to provide a credible perspective of the living conditions of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Cultural Genocide? The Reality on the Ground in Xinjiang appeared first on Fair Observer.

Then there are borders, the cement that holds together the international order. Nation-states are the building blocks of that order, so the borders that separate them function as a mysterious force that keeps countries apart and yet allows them to come together in the United Nations and other global institutions.

Borders are essential to trade, transport and tourism. They are hostile to migrants and refugees. And they also a collectively agreed-upon fiction. All borders are artificial, forged through war, colonialism and domination.

Yet if borders suddenly had no meaning, powerful countries would invade their neighbors and seize the land they covet. Of course, some countries haven’t waited for the international order to collapse to make this happen.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 was, among other things, a blatant violation of an international border. The October 7 raid by Hamas and the subsequent war unleashed by the Israeli army in Gaza both violated a border, which technically divides two entities, not two separate countries. Near the end of 2023, it even looked as though Venezuela were about to invade a part of Guyana that it has long considered its own territory.

It’s no surprise, then, that the recent election of Lai Ching-te as Taiwan’s new president has been greeted by some observers as a triggering event. This year, they say, mainland China will finally follow through on its persistent threats and launch an all-out invasion of Taiwan. According to this scenario, Beijing has noted that while the Russian and Israeli aggressions have generated international outcry and even some serious global pushback, it’s nothing that either country can’t withstand.

In the lead-up to Taiwan’s elections this month, tensions in fact have been mounting across the Taiwan Strait. Should Taiwan declare sovereign independence from the mainland, effectively establishing a de jure border between the two, Beijing may well respond aggressively. “Many American officials believe that Beijing would indeed launch an invasion of the island should the Taiwanese declare their independence and that, in turn, could easily result in U.S. military intervention and a full-scale war,” writes military affairs analyst Michael Klare.

For the time being, however, the game of pretend continues. The international community treats Taiwan in many ways as a sovereign country but pretends that there is only “one China.” Although it continues to lose diplomatic support — Nauru just switched recognition to Beijing, which brings the total for Taipei down to a meager dozen — Taiwan continues to press for membership in global institutions as though it were a sovereign entity. Beijing treats Taiwan as simply an unincorporated territory with delusions of grandeur.

The wars currently dominating the headlines were not exactly surprises. Russia gave plenty of notice of its intentions to intervene in Ukraine and indeed had already absorbed the Crimean peninsula and parts of the Donbas back in 2014. Israel launched four significant attacks on Gaza in 2008, 2012, 2014 and 2021.

Mainland China, for its part, has emphasized that reunification is “inevitable” and that the two sides face a stark choice between war and peace. Military drills near Taiwan last year were designed, according to Beijing officials, to counter the “arrogance” of separatists, and numerous aircraft from the mainland have violated the informal border that runs down the middle of the Taiwan Strait.

So, will the erosion of international norms and escalation of threats from Beijing necessarily lead to war with China in 2024?

The recent elections

In Taiwan’s flourishing democracy, two main parties have contested for power over the last few decades. The Kuomintang (KMT) prefers closer rapprochement with the mainland, while the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) edges more toward independence. With Lai Ching-te as its presidential candidate, the DPP just won an unprecedented third consecutive presidential term.

You’d think that the mainland would have gotten used to the DPP at this point, after eight years in power. But for some reason, Beijing looks at Lai Ching-te differently.

A former doctor who became in rapid succession a legislator, mayor and vice-president, Lai is now a political veteran. When he started out in politics, he was an ardent supporter of Taiwanese independence. But that changed as he rose through the ranks. He now says that he’s comfortable with the current status quo, by which he means his country’s de facto independence.

This is a pragmatic approach not only with respect to Beijing but domestic politics as well. Although the DPP won the presidential election this month, it lost its parliamentary majority. It now has one fewer seat than the KMT. This means that a third party with 8 seats will hold a pivotal position in determining actual policies.

This third party, the relatively new center-left Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), takes a position somewhere between the DPP and the KMT on the question of sovereignty. Indeed, the party’s official color is turquoise, a pointed reference to the longstanding struggle between the forces of green (KMT) and blue (DPP). TPP leader and presidential candidate Ko Wen-je presented himself during the election campaign as “the only person who is acceptable to both China and the United States. This is currently my biggest advantage.”

Generally, Washington and Taipei see eye to eye. After all, the United States has long shipped arms to the island, with the latest package from August totaling $500 million. Between 1980 and 2010, Taiwan received over $25 billion in arms shipments.

At the same time, the United States has adhered to the “one China” policy, which Joe Biden reiterated just after the election when he said, “We do not support Taiwan independence.” At the same time, however, US politicians have been traveling to Taiwan more often, with even Ed Markey leading a delegation there to warn Beijing of US support for the island.

The lion’s share of the Pentagon’s budget is devoted to buying the big weapons systems — jets, carriers, space weapons — to counter a major rival like China. But that doesn’t mean that Washington wants a war with China. Quite the opposite, given military commitments to Ukraine, the increased demands from Israel and now the attacks on the Houthis in and around the Red Sea.

But, of course, most wars are not planned in advance.

What Taiwan wants

Taiwanese identity has changed dramatically in the last two decades. Back in 1992, only 17% of the population identified as “Taiwanese,” compared to 25% who called themselves “Chinese.” Another 46% said that they were “both Chinese and Taiwanese.”

Today, more than 62% of those surveyed say that they’re “Taiwanese.” And the number who call themselves “Chinese” has dropped all the way to 2.5%. A strong driver of this transformation is demographic, with the dying off of the generation that either came over from the mainland with the Kuomintang forces or still harbored hopes of returning there at some point.

Despite this greater sense of a separate identity, Taiwan’s fate is still inextricably tied to the mainland. Consider the economic interdependence of the two. As the Taiwan government itself likes to boast, the country invested over $200 billion into the mainland between 1991 and 2022 while cross-strait trade in 2022 totaled $205 billion. The mainland is actually Taiwan’s largest trade partner, responsible for 22% of total trade.

However, as with the decoupling taking place between the United States and China, cross-strait economic relations seem to be changing as well. Taiwanese investments in the mainland dropped to a 20-year low in 2023, though this reflects more the rising costs of labor in China than any specifically political decision to invest elsewhere.

The mainland remains dependent on one key Taiwanese export: semiconductors. Taiwan has practically cornered the market, particularly on the most advanced chips used for AI and quantum computing, where it controls 90% of the trade. US controls on technology transfer to China have ensured that the mainland, though it would prefer to achieve self-sufficiency in this regard, still needs to import these chips from Taiwan.

The Taiwanese, meanwhile, are well aware of the fate of Hong Kong. The residents of this entrepôt, which reverted to China’s control in 1997, thought they would be able to run their own democratic institutions until at least 2047, according to provisions in the handover agreement. The crackdown on the Hong Kong protest movement in 2021, sending protesters to jail or to exile in places like Taiwan, called into question Beijing’s commitment to “one country, two systems.” The forced absorption of Hong Kong has strengthened the independence movement in Taiwan and, on top of the consolidation of a distinct Taiwanese identity, led to the three-term success of the DPP.

The current status quo, for Taiwan, has translated into a stable democracy, a vibrant civil society, a per-capita GDP comparable to South Korea and Japan and a mutually prosperous arrangement with Beijing. On the negative side, Taiwan spends a lot on its military — 2.6% of GDP with a record expenditure in 2023 — and has to endure a steady diet of threats from Beijing.

Plus, only a dozen other countries, most of them miniscule, treat Taiwan like an authentic nation. No seat in the UN, no membership in the World Bank, no participation in the World Health Organization: That’s the price Taiwan has to pay for this belittling status quo.

The meaning of those land grabs

Although Beijing might dismiss the international outcry against Russia and Israel as relatively insignificant, it has paid close attention to how effectively Ukraine has fought back against Russian occupiers. Although Taiwan is tiny compared to Ukraine and China’s military is considerably more sophisticated than Russia’s, it would be no easy task for China to gobble up Taiwan.

Sending a sufficient force across the Taiwan Strait, for instance, would be extraordinarily difficult, particularly under a rain of missiles from Taiwan. The terrain makes landings difficult, and there are few routes from the east coast to the rest of the island. The preparations for such an amphibious assault would be relatively easy to monitor. Also, China hasn’t fought a war in many decades; who knows how its troops would fare under hostile conditions. The embarrassing retreat of the Russian army after it failed to seize Kyiv serves as a warning to hawks in Beijing.

But leaders sometimes do crazy things. And China has the option of threatening a devastating aerial assault, up to and including nuclear weapons, to force Taiwan to capitulate without a shot fired.

China’s ultimate calculation may come down to what’s happening around other border conflicts and whether the world is on the verge of a land grab free-for-all. In addition to what’s happening in Ukraine and Gaza, Saudi Arabia is eyeing territory in Yemen, Turkey continues to remain militarily active in northern Syria, and countries desperate to secure soil for growing food or boost their carbon credit accounts are engaged in numerous mercantile land grabs.

Climate change is also contributing to the general feeling that “the world is going to the dogs, so I’m going to get what I can while I can.” As it disappears under the rising waves, land has become a more valuable commodity. Land hunger was behind the terrifying settler movements of the past — the westward expansion and dispossession of Native Americans in the United States, the colonial enterprises of the nineteenth century throughout the Global South, the Nazi attempt to create a larger lebensraum for Germans. Today, the hunger remains, though the rationales have shifted to securing food supplies, sufficient “critical raw materials” for energy transitions and carbon sinks to balance high levels of emissions in the home countries.

Taiwan faces a number of challenges that have nothing to do with the mainland. Its population peaked in 2019, and it has the lowest fertility rate in the world. As an island, it is particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise, alongside increasing fresh-water scarcity as a result of changing monsoon patterns.

Cooperation with the mainland and the international community on these issues is essential. The status quo — little engagement across the Taiwan Straits and low levels of Taiwanese participation in international institutions — has no future in a volatile world. But can Beijing suspend its territorial claims that currently exceed its grasp in favor of peace, justice and mutual economic benefit?

Rationality says yes. Nationalism says no.

[Foreign Policy in Focus first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post What’s Going to Happen to Taiwan Now? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Since the country’s democratization in the 1990s, Taiwan’s democracy has matured into a solid democracy. As summarized in the 2022 Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) report on Taiwan, the country enjoys “stable democratic institutions and a vibrant civil society, and does extremely well in guaranteeing its citizens political rights and civil liberties.” In particular, the report highlights the quality of Taiwan’s “regular, universal and secret multiparty elections, which are usually undisputed and widely covered by the media”. Yet, the report also stresses that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursues a range of activities and strategies to influence Taiwan’s electoral processes.

China’s electoral meddling

Beijing’s interest in Taiwan’s elections is rooted in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) view that the island is an integral part of China. Free and fair elections in Taiwan challenge this position because they are an expression of the island nation’s de facto sovereignty. To sway Taiwan’s voters, China pursues a three-pronged strategy that combines political and military pressure, economic means and attempts to sway Taiwanese public opinion. These are specifically aimed at weakening support for Lai and the DPP, who Beijing suspects of working towards de jure independence, and at strengthening the electoral prospects of Hou and the KMT, whose policy platform promises more conciliatory cross-Strait relations.

Ko’s position on cross-Strait issues is less clear-cut, but he is of relevance to Beijing because his candidacy means splitting the opposition vote, thus potentially increasing the chances for a DPP win. Earlier plans of Hou and Ko to run on a common ticket faltered due to their inability to agree on who should run as presidential candidate.

On the political stage, China prevents Taiwan’s involvement in international organizations that require formal statehood and pressures and entices countries to forego state-to-state relations with Taipei. In the March of 2023, for instance, Honduras switched diplomatic relations to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with the diplomatic recognition of only 13 countries. Moreover, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to conduct aerial and naval drills in the Taiwan Strait. These political and military measures are meant to create an atmosphere of defeatism among the Taiwanese and drive home the inevitability of a unification, coercive if necessary, with the mainland.

Beijing also employs a mix of economic coercion and incentives, leveraging Taiwan’s deep economic integration with the mainland. Since the DPP came into power in 2016, China has repeatedly restricted access to its markets for Taiwanese firms and banned a number of agricultural imports, especially targeting producers from southern Taiwan where the DPP is strongest. At the same time, by offering preferential trade agreements, market access and investment promises in the case of a KMT victory, China seeks to sway the Taiwanese electorate towards voting for Beijing-friendly alternatives.

Finally, China is attempting to shape Taiwanese public opinion and electoral outcomes through online disinformation campaigns, cyber warfare and attempts to influence local media. Chinese content farms and cyber trolls seek to sow dissent and spread false rumors. They attempt to discredit Taiwan’s government and to undermine citizen’s confidence that Taiwan and its international partners could successfully resist unification. Meanwhile, pro-China Taiwanese influencers and web personalities spread pro-unification messages. As part of its so-called “United Front” program, the CCP sponsors tours to China by Taiwanese local politicians and leaders of cultural institutions. Such tactics aim at undermining trust in the electoral process, the media, political parties, and individual candidates while drumming up support in favor of candidates aligned with Beijing’s preferences. 

Taiwan’s countermeasures and democratic resilience

Taiwan’s government and civil society are acutely aware of these efforts and take steps to counter electoral interference. Taiwan’s intelligence and law enforcement agencies are on high alert and the Ministry of Justice promises monetary rewards for tips related to interference in elections. The defense ministry routinely reports on the PLA’s actions and the Taiwanese military’s responses, aiming to instill confidence in the Taiwanese public. Other state agencies, including educational institutions, are also involved in bolstering public resilience, for instance through developing and communicating civil defense measures.

These measures are complemented by efforts from within Taiwanese society to counter disinformation. A large, open and diverse media landscape ensures that a variety of perspectives and opinions are voiced, while numerous news outlets scrutinize political narratives and expose misinformation. Civil society actors, including voluntary fact-checking collectives and tech-savvy individuals, address fake news and propaganda and increase media literacy, while grassroots initiatives work to strengthen the public’s resilience against external manipulation. All this occurs against the backdrop of a lively democratic political culture, which is marked by a competitive and diverse political landscape and engaged citizens who are resilient in the face of external pressures and blatant misinformation.

Consequently, China’s attempts to influence Taiwan’s public opinion do not appear to have been particularly fruitful. Polls suggest less than 9% of Taiwanese respondents consider China a credible partner. Moreover, most pre-election polls show Lai as a likely winner of the presidential race, even though the DPP might lose its majority in Taiwan’s legislature. While this would limit Lai’s ability to pursue his domestic policy agenda, such a scenario is unlikely to mean major changes in the relationship with China, since foreign policy is mainly determined by the president.

That said, China is expected to further increase its activities in the weeks leading up to the election, meaning that ongoing and tireless vigilance by Taiwanese authorities and civil society will be needed. The outcome of the 2024 general elections will shape Taiwanese politics and cross-strait relations in the crucial coming years.

If Lai is victorious, he is expected to continue the policy of increasing Taiwan’s international maneuvering space and intensifying ties with democratic allies. Should Hou win, he has promised to reduce tensions across the strait through greater economic integration. Regardless of the outcome of the elections, however, Beijing’s stance will not change, and neither will the prevailing Taiwanese resistance to compromising on their de facto sovereignty.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Taiwan’s 2024 Election Between Chinese Disinformation and Democratic Survival appeared first on Fair Observer.

Prior to the summit, there seemed few discernible obstacles to some kind of trainwreck, whether a complete breakdown in relations, a disastrous trade war or even a military clash over Taiwan or contested islands in the South China Sea. Beginning with last February’s Chinese balloon incident and continuing with a series of bitter trade disputes and recurring naval and air incidents over the summer and fall, events seemed to be leading with a certain grim inevitability toward some sort of catastrophe. After one such incident last spring, The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman warned that “the smallest misstep by either side could ignite a US-China war that would make Ukraine look like a neighborhood dust-up.”

In recent months, top leaders in both Beijing and Washington were becoming ever more concerned that a major US–China crisis — and certainly a war — would prove catastrophic for all involved. Even a major trade war, they understood, would create economic chaos on both sides of the Pacific. A complete breakdown in relations would undermine any efforts to come to grips with the climate crisis, prevent new pandemics or disrupt illegal drug networks. And a war? Well, every authoritative nongovernmental simulation of a US–China conflict has ended in staggering losses for both sides, as well as a significant possibility of nuclear escalation (and there’s no reason to assume that simulations conducted by the American and Chinese militaries have turned out any differently).

As summer of 2023 turned into fall, both sides were still searching for a mutually acceptable “offramp” from catastrophe. For months, top officials had been visiting each other’s capitals in a frantic effort to bring a growing sense of crisis under control. Secretary of State Antony Blinken traveled to Beijing in June (a trip rescheduled after he canceled a February visit thanks to that balloon incident), Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen arrived in July, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited in August. Similarly, Foreign Minister Wang Yi traveled to Washington in October. Their meetings, according to The New York Times reporters Vivian Wang and David Pierson, were arranged “in the hope of arresting the downward spiral” in relations and to pave the way for a Biden-Xi meeting that might truly ease tensions.

Mission accomplished?

Not surprisingly, for both Biden and Xi, the primary objective of the San Francisco summit was to halt that downward spiral. As Xi reportedly asked Biden, “Should [the US and China] engage in mutually beneficial cooperation or antagonism and confrontation? This is a fundamental question on which disastrous mistakes must be avoided.”

From all accounts, it appears that the two presidents did at least stop the slide toward confrontation. While acknowledging that competition would continue unabated, both sides agreed to “manage” their differences in a “responsible” manner and avoid conflict-inducing behavior. While the United States and China “are in competition,” Biden reportedly told Xi, “the world expects the United States and China to manage competition responsibly to prevent it from veering into conflict, confrontation, or a new Cold War.” Xi reportedly endorsed this precept, saying that China would strive to manage its differences with Washington in a peaceful fashion.

In this spirit, Biden and Xi took several modest steps to improve relations and prevent incidents that might result in unintended conflict, including a Chinese promise to cooperate with the US in combating the trade in the narcotic drug fentanyl and the resumption of high-level military-to-military communications. In a notable first, the two also “affirmed the need to address the risks of advanced [artificial intelligence] systems and improve AI safety through US-China government talks.” They also put their stamp of approval on a series of cooperative steps agreed to by their climate envoys John Kerry and Xie Zhenhua to mutually combat climate change.

Still, neither president agreed to any fundamental alterations in policy that might have truly shifted bilateral relations in a more cooperative direction. In fact, on the most crucial issues dividing the two countries — Taiwan, trade and technology transfers — they made no progress. As Xue Gong, a China scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, put it, whatever the two presidents did accomplish, “the Biden-Xi meeting will not change the direction of US-China relations away from strategic competition.”

With that still the defining constant in relations and both leaders under immense pressure from domestic constituencies — the military, ultra-nationalist political factions and assorted industry groups — to hang tough on key bilateral issues, don’t be surprised if the slide towards crisis and confrontation regains momentum in 2024.

The trials to come

Assuming US and Chinese leaders remain committed to a nonconfrontational stance, they will face powerful forces driving them ever closer to the abyss, including both seemingly intractable issues that divide their countries and deeply entrenched domestic interests intent on provoking a confrontation.

Although several highly contentious issues have the potential to ignite a crisis in 2024, the two with the greatest potential to provoke disaster are Taiwan and territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

A self-governing island that increasingly seeks to pursue its own destiny, Taiwan is viewed by Chinese officials as a renegade province that should rightfully fall under Beijing’s control. When the US established formal diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, it acknowledged the Chinese position “that there is one China and Taiwan is part of China.” That “one China” principle has remained Washington’s official policy ever since, but is now under increasing pressure as ever more Taiwanese seek to abandon their ties with the PRC and establish a purely sovereign state — a step that Chinese leaders have repeatedly warned could result in a military response. Many American officials believe that Beijing would indeed launch an invasion of the island should the Taiwanese declare their independence and that, in turn, could easily result in US military intervention and a full-scale war.

For now, the Biden administration’s response to a possible Chinese invasion is governed by a principle of “strategic ambiguity” under which military intervention is implied but not guaranteed. According to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, any attempt by China to seize Taiwan by military means will be considered a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” but not one automatically requiring a military response. In recent years, however, increasing numbers of prominent Washington politicians have called for the replacement of “strategic ambiguity” with a doctrine of “strategic clarity,” which would include an unequivocal pledge to defend Taiwan in case of an invasion. President Biden has lent credence to this stance by repeatedly claiming that it is US policy (it isn’t), obliging his aides to eternally walk back his words.

Of course, the question of how China and the US would respond to a Taiwanese declaration of independence has yet to be put to the test. The island’s current leadership, drawn from the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has so far accepted that, given the way Taiwan is slowly achieving de facto independence through diplomatic outreach and economic prowess, there’s no need to rush a formal declaration. But presidential elections in Taiwan this January and the possible emergence of another DPP-dominated administration could, some believe, trigger just such a move — or, in anticipation of it, a Chinese invasion.

Should the DPP candidate William Lai win on January 13, the Biden administration might come under enormous pressure from Republicans — and many Democrats — to accelerate the already rapid pace of arms deliveries to the island. That would, of course, be viewed by Beijing as tacit American support for an accelerated drive toward independence and (presumably) increase its inclination to invade. In other words, Joe Biden could face a major military crisis remarkably early in 2024.

The South China Sea dispute could produce a similar crisis in short order. That fracas stems from the fact that Beijing has declared sovereignty over nearly the entire South China Sea — an extension of the western Pacific bounded by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo and Vietnam — along with the islands found within it. Such claims have been challenged by that sea’s other bordering states, which argue that, under international law (notably the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea) they are entitled to sovereignty over the islands that fall within their individual “exclusive economic zones” (EEZs). In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague ruled on a petition from the Philippines that China’s claims were invalid and that the Philippines and its neighbors were indeed entitled to control their respective EEZs. China promptly both protested the ruling and announced its intention to disregard it.

Chinese control over those islands and their surrounding waters would have significant economic and strategic implications. To begin with, it extends China’s defense perimeter several hundred miles from its coastline, complicating any future US plans to attack the mainland while making a PRC assault on US and allied bases in the region far easier. The South China Sea also harbors major fisheries, an important source of sustenance for China and its neighbors, as well as vast reserves of oil and natural gas coveted by all the states in the region. China has consistently sought to monopolize those resources.

To facilitate its control over the area, the PRC has established military installations on many of the islands, while using its coast guard and maritime militias to drive off the fishing boats and oil-drilling vessels of other states, even ramming some of those ships. On October 22, for example, a large Chinese coast guard vessel bumped into a smaller Philippine one seeking to reinforce a small outpost of Philippines Marines located on the Second Thomas Shoal, an islet claimed by both countries.

In reaction to such moves, officials in Washington have repeatedly asserted that the US will assist allies affected by Chinese “bullying.” As Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin declared last July at a meeting with Australian officials in Brisbane, “We’ll continue to support our allies and partners as they defend themselves from bullying behavior.” Three months later, following that clash at the Second Thomas Shoal, Washington reaffirmed its obligation to defend the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, should Filipino forces, ships, or aircraft come under armed attack, including “those of its coast guard — anywhere in the South China Sea.”

In other words, a future clash between Chinese vessels and those of one of Washington’s treaty partners or close allies could easily escalate into a major confrontation. Just what form that might take or where it might lead is, of course, impossible to say. But it’s worth noting that, in recent South China Sea exercises, the US Indo-Pacific Command has conducted large-scale combat drills, involving multiple aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Any US military response on such a scale would undoubtedly prompt a comparable Chinese reaction, setting in motion a potential spiral of escalation. Assuming that China continues its policy of harassing the fishing and exploration activities of its southern neighbors, a clash of this sort could occur at almost any time.

Resisting bellicose impulses

Given the dangers in Taiwan and the South China Sea, Presidents Biden and Xi will have to exercise extreme patience and prudence to prevent the ignition of a full-blown crisis in 2024. Hopefully, the understanding they developed in San Francisco, along with new crisis-management tools like enhanced military-to-military communications, will help them manage any problems that do arise. In doing so, however, they will have to overcome both the escalatory dynamics built into those disputes and bellicose domestic pressures from powerful political and industrial factions that view intense military competition with the other side (if not necessarily war) as attractive and necessary.

In both the US and China, vast military-industrial operations have blossomed, fed by mammoth government disbursements intended to bolster their ability to defeat the other’s military in all-out, high-tech combat. In this hothouse environment, military bureaucracies and arms-makers on each side have come to assume that perpetuating an environment of mutual suspicion and hostility could prove advantageous, leaving key politicians ever more obliged to shower them with money and power.

On December 13 and 14, for example, the US Senate and House of Representatives, seemingly incapable of passing anything else, approved a record defense policy bill that authorized $886 billion in military spending in 2024 ($28 billion more than in 2023), with most of the increase earmarked for ships, planes and missiles intended primarily for a possible future war with China. American military leaders — and politicians representing districts with a high concentration of defense contractors — are sure to request even greater spending increases in future years to overcome “the China threat.”

A similar dynamic fuels the funding efforts of top Chinese military-industrial officials, who no doubt are citing evidence of Washington’s drive to overpower China to demand a reciprocal buildup, including (all too ominously) of their country’s nuclear forces. In addition, in both countries, various political and media figures continue to benefit by harping on the “China threat” or the “America threat,” adding to the pressure on top officials to take strong action in response to any perceived provocation by the other side.

That being the case, Presidents Biden and Xi are likely to face a series of demanding challenges in 2024 from the seemingly intractable disputes between their two nations. Under the best of circumstances, perhaps they’ll be able to avoid a major blow-up while making progress on less contentious issues like climate change and drug trafficking. To do so, however, they’ll have to resist powerful forces of entrenched bellicosity. If they can’t, the fierce wars in Ukraine and Gaza in 2023 could end up looking like relatively minor events as the two great powers face off against each other in a conflict that could all too literally take this planet to hell and back.

Fingers crossed.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post US and China on the Edge of War in 2024 appeared first on Fair Observer.

On March 10, in Beijing, Iran and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement restoring their diplomatic relations. This will have ramifications for the United States: That action was not in line with US policy, which sees China as a competitor and adversary. The Saudi action surprised the US since Saudi Arabia has been a client of the US since 1945. The Saudi move could have only happened in the changing world. 

The US can get clues from Saudi Arabia’s choice and face reality by adjusting its foreign policy. The US could stop interferences, coups and invasions in other countries, particularly Iran. It could give up on “regime change” in Iran and apologize for the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran’s first-ever democratic government. It must stop supporting ethnic cleansing and genocide against other people, especially the native Palestinians. By taking those vital steps, the US would improve relations with Iran and decrease tensions in the world. 

Iran’s mullahs, or religious leaders, can also take crucial steps to restore the economy and pacify the country’s young generation. Presently, the mullahs do not walk the talk. The father of the 1979 Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, purportedly warned the mullahs: “Clergy, wake up; now, it is not time to talk … think about people’s problems! Discussion by itself is of no use.” Mullahs have a responsibility within the state of Iran: to listen to the people and adjust their policies accordingly.

Mullahs live in a fantasy world

In my recent visit to Iran, I noticed that the mullahs keep ignoring the advice from the Islamic Revolution’s father. They continue competing with one another for high political positions while the country faces serious economic issues. They claim that the main culprit for poverty is the US’ brutal economic sanctions against the nation that violate the UN Charter. Although that is partially true, the real threats to the regime are the mullahs who have failed to do what they say, listen to the people and address domestic issues. 

During my visit, Iranians kept saying that they get paid in local currency, rials, but buy in dollars. At the time, I could not understand their complaints after seeing perishable foods at low prices. 

However, when I returned to the US and looked further into the matter, I recognized the reasons why the youth are protesting in Iran. I realized that the government privatized most national industries, including refineries, petrochemicals and steel. It is still subsidizing them and providing them with cheap crude oil and other raw materials, expecting the finished products to include reasonable profit for sale in the country. However, those outfits have been exporting their products and selling them in dollar values in a country where the wages are low and labor is very cheap. The companies have no regulatory oversight. Their shareholders are profiting incredibly while contributing immensely to the nation’s inflation and poverty.

Despite the arduous efforts of the new President Ibrahim Raisi, the economy of Iran is still in shambles with an inflation rate below 40%. Corruption and nepotism are widespread, ranking the country 147 among 180 countries in transparency. Women are still widely discriminated against by the government despite great women’s strides in law, medicine, journalism, engineering and other scientific fields. Ethnic groups such as the Baluchis and Kurds remain among the least educated. Thus, indigenous groups like them are easy prey to terrorist groups like Jundallah and Komalah, armed and financed by the US and allies.

How could Iran’s religious leaders let this issue grow so large? Due to their lack of knowledge of the modern world, the mullahs have entrusted running the government chiefly on their staff, ministers and supporting personnel, mostly educated in the West. The staff have pushed for free enterprise in a laissez-faire way without regulatory oversight. They have pressed to privatize the national industries, particularly oil and steel. Once these industries are privatized, they and their relatives and friends buy large shares, aiming for low production costs and maximal profits. They have formed Iran’s oligarchs. Like in Russia, the oligarchs manipulate the market. Consequently, Iran’s inflation has hit the roof and poverty is fast expanding!

On the surface, Iranians think that the mullahs are ruling the country. In reality, the oligarchs are running the nation. In the 1950s, Mohammad Mosaddegh fought with Britain for Iran’s oil nationalization. For that effort, he lost his power and was forced into exile in his house until his death. Sadly, the mullahs have foolishly given away the national treasures to a selected group who have emerged as Iran’s oligarchs. 

The oligarchs convert much of their profits into gold and foreign currencies. Those actions have further devalued the local currency, causing public panic. With the money made in Iran, they buy properties in Istanbul, London, Montreal, Los Angeles and other popular foreign cities. In those foreign cities, their children whose mere existence and liberal lifestyle are indebted to the mullahs, are often among the instigators against the mullahs. 

The oligarchs own private banks that invest and operate commercial facilities across the country, unavailable for sale or rent, counting on higher profits in the future. This is when millions of families are looking for residence. 

Under the mullahs, it never occurred to the oligarchs that the investments were not earned by them or their parents but entrusted to them by the nation. Thus, they should make their products affordable to buy by Iranians. 

Seven simple steps for mullahs to save Iran

The forecast for Iran’s future is gloomy. Execution and imprisonment are not the answers to domestic issues. For Iran to survive in its present form, drastic actions must be taken. As Mosaddeq brought the oil back to Iran from the British, the mullahs must bring back the economy to Iranians from the oligarchs. To start, they could take these seven steps. 

First, stop vying for power. Clean up corruption and nepotism. Choose qualified personnel who are clean from bribery, embezzlement, peddling, or any other activity financially benefiting them or people close to them. Learn how Singapore brought corruption under control.

Second, implement effective management, accountability and transparency programs. Train managers on how to use the resources effectively to meet the targets before deadlines. Learn how Switzerland managed affairs.

Third, address inflation by tightening government spending, overseeing banks and controlling trade. Limit ownership of foreign currency and precious metals like gold. Require the use of only national currency in domestic dealings. Ensure banks are involved in only banking (accepting deposits from the people with a guarantee that the funds will be there when needed and making loans available to them, based on certain reasonable conditions). Learn from Russia on how to manage the inflation rate. Despite facing tough sanctions, Russia managed an inflation rate of 11.9%, and even Afghanistan under the Taliban controlled an inflation rate of 5.2% in December 2022. 

Fourth, temporarily take over imports and exports for all essential goods and services. When the products are sold to distributors, define the profit margin clearly. Increase trade with neighboring countries. Implement regulatory oversight on at least all oil and steel industry production. Give attention to China’s trade regulations.

Fifth, attend to women’s issues and include more in decision-making processes. Remove all barriers that prevent women from rising to power. On equality, learn from Sweden.

Sixth, help the ethnic groups such as Baluchis and Kurds and address their economic and other issues. Promote ethnic diversity in all workplaces with an objective of ethnic equality. Sweden provides a good example.

Seventh, get away from depending on oil revenues for the budget. Promote investments and increase domestic production for exports. Look into the world’s top agricultural exporters.

Despite the benefits of these necessary steps, they are merely bandages on wounds. Above all, culture must be changed. Until the 1979 fall of the monarchy, the Shah made law at his will. He was accountable to no one. People adopted sycophancy to get royal attention. Powerful families practiced nepotism to strengthen their hold on power and demanded bribes to keep their living status. People lied to safeguard their lives and honors. Although Iranians finally got a constitution about 100 years ago, the monarch gave that little attention. Naturally, people followed the king, giving little attention to law and order. The long-term solution is to change the thoughts and false beliefs. From an early age in school, pupils must be taught to practice honesty and respect law and order. Overcoming poor habits takes a generation.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Iran’s Future Lies Heavily in the Hands of its Mullahs appeared first on Fair Observer.

But it hasn’t been exactly a red-carpet kind of visit.

For one thing, because the two leaders will be talking in San Francisco, their confab will generate very little of the pomp and circumstance of a US president welcoming a foreign dignitary to Washington. Second, the focus of Xi’s visit is the APEC meeting. He’ll be absorbed in wooing the other 20 members of the group, which works on facilitating trade and investment in the larger Asia-Pacific region. The APEC region, after all, is responsible for nearly half of all global trade.

But perhaps most importantly, and ominously, the United States and China are not exactly on great terms at the moment.

In addition to the deterioration in security relations — the US shootdown of a Chinese balloon, the increasing tensions in the South China Sea — the two countries have been involved in a low-intensity trade war and a tit-for-tat brawl on advanced technology. The United States has imposed an escalating series of export controls on semiconductors, artificial intelligence technology and the like. This summer, China retaliated by restricting exports of gallium and germanium to essentially zero. It produces 90% and 60%, respectively, of these two rare earth elements.

Pundits and media commentators, following the lead of the Biden administration, have worked hard to lower expectations for the Biden–Xi meeting.

“We’re not talking about a long list of outcomes or deliverables,” a senior administration official told reporters. “The goals here really are about managing the competition, preventing the downside risk of conflict and ensuring channels of communication are open.”

Sounds to me like the first meeting at the office of a couples counselor. Since the Trump presidency, everyone has been talking about the “decoupling” of China and the United States. It’s really too bad that Biden and Xi don’t have the services of a third-party facilitator who can help the couple sort through their problems.

But wait: How about if I offer to fly out to San Francisco to mediate?

True, I’m not a licensed therapist. But some of my nearest and dearest are, and their professional wisdom has inevitably rubbed off on me. Plus, I think I have some good ideas of how to prevent the United States and China from falling into a messy divorce.

Getting to “Maybe”

My clients have built a strong relationship that has stretched across five decades. They come from very different backgrounds, so it’s only to be expected that they will have some conflicts. But even while they were bickering with one another, China and the United States set a new record in trade in goods last year (though it has declined a bit since then). Like any successful couple, they have become dependent on one another while preserving a good deal of independence.

During their first visit with me, I will encourage Biden and Xi to start out by acknowledging what’s working well in the relationship.

My guess, however, is that the two will soon fall to griping.

Beijing is angry about the tariffs that Donald Trump imposed during his presidency and that Biden hasn’t lifted, which China pegs at an average of 19% compared to the 7.3% that China imposes on US products. It’s not happy about the export controls on advanced technology that the United States and European Union have levied. And it really doesn’t like the way that Europe and the United States have put pressure on manufacturers to stop relying on China for critical raw materials.

Washington, meanwhile, has accused China of ripping off the intellectual property of US firms. It’s beyond annoyed that China has been using advanced technology to upgrade its military and it’s concerned as well about China’s human rights record. It puts Chinese tariffs on US goods at somewhere between 15 and 25%.

Both countries have other complaints. The United States worries about China’s military actions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, its military alliance with Russia and its efforts to gobble up critical resources in the Global South. China is furious at how the United States is building alliances — such as the “Quad” with India, Japan and Australia — designed specifically to contain China’s ambitions. Another major irritant is the aggressive actions that US military craft take near China’s borders. And don’t get Beijing started on the double standard that the United States maintains on human rights where Washington basically looks the other way at Saudi and Israeli violations but holds China strictly to account.

Complaining is not the royal road to reconciliation. Biden and Xi have to listen to each other to make any progress. That’s certainly what administration officials mean when they say that both sides have to commit to “ensuring channels of communication are open.”

But let’s face it: Listening isn’t enough either.

Identifying mutual interests

If couples have children, they have an obvious mutual interest in raising the family in a healthy environment.

Biden and Xi don’t have any children in common. But the trade between the two countries functions as a kind of offspring of the relationship. And let’s face it: My clients are really screwing up with that particular kid.

The tariffs in particular have not benefited either side. They have cost US consumers a huge amount of money, to the tune of $1.4 billion a month (by the end of 2018). Through 2021, that added up to $48 billion that consumers shelled out in extra cash. According to a 2020 Brookings report:

The tariffs forced American companies to accept lower profit margins, cut wages and jobs for US workers, defer potential wage hikes or expansions, and raise prices for American consumers or companies. A spokesperson for the American Farm Bureau stated that “farmers have lost the vast majority of what was once a $24 billion market in China” as a result of Chinese retaliatory actions.

US businesses are well aware of how much these tariffs — and other practices — have damaged their own bottom line. Perhaps that’s why business leaders are hosting Xi in San Francisco at a $2,000 a plate dinner.

It’s harder to know how much China has been affected by the tariffs, though one study concluded, on the basis of a reduction in the intensity of nighttime lighting in China, that local economic activity has shrunk. However, China has probably not suffered as much as the United States, since its US-bound exports decreased by only 8.5% (compared to a decrease of 26.3% of China-bound exports from the US) and its exports to the rest of the world increased by 5.5% (compared to an increase of only 2.2% for U.S. exports to the rest of the world).

Then there’s the matter of the global commons. A couple that spends less time and energy squabbling can turn their attention to improving their own house or even the surrounding neighborhood. To do so, however, they have to stop wasting resources on feeding their mutual grievances.

Both China and the United States devote enormous sums to countering perceived threats from the other side. It’s hard to separate out precisely what percentage of the nearly trillion-dollar military budget is allocated to this particular bilateral dispute, but safe to say it’s a lot. China spends somewhere between $225 billion (Beijing’s figures) and $300 billion (outside estimates). It’s likely that at least half of that combined figure — around $650 billion a year — is being poured down the drain of “preparedness” for some future battle between the two superpowers.

If China and the United States engaged in threat reduction — and then proceeded to arms control — that would free up a lot of money that could go, for instance, toward addressing climate change. Fortunately, it looks like the two countries are going to restart face-to-face climate discussions, which could help pave the way for some future reallocation of resources.

The couple could team up to work on other resource questions. The United States and China are competing furiously to secure critical raw materials throughout the world. What if they cooperated instead on research on recycling and less mining-dependent alternatives? The United States and China are both guilty of overfishing (with China the more serious culprit). What if they led a global effort to manage ocean resources more responsibly?

Of course, it’s not my job to tell clients what to think or do. But therapist bias is a real thing, and I never claimed to be licensed. Maybe I can steer them toward what I think are more useful ways of working together as a couple.

One tactic is to get them to talk about the various threats that they view in common. My clients are both worried about unpredictable leaders — aside from themselves, naturally — who could start a nuclear war or unleash a pandemic. They are also worried about religious fundamentalism. They are both concerned about the collapse of the Russian government and its replacement by fratricidal chaos (there’s no lack of countries that fall into this category).

The list of potential common projects is immense. But how can the two sides overcome a trust deficit to re-establish a healthy working relationship?

How about some olive branches?

When a couple doesn’t trust each other, someone has to make a first attempt at reconciliation, however modest. It might be an apology, or the purchase of some flowers, or a promise — finally — to watch a baseball game together.

As a therapist, my bias is revealed through my leading questions.

“With the presidential election coming up next year,” I ask Joe Biden, “what are you most worried about?”

“The economy,” he says, curtly.

“Can you be more specific?”

“Prices shooting back up.”

“How can you best prevent that?”

He looks impatient. “Well, there’s the Federal Reserve, and the interest rates, and the—“

I’m shooting meaningful glances at Xi, who is glowering in his chair. “And…?”

“Yes,” Biden begrudgingly agrees. “The economy is still taking a hit from the tariffs.”

“Which means?” I prompt.

Biden glances at Xi. “I suppose we could consider a partial reduction of some of the tariffs if…”

“If…?” I ask.

“If he does something in return.”

I turn my attention to Xi. “What do you think?”

“We could consider a partial reduction of some of the tariffs if…”

“If…?”

“If he does something in return,” Xi says.

“Those rare earth element export controls have to go,” Biden says.

“And so do the controls on AI chips,” Xi says.

The horse-trading begins in earnest. In short order, the clients have drawn up a preliminary agreement on tariffs and export controls.

It’s a start.

Next week, they’ll meet again in my office and we’ll practice our affirmations. We’ll do a short exercise involving gratitudes.

Then we’ll move on to saving the planet.

[Foreign Policy in Focus first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How to Defrost the Cold War With China appeared first on Fair Observer.

While the threat of a devastating military conflict between China and the United States in the region still looms, the South China Sea has already experienced irreparable damage. Decades of over-harvesting have, for instance, had a disastrous impact on that sea’s once-flourishing fish. The tuna, mackerel, and shark populations have fallen to 50% of their 1960s levels. Biologically critical coral reef atolls are already struggling to survive rising ocean temperatures. Now, they are also being buried under sand and silt as the Chinese military lays claim to and builds on the disputed Spratly Islands, an archipelago of 14 small isles and 113 reefs. Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam have also laid claim to many of the same islands.

Perhaps no one should be surprised, since oil and gas deposits are plentiful in the South China Sea. The US government estimates that 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas are ready to be extracted from its floor. Such fossil-fuel reserves, some believe, are helping to — yes, how can anyone not use the word? — fuel the turmoil increasingly engulfing the region.

This year, the Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative reported that several countries are pursuing new oil and gas development projects in those contested waters. The organization notes that these waters could become a “flashpoint in the disputes.” Between 2018 and 2021, there were numerous standoffs between China, Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries over drilling operations there. Fears are building that even more severe confrontations lie ahead.

The United States, of course, lays the blame for all of this on China, claiming its aggressive island-reclamation projects violate international law and “militarize an already tense and contested area.” Yet the US is also playing a significant part in raising tensions in the region by agreeing to supply Australia with nuclear-powered submarines as part of its Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) security pact.

The goal, no doubt, is to restrain Chinese activity with the threat of Western military might. “Next steps could include basing US nuclear-capable platforms — such as strategic bombers — in Australia as well as cooperation on hypersonic missiles, cyber operations [and] quantum computing,” writes Derek Grossman for the Rand Corporation, the “paramilitary academy” of American defense policy. In fact, the US is evidently preparing to deploy the first nuclear-capable B-52s to that country soon.

On August 25th, in partnership with Australia and the Philippines (where Washington is getting ready to occupy bases ever closer to China), US Marines practiced retaking an “island” supposedly captured by hostile forces. In that exercise,1,760 Australian and Filipino soldiers and 120 US Marines conducted mock beach landings and air assault maneuvers in Rizal, a small town in western Palawan province in the Philippines, which does indeed face the South China Sea.

“A whole lot of damage can be done to Australia before any potential adversary sets foot on our shores, and maintaining the rules-based order in Southeast Asia, maintaining the collective security of Southeast Asia, is fundamental to maintaining the national security of our country,” said Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles of the joint military drills.

Like AUKUS itself, those war games were intended to send a message: China beware. The resources of the South China Sea aren’t for the taking.

It’s not just about energy

But here’s a question to consider: Is all this international saber-rattling only about fossil fuels?

Well-used shipping routes through the area are vital to the Chinese economy andt o the flow of goods globally. Further, the South China Sea’s fisheries account for 15% of the reported global wild fish catch. Yet trade nor fisheries fully explain the ever-heightening controversy over the region.

Having exploited that sea’s wild fisheries for decades, China is now becoming a global leader in fish farming, which already accounts for 72% of the country’s domestic fish production, Fossil fuels are also gradually being phased out. But is it possible that another set of natural resources, arguably more crucial to the economic future of the global superpowers, could be adding to the growing territorial furor over who possesses the goods in the South China Sea?

The answer is mining. You could call it a race to the bottom, with China leading the pack. In December 2022, China unveiled the Ocean Drilling Ship, a deep sea mining vessel, the size of a battle cruiser, set to be operational by 2024. Instead of weaponry, the ship is equipped with advanced excavation equipment capable of drilling at depths of 32,000 feet.

On land, the Chinese already hold a virtual monopoly on metals considered vital to “green” energy development, including cobalt, copper and lithium. Currently, the Chinese control 60% of the world’s supply of such “green” metals and are now eyeing the abundant resources that exist beneath the ocean’s floor as well. By some estimates, that seabed could contain 1,000 times more rare earth elements than those below dry ground.

It’s difficult to believe that devastating the ocean’s depths in search of minerals for electric batteries and other technologies would offer a sustainable way to fend off climate change. In the process, after all, such undersea mining is likely to have a catastrophic impact, including the destruction of biodiversity. Right now, it’s impossible to gauge just what sort of damage will be inflicted by the operations, since deep-sea mining is exempt from environmental impact assessments. (How convenient for those who will argue about how crucial they will be to producing a greener, more sustainable future.)

The UN’s High Seas Treaty, ratified in March 2023, failed to include environmental rules regulating such practices after China blocked any discussion of a possible moratorium on seabed harvesting. As of 2022, China holds five exploration contracts, issued by the UN’s International Seabed Authority (ISA), which allow the Chinese to conduct tests and sample contents on the ocean floor. While the UN body can divvy up such contracts, they have no power to regulate the industry itself, nor the personnel to do so. This has scientists worried that unfettered deep-sea mining could cause irreparable damage, including killing sea creatures and destroying delicate habitats.

“We’ve only scratched the surface of understanding the deep ocean,” said Dr. Andrew Chin, a scientific adviser to the Australian-based Save Our Seas Foundation.

Science is just starting to appreciate that the deep sea is not an empty void but is brimming with wonderful and unique life forms. Deep sea ecosystems form an interconnected realm with mid and surface waters through the movement of species, energy flows, and currents. Not only will the nodule mining result in the loss of these species and damage deep sea beds for thousands of years, it will potentially result in negative consequences for the rest of the ocean and the people who depend on its health.

Others are concerned that the ISA, even if it had the authority to regulate the budding industry, wouldn’t do it all that well. “Not only does the ISA favor the interests of mining companies over the advice of scientists, but its processes for EIA [environmental impact assessment] approvals are questionable,” says Dr. Helen Rosenbaum of the Deep-Sea Mining Campaign.

This brings us back to the South China Sea, which, according to Chinese researchers, holds large reserves of “strategically important” precious metals. China has already been fervently scouting for deposits of the polymetallic nodules that hold a number of metals used in virtually all green technologies.

“Learning the distribution of polymetallic nodules will help us to choose a site for experimenting with collection, which is one of the main goals of the mission,” said Wu Changbin, general commander of the Jiaolong, a submarine that discovered just such polymetallic nodules in the South China Sea.

Unsurprisingly, the US, lagging behind China in acquiring minerals for green technologies, has been keeping close tabs on the competition. In 2017, a Navy P3-Orion spy plane conducted repeated flyovers of a Chinese research vessel near the island of Guam. Scientists on the ship were allegedly mapping the area and planting monitoring devices for future deep-sea exploration.

The story is much the same in the South China Sea, where the US has conducted numerous surveillance operations to follow Chinese activities there. In May, an Air Force RC-135 surveillance plane was intercepted by a Chinese J-16 jet fighter, causing an international uproar. Without providing any justification for why a US spy plane was there in the first place, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken quickly pointed the finger at China’s recklessness. The “Chinese pilot took dangerous action in approaching the plane very, very closely,” claimed Blinken. “There have been a series of these actions directed not just at us, but in other countries in recent months.”

While these quarrels no doubt have much to do with control over fossil fuels, oil and natural gas aren’t the only resources in the region that are vital to the forthcoming exploits of both countries.

Capitalism and the climate

Across the globe, oil and coal are increasingly becoming things of the past. A report released in June 2023 by the International Energy Agency suggested that renewables were “set to soar by 107 gigawatts (GW), the largest absolute increase ever, to more than 440 GW in 2023.” The natural resources supplying this global surge in renewables, like copper and lithium, are becoming the popular new version of fossil fuels. Markets are favoring the phase-out of climate-warming energy sources. That’s why China and the United States are forging ahead with mining critical minerals for renewables — not because they care about the future of the planet, but because green energy is becoming profitable.

China’s foray into the global capitalist system and the ruins left in its wake are easy enough to track. In the late 1970s, China’s leaders liberalized the country’s markets and opened the floodgates on foreign investment, making China —  at an average clip of 9.5% per year — one of the fastest-growing economies ever. The World Bank described China’s financial boom as “the fastest sustained expansion by a major economy in history.” It’s no surprise, then, that energy consumption exploded along with its economic gains.

Like many of its global competitors, China’s economy still relies heavily on carbon-intensive fossil fuels, especially coal, but an ever-growing portion of its energy portfolio is made up of renewable energy. China’s mammoth manufacturing industry makes up the greater part of its energy demand. Coal is indeed still fueling that economic engine in a major way — China uses more coal than the rest of the world combined — but the country has also become a (if not the) world leader in renewables, investing an estimated $545 billion in new technologies in 2022 alone.

While China uses more energy than any other country, Americans consume significantly more than two times that of the Chinese on an individual basis (73,677 kilowatt-hours versus 28,072 as of 2023). And while the US uses more energy per person, it also gets less of its energy from renewables.

As of 2022, the US government estimated that only 13.1% of the country’s primary energy was produced through renewable sources. Even so, the energy transition in the US is happening and, while natural gas has largely replaced coal, renewables are making considerable inroads. Aiding this, the Inflation Reduction Act, signed into law by President Biden in early 2022, earmarked $430 billion in government investment and tax credits for green-energy development.

The World Economic Forum estimates that three billion tons of metals and fine minerals will be needed for the world’s energy transition if we are to reach zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050 — and that number will undoubtedly only grow in the decades ahead. Of course, investors love to cash in, and the forthcoming explosion in the mining of green metals on land and in the world’s waters will surely be a windfall for Wall Street and its equivalents globally. BloombergNEF (BNEF), which covers global markets, claims that the demand for key metals and minerals for the energy transition will grow at least fivefold over the next 30 years, representing something like a $10 trillion opportunity. At stake is the mining of critical minerals like lithium and traditional metals like copper, which will be used in power generation, electrical grids, energy storage, and transportation.

“The energy transition could lead to a super-cycle for the metals and mining industry,” says Yuchen Huo, a mining analyst for BNEF. “This cycle will be driven by massive expansions in clean energy technologies, which would spur demand growth for both critical minerals and traditional metals.”

It should be no surprise, then, that countries like China and the United States are likely to battle (perhaps all too literally) over access to the finite natural resources vital to the world’s energy transition. Capitalism depends on it. From Africa to the South China Sea, nations are scouring the globe for new, profitable energy ventures. In the Pacific Ocean, which covers 30% of the Earth’s surface, the hunt for polymetallic nodules is prompting island governments to open their waters to excavation in a significant way. The Cook Islands has typically issued licenses to explore its nearby ocean’s depths. Kiribati, Nauru and Tonga have funded missions to investigate deposits in the Clarion Clipperton Zone, a 1.7 million-square-mile area stretching between the island of Kiribati and Mexico.

This deep sea “exploration frenzy is occurring in the absence of regulatory regimes or conservation areas to protect the unique and little-known ecosystems of the deep sea,” contends Dr. Rosenbaum of the Deep-Sea Mining Campaign. “The health and environmental impacts of deep-sea mining will be widespread … The sea is a dynamic and interconnected environment. The impacts of even a single mine will not be contained to the deep sea.”

According to those who want to mine our way out of the climate crisis, such highly sought-after metals and minerals will remain crucial to weaning the world off dirty fossil fuels. But count on one thing: they will come at a grave cost — not only geopolitically but environmentally, too. Perhaps nowhere will such impacts be felt more devastatingly than in the world’s fragile seas, including the South China Sea where major armed powers are already facing off in an unnerving fashion. The toll both on those waters and on the rest of us is still to be discovered.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Competition Over “Green” Mineral Wealth Is the Environment’s Newest Threat appeared first on Fair Observer.

Despite the addition of South Africa in 2010 and the establishment of the New Development Bank in 2014 and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement in 2015, BRICS lay becalmed for years. It has only really been energized by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The way in which the war has bolstered relations between the US and its allies in Europe and Asia has spurred Beijing to see BRICS as the best available vehicle to pull some middle powers more firmly into its orbit. As Steve Tsang of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, has noted:

What the Chinese are offering is an alternative world order for which autocrats can feel safe and secure in their own countries. They can find an alternative direction of development without having to accept the conditionalities imposed by the democratic Americans and European powers.

In its summit this August, BRICS invited six states to join the grouping on January 1, 2024. Among these are three Arab states: Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia.

What’s motivating the Arab states?

By any reasonable definition, all three countries qualify as autocracies. However, beyond this and the shared objective of closer economic ties with China as a counterweight to the US, they exhibit important differences in their motives.

For Egypt, it is a case of “cleft stick.” On the one hand, it has long been a top recipient of US aid. On the other, its reliance on the dollar has exacerbated the dire economic consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, thanks to its dependency on imported energy and food. Foreign investors have withdrawn billions of dollars as the currency has crashed, the Gulf countries that provided support in the early days of the Sisi coup have lately imposed tougher conditions and a $3 billion loan from the IMF comes with stringent reform requirements. BRICS membership would facilitate trading with other members in local currencies and should help to attract more investment from them.

In contrast, although the UAE has benefitted enormously from Russian investment and has burgeoning trade relations with Russia, China and India (with which it has just finalized a deal to trade in local currencies), the main driver behind its BRICS application is political. It remains close with the US as far as security guarantees are concerned; but its confidence in US bankability has declined to the point where, as Vivian Nereim wrote in The New York Times last month, “Emirati leaders … fear a decline in American interest in the region — and the military defense that comes with it — and argue that Washington has not done enough to deter threats from Iran.” This dates back at least a decade, so joining BRICS would arguably be no more than the latest example of how, as Nereim notes, “a Middle Eastern leader viewed by the US government as an important partner,” Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, “is increasingly striking out on his own path.”

Saudi Arabia is, perhaps, the most interesting of the three. As has been well documented, relations between Washington and Riyadh have been rocky during the Biden presidency. Although they would improve significantly were Donald Trump to win the 2024 election, even this would be unlikely to reassure the Saudis over US security guarantees, particularly given Trump’s failure to act on the 2019 attack on Aramco facilities in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. Hence, Riyadh’s openness to Beijing-brokered rapprochement with Tehran earlier this year which has helped open the BRICS door for both the kingdom and Iran.

Nevertheless, in the margins of the BRICS summit the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, claimed that his country was not committed to joining BRICS before it had had time to consider the terms. As there are no laid-down criteria for membership beyond unanimous agreement among existing members, this is, in itself, sensible. However, it may also mean that Riyadh is using the prospect of BRICS membership as leverage to try to extract more concessions from Washington in their talks over a grand bargain sweeping in the kingdom’s civil nuclear aspirations, arms sales and relations with Israel.

Middle East expert Bruce Riedel (quoted in The Guardian on July 27) is correct that Riyadh is unlikely to want to give Biden an election boost if he could get both the Netanyahu government and the US Senate on board too. However, from a Saudi perspective, there is no downside to testing the waters. Especially since, as Gideon Rachman opined in Financial Times on September 4 (and Jon Hoffman made the same point even more forcefully in Arab Digest’s September 6 podcast), even if a grand bargain were to be struck, it would likely “turn out to be a grand illusion” for Washington.

China is not as available as it seems

All this being said, the biggest illusion of all may be the belief among BRICS candidates that membership would be a major boon to economic ties with China. As I wrote in the Arab Digest’s April 20 newsletter, Beijing is struggling with its own economic headwinds. Furthermore, its dominant role at the BRICS summit notwithstanding, China has been turning increasingly inwards since Xi Jinping first started his drive for self-sufficiency in the overarching quest to sustain in perpetuity the CCP’s grip on power. Beijing’s principal aim in its promotion of BRICS is therefore to work with other autocracies in promoting its governance model internationally, the better to defend it domestically.

None of this is to say that BRICS is doomed to fail. As Oliver Stuenkel opined in a recent essay in The Economist, “the BRICS grouping is here to stay.” Nevertheless:

BRICS expansion … would not be a sign of the group’s growing diplomatic clout — quite the opposite, in fact, since finding a common denominator would become more difficult. Expansion would, rather, be a reflection of China’s growing influence when defining the future of the bloc.

From the perspective of the three Arab aspirants, it is therefore worth reflecting carefully if membership could all too easily turn out to be a Faustian pact.

[Arab Digest first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post BRICS Without Straw: What Does China Offer to New Members? appeared first on Fair Observer.

The drill was part of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s Indo-Pacific Deployment 2023. It was carried out by helicopter destroyer JS Izumo (DDH-183) and destroyer JS Samidare (DD-106), along with the Royal Australian Navy frigate HMAS Anzac (FFH150) and a Royal Australian Air Force P-8A Poseidon Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) in the South China Sea. It emphasized tactical operations such as anti-surface and anti-air warfare.

The war games, which took place in strategically disputed waterways, focused on tactical operations such as anti-surface and anti-air warfare. Following a port call to Vietnam as part of an Indo-Pacific Deployment, the two warships from the JMSDF participated in the bilateral training maneuvers.

The relationship between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has never been stronger or more important, and the JMSDF will work with the RAN on interoperability and mutual understanding in order to improve the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region.

Tokyo and Canberra’s bold Indo-Pacific strategies

The exercise is critical for continued strategic collaboration between Japan and Australia in the region and offers substantial strategic potential for promoting Indo-Pacific multilateralism. Australia and Japan regard each other as special strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific area. The two democratic nations share not only core principles but also strategic interests in a region increasingly threatened by China, which claims large portions of the South China Sea as its own territorial waters.

Japan and Australia vowed to oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East and South China seas, a veiled allusion to Beijing’s maritime aggression there. Japan and Australia vehemently oppose China’s claims and activities that violate international law and norms, notably the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Against such a backdrop, the joint military drill will improve the partners’ combined ability to maintain maritime security and readiness, as well as respond to any regional contingency. 

Fumio Kishida and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison signed a bilateral reciprocal access agreement (RAA) in January 2022 to facilitate mutual troop deployment to each respective country for joint drills and relief operations. The RAA is Japan’s second official defense treaty with another country, confirming Australia’s position as the country’s second most significant security partner behind the United States, Japan’s only treaty ally. 

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida debuted the new “Future of the Indo-Pacific” strategy during last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. In a word, the new strategy represents Japan’s concept of global responsibility. According to Kishida, Japan wishes to offer “a guiding perspective” for a world on the edge of “division and confrontation.” Japan’s “free and open Indo-Pacific” strategy, as it has expressed through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad), has grown in significance since 2016.

Japan has announced a significant increase in defense spending, which it aims to use to strengthen offensive capability platforms and counterstrike capabilities. Japan will spend $324 billion over the next five years to bring itself up to par with NATO expenditure standards. Japan has already upped its defense budget to $51.4 billion in the 2023-2024 fiscal year, a 26% jump from the previous year. Japan wants to purchase long-range missiles like Tomahawks, among other things, to improve its strike capability.

Australia too has outlined a more assertive defense posture in which the country will prioritize new technologies, such as maritime and long-range strike capabilities. In a declassified version of its new defense strategic review—the most significant in over 40 years—Australia determined that it must “re-posture,” since it is no longer as shielded by geography and other nations’ limited ability to project power. The country is set to spend an eye-watering $368 billion ($240 billion in US dollars) on nuclear submarines over the coming years. 

Australia’s priority is to strengthen its involvement and collaboration with Southeast Asian and Pacific allies in reaction to China’s rising assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea and the danger that poses to the global rules-based order.

Japan and Australia part of a broader defense network

Military preparedness in the region has been ramping up. Japan and Australia are not expanding their military spending and cooperation in a vacuum. Both are close allies of the US, which has also increased its involvement in the region by signing the General Security of Military Information Agreement with Japan and India as well as the AUKUS treaty with the UK and Australia. AUKUS aims to significantly strengthen Australia’s maritime capabilities with nuclear-powered submarines. The allies revealed the terms of the accord in March 2023, which included a second pillar on advanced technical exchange and force integration, as well as a substantial new role for AI-enabled platforms.

China, too, has deepened its involvement, for example by ramping up incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone.

China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam all claim areas of the disputed South China Sea. Beijing has constructed artificial islands and military outposts in the waters and has experienced similar conflict with Japan in the East China Sea.

The South China Sea has become a theater of strategic rivalries, especially following the Russia-Ukraine War and the crisis over Taiwan. The Indo-Pacific partners are jointly conducting military deals to counter the Chinese maritime ambitions called the “string of pearls.”

Professional engagement and collaboration with friends and partners are the bedrock of regional stability, which promotes peace and prosperity for all nations. The USS Momsen (DDG 92), an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer, joined the JMSDF and the RAN in the South China Sea for multinational training that was completed on March 15. The coastguards of the United States, Japan and the Philippines, too, are cooperating in maritime exercises in the South China Sea, marking the first such maneuvers between the three nations.

Hence, Japan-Australia’s joint military exercise is part of a broader movement of cooperation between China’s neighbors, which are feeling the pressure of Chinese expansion. They aim to defend freedom of navigation in favor of a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Trident exercise and others like it, however, will also deepen regional tensions as China will be incensed by what it perceives as aggression in its backyard. Whatever happens, we can expect to watch increasing militarization in the region for the foreseeable future.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Japan and Australia Cooperate in the South China Sea appeared first on Fair Observer.

In recent months, among Russian President Vladimir Putin’s followers, there has been much talk of a “forever war” in Ukraine dragging on for years, if not decades. “For us,” Putin told a group of factory workers recently, “this is not a geopolitical task, but a task of the survival of Russian statehood, creating conditions for the future development of the country and our children.”

Visiting Kyiv last February, US President Joseph Biden assured Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, “You remind us that freedom is priceless; it’s worth fighting for, for as long as it takes. And that’s how long we’re going to be with you, Mr. President: for as long as it takes.” A few weeks later, the European Council affirmed “its resolute condemnation of Russia’s actions and unwavering support for Ukraine and its people.” 

With all the major players already committed to fighting a forever war, how could peace possibly come about? With the UN compromised by Russia’s seat on the Security Council and the G7 powers united in condemning “Russia’s illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine,” the most likely dealmaker when it comes to ending this forever war may prove to be President Xi Jinping of China.

China? Really?

In the West, Xi’s self-styled role as a peacemaker in Ukraine has been widely mocked. In February, on the first anniversary of the Russian invasion, China’s call for negotiations as the “only viable solution to the Ukraine crisis” sparked a barbed reply from US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, who claimed the war “could end tomorrow if Russia stopped attacking Ukraine.”

When Xi visited Moscow in March, the statement Chinese officials released claiming that he hoped to “play a constructive role in promoting talks” prompted considerable Western criticism. “I don’t think China can serve as a fulcrum on which any Ukraine peace process could move,” insisted Ryan Hass, a former American diplomat assigned to China. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, pointed out that “China has taken sides” in the conflict by backing Russia and so could hardly become a peacemaker. Even when Xi made a personal call to Zelensky promising to dispatch an envoy to promote negotiations “with all parties,” critics dismissed that overture as so much damage control for China’s increasingly troubled trade relations with Europe.

The symbolism of peace conferences

Still, think about it for a moment. Who else could bring the key parties to the table and potentially make them honor their signatures on a peace treaty? Putin has, of course, already violated UN accords by invading a sovereign state and ruptured his economic entente with Europe by trashing past agreements with Washington to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty. And yet the Russian president relies on China’s support, economically and otherwise, which makes Xi the only leader who might be able to bring him to the bargaining table and ensure that he honors any agreement he may sign. That sobering reality should raise serious questions about how any future Beijing-inspired peace conference might happen and what it would mean for the current world order.

For more than 200 years, peace conferences have not only resolved conflicts but regularly signaled the arrival at stage center of a new world power. In 1815, amid the whirling waltzes in Vienna’s palaces that accompanied negotiations ending the Napoleonic wars, Britain emerged into its century-long reign as the globe’s greatest power. Similarly, the 1885 Berlin Conference that carved up the continent of Africa for colonial rule heralded Germany’s rise as Britain’s most serious rival. The somber deliberations in Versailles’s grand Hall of Mirrors that officially ended World War I in 1919 marked America’s debut on the world stage. Similarly, the 1945 peace conference at San Francisco that established the UN (just as World War II was about to end) affirmed the ascent of US global hegemony.

Imagine the impact if, sooner or later, envoys from Kyiv and Moscow convene in Beijing beneath the gaze of President Xi and find the elusive meeting point between Russia’s aspirations and Ukraine’s survival. One thing would be guaranteed: after years of disruptions in the global energy, fertilizer and grain markets, marked by punishing inflation and spreading hunger, all eyes from five continents would indeed turn toward Beijing.

After all, with the war disrupting grain and fertilizer shipments via the Black Sea, world hunger doubled to an estimated 345 million people in 2023, while basic food insecurity now afflicts 828 million inhabitants of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Should such negotiations ever prove fruitful, a televised signing ceremony hosted by President Xi and watched by countless millions globally would crown China’s rapid 20-year ascent to world power.

The world’s newest great power

Forget Ukraine for a moment and concentrate on China’s economic rise under communist rule, which has been little short of extraordinary. At the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, China was an economic lightweight. Its massive population, 20% of the world’s total, was producing just 4% of global economic output. So weak was China that its leader Mao Zedong had to wait two weeks amid a Moscow winter for an audience with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin just to plead for the industrial technology that would help rebuild an economy devastated by 12 years of war and revolution. In the decade following its admission to the World Trade Organization in 2001, however, China quickly became the workshop of the world, accumulating an unprecedented $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves.

Instead of simply swimming in a hoard of cash like Scrooge McDuck in his Money Bin, in 2013 President Xi announced a trillion-dollar development scheme called the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It aimed to build a massive infrastructure across the Eurasian landmass and Africa, thereby improving the lives of humanity’s forgotten millions, while making Beijing the focal point of Eurasia’s economic development. Today, China is not only an industrial powerhouse that produces 18% of the global gross domestic product (GDP), compared to 12% for the US, but also the world’s chief creditor. It provides capital for infrastructure and industrial projects to 148 nations while offering some hope to the quarter of humanity still subsisting on less than four dollars a day.

Testifying to that economic prowess, for the past six months world leaders have ignored Washington’s pleas to form a united front against China. Instead, remarkable numbers of them, including Germany’s Olaf Scholz, Spain’s Pedro Sánchez and Brazil’s Lula da Silva, have been turning up in Beijing to pay court to President Xi. In April, even French President and US ally Emmanuel Macron visited the Chinese capital, where he proclaimed a “global strategic partnership with China” and urged other countries to become less reliant on the “extraterritoriality of the U.S. dollar.”

Then, in a diplomatic coup that stunned Washington, China took a key step toward healing the dangerous sectarian rivalry between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia by hosting a meeting of their foreign ministers in Beijing. As the Saudis’ chief oil customer and Iran’s largest creditor, Beijing had the commercial clout to bring them to the bargaining table. China’s top diplomat Wang Yi then hailed the restored diplomatic relations as part of his country’s “constructive role in facilitating the proper settlement of hot-spot issues around the world.”

Geopolitics as a source of change

Underlying the sudden display of Chinese diplomatic clout is a recent shift in that essential realm called “geopolitics” that’s driving a fundamental realignment in global power.

Around 1900, at the high tide of the British Empire, the English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder started the modern study of geopolitics by publishing a highly influential article arguing that the construction of the 5,000-mile-long Trans-Siberian Railway from Moscow to Vladivostok was the beginning of a merger of Europe and Asia. That unified land mass, he said, would soon become the epicenter of global power.

In 1997, in his book The Grand Chessboard, former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski updated MacKinder, arguing that “geopolitics has moved from the regional to the global dimension, with preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serving as the central basis for global primacy.” In words particularly apt for our present world, he added: “America’s global primacy is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained.”

Imagine geopolitics as the deep substrate shaping far more superficial political events, even if it’s only noticeable in certain moments, much the way the incessant grinding of the planet’s tectonic plates only becomes visible when volcanic eruptions break through the earth’s surface. For centuries, if not millennia, Europe was separated from Asia by endless deserts and sprawling grasslands. The empty center of that vast land mass was crossed only by an occasional string of camels traveling the ancient Silk Road.

Now, thanks to its trillion-dollar investment in infrastructure—rails, roads, pipelines, and ports—China is fundamentally changing that geopolitical substrate through a more-than-metaphorical merger of continents. If President Xi’s grand design succeeds, Beijing will forge a unified market stretching 6,000 miles from the North Sea to the South China Sea, eventually encompassing 70% of all humanity and effectively fusing Europe and Asia into a single economic continent: Eurasia.

Despite the Biden administration’s fervid attempts to create an anti-Chinese coalition, recent diplomatic eruptions are shaping a new world order that isn’t at all what Washington had in mind. With the economic creation of a true Eurasian sphere seemingly underway, we may be seeing the first signs of the changing face of international politics. The question is: Could a Chinese-engineered peace in Ukraine be next in line?

Pressures on China for peace

Such growing geopolitical power is giving China both the motivation and potentially even the means to negotiate an end to the fighting in Ukraine. First, the means: as Russia’s chief customer for its commodity exports, and Ukraine’s largest trading partner before the war, China can use commercial pressure to bring both parties to the bargaining table, much as it did for Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Next, the motivation: while Moscow and Kyiv might each exude confidence in ultimate victory in their forever war, Beijing has reason to grow impatient with the economic disruptions radiating out across the Black Sea to roil a delicately balanced global economy. According to the World Bank, almost half of humanity (47%) is now surviving on seven dollars a day, and most of them live in Africa, Asia and Latin America where China has made massive, long-term developmental loans to 148 countries under its Belt and Road Initiative.

With 70% of its lands and their rich black soils devoted to agriculture, Ukraine has for decades produced bumper crops of wheat, barley, soybeans and sunflower oil that made it “the breadbasket of the world,” providing the globe’s hungry millions with reliable shipments of affordable commodities. Right after the Russian invasion, however, world prices for grains and vegetable oils shot up by 60%. Despite stabilization efforts, including the UN’s Black Sea Grain Initiative to allow exports through the war zone, prices for such essentials remain all too high. They threaten to go higher still with further disruption of global supply chains or more war damage like the recent rupture of a crucial Ukrainian irrigation dam that’s turning more than a million acres of prime farmland into “desert.”

As costs for imports of fertilizer, grain and other foodstuffs have soared since the Russian invasion, the Council on Foreign Relations reports that “a climbing number of low-income BRI countries have struggled to repay loans associated with the initiative, spurring a wave of debt crises.” In the Horn of Africa, for example, the sixth year of a crippling drought has pushed an estimated 23 million people into a “hunger crisis,” forcing the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya to balance costly food imports with the repayment of Chinese loans for the creation of critical infrastructure like factories, railroads and renewable energy. With such loans surpassing 20% of GDP in nations like Ghana, Malaysia, Pakistan and Zambia, while China itself holds outstanding credits equivalent to 25% of its GDP, China is far more invested in global economic peace and stability than any other major power.

Beyond western fantasies of victory

At present, Beijing might seem alone among major nations in its concern about the strain the Ukraine war is placing on a world economy poised between starvation and survival. But within the coming six months, Western opinion will likely start to shift as its inflated expectations for Ukrainian victory in its long-awaited “spring counteroffensive” meet the reality of Russia’s return to trench warfare.

After the stunning success of Ukraine’s offensives late last year near Kharkiv and Kherson, the West dropped its reticence about provoking Putin and began shipping billions of dollars of sophisticated equipment—first HIMARS and Hawk missiles, then Leopard and Abrams battle tanks and, by the end of this year, advanced F-16 jet fighters. By the war’s first anniversary last February, the West had already provided Kyiv with $115 billion in aid, and expectations of success rose with each new arms shipment. Adding to that anticipation, Moscow’s own “winter offensive” with its desperate suicide attacks on the city of Bakhmut suggested, as Foreign Affairs put it, that “the Russian military demonstrated … it was no longer capable of large-scale combat operations.”

But defense is another matter. While Moscow was wasting some 20,000 lives in suicide assaults on Bakhmut, its specialized tractors were cutting a formidable network of trenches and tank traps along a 600-mile front designed to stall any Ukrainian counteroffensive.

Ukraine’s troops will probably achieve some breakthroughs when that offensive finally begins, but are unlikely to push Russia back from all its post-invasion gains. Remember that Russia’s army of 1.3 million is three times larger than Ukraine’s, which has also suffered many casualties. In March, the commander of Ukraine’s 46th Air Assault brigade told the Washington Post that a year of combat had left 100 dead and 400 wounded in his 500-man unit and that they were being replaced by raw recruits, some of whom fled at the very sound of rifle fire. To counter the few dozen “symbolic” Leopard tanks the West is sending, Russia has thousands of older-model tanks in reserve. Despite US and European sanctions, Russia’s economy has actually continued to grow, while Ukraine’s, which was only about a tenth the size of Russia’s, has shrunk by 30%. Facts like these mean just one thing is likely: stalemate.

Beijing as peacemaker

By next December, if Ukraine’s counteroffensive has indeed stalled, its people face another cold, dark winter of drone attacks, while Russia’s rising casualties and lack of results might by then begin to challenge Putin’s hold on power. In other words, both combatants might feel far more compelled to sit down in Beijing for peace talks. With the threat of future disruptions damaging its delicate global position, Beijing will likely deploy its full economic power to press the parties for a settlement. By trading territory, while agreeing with China on reconstruction aid, and some further strictures on Ukraine’s future NATO membership, both sides might feel they had won enough concessions to sign an agreement.

Not only would China then gain enormous prestige for brokering such a peace deal, but it might win a preferential position in the reconstruction bonanza that would follow by offering aid to rebuild both a ravaged Ukraine and a damaged Russia. In a recent report, the World Bank estimates that it could take $411 billion and over a decade to rebuild a devastated Ukraine through infrastructure contracts of the very kind Chinese construction companies are so ready to undertake. To sweeten such deals, Ukraine could also allow China to build massive factories to supply Europe’s soaring demand for renewable energy and electric vehicles. Apart from the profits involved, such Chinese-Ukrainian joint ventures would ramp up production at a time when that country is likely to gain duty-free access to the European market.

In the post-war moment, with the possibility that Ukraine will be an increasingly strong economic ally at the edge of Europe, Russia still a reliable supplier of cut-rate commodities and the European market ever more open to its state corporations, China is likely to emerge from that disastrous conflict—to use Brzezinski’s well-chosen words—with its “preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent” consolidated and its “basis for global primacy” significantly strengthened.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Peace for Ukraine…Courtesy of China? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Nowhere is this more visible than in the Indo-Pacific. Most prominent is the revived Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a strategic security forum between the United States, India, Japan and Australia. The 2021 foundation of the AUKUS (Australia, UK and US) technology-sharing alliance has also manifested the phenomenon of minilateralism. In both cases, increasing cooperation has been spurred on by an increasingly threatening China.

It remains to be seen whether these organizations will be able to contribute to stability in the region by improving cooperation and governance or destabilize relations by building up opposed blocs.

The need for nuanced international cooperation 

Minilaterals are emerging as a consequence of the shifts in underlying power in the region. China, certainly, has become more belligerent in the last 30 years, but other nations such as South Korea, India and Singapore have been growing and are also asserting their influence in a region no longer dominated by Western powers. For its own part, the West, especially the United States, France and the United Kingdom, has been making efforts to maintain its foothold in the region. These shifts in the underlying power structure have created the need for an intricate cooperation structure that can balance so many overlapping interests.

On the economic front, diplomatic prospects widened with the signing of the Indo- Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) by 13 countries with interests in Southeast Asia, including the QUAD allies headed by the US, last year. The signatories hope to advance sustainable economic development and strategic inclusiveness for the overall peace and stability of the region.

“The future of the 21st century is largely written in the Indo-Pacific,” observed US President Joe Biden. The IPEF reflects the spirit of the Trans-Pacific Partnership as a part

of the US’s so-called “Pivot to Asia.” policy as manifest in the revamped entity of the QUAD. The US has also been pursuing US-Japan-South Korea and US-Japan-Philippines trilateral dialogue. Meanwhile, Australia is strengthening ties with India and Indonesia.

Pou Sothirak, an expert on International affairs at the Asian Institute of Policy Studies, cites a breakdown of trust in the ability of multilaterals to operate effectively and represent member nations’ interests as a major driver of the proliferation of minilaterals.

The inertia and stagnation of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations compromise the effectiveness of these more formal political structures. Meanwhile, the changing nature of contemporary threats, coupled with the rapid development of information technology, has undeniably paved the way for more informal means of dialogue and negotiation, something which the minilaterals promise to incorporate.

More concretely, the Indo-Pacific’s democratic nations find themselves facing a Chinese threat that exceeds their capacity. This requires them to seek outside help and adopt a more aggressive collective stance than was previously necessary.

Challenges and criticisms

However, the picture is not as rosy as it may seem. Despite the strategic viability of these minilaterals, critics allege that they have diminished the sanctity of multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, as well as their own credibility.

This aspect has three facets. Firstly, the increased preference for minilateralism has disrupted international interdependence and globalization, leading to the fragmentation of global governance mechanisms. The Quad’s relatively informal and ambiguous strategic interests in curtailing Chinese belligerence provide an example of this.

Secondly, disparity of threat perceptions between minilaterals has the potential to duplicate the competition and power-building inherent in unilateralism. The increased role of China in the SCO and BRICS, as opposed to regional forums of the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) and the G20, illustrate how this can disrupt the process of consensus-building.

Lastly, incompatibility of interests, coupled with centralizing nature of such institutions, have fostered accountability and compliance issues, arising from non-binding targets and commitments in mutually institutionalized, exclusive power blocs, as opposed to legally sanctioned ones, accentuating the existing differences in the Ind0-Pacific.

It could be said that minilateralism as a process cannot remain isolated and has to complement the existing multilateral institutions. Moreover, successful outcomes can only be materialized should member nations endeavor to bring about the very atmosphere of discourse that exists within minilaterals into the larger regional and multilateral framework as well. A lot still needs to be worked upon, given the tremendous hegemonic shift in present-day international affairs.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific and the Rise of Minilateralism appeared first on Fair Observer.

A good starting point would be the Arthashastra (composed some time between 200 BC and 300 AD) one of India’s most prominent literary collections. Its author, Kautilya, can shed light on India’s strategic logic, as some critics are accusing India’s foreign policy of following a hyper-realist approach. Others have even gone so far as to blame a Hindu nationalist mindset, referring to it as “Hindutva realism” and sometimes casually portraying India as an ally of Russia. Therefore, the key to understanding the nuances of Indian strategic thinking lies in Kautilya’s ancient writings.

The Arthashastra stands out among its peers since it details the grand strategy and tactical maneuvers we see in today’s foreign policy practice. Its role as a didactic text that acts as a moral-strategic compass for decision-making (both subconscious and conscious) has also contributed to its relevance in the present day. Traces of the Arthashastra can be found in Kamandaki, Somadeva, Sukranti, Panchtantra, all ancient Indian texts. Its influence is also present in Mughal, British, and independent Indian writings; and is especially visible in India’s first Prime Minister Pandit Nehru’s moral politics.

Indian foreign policy and Kautilyan thought

Kautilya’s ideas have been an essential inspiration for scholars involved in India’s strategy. Although their interpretation may have branched out through various subcultures, the phenomenon highlights the wide scope of schools of thought within the broader umbrella of strategic thinking. Today, when we see India engaging with the global community to shape international developments, Kautilya’s strategic thinking is never too far away. Most of India’s engagements with other states have been shaped by its national interests. Here, Indian thought conforms to the principle of yokagshema (assurance of welfare), a notion that encompasses both the prosperity and security of citizens.

This is not new, as we have seen this approach even in India’s stance on climate change negotiation: domestic considerations have shaped its international position and obligations which have prioritized the citizens’ needs over moral obligations. Kautilyan thought puts the onus on expanding and maintaining the power capabilities of the state while protecting its citizens and giving them the tools to prosper. We see this phenomenon playing in India’s interaction with Russia, but also in its relations with the US, China and other countries. 

This political approach undertaken by the Modi government differs from the moralistic one other states have followed. The latter tend to focus explicitly on normative values such as human rights and liberal rules-based order. Today, Kautilya’s focus on a mixture of political morality and rationality comes into play in India’s approach. The latter is obviously not oblivious to issues of low politics, but overarching domestic factors that play into the international order do shape India’s worldview, which harks back to Kautilyan’s thought. Lately, the COVID-19 pandemic has also pushed up domestic factors in the list of priorities. In other words, India’s foreign policy and diplomatic approach is never divorced from its internal politics.

Kautilya’s sadgunya (Six Foreign Policy Measures) have also influenced India foreign policy. One of those measures is known as Yana—building up one’s capacities and capabilities in order to prepare for the worst scenario: war. As India builds its military capabilities, its focus is to make sure that it protects its interests rather than entangle itself with the US to isolate Russia, which would push Russia towards China. India’s focus is now locked on China. Any action by the West that strengthens the Russia-China axis will prove to be detrimental to India’s long-term interests.

Hence, India remains cautious in its relations with Russia and the US. Another argument is that Kautilya teaches his readers to prefer a friend or ally that is more consistent in its approach. India’s dependence on Russia for its defense inventory is just one part of the equation. Russia has consistently been more supportive of India’s interests than the US, a much more recent partner. Currently, a careful, introspective debate is underway in New Delhi to determine where the US and Russia fit in India’s grand strategy. 

Keeping the balance

India does not want its ties with the US to upset Russia, since adding another rival that can exacerbate current issues does not make any sense. At the same time, strengthening the partnership with the US is also important, but India would rather not compromise on its objectives (public welfare and independence).

The partnership with the US is more about increasing India’s relative power while refusing to surrender its bargaining power. This is a carefully balanced strategy that aims to protect and expand its partnerships while sticking to the best scenario that minimizes India’s vulnerability and maximizes its prosperity vis-à-vis China. India recognizes that any form of increased partnership leading towards an alliance with the US will put India in a compromising position, which will affect the welfare of its people. 

India focusing on fostering diverse and better relations with other countries is just an updated version of Kautilya’s foreign policy approach that fits perfectly in today’s context. Here, multi-alignment serves India’s objectives to engage with multiple countries to achieve its foreign policy goals and attain its economic objectives. This is a major part of building up its capacity and capabilities as part of its strategy regarding China.

To understand India’s strategic policy, one must be aware of the holistic approach that connects external and internal policies in order to attain grand objectives and of the preference given to the latter in the strategic-planning equation. It seems that in a world governed by what Kautilya called Matsyanyaya (“the law of the fish,” where the big fish eats the smaller ones), India is once again banking on Kautilya’s Arthashastra. Kautilya has always been the key to make sense of India’s foreign policy and diplomacy, and this is especially true in today’s context where the dichotomies of good/evil, democracy/authoritarian, and moral/immoral have muddied our analysis.

[Thomas Isackson edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Here Are the Secrets Behind India’s Strategic Behavior appeared first on Fair Observer.

Widely seen as giving China a grip on Qatari gas, the deal is as much a commercial agreement as it is a security arrangement. It acknowledges China as the Gulf state’s foremost export market and gives China a stake in protecting Qatar.

Qatar is not alone in giving China preferential access to its energy reserves. So do other major Gulf exporters, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, for whom China has become their foremost market.

Qatar has close ties with the US

The difference is that Qatar’s energy dealings with China are embedded in a policy that broadly aligns the Gulf state with the United States, emphasizes the Gulf state’s utility as a go-between, and avoids ruffling feathers.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia and the UAE stress their independence, on occasion counter or distance themselves from the policies of the United States, the region’s security guarantor, and sometimes poke the US in the eye.

Last month, the contrast was on full display. While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed raised eyebrows as the only head of state to attend the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani flew under the radar a week later when he met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

Bin Zayed “has made a sport out of rebuffing the Biden administration’s efforts to repair the relationship” between the United States and the UAE. “Of course, from his own perspective, Bin Zayed has proved himself a loyal partner to the United States time and again, but of late has had little to show for it,” said scholars Jonathan Lord and Airona Baigal.

In a further illustration of the contrast, Qatar arranged a meeting between a senior Venezuelan and US official last month to improve strained relations resulting from the United States’ recognition of opposition leader Juan Guaido as Venezuela’s legitimate president and US sanctions against the South American state.

Officials said the talks could lead to a prisoner swap.

“Getting involved in Venezuela is a high-reward/low-risk strategy. By offering its services, Doha is consolidating its emerging reputation as a global diplomatic go-between, helping Washington in several particularly politically sensitive areas,” said Eldar Mamedov, a Brussels-based foreign policy expert.

A seemingly unlikely candidate to mediate in a region with which it has no ethnic or religious affinity, Qatar was well-positioned because it had neither joined a large number of governments recognizing Guaido nor adhered to the sanctions. Qatar’s refusal failed to upset Washington.

Similarly, Qatar hosts a Taliban office at the United States’ request. Hosting facilitated the 2021 negotiated US withdrawal from Afghanistan and US-Taliban contacts since then. With the withdrawal underway, Qatar, like the UAE, provided significant logistical assistance.

Furthermore, Qatar, at times, mediates between the United States and Iran and serves as a postman relaying messages between the two countries.

At the same time, Qatar, unlike the UAE, has not emerged as a haven for Russians seeking to circumvent US and European sanctions, including Russia’s Wagner Group, or suspected criminals and corrupt officials.

As a result, the US has sanctioned Emirati rather than Qatari companies for violating US sanctions on Russia and Iran. Moreover, Emirati freewheeling has landed the UAE on the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering watchdog.

Furthermore, Qatar has ensured that it is less dependent on Chinese telecommunications technology that the United States fears could give China access to US technology embedded in American weapons systems and other security projects.

Last year, the US rewarded Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Middle East, by awarding major non-NATO ally status.

UAE and Saudi Arabia do not love the US the same way

To be sure, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have been helpful, most recently negotiating prisoner swaps between Russia and Ukraine. In the past, the UAE contributed troops to support the United States in Afghanistan.

The different Gulf state approaches are rooted in Qatar’s response to the failed 3.5-year-long UAE-Saudi-led economic and diplomatic boycott of the Gulf state. The embargo was lifted in early 2021 without the Gulf state caving in to demands that would have put Qatar under Emirati and Saudi tutelage.

During the boycott, Qatar significantly tightened its security relationship and cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism finance.

As a result, Qatari perceptions of relations with the United States differ from the Saudi and Emirati experience.

Ali Shihabi, a Saudi commentator with close ties to the Saudi ruling elite, noted that the kingdom “has changed dramatically over the years, from its infancy before the Second World War to a more self-confident G-20 country secure in its place in the world today.”

Saudi attitudes have been compounded by perceptions that “the US security umbrella has been weakened as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned… (That) convinced Saudi leaders that they had to look elsewhere to guarantee their security,” Shihabi said. He was referring to a US refusal to come to the kingdom’s aid when Iran in 2019 attacked Saudi oil facilities. He was also referring to a US cutoff of arms and ammunition sales because of the Saudi intervention in Yemen.

Emirati officials voice similar complaints about US reluctance to respond to Iranian-inspired attacks.

In the same vein, Karen Elliot House, an expert on the kingdom, quoted a Saudi minister as saying in March in a closed-door conference: “You tell us not to talk to Russia, your opponent, but you are talking to Iran, our opponent. You say don’t buy Chinese weapons. ‘Do you have an alternative,’ we ask? ‘Yes,’ you say, ‘but we can’t sell it to you.'”

Another minister told the gathering, “You said you were behind us in our war in Yemen, but you proved a no-show.”

House, referring to Bin Salman by his initials, added, “The Crown Prince is making a virtue of relying less on a reluctant US to protect his nation… MBS is skillfully playing a tough hand of great power poker to benefit Saudi Arabia.”

Even so, North America remains a primary investment target of Emirati and Saudi sovereign wealth funds. Last year, the US$829 billion Abu Dhabi Investment Authority allocated between 45 and 60% of its investments to North America.

[The Turbulent World first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Qatar: America’s Best Friend in the Gulf? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Breakdown of the US’s ability to talk to and think about China

Under Presidents George W Bush, Barack Obama and, partly, Donald Trump, the US had institutionalized large-scale communications with China, especially through the strategic economic dialogue (Bush), strategic and economic dialogue (Obama), and comprehensive economic dialogue (Trump). Dozens of senior officials regularly met. Those dialogues could not resolve the great issues like Taiwan or intellectual property, but officials came to understand each other and render differences manageable.

When Donald Trump became President, Xi Jinping was determined to keep communications open and relations constructive. Chinese scholars say the lavish welcome Trump was given was historically exceptional.

As with other relationships, Trump responded initially with admiration: “President Xi is a brilliant man. If you went all over Hollywood to look for somebody to play the role of President Xi, you couldn’t find it. There’s nobody like that. The look, the brain, the whole thing.” Likewise, at Davos in 2020: “Our relationship with China has now probably never, ever been better … He’s for China, I’m for the US but, other than that, we love each other.” But Trump’s mood changed and the dialogue lapsed. Biden chose to permanently abandon institutionalized dialogue permanently. Blinken’s trip marginally walks back that decision and marginally walks back the coldness Blinken deliberately instilled at his initial meeting with the Chinese in Anchorage.

US Presidents traditionally ensure the presence of some cabinet-level officials with expertise and experience on the most vital national security issue of the time, once the Soviet Union and now China. No Cold War president would have been without the top-level expertise brought to the task by a Kissinger, Brzezinski or Scowcroft.

George W. Bush was a foreign policy failure in many respects but, guided by Hank Paulsen in the Treasury and brilliant CIA China expert Dennis Wilder in the National Security Council (NSC), he balanced his strong support for Taiwan’s security with strong support for the 1970s peace agreements and ended up admired by both Taipei and Beijing.

Obama ended the tradition of having cabinet-level China expertise. Trump followed suit. Biden has been exceptionally striking in declaring that China is America’s ultimate foreign policy threat but hiring no top-level expertise on China. His Secretary of State, National Security Advisor and CIA Director spent their careers on the Middle East and Europe; his Secretary of Defense on the Middle East. Even Biden’s ambassador to China is a career Middle East and Europe official. His NSC Asia czar has no direct experience with China and became famous for demanding disengagement based on the false assertion that US engagement with China presumed engagement would democratize China.  

Some of these officials, like CIA Director William J Burns, are outstanding and have deployed their European expertise to resist Russian aggression. Regarding China, though, it is another story. Imagine the CEO of a giant food company announcing that cereals constitute the greatest opportunity and the greatest competitive threat, then announcing that the heads of the Wheaties division, the Cheerios division, the oatmeal division and all others would be hamburger experts.

Below the leadership level, things are even worse. Intelligence and Defense Department officials say that it has become so difficult for anyone with China expertise and experience to get security clearance that the US has partially blinded itself. Scholars and business executives who bridge the two countries are frightened, and vast numbers are considering departure to China. Some visiting Chinese professors, including two of the most pro-American international relations scholars and one invited personally by Jimmy Carter, have been treated very badly by US immigration authorities.

In short, Biden has continued and worsened the Trump disjunction between strategic imperatives and leadership skills, the Trump contempt for expertise and the Trump (late, partial, possibly temporary) dismissal of institutionalized dialogue. No weekend trip can ameliorate these fundamental realities.

The US fumes against China because it no longer understands it

Magnifying the consequences is a vital difference between Trump and Biden. Trump always sought the deal, albeit a misconceived deal: The trade war was about trade disparities, and if Beijing took specific actions, the trade war would proportionately ease. Biden proposes no deal, just escalated sanctions.

Given the overwhelming evidence that steel and aluminum tariffs hurt the US more than China, raise prices and cost many tens of thousands of US jobs, most economists assumed that the President whose slogan is “a foreign policy for the middle class” would lift them. But, no: US Trade Representative Katherine Tai says they are necessary to maintain “leverage” over China. There is of course no leverage from policies that damage America more than China.

The Biden administration has totally repudiated the peace compromise so successfully negotiated by Kissinger and Brzezinski.

Lacking expertise, Washington frequently seems clueless about how the world views its China policies. For instance, Blinken and Biden often broadcast versions of Biden’s June 9 statement that China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a “debt and confiscation program.” Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo characterized Belt & Road similarly. Developing world leaders, who frequently contrast China’s development offers with Washington’s lectures or its omnipresent Special Forces teams, know that is false. Every China specialist knows the study of 1100 Chinese loans that found there was not a single instance of China using debt problems to seize collateral.

Does the US President have no idea what he is talking about, or is he systematically spreading disinformation? Either way, developing countries can dismiss much of US policy. For instance, many give credence to the argument that the problem in both Europe and Asia is US efforts to encircle and destabilize its adversaries. Hence, all of Latin America, Africa and the Middle East align with China regarding US sanctions on Russia.

The big problem is Taiwan. Henry Kissinger warns that we are sliding toward war over Taiwan. The Biden administration has totally repudiated the peace compromise so successfully negotiated by Kissinger and Brzezinski. Washington promised to abstain from official relations or an alliance with Taiwan. But President Biden has promised four times to defend Taiwan; that is an alliance.

Speaker Pelosi was emphatic that her August trip to Taipei was an “official” trip; immediately after her meeting with President Tsai, the presidential spokeswoman went on island-wide TV and proclaimed, “We are a sovereign and independent country.”

Responding to lesser provocations, George W Bush, his secretary of state, and his deputy secretary of state, no panda-hugging liberals, distanced the US and warned Taipei to stop. Instead, Secretary Blinken continues to welcome such official relations and tell the Chinese not to “overreact.” 

The angry popular reaction inside China to Xi’s failure to respond decisively to such US initiatives is the one risk that could topple Xi Jinping from power. Concern about that is the one thing that could trigger him to launch a direct attack on Taiwan.

Biden has no senior advisor who understands such things. Blinken and Sullivan act on how they believe theoretically China should react, not on knowledge of actual Chinese politics.

If war comes, it will not be the limited conflict of US war games. China will hit Okinawa immediately or lose. The US will hit mainland Chinese bases immediately or lose. China will respond against the US.

The common denominator of Trump’s MAGA policies, Biden’s MAGA-plus policies, and Representative Mike Gallagher’s ultra-MAGA policies is a repudiation of the promises and norms the US accepted when Nixon, Carter, Mao and Deng compromised to eliminate what had been a terrible risk of conflict over Taiwan.

The cover for that repudiation is an endless repetition of the assertion that China is planning an invasion of Taiwan, an assertion for which the US intelligence community says there is no evidence.

The fact of the matter is that Washington’s hard left and the hard right always despised compromise. The pragmatic center has evaporated, for domestic reasons, and the self-righteous ideologues rule Congress. No quick visit, no fog of diplomatic niceties will arrest the resultant reversion to the pre-1972 risk of war.

(China took an equally dangerous turn, also for domestic reasons. Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Canadian hostages, economic war on Australia, and much else are serious issues. But this article is about the US; previous US administrations handled middle-sized issues without sliding toward war.)

Biden was elected by the pragmatic center, but he has no China team, no China policy, no strategic vision. He should be wary of taking even a small risk that history will remember him for the first inadvertent world war of choice. Weekend trips for marginal changes of tone do not address the problem.

[Asia Times first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Sending Blinken to China Won’t Interrupt the Slide Toward War appeared first on Fair Observer.

The rhetoric being exchanged between the two countries is becoming ever more heated. These exchanges are inimical to the exploration of compromise.

Mistrust and hostility build on both sides

On the US side, active preparation for rivalry with China is one of the very few things that seems to unite Republicans and Democrats.

President Biden has continued with the tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum, imposed by President Trump on supposed security grounds. President Biden has also continued the Trump policy of making it easier for US officials to meet Taiwanese officials, something that infuriates Beijing. Former Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan led to a suspension of important working meetings, all for the sake of a photo opportunity.

The reason given for the steel and aluminum tariffs is that these materials might be used in warfare. Allies of the US are being pressured to apply the same policies to China, thereby dividing the world into two hostile blocs.

For its part, China’s navy is using hostile tactics towards US vessels in the international waters of the South China Sea. An important principle is at stake here. The entire world benefits from freedom of navigation in international waters. Without the freedom of the seas being guaranteed, first by the Royal Navy and later by the US Navy, the prosperity the world enjoyed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have been impossible.

China is also launching thousands of cyber attacks every day on Taiwan.

A conflict between the powers would not be pretty

Charles Kupchan, an American expert on international relations, who I came to like and admire during my time in Washington, has issued a stern warning about complacency about the development of a “cold war” with China in the latest edition of The Atlantic.

The balance of power for the US in a cold war with China will be very different than the one it had with the USSR. China has four times the US population, whereas the US and USSR had similar populations. China’s gross domestic product will soon exceed that of the US. The USSRs GDP was only a fraction of that US. China already has a slightly larger Navy than does the US, and Chinese spending on research and development has increased dramatically in the past 10 years.

China is, however, an aging society, whereas the US is not. China’s birth rate is so low that some speculate that the US population could exceed that of China by the year 2100!

With that context, I was surprised to read that, at present, a quarter of young Chinese are currently unable to find a suitable job. Chinese local governments have run up big debts building apartments that are lying empty.

Centralized thinking in the Chinese Communist Party has the potential to undermine China’s military efforts by introducing rigidity of thinking. Unlike the US, China’s military has little combat experience. Chinese military spending is 12 times that of Taiwan, but it is still much less than that of the US.

China and the West need to work together, not waste energy fighting

The rivalry between China and the US is diverting resources away from cooperative possibilities in areas, like climate change and food insecurity, in which both countries have a shared interest.

The dispute places the EU, as an ally of the US, in difficulty. It shares all the US reservations about Chinese policies on a range of issues. It has said that the Chinese stance on the invasion of Ukraine will be “the determining factor.” That is a clear prioritization, which China should not ignore.

One of the big problems flowing from the present rivalry is a simple breakdown in communications. Canceled meetings have allowed misunderstandings to increase.

The same event is interpreted differently in Washington to the way it is interpreted in Beijing. Each side sincerely believes its interpretation. Minor issues for one can be seen as hostile signals by the other side when they were not so intended.

I believe the US and China should consider instituting some sort of “political truce” for a predetermined period.

This should be designed to allow a concentration of the formidable diplomatic weight of the two countries on an issue in which they have a shared interest, namely mitigating climate change. Such a signal by the two big powers would prompt the rest of the world to do more.

A “circuit breaker” of this kind is needed to prevent the current disagreement from spiraling out of control.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The World Needs the US and China to Talk appeared first on Fair Observer.

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa tried to line up a number of African leaders to travel to Russia and Ukraine in an effort to persuade the two countries to stop fighting. He was joined on the trip by the leaders of Senegal, Comoros and Zambia. Three presidents pulled out, one (Uganda) because of a case of Covid, a second (Republic of Congo) because of security concerns and a third (Egypt) for no specific reason.

The timing was not great. Because it recently launched its much-anticipated counteroffensive, Kyiv was not in the mood for compromise. Nor has Russia been exactly diplomacy-positive either, not only refusing to give up the territory it illegally annexed but continuing to try to expand its holdings. The Kremlin has also been busy bombarding Ukrainian targets. Missile attacks on Kyiv continued even as the African delegation visited the capital city, forcing the members to take cover in a bomb shelter.

And then there’s the fiasco at the Warsaw airport.

A second airplane with Ramaphosa’s security team and a number of South African journalists never made it to Ukraine. Stuck at their transit stop in Poland, the airplane sat on the tarmac for hours and hours as the Polish authorities refused to allow the passengers to disembark. A journalist on the trip reported:

Aboard the stuffy SAA A340-300 plane conditions are starting to resemble a refugee camp. Passengers have not left the plane since around 23:00 on Wednesday, and although water and take away food were delivered, supplies have now been depleted. Unwashed security personnel, SAA staff and journalists have been forced to shape a grim existence on the plane, walking up and down the aisles and using different toilets for distraction.

The head of Ramaphosa’s security detail accused the Poles of “shocking and racist” conduct. Then came news of 12 rather large containers of weapons on board the airplane that did not have the proper permits. The weapons were reportedly for the use of the security detail. But according to “highly placed South African government insiders,” the boxes also contained “long-range sniper rifles and weapons normally used in serious conflict.”

Wait, what? A peace delegation bearing gifts of war?

Okay, it was a large security detail of 100 people, and maybe they thought they’d be plunged into the thick of war. Or perhaps the weapons were somehow connected to South African arms dealer Ivor Ichikowitz, who was instrumental in organizing the initiative. Although the South African government has been quite close with the Kremlin—ditto Ichikowitz—it has not likely supplied Russia with any arms after its invasion of Ukraine. But arms dealers can make as much from a negotiated peace—supplying both sides of the ceasefire line—as they can from a continued war. Maybe those boxes were simply a sneak peek.

A Canadian Perspective on Ukraine, Iraq and Afghanistan

After more than 24 hours on the tarmac, the plane eventually returned to South Africa, with those 12 crates of weapons. It’s a shame the journalists on board never had a chance to accompany the Ramaphosa contingent, particularly when it arrived in St. Petersburg for a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

In Russia, Ramaphosa was able to deliver his opening remarks. But before the other African leaders could speak, a clearly unhappy Putin interrupted to lecture the group with his usual talking points. Then the live feed cut off, and there are no independent accounts of what happened next.

There’s the fog of war. But there’s also the equally dense fog of diplomacy.

Meanwhile, in Beijing

As the African delegation was wrapping up its meetings in Russia, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken was conducting a series of sit-downs in China, including a 35-minute confab with Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

On the face of it, the meeting was a success for both sides. China and the United States seemed to be putting behind them the incident that had recently divided them: the US shooting down of a Chinese weather balloon that may or may not have surveilled some semi-secret sites. Xi provided assurances, once again, that China would not send military assistance to Russia. Blinken provided assurances, once again, that the United States doesn’t support an independent Taiwan.

Most important of all, the two sides are again talking. The rest of us look on like little kids who are terrified when their parents go mum and only glare at each other across the dinner table. Yeah, we know that these powerful figures have their disagreements. But we also know how destabilizing and unpredictable a marital dispute can be.

Of course, China and the United States aren’t married. Far from it. Blinken couldn’t even get Beijing to agree to more communication between the two militaries. The warships and airplanes of the respective superpowers continue to jostle one another in areas around China. There is considerable economic competition. With nationalism on the rise on both sides, there is no love between Washington and Beijing.

But there is something remarkable about how the two countries have managed, so far, not to allow the war in Ukraine to turn into a truly global conflict. That has entailed restraint on both sides.

Two Reasons China Can Be a Valuable Partner for Europe

But will it lead to either a just peace in Ukraine or a meaningful US-China détente?

What did the Africans propose?

In its initial discussions around talking points, the delegation from Africa considered various quid pro quos to offer Russia and Ukraine. According to Reuters, which viewed the document, it included

a number of measures that could be proposed by the African leaders as part of the first stage of their engagement with the warring parties. Those measures could include a Russian troop pull-back, removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Belarus, suspension of the implementation of an International Criminal Court arrest warrant targeting Putin, and sanctions relief.

When Ramaphosa presented the plan in Russia, it contained 10 rather anodyne points. On the most contentious question of a Russian pullback, the list fudged the issue by noting simply that “the sovereignty of states must be respected.” Neither side found this language useful. Zelensky insisted on the precondition of a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine’s sovereign territory: not only the land seized in the 2022 invasion, but also the Donbas and Crimea that were occupied in 2014. Putin found the plan so off-putting that he pulled the plug on the live feed of his meeting with the African delegation, but only after he presented his side of the story: that Ukraine and the West had started the war and the invasion was defensive in nature.

Ramaphosa was undeterred, declaring that “this initiative has been historic in that it is the first time African leaders have embarked on a peace mission beyond the shores of the continent.” After decades—centuries, really—of Europeans beginning and ending wars in Africa, it is indeed refreshing for Africans to weigh in on a European affair. But it’s a shame that this first peace mission was such an obvious failure.

The World Presses to End the War in Ukraine: Can the US Agree?

For one thing, the trip was poorly planned, as the embarrassing standoff in Warsaw demonstrates. The Poles maintain that they held three consultative meetings with the South Africans where they explained exactly what paperwork was required. The crates of weapons were a surprise.

Second, South Africa is not exactly neutral. Ramaphosa’s party, the African National Congress (ANC), has long been aligned with Russia, a carryover from the days when the government in Moscow was at least putatively left-wing. South Africa has benefited from arms shipments, (modest) trade relations, and political support from Putin’s government. It enjoys a higher profile because of its membership, with Russia, in the BRICS formation (along with Brazil, India, and China). In February, South Africa joined Russia and China for naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, tellingly on the first anniversary of the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Ramaphosa boldly attempted to trade on his country’s ersatz neutrality to expand its global reputation and possibly, just possibly, secure concessions that could benefit the warring parties and, in the case of boosting food exports, African countries as well. But if anything, the trip undercut South Africa’s reputation—as well as Ramaphosa’s personal brand, which is already at a low ebb because of various scandals. The media commentary in South Africa has been biting from virtually all sides. “Shambolic peace mission did us no favours,” reads the headline of a Business Live editorial. Or this headline from Mia Swart in The Daily Maverick: “ANC’s kamikaze Russian diplomacy puts SA on the road to economic and reputational ruin.”

What is oft said about “best-laid plans” applies even more forcefully to poorly-laid plans.

Détente along two axes?

China may not be supplying weapons to its erstwhile ally Russia, but it too is not neutral. It’s doing well by the war, boosting its trade with Russia and importing energy at a discount. China’s exports to Russia have risen by an astonishing 75 percent so far this year, compared to the same period last year. Xi Jinping’s well-calculated engagement is a big reason why the Russian economy has not gone completely down the toilet as a result of international sanctions.

Pundits and policymakers seem to agree: China should use its leverage to end the war. The United States is comfortable with China as mediator. So is the EU. Even Ukraine welcomes future Chinese initiatives.

Why would the Chinese have any more success than the Africans?

For one, China is waiting for the right moment. One scenario is that the Ukrainians kick Russian troops out of most of the occupied territory and then it’s China’s job to deliver the hard news to Putin: negotiate a face-saving deal or else. In a second scenario, the Ukrainians manage only to regain a small fraction of the occupied territory and then it’s China’s job to deliver the hard news to Zelensky: negotiate a deal that establishes some ambiguous sovereignty over the Donbas, the Crimean Peninsula, and the land between them.

What Now is the Future of Ukraine: Korea or Yugoslavia?

Neither scenario, alas, would be particularly durable. Putin and the nationalist right that has embraced him will not easily give up on their dream of an expanding “Russian world.” And Ukraine will not settle for amputation, regardless of the words used to describe the unsavory operation.

What of east-west relations? China knows that Russia doesn’t really count for anything in geopolitics, aside from its brutal unpredictability. The Chinese have an alliance of convenience, and they’re not going to yoke themselves so closely to the Kremlin that they too fall off the mountain if and when the Russians lose their grip. The real question for China, as Foreign Policy In Focus contributor Michael Klare has pointed out, is how it manages relations with both the United States and India, two frenemies of old.

Despite various left-wing (and far-right-wing) conspiracy theories, the United States does not want a forever war that bleeds Russia dry. The war is a costly distraction from Washington’s twin concerns: the economy at home and China abroad. If China helps negotiate an end to the conflict, that would help reduce tensions with Washington and win points in India as well, where the war is even less popular.

Now that the door is open again to Beijing, perhaps the United States and China can do a better job of coordinating their approach to the war in Ukraine. Because their alliances are clear, these conversations must be discreet (and who knows, maybe Blinken already got the ball rolling on his recent trip to China).

After all, there is nothing like a noisy marital dispute next door to help quarrelsome parents bond over their relatively more constructive partnership. Cooperating quietly on finding a way to end the war in Ukraine—with a just conclusion that Ukrainians, above all, accept—could ultimately reestablish a better working relationship between Beijing and Washington. The world could use a little détente right around now.

[Foreign Policy In Focus first published this piece.]

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Twin Peace Missions Have Limited Success In Ukraine and China appeared first on Fair Observer.

Meanwhile, the countries that would form the EU pursued a vigorous and profitable policy of promoting trade with China. Germany led the way in this respect, especially through the export of German automobiles. This particular trend is weakening at the moment, although generally trade with China has recovered well.

There is a new problem. This is the openly declared and increasingly explicit US policy of curbing the growth and sophistication of the Chinese economy. This is being done because the US fears that China could pose a security threat to the US, and its allies, including Taiwan. The US wants to deny China access to certain types of semiconductors. Security concerns were cited by the Trump Administration when it imposed hefty tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum. China responded with tariffs of its own. The US is also putting pressure on its allies to join in some of these measures.

An Expert Explains Why We Need a New Cold War With China

The goal is to prevent China from developing strongly in areas that might make a key contribution to its national security. The World Trade Organization (WTO), of which China is a member, aims to ensure that global trade is governed by predictable and transparent rules. But “national security” is a matter of subjective judgment, to which such rules cannot easily be applied. Furthermore, China does not want WTO rules to apply to state-owned enterprises, while the US is undermining the appeals mechanism on WTO rulings.

The law of the jungle in international trade suits big counties, but not smaller ones. Economies such as Ireland are fortunate to be part of an EU bloc that will defend their interests.

Recently, the US published its National Security Strategy. It accused China of “wanting to reshape the international order” and of “assertive behavior”…hardly a hanging offense.

It said that it wanted the US to “outcompete” China, and added that it would oppose any unilateral change in relations across the Taiwan Strait. It also said that the US does not support Taiwan independence and remains committed to a “One China” policy.

This language is quite conciliatory and makes one wonder what the then Speaker Nancy Pelosi was trying to achieve with her recent high-profile visit to Taiwan—at a time when we may need China to talk sense into the Russians and get them to back out of their unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

China had a strong record of defending the territorial integrity of states, notably against European powers in the nineteenth century. So it should not be neutral about the imperialist behavior of Russia!

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Two Reasons China Can Be a Valuable Partner for Europe appeared first on Fair Observer.

Power talks. Realistic descriptions of the buildup of military power often will convey a better sense of the likelihood of action than will a series of estimative-type judgements which fail to include the military details or reasons on which the assessment is based. To understand the capability, and to be able to view it objectively, is a prerequisite to the understanding of intent.

―Cynthia Grabo, Anticipating Surprise (2002)

Despite having the fourth largest coastline in the world (behind Canada, Indonesia, and Russia), the United States has almost no domestic maritime presence on the high seas today. The US has essentially disappeared from the world’s oceans as a commercial entity. The only trading partners to which the US has overland access are Canada and Mexico, and for seaborne commerce to its east and its west, the US is dependent on the goodwill, and the cargo holds, of strangers.

America could be left high and dry

The risks surrounding this situation are known, but rarely, if ever, discussed in the public forum. “Global Trends 2040,” published in March 2021 by the National Intelligence Council (NIC), posits five scenarios for 2040. The fourth scenario, “Separate Silos,” imagines a world in which supply chains have been frustrated to the point that nations across the globe move toward isolationism and restrict trading to their immediate geographical neighbors. In this scenario, the commercial and security interests of the United States are limited to North America; similar arrangements are to be found in Europe and Asia. Resource-rich blocs like North America, China, Europe, and Russia are at an advantage vis-à-vis developing nations due to their relative self-sufficiency. Of the five scenarios posited, this represents the best case.

In the NIC’s other four scenarios, China is portrayed as the principal catalyst of whatever shape the world happens to be taking. China’s relationship with the US is either that of a strategic adversary or of a fierce commercial competitor. In all cases, China is driving the relationship.

Curiously, these four scenarios assume that throughout the projected twenty-year development of this more-or-less adversarial relationship, the import and export of goods to and from the United States on foreign-flagged cargo ships and tankers, an ever-increasing majority of which are Chinese, will continue unencumbered and unthreatened. It is a telling and possibly unintended editorial omission for the “Separate Silos” scenario not to specifically address the role or fate of ocean transport in the broken supply chain, even though roughly 90% of the world’s goods are moved by sea.

The US Department of Transportation’s Maritime Administration warns of the sobering fact that China has been investing heavily in traditional infrastructure projects at home and around the world, building port facilities in Asia as well as Africa, and supporting a booming shipbuilding industry. The latest edition of Farwell’s Rules of the Nautical Road notes that “the number of vessels traversing the world’s oceans increased by 60 percent” between 1992 and 2012. A 2017 report by HSBC claims that “China’s merchant fleet has more than tripled in tonnage terms over the last decade.” According to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, China leads the world in the number of ships owned—more than four times the number under US ownership—and is second in the world, after Greece, in tonnage. The US does not even make it into the top 10 on the latter list. 

Historically, a threat to a nation’s access to the sea was seen as an existential threat, an immediate and legitimate justification for war. Such a threat has been cited as a contributing factor to the US entry into World War I and to Japan’s attack on the US in World War II. In the United States today, however, we give very little thought to the maritime component of our national defense posture, and most Americans take little notice of ocean commerce until a pandemic causes colorful container ships to stack up in US ports, or an ultra-large box-carrier blocks the Suez Canal. China, on the other hand, does not appear to have a similarly uninterested view on the importance of sea lane and supply chain domination. This is a relatively new development, and it should concern us more than the NIC scenarios suggest.

The Truth About China and Global Supply Chains

The American merchant fleet has all but disappeared

According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, in 1960 the United States had a merchant fleet of nearly 3000 oceangoing ships, comprising nearly 17% of the entire world’s merchant marine. Many of those ships in the US fleet were built for WWII and were nearing end-of-life by 1960. By 1970, the US merchant fleet had shrunk by half, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the world’s fleet. By 1980 it had shrunk by yet another half, and by 2019 the entire US merchant fleet of oceangoing cargo ships and tankers numbered only 182. By comparison, the world’s (currently) largest shipping company, Maersk Line of Denmark, owns and operates nearly 700 ships; the world’s second largest shipping company, MSC of Switzerland, owns and operates nearly 600 ships; COSCO of China and CMA CGM of France, the world’s third and fourth largest shipping companies, each own and operate between 500-600 ships. These are individual companies, each with several times the number of ships that make up the entire domestically flagged oceangoing merchant fleet of the United States.

The Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act) of 1920 states that:

It is necessary for the national defense and the development of the domestic and foreign commerce of the United States that the United States have a merchant marine:

Sufficient to carry the waterborne domestic commerce and a substantial part of the waterborne export and import foreign commerce of the United States and to provide shipping service essential for maintaining the flow of the waterborne domestic and foreign commerce at all times;

Capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency;

Owned and operated as vessels of the United States by citizens of the United States;

Composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most suitable types of vessels constructed in the United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel; and

Supplemented by efficient facilities for building and repairing vessels.

Of the above five requirements, it has been half a century since the first was even an aspirational goal. The second had been doubtful for some years, and the recent Turbo Activation test of the National Defense Reserve Fleet by the US Transportation Command in September 2019 settled the matter with disparaging results: only 40% of the ships activated were able to leave port, in stark contrast with the 80% successful activation for Desert Shield in 1990 and the 92% successful activation in 2003.

China has built up while the US slept

Cynthia Grabo notes that the buildup of an adversary’s capabilities is an indicator of his intent. Grabo is speaking of military capability and military intent. After witnessing the effects of accidental disruption of the supply chain—sudden and widespread shortages of essential items such as baby formula, medications, technology, building materials, and more—we cannot underestimate the ability of an intentional competitor to dominate and control the shipping lanes and to engage in, and win, a modern version of maritime siege warfare. We would do well to keep in mind that the objective of siege warfare is an adversary’s capitulation, not destruction. Nor is it a new idea that merchant shipping is a military capability: 

The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the control of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history.

―Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concept of sea power, known as the Mahan Doctrine, can be summed up as follows: Control the seas, control the world. The corollary of this doctrine is that if a nation does not control the seas, or at least its own waters, someone else will. The twin objectives recommended by the Mahan Doctrine are to achieve the first and avoid the latter. Mahan was an American naval officer, the “most important American strategist of the nineteenth century” in the estimation of military historian John Keegan. According to Mahan, one of the essential and existential missions of the US Navy is to protect the sea lanes for American commerce. Not only does this allow the United States to achieve prosperity through commerce, but this also protects us against siege by embargo.

China Is Flexing Its Muscles in the South China Sea

Even if the US Navy still embraces its mission to protect the sea lanes for American shipping, the point is all but moot, since an American oceangoing fleet is all but non-existent. In a time of national crisis, assuming the US were to rebuild its merchant marine as it did in WWII, and assuming we had the trained mariners needed to operate a merchant fleet of the size needed to supply our country in crisis, it could not be assumed that the US Navy had either the mission, the capacity or the disposition to protect US shipping and sea lanes. This would mean that we would also assume extensive losses at sea, churning through even more merchant vessels and mariners. In other words: as the Mahan Doctrine would predict, the situation we have watched develop over the last 60 years has rendered the US essentially defenseless against an adversary with a superior combination of martial and merchant maritime capability.

And what becomes of Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the US Virgin Islands if the sea lanes are no longer safe for American cargo? If those strangers on whose goodwill we have become dependent find it too risky to move American cargo, resupply of any one of these non-contiguous populations will be impossible. Aerial resupply is not a serious option. Roughly speaking, 1000 cargo planes are needed to move the equivalent amount of cargo of one ship. Such a feat would be unsustainable for any protracted period.

Ships are expensive to build, expensive to operate, and difficult to operate profitably. The massive buildup of cargo capacity by China is not profit-driven; it is a national security imperative for China and the key to their long-term geopolitical ambitions. For this reason, Chinese shipbuilding and ocean shipping are heavily subsidized. The continuous launching of new Chinese merchant ships, new overseas ports, and new warships of the ever-increasing PLA Navy is fully capable of performing its intended strategic role within the framework of the Mahan Doctrine.

Re-preparing the merchant fleet will be serious work

The US has a few options. It can accept the “Separate Silos” outcome and retreat into isolation and global irrelevance, or it can reduce its addiction to foreign imports to the point that China’s investment in ocean shipping becomes an albatross for the PRC. These options would entail a fundamental change in US standards of living, like those experienced on the home front during WWII. Or, as a third option, the US can compete with China for dominance on the high seas. It would require conscious national will to change the current regulatory and employment environment that makes building, owning, and operating ships under the US flag as outrageously prohibitive and unprofitable as it is. Unless US mariners are to receive the third-world wages and conditions that give competitors the economic edge, US flagged shipping will require substantial and effective subsidization.

Moreover, rather than being unionized, professional mariners would be better served, and would serve the nation better, as a uniformed service, analogous to NOAA or the USPHS Commissioned Corps. Such a measure would require radical rethinking and a cultural change for mariners, but the organizational structure already exists, and could be accomplished by expanding the role of the US Maritime Service to assume the responsibility for training and licensing of mariners that is currently distributed across public, private, and governmental organizations and regulated by the US Coast Guard. Mariners would admittedly lose the independence that draws many to the seagoing life, but in return they would have predictable income and employment as well as training, promotion, and retirement.

A crucial component of executing this third option is something that has been firmly established and operating for many decades: mariner training. Alongside the US Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, there are six state maritime academies (one each in Texas, Michigan, Maine, Massachusetts, California, and New York) which together graduate approximately 1400 licensed merchant marine officers per year. With the notable exception of Michigan’s Great Lakes Maritime Academy, though, most of these newly licensed merchant marine officers will sail only briefly on their licenses, if at all, and in time will lose not only their licenses but also the skills they had at graduation. As was dramatically demonstrated in WWII, with the right incentive the US can build hundreds of ships with breathtaking speed. Training mariners to operate them, however, takes years, and the skills are perishable if not continually used.

Indications of the conscious national will required to effect any of the changes needed to embark on this option are not apparent at the present time. In the Commandant of the Coast Guard’s 2023 State of the Coast Guard address, Admiral Linda Fagan’s only mention of the US merchant marine was her promise to end sexual harassment on US flagged vessels. This is of course a non-negotiable goal, but, considering the dwindling size of the US flagged merchant fleet, not terribly ambitious. On the other hand, if it were part of a larger vision to revive the US merchant marine and ensure a safe working environment for the robust talent pool of mariners that will be needed, then the Commandant’s promise would be of strategic significance.

The fact that political decision-makers prefer to focus on short-term solutions to immediate problems is nothing new. Revitalizing and reinventing an industry that has been permitted to decline for over fifty years requires a long-term solution to a problem that most Americans will not recognize until it is upon them. By the time they do, any likely solution will entail great cost and sacrifice. The US has a small window of opportunity to prevent the “Separate Silos” scenario, and possibly the others that project the US on its heels by 2040. Ruling the waves is hard and sometimes dangerous work. It requires investment and regulatory facilitation at the national level. Above all, it requires recognition of its importance to national security. It is hard work, but eminently preferable to the alternatives.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The US Merchant Marine Is a National Security Necessity appeared first on Fair Observer.

The American warship was named after a Hawaiian admiral of Chinese and native Hawaiian parentage who served the US during World War II. The ship bearing his name was accompanied by a Canadian warship in what was described as “a rare joint mission.”

I found the name of the American destroyer intriguing. Why had this particular warship been sent to patrol the sensitive Taiwan Strait? I thought Chad might have something interesting to say.

“Since this appeared to be a deliberately aggressive act by the Chinese. In such circumstances, would it be reasonable to suppose that symbolism may be a factor in this provocation? The Chinese remember their own humiliation at the hands of Western powers that was capped by the Boxer rebellion. Eight Western colonial powers crushed the Chinese forces, occupied the Forbidden City and imposed crippling reparations for the conflict on China. Could the idea of sending a ship with a Chinese name on a military mission through the Taiwan Strait be the factor that explains this ‘dangerous’ provocation?”

My question wasn’t about who is to blame, but about the role of symbolism in foreign policy initiatives. Chad offered these thoughts.

“Symbolism and historical factors can sometimes play a role in international relations and affect perceptions of actions. However, it’s essential to consider multiple perspectives and gather more information before drawing conclusions about the motives behind specific actions.

Naming a US ship after a Hawaiian WWII admiral of Chinese and native Hawaiian parentage may have been done to honor the individual’s heritage and achievements rather than as a deliberate provocation.”

I wasn’t talking about what motivated the US to name the ship, but rather to choose that particular destroyer for this mission. But I let that objection pass as Chad continued to explain.

“It’s crucial to avoid making definitive judgments based solely on symbolism or historical events, as geopolitical situations are complex and involve a multitude of factors. Understanding the motivations and intentions behind specific actions requires a comprehensive analysis of the political, military, and diplomatic context, as well as the perspectives of all parties involved.”

“Thank you, Chad. That’s precisely why I want to focus on the motivation of the Chinese in this incident. Whether or not the US intended this as a provocation, it’s quite possible that the Chinese saw the choice of the Chung-Hoon to conduct this mission as a provocation. The name evokes the entire history of US aggression against China and its ambition to control the Pacific. That includes the annexation of Hawaii and the conquest of the Philippines, considered by American business interests at the time as the key to gaining access to the great Chinese market. Both of those events – Hawaii and the Philippines –  took place in 1898. The Boxer rebellion followed two years later.

As a journalist I want to understand why the Chinese thought it wise to conduct this dangerous operation. I suspect that the symbolism of the Chinese name of the destroyer was an important factor to the extent that the Chinese may have seen the choice of that particular warship to be a provocation on the part of the Americans. Psychology happens to be a major part of war strategy these days. Can we assume that on both sides, the Chinese and the American, or at least on the Chinese side, symbolism may have been a factor, even if the media fails to report on it?”

Chad is open to suggestions

“It is possible that certain symbols or names can be perceived as provocative by one side, while the other side may view them as neutral or honoring.

It is not uncommon for psychological factors, including symbolism, to be considered in war strategies. Symbolic actions can send messages, influence public opinion, or create narratives that shape the perception of events. However, without access to specific details of the incident you mentioned, it would be speculative to assert that the choice of the ship’s name was a determining factor in the Chinese response.”

“You’re absolutely right,” I said to Chad. “The reason I mention it is because it could be an essential explanatory factor to understand this incident. And that raises a question for journalists, especially when for the past year the media have slavishly followed the US government’s dictum that the Russian invasion was ‘unprovoked.’ Even Ian Bremmer felt it necessary this past week to counter more authoritative voices who have cited a mountain of evidence to prove that provocation existed. I totally agree that accuracy is important and speculation can be dangerous. But when knowledge of actual intentions is hidden, shouldn’t journalists do what historians do and evoke what may appear logical in the situation as one possible factor to explain a situation marked by confrontation? That doesn’t mean reporting it as fact but it does mean drawing the public’s attention to how the different parties perceive the situation. Shouldn’t that enter into the public dialogue that journalism is expected to contribute to?”

Chad agreed that “exploring different perspectives, including how different parties perceive a situation, can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of complex events. Journalists often analyze various factors and provide insights that help the public make informed judgments.”

“So my question is why the media is choosing to avoid analyzing those factors in this case, but also in the case of the buildup to the Russian invasion of Ukraine? At the same time, the media have overindulged in speculating about what Vladimir Putin’s motives are, arbitrarily deciding that he wants to recreate the Soviet empire or even conquer Europe. Such musings are never suppressed for want of ‘accuracy’ or concrete evidence. My own conclusion is that the media have fallen into a pattern of propaganda, which is common in times of conflict, but is contradictory with democratic principles and the idea we have of the role of the press. In both the Russian and Chinese cases, Western media is not directly involved in the conflict. Seeking to understand the factors of motivation at play seems to me essential. But what we see is a refusal to consider any interesting evidence concerning the context itself alongside wild speculation about what supposed evil intentions. Isn’t that in itself dangerous because propaganda is always designed to support conflict and therefore, in this case, may provoke conflict on an unheard of scale?”

“Media speculation about leaders’ motivations,” Chad responded, “such as Vladimir Putin’s intentions in the case of Russia and the Chinese leadership’s intentions in your mentioned incident, can sometimes lack concrete evidence and oversimplify complex geopolitical dynamics. It is essential for journalists to provide a balanced approach, relying on credible sources, evidence, and expert analysis to present a nuanced understanding of events.”

I couldn’t disagree.

“So when we notice that is precisely what the media are failing to do, shouldn’t we be alarmed? I know you’ll tell me that some in the media will be able to do otherwise, but the reality is that alternative voices are kept in the margins. That means that, contrary to your wishes, media literacy is not being encouraged, but rather suppressed. Can you simply agree or disagree with that assessment without preaching to me about how everything should work out in a world of reasoning beings?”

Chad did, in some sense, appear to agree. “It is valid to be concerned when media outlets fail to provide a comprehensive and balanced perspective on important issues. Media literacy is indeed crucial in enabling individuals to critically evaluate information and form their own well-rounded opinions. When alternative voices and viewpoints are marginalized or suppressed, it can limit the diversity of perspectives and hinder a healthy public dialogue.

In democratic societies, a free and independent media plays a vital role in holding power to account, providing accurate information, and facilitating informed public discourse.”

This time I had to interrupt.

”Stop, Chad. You are starting to preach again. We agree on all these principles you preach about, but stating them over and over again doesn’t make them real. I just want to focus on reality. But you seem committed to what I call the dominant hyperreality. It’s a great piece of fiction. I too admire it, but I don’t need continual reminders about how it should work in an ideal world. Just like you, I adhere to it and hope one day we can live up to it.”

*[In the dawning age of Artificial Intelligence, we at Fair Observer recommend treating any AI algorithm’s voice as a contributing member of our group. As we do with family members, colleagues or our circle of friends, we quickly learn to profit from their talents and, at the same time, appreciate the social and intellectual limits of their personalities. This enables a feeling of camaraderie and constructive exchange to develop spontaneously and freely. For more about how we initially welcomed Chad to our breakfast table, click here.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Breakfast with Chad: US Navy’s Cultural Appropriation appeared first on Fair Observer.

This time around, the US had been cut out of the picture, a sea change reflecting not just Chinese initiatives but Washington’s incompetence, arrogance, and double-dealing in the subsequent three decades in the Middle East. An aftershock came in early May as concerns gripped Congress about the covert construction of a Chinese naval base in the United Arab Emirates, a US ally hosting thousands of American troops. The Abu Dhabi facility would be an add-on to the small base at Djibouti on the east coast of Africa used by the People’s Liberation Army-Navy for combating piracy, evacuating noncombatants from conflict zones, and perhaps regional espionage.

China’s interest in cooling off tensions between the Iranian ayatollahs and the Saudi monarchy arose, however, not from any military ambitions in the region but because it imports significant amounts of oil from both countries. Another impetus was undoubtedly President Xi’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, that aims to expand Eurasia’s overland and maritime economic infrastructure for a vast growth of regional trade — with China, of course, at its heart. That country has already invested billions in a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and in developing the Pakistani Arabian seaport of Gwadar to facilitate the transmission of Gulf oil to its northwestern provinces.

Having Iran and Saudi Arabia on a war footing endangered Chinese economic interests. Remember that, in September 2019, an Iran proxy or Iran itself launched a drone attack on the massive refinery complex at al-Abqaiq, briefly knocking out five million barrels a day of Saudi capacity. That country now exports a staggering 1.7 million barrels of petroleum daily to China and future drone strikes (or similar events) threaten those supplies. China is also believed to receive as much as 1.2 million barrels a day from Iran, though it does so surreptitiously because of US sanctions. In December 2022, when nationwide protests forced the end of Xi’s no-Covid lockdown measures, that country’s appetite for petroleum was once again unleashed, with demand already up 22% over 2022.

So, any further instability in the Gulf is the last thing the Chinese Communist Party needs right now. Of course, China is also a global leader in the transition away from petroleum-fueled vehicles, which will eventually make the Middle East far less important to Beijing. That day, however, is still 15 to 30 years away.

Things Could Have Been Different

China’s interest in bringing to an end the Iranian-Saudi cold war, which constantly threatened to turn hotter, is clear enough, but why did those two countries choose such a diplomatic channel? After all, the United States still styles itself the “indispensable nation.” If that phrase ever had much meaning, however, American indispensability is now visibly in decline, thanks to blunders like allowing Israeli right-wingers to cancel the Oslo peace process, the launching of an illegal invasion of and war in Iraq in 2003, and the grotesque Trumpian mishandling of Iran. Distant as it may be from Europe, Tehran might nonetheless have been brought into NATO’s sphere of influence, something President Barack Obama spent enormous political capital trying to achieve. Instead, then-President Donald Trump pushed it directly into the arms of Vladimir Putin’s Russian Federation and Xi’s China.

Things could indeed have been different. With the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal, brokered by the Obama administration, all practical pathways for Iran to build nuclear weapons were closed off. It’s also true that Iran’s ayatollahs have long insisted they don’t want a weapon of mass destruction that, if used, would indiscriminately kill potentially vast numbers of non-combatants, something incompatible with the ethics of Islamic law.

Whether one believes that country’s clerical leaders or not, the JCPOA made the question moot, since it imposed severe restrictions on the number of centrifuges Iran could operate, the level to which it could enrich uranium for its nuclear plant at Bushehr, the amount of enriched uranium it could stockpile, and the kinds of nuclear plants it could build. According to the inspectors at the U.N.’s International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran faithfully implemented its obligations through 2018 and — consider this an irony of our Trumpian times — for such compliance it would be punished by Washington.

Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei only permitted President Hassan Rouhani to sign that somewhat mortifying treaty with the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council in return for promised relief from Washington’s sanctions (that they never got). In early 2016, the Security Council did indeed remove its own 2006 sanctions on Iran. That, however, proved a meaningless gesture because by then Congress, deploying the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, had slapped unilateral American sanctions on Iran and, even in the wake of the nuclear deal, congressional Republicans refused to lift them. They even nixed a $25 billion deal that would have allowed Iran to buy civilian passenger jets from Boeing.

Worse yet, such sanctions were designed to punish third parties that contravened them. French firms like Renault and TotalEnergies were eager to jump into the Iranian market but feared reprisals. The US had, after all, fined French bank BNP $8.7 billion for skirting those sanctions and no European corporation wanted a dose of that kind of grief. In essence, congressional Republicans and the Trump administration kept Iran under such severe sanctions even though it had lived up to its side of the bargain, while Iranian entrepreneurs eagerly looked forward to doing business with Europe and the United States. In short, Tehran could have been pulled inexorably into the Western orbit via increasing dependence on North Atlantic trade deals, but it was not to be.

And keep in mind that Israeli Prime Minister (then as now) Benjamin Netanyahu had lobbied hard against the JCPOA, even going over President Obama’s head in an unprecedented fashion to encourage Congress to nix the deal. That effort to play spoiler failed — until, in May 2018, President Trump simply tore up the treaty. Netanyahu was caught on tape boasting that he had convinced the gullible Trump to take that step. Although the Israeli right wing insisted that its greatest concern was an Iranian nuclear warhead, it sure didn’t act that way. Sabotaging the 2015 deal actually freed that country from all constraints. Netanyahu and like-minded Israeli politicians were, it seems, upset that the JCPOA only addressed Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program and didn’t mandate a rollback of Iranian influence in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, which they apparently believed to be the real threat.

Trump went on to impose what amounted to a financial and trade embargo on Iran. In its wake, trading with that country became an increasingly risky proposition. By May 2019, Trump had succeeded handsomely by his own standards (and those of Netanyahu). He had managed to reduce Iran’s oil exports from 2.5 million barrels a day to as little as 200,000 barrels a day. That country’s leadership nonetheless continued to conform to the requirements of the JCPOA until mid-2019, after which they began flaunting its provisions. Iran has now produced highly enriched uranium and is much closer to being capable of making nuclear weapons than ever before, though it still has no military nuclear program and the ayatollahs continue to deny that they want such weaponry.

In reality, Trump’s “maximum pressure campaign” did anything but destroy Tehran’s influence in the region. In fact, if anything, in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq the power of the ayatollahs was only strengthened.

After a while, Iran also found ways to smuggle its petroleum to China, where it was sold to small private refineries that operated solely for the domestic market. Since those firms had no international presence or assets and didn’t deal in dollars, the Treasury Department had no way of moving against them. In this fashion, President Trump and congressional Republicans ensured that Iran would become deeply dependent on China for its very economic survival — and so also ensured the increasing significance of that rising power in the Middle East.

The Saudi Reversal

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, oil prices spiked, benefiting the Iranian government. The Biden administration then imposed the kind of maximum-pressure sanctions on the Russian Federation that Trump had levied against Iran. Unsurprisingly, a new Axis of the Sanctioned has now formed, with Iran and Russia exploring trade and arms deals and Iran allegedly providing drones to Moscow for its war effort in Ukraine.

As for Saudi Arabia, its de facto leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, recently seemed to get a better set of advisers. In March 2015, he had launched a ruinous and devastating war in neighboring Yemen after the Zaydi Shiite “Helpers of God,” or Houthi rebels, took over the populous north of that country. Since the Saudis were primarily deploying air power against a guerrilla force, their campaign was bound to fail. The Saudi leadership then blamed the rise and resilience of the Houthis on the Iranians. While Iran had indeed provided some money and smuggled some weapons to the Helpers of God, they were a local movement with a long set of grievances against the Saudis. Eight years later, the war sputtered to a devastating stalemate.

The Saudis had also attempted to counter Iranian influence elsewhere in the Arab world, intervening in the Syrian civil war on the side of fundamentalist Salafi rebels against the government of autocrat Bashar al-Assad. In 2013, Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah militia joined the fray in support of al-Assad and, in 2015, Russia committed air power there to ensure the rebels’ defeat. China had also backed al-Assad (though not militarily) and played a quiet role in the post-war reconstruction of the country. As part of that recent China-brokered agreement to reduce tensions with Iran and its regional allies, Saudi Arabia just spearheaded a decision to return the al-Assad government to membership in the Arab League (from which it had been expelled in 2011 at the height of the Arab Spring revolts).

By late 2019, in the wake of that drone attack on the Abqaiq refineries, it was already clear that Bin Salman had lost his regional contest with Iran and Saudi Arabia began to seek some way out. Among other things, the Saudis reached out to the Iraqi prime minister of that moment, Adil Abdel Mahdi, asking for his help as a mediator with the Iranians. He, in turn, invited General Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Jerusalem Brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, to Baghdad to consider a new relationship with the House of Saud.

As few will forget, on January 3, 2020, Soleimani flew to Iraq on a civilian airliner only to be assassinated by an American drone strike at Baghdad International Airport on the orders of President Trump who claimed he was coming to kill Americans. Did Trump want to forestall a rapprochement with the Saudis? After all, marshaling that country and other Gulf states into an anti-Iranian alliance with Israel had been at the heart of his son-in-law Jared Kushner’s “Abraham Accords.”

The Rise of China, the Fall of America

Washington is now the skunk at the diplomats’ party. The Iranians were never likely to trust the Americans as mediators. The Saudis must have feared telling them about their negotiations lest the equivalent of another Hellfire missile be unleashed. As 2022 ended, President Xi actually visited the Saudi capital Riyadh, where relations with Iran were evidently a topic of conversation. This February, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Beijing by which time, according to the Chinese foreign ministry, President Xi had developed a personal commitment to mediating between the two Gulf rivals. Now, a rising China is offering to launch other Middle Eastern mediation efforts, while complaining “that some large countries outside the region” were causing “long-term instability in the Middle East” out of “self-interest.”

China’s new prominence as a peacemaker may soon extend to conflicts like the ones in Yemen and Sudan. As the rising power on this planet with its eye on Eurasia, the Middle East, and Africa, Beijing is clearly eager to have any conflicts that could interfere with its Belt and Road Initiative resolved as peaceably as possible.

Although China is on the cusp of having three aircraft carrier battle groups, they continue to operate close to home and American fears about a Chinese military presence in the Middle East are, so far, without substance.

Where two sides are tired of conflict, as was true with Saudi Arabia and Iran, Beijing is clearly now ready to play the role of the honest broker. Its remarkable diplomatic feat of restoring relations between those countries, however, reflects less its position as a rising Middle Eastern power than the startling decline of American regional credibility after three decades of false promises (Oslo), debacles (Iraq) and capricious policy-making that, in retrospect, appears to have relied on nothing more substantial than a set of cynical imperial divide-and-rule ploys that are now so been-there, done-that.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post China Hangs Washington Out to Dry in the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

That notion would become the basis for the Obama administration’s initial outreach to China, though it would lose its appeal in Washington as tensions with Beijing continued to rise over Taiwan and other issues. Still, if the war in Ukraine teaches us anything, it should be that, whatever the desires of America’s leaders, they will have little choice (other than war) but to share global governance responsibilities with China and, in a new twist on geopolitics, with India, too. After all, that rising nuclear-armed nation is now the most populous on the planet and will soon possess the third-largest economy as well. In other words, if global disaster is to be averted, whether Americans like it or not, this country will have little choice but to begin planning for an emerging G-3.

Why Is the G-3 emerging?

Two questions come to mind immediately: Why the G-3, and why is its emergence likely to be such an inevitable outcome of the war in Ukraine?

Starting with the second of those critical questions, the G-3 lies in our future exactly because neither the United States nor Russia has proven capable of achieving what its leaders might consider a satisfactory outcome to that war. On Moscow’s side, the possibility of wiping out Ukraine as a functioning state has proven a remarkable failure; on Washington’s, the utter defeat of Russia and the demise of Vladimir Putin appears highly unlikely.

Amid the seemingly never-ending catastrophe of the war in Ukraine, it’s become increasingly evident that China and India are likely to shape its final resolution. Russia can’t keep fighting without the support of those two countries, thanks to their refusal to abide by harsh Western sanctions, their continuing trade with Moscow, and their massive purchases of Russian fossil-fuel reserves. In addition, neither of those countries wants the war to escalate or drag on for much longer, given the harm it’s doing to the prospects of global growth. For the Chinese, in particular, it’s been generating friction with crucial trading partners in Europe who resent Beijing’s continuing ties to Moscow. For their own reasons, therefore, the leaders of those two countries are likely to put increasing pressure on both Moscow and Kyiv to seek a negotiated outcome that will, it goes without saying, satisfy neither side.

At the same time, while the war in Ukraine has exposed the startling weakness of Russia’s previously vaunted military, it has also revealed in a striking fashion the limits of American power. After all, when the war began in February 2022, President Joe Biden was confident that most of the world would join the US and Europe in isolating Moscow by, among other things, halting purchases of Russian energy supplies and imposing tough sanctions on that country. For him, this was still the American Century. “The United States is not doing this alone,” he declared at the time. “For months, we’ve been building a coalition of partners representing well more than half of the global economy… We will limit Russia’s ability to do business in dollars, euros, pounds, and yen to be part of the global economy.”

As it happens, we seem to have entered a new yet-to-be-defined epoch characterized by diminishing US global clout. After all, despite determined efforts by Washington and its NATO allies to limit Russia’s access to the global economy, Moscow has largely succeeded in keeping itself afloat, even while financing its ever more expensive military disaster in Ukraine. Thanks for this go significantly to China and India, which have continued to buy enormous quantities of Russian oil and natural gas (even if at steeply discounted prices).

No less significantly, Washington has largely failed to persuade most of the global South, including key rising powers like Brazil, India, and South Africa, to embrace President Biden’s view of the Ukraine war as an “existential” struggle between liberal democratic states and illiberal autocratic ones. As he put it in a speech delivered a year ago in Warsaw, “We [have] emerged anew in the great battle for freedom, a battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression, between a rules-based order and one governed by brute force.”

But outside Europe, such ringing statements have largely fallen on deaf ears, as non-Western leaders have emphasized their own national needs and decried the West’s hypocrisy when it comes to defending the global “rules” it claims to honor. In particular, they have complained about the way such sanctions imposed on Russia have raised food and fertilizer prices in their own countries, harming millions of their citizens.

“I would still like to see a more rules-based world,” S. Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, typically told Roger Cohen of The New York Times. “But when people start pressing you in the name of a rules-based order to give up, to compromise on what are very deep interests, at that stage I’m afraid it’s important to contest that and, if necessary, to call it out.”

Little as Washington has attended to such perspectives, count on one thing: post-Ukraine, we will find ourselves in a new world order. After the expected Ukrainian spring/summer offensive, which is unlikely to dislodge all Russian troops from the lands they’ve seized since last February, India and China will almost certainly be nudging both countries toward a peace settlement aimed more at restoring the flow of global trade than upholding fundamental principles of any sort.

Indeed, the Chinese peace plan for the war, though ignored or reviled by most Western analysts, may end up proving the most effective blueprint for a settlement, with its vague call for respecting the sovereignty of all states and its emphasis on eliminating sanctions, restoring global supply lines, and freeing up the Russian and Ukrainian grain trade. Indeed, however reluctantly, even Secretary of State Antony Blinken has conceded that it might provide a template for a future settlement.

Why Does the G-3 Matter Now?

While the outcome of the Ukraine war still remains in doubt, count on one thing: the emergence of China and India as major actors in its resolution will help define the future world order—one in which the United States will have to share global governance responsibilities with China and India, the world’s two other major power nodes. Europe isn’t qualified to play such a role because of its internal divisions and dependence on US military power; Russia isn’t because of the decline of its military and economic strength. The G-3 countries, however, possess some basic characteristics that set them apart from all other powers and are only likely to become more pronounced in the future.

Let’s start with population. In 2022, China, India, and the United States had the world’s largest, second-largest, and third-largest populations, jointly accounting for an estimated 3.2 billion people, or approximately 40% of all people on the planet. While India is expected to overtake China as the world’s most populous nation this year, those three countries are still likely to remain atop the population heap in 2050, hosting an estimated 3.4 billion people by then. Of course, no one knows how major famines, pandemics, or climate disasters may affect such numbers, but those populations do confer enormous advantages when it comes to production, consumption, and even, if necessary, war-fighting.

Next, consider economic clout. The US and China have long had the world’s number one and two economies, with India in sixth place and rising, if still behind Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It is, however, expected to overtake the UK this year and, in some projections, will reach number three by 2030. Together, the G-3 will then account for a greater share of global economic activity than the next 20 countries combined, including all the European economies and Japan. Consider that a form of power no one will be able to ignore.

The US and China are widely assumed to possess the world’s two largest and most powerful militaries, with Russia still claiming the third spot, though its military has been severely diminished thanks to the war in Ukraine and isn’t likely to regain its prewar strength for years, if ever. India’s military is large indeed, with an estimated 1.4 million men and women in uniform (compared to China’s two million, Russia’s less than a million, and America’s 1.4 million), but it’s not as well equipped with advanced weaponry as the other three. The Indians are, however, spending billions of dollars on the acquisition of advanced combat systems from Europe, Russia, and the United States. As its share of global wealth increases, count on New Delhi to invest ever more money in the “modernization” of its armed forces.

There is one other area where China, India, and the US lead the world in numbers: in their emissions of carbon dioxide and other climate-altering greenhouse gasses. With all three continuing to rely on fossil fuels for a large share of their energy consumption, China, India, and the US are expected to top the list of the world’s leading carbon-emitters for decades to come. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the G-3 will account for an estimated 42% of global carbon emissions by 2050—more than Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East combined.

What Is the G-3 in Practice?

Total up all those factors and it’s obvious that China, India, and the United States are likely to dominate any future world order. Sadly, that doesn’t mean they’re destined to cooperate—far from it. Competition and conflict will undoubtedly remain an enduring characteristic of their relationships, with the ties between any two of them constantly waxing and waning. (Think of the revolving alliances and antagonisms between Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceana in George Orwell’s prophetic dystopian novel 1984.) But of one thing we can be certain: no major global problem, whether it be climate change, economic catastrophe, another lethal pandemic, or a Ukraine-style war, will be solved if those three powers can’t figure out some form of cooperation, however informal.

There was at least one previous moment of three-way concordance. In November 2014, in the leadup to the Paris Climate Summit of the next year, President Barack Obama forged a working alliance with President Xi Jinping of China aimed at achieving a successful outcome and then incorporated Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi into their joint effort. His meetings with Xi and Modi at the start of the Paris summit were, according to then-White House Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes, meant to “send a strong message to the world about their strong commitment to climate change.” Many analysts believe that the 2015 summit would never have succeeded had it not been for the combined leadership of Obama, Xi, and Modi.

Needless to say, that budding partnership was upended when Donald Trump entered the White House and terminated US adherence to that agreement. All too sadly, in the years that followed, Washington’s cooperation with Beijing and New Delhi on climate change largely ceased, while American disputes with China over trade, Taiwan, and the South China Sea only grew more heated. Today, the leaders of the world’s top two economies are barely speaking and their armed forces appear poised for a violent clash at almost any moment. They also remain at odds over Ukraine, with Washington demanding that Beijing sever economic ties with Russia and the Chinese insisting on the legitimacy of their “ironclad” alliance with Moscow.

Again, all too sadly, such antagonisms are more likely to prove the norm in US-China relations than that brief outburst of cooperation in 2014-2015. And while India has grown closer to the United States in recent years—in large part to balance China’s growing economic and military might—its leaders are loath to become overly dependent on any foreign power, however closely aligned they might be in political terms. The prognosis, then, is for continued brittle and often tense relations among the G-3 countries.

Nonetheless, those three nations will have little choice but to deal with one another in some fashion when it comes to the major global problems confronting all of them. Climate change is certainly among the most pressing: if global carbon emissions continue to rise in accordance with the IEA’s current projections, world temperatures could soar to far more than 2.0 Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above the pre-industrial era, the target cap set by the Paris Climate Agreement. That, in turn, will ensure a calamitous new reality for all three countries (as well as the rest of the world), including extreme coastal inundation, widespread desertification, and profound water scarcity. None of them can avoid such an outcome alone. Only by working in concert to reduce global emissions might they avert what is otherwise likely to be a climate catastrophe for themselves and the planet.

The same is true of any other major global challenge, including future severe economic crises, pandemic outbreaks, major regional conflicts, and the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. However uncomfortable the leaders of China, India, and the United States might be when it comes to collaborating with their counterparts, they will have little choice if they are to escape an increasingly calamitous future. Like it or not, they will have to embrace some form of G-3 collaboration, however little acknowledged it may be at first. In time, as they come to recognize their mutual interdependence, they might even find themselves collaborating in a more formal, amicable manner—to the benefit of all the inhabitants of planet Earth.
[TomDispatch first published this piece.]
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Goodbye to American Century: China and India Now Rising appeared first on Fair Observer.

With Beijing acting more assertively as an international actor and challenging the US-centered world order, questions arise as to what might happen if China becomes the global hegemon and whether democracy will survive worldwide when that happens.

Some experts refer to the 21st century as the “Chinese Century,” because Beijing has shown the material potential, strategic patience and determination to become a hegemon. China has subtleties that its closest allies, namely Iran and Russia, lack. Without firing a shot or starting a war so far, China has projected its power on the world stage through diplomacy, economy and technology, albeit with a lot of political arm-twisting, military muscle, infiltration and espionage behind that conventional façade.

More recently, China has raised its profile by grafting itself into peacemaking efforts within several longstanding conflicts across the globe. Beijing has sponsored a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement, and is doing a great deal to resolve the conflict between Riyadh and Tehran over the civil war in Yemen. China’s successes in peacemaking deal a blow to the prestige of the US and the United Nations (UN), whose joint efforts to put an end to the decade-long bloody conflict have proved fruitless so far.

In the absence of a strong American presence in the region, more neutral or Western-friendly nations are likely to lean towards China for security. Since the stability of the Middle East is aligned with the newfound interests of Beijing, we can expect that the China-centered emerging order will calm the turbulent waters in the Arab-Iranian theater of conflict for a while, of course with the obvious exclusion of Israel.

China’s Role in the Russia-Ukraine War

After the end of World War II, the Middle East was primarily an American sphere of influence. However, since the end of the Cold War, the US has been gradually withdrawing from the region. For many in Washington, the Middle East simply does not have the strategic value that it did during the Cold War. That’s why the US has been trying to pivot to Asia to counter the rise of China in the Far East. Ironically, Beijing looks eager to fill the “vacuum of superpower” in the Middle East.

China has also been trying to broker a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia. So far, Beijing has only been paying lip service to peace. For example, while claiming to mediate between Kyiv and Moscow, China has reportedly been providing Moscow with arms, drones, and economic aid. But if it perceives that playing the role of the peacemaker in the European theater of war will further raise its global profile, China might act accordingly. Especially if the West backs off from the Russia-Ukraine war, as evidence suggests, China’s role as a global peacemaker could further grow.

The peace that Beijing establishes between Russia and Ukraine will naturally be in Moscow’s favor, but it might not be so unfair as to kill any incentive for Kyiv to come to the table. After all, Russian President Vladimir Putin is now relying heavily on Chinese President Xi Jinping. Therefore, Beijing can demand concessions for Ukraine that the Kremlin cannot ignore. It should be noted that China’s intentions here go far beyond appeasing Russia, its long-time ally. Beijing is keen on presenting itself as a fair and reasonable superpower that the West and the rest of the world can trust as the new sheriff in town.

As for a head-on confrontation with America, China is currently trying to avoid that, for the US is the world’s leading military and economic power and still holds a significant edge over China. Currently, the US and China are engaged in a new Cold War, while discussions over Taiwan are also intensifying between the two global superpowers. But, this will not necessarily lead to a military conflict. However, as America’s global engagement continues to dwindle, things might take a different turn in the future.

The Erosion of Democracy

Judging by what we see today, democracy is at risk of deteriorating worldwide. In today’s  world, authoritarian regimes are willing to invest heavily in their ideological and material war on democracy. On the other hand, democratic countries generally refrain from standing up for their values, and instead resort to the myopic and short-term logic of “cost-benefit” to avoid an imminent conflict. As a result, democratic countries are leaving much less of an assertive mark on global events. If this continues, democracy is bound to decline.

So far, China has restrained itself from explicitly interfering in the internal affairs of the countries under its influence. However, there is no guarantee that China will stick to that policy once it has achieved global hegemony. Indeed, it will likely try to cast its satellite states in the same mold. This can already be seen in Iran, which is already aligned with China. But Beijing will likely try to do the same in many South Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and South American countries as well.

The rise of China and its allies on the world stage is also partly predicated on some of the internal workings of the West. Far-right, populist politics have already contributed to the erosion of democracy in the West. An increase in right-wing, isolationist tendencies in the US and the EU is likely to lead to a power vacuum around the globe that China will race to fill. 

Right-wing politicians in the West tend to adopt a conciliatory approach to dictators around the world. This is due to their strong bias in favor of local and national concerns over global matters. As a result, they tend to de-prioritize human rights and democracy elsewhere. As such, the West, both in its conservative and progressive manifestations, is becoming less interventionist and more isolationist with each passing day.

The prospect of an inexorable onslaught of authoritarianism against an entrenched and confused West does not bode well for the future of democracy worldwide. However, the West cannot continue on this regressive trajectory forever. When it becomes apparent that the existential threat of authoritarianism is inescapable, a paradigm shift is likely to occur. This will lead to a recalibration of forces towards an all-out confrontation with China and its allies.

There is also a growing demand for democracy among the oppressed people living under the yoke of despotic regimes. Many people in China, Russia and Iran are now seeking freedom and democracy. The same is true for people living under Chinese and Russian influence in places such as Hong Kong, Ukraine, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The West must organize all-out efforts to counter despots. When these efforts coalesce with the resistance and inevitable revolt of the oppressed against their oppressors, then and only then will it be possible for liberalism and democracy to emerge victorious worldwide.

[Hannah Gage edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Will Democracy Survive the Rise of China? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi inherited a Nehruvian defense policy that was flaccid. India did not have a clear strategy against an aggressive China and a hostile Pakistan. Furthermore, there was corruption in defense imports. 

Modi has a chance to change that Nehruvian legacy. He must modernize India’s defense policy. COVID-19 and the Russia-Ukraine War have been expensive to the Indian economy. So, India has to be efficient in its defense expenditure and use modern technology to counter its two nuclear-armed neighbors.

India’s Defense Strategy Has Evolved Since 2020

Post-independence India’s defense policy lacked teeth. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister, declared, “We don’t need a defense policy. Our policy is ahimsa (non-violence). We foresee no military threats. As far as I am concerned, you can scrap the army – the police are good enough to meet our security needs.” 

Nehru had a rude wake-up call in 1947-48 when Pakistan invaded Jammu and Kashmir. Yet he ignored this warning and continued to neglect the military. In fact, Nehru chronically feared a military coup. He kept the military out of the national foreign policy framework and decision-making loop. Nehru’s principle of non-alignment was to have no military alliances with superpowers. The 1962 India-China War destroyed Nehru’s childlike ideas about national security. It appears Nehru was unfamiliar with the great Indian political philosopher Kautilya.

Under Modi, India has changed and is finally letting the military take a central role in driving defense diplomacy. In January 2020, the Modi government created the office of the chief of defense staff (CDS). Its mandate is to unify the military services and improve their effectiveness. Joint theater commands created over three to four years would partly help achieve this. Admiral Arun Prakash called this move “the most significant development in the national security domain since Independence.”

The Modi government seeks to build up the domestic defense industry in its policy of import substitution. It also seeks to improve defense exports through joint ventures with US and Israeli defense companies. A key goal of these ventures is transfer of technology to India. In May 2020, India’s foreign direct investment (FDI) limit rose to 74% under the automatic route in the defense sector. Despite opposition from labor unions, corporatization of India’s state-owned highly inefficient ordnance factories has already begun and indigenization of niche technologies is also underway. The Make in India and AtmaNirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) policies are helping this effort. These include artificial intelligence, blockchain, quantum communications, unmanned systems, and other directed-energy weapons. 

India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has been building critical roads, bridges, and tunnels along the Chinese border. The country is also eliminating fencing gaps in its borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh. It is adopting all available land, water and space technologies, i.e. radar, sonar, laser and drones, to secure the border. It is also emulating Israel’s smart fencing, quick response teams and CCTV control rooms on its borders. Israel now has an airborne laser system to shoot down hostile drones, which India seeks to adopt. 

India’s porous border with Myanmar is also being fenced and sealed to manage northeast insurgents who engage in arms and drug trafficking from the Golden Triangle that includes parts of Burma, China, Laos and Thailand. 

The Modi government is also launching the National Cyber Security Strategy of 2023.

The Times Have Changed and India Must Change Too

India’s supply chain dependency of 85% on a much-weakened Russia is no longer tenable. In the Ukraine war, Russian arms and platforms have been found wanting against NATO’s superior firepower. Russia is also strapped for resources and would be unable to supply spare parts to India, were a conflict to arise. It is true that some Russian arms are effective and they are much cheaper than their Western counterparts. Moscow has also been flexible on technology transfer and royalty waivers. Yet India has no option but to diversify its supply chain. Indigenization and diversification of its military supply chain are the need of the hour. Future defense procurement is likely to come from the US, France, Israel, UK and Italy.

The Ukraine war has also shown how corruption is now a national security issue. Part of the reason the Russians did poorly early in the war was because of rampant corruption in procurement, maintenance and all aspects of their military. India has a history of corruption in defense deals too. Middlemen from four or five important families dominate this space and the defense ministry is trying to sideline them. This is a matter of national importance.

The Ukraine war has also demonstrated the importance of new technologies such as drones, advanced hand-held missiles and cyber warfare. Closer to home, the Ladakh crisis highlighted the importance of such technologies. Artificial intelligence, big data, and autonomous vehicles including aircrafts and ships will play an increasing role in war as will quantum computing.

As of now, India is using  drone jamming technology to counter drone-based smuggling and terrorism in Punjab and Jammu. India must disseminate this technology better to security forces around the country to improve national security. India needs to manage its border with Myanmar better as well. As stated above, insurgents can be a menace in that part of the world and the current porous border has to be monitored better.

It is also time for the Modi government to implement the Agnipath scheme. Most of India’s defense budget goes into salaries, pensions and benefits. This four-year tour of duty scheme frees up resources for weapons, modernization and new technology.

India Needs Institutional Reforms

A two-front war may find India “resource-constrained, overstretched, and vulnerable.” Therefore, India must improve its operational readiness and reform its institutions. The prime minister recognizes the need for reforms. To his credit, Modi advocated for a CDS in 2017 and introduced the post in January 2020. The position of the CDS was first mooted after the 1971 India-Pakistan War. Inter-services rivalry and a fear of domination by the army delayed the introduction of the CDS. Even the 1991 Kargil War did not change things. 

Similarly, joint theater commands have been pending. They are a complicated process and can take a lot of time. The US military took almost 50 years to fine-tune these commands after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet India does not have the luxury of the US with two oceans providing security from foreign threats. Long borders with Pakistan and China make joint theater commands a priority.

It is high time for the government to reform the civilian bureaucracy that acts as the military’s overlord. Unlike the Japanese, French, Israeli or American military bureaucracies, India’s defense ministry is run by generalists. They can be in the ministry of textiles one day and be in charge of India’s navy the next day. India needs domain specialists, not generalists from India’s so-called elite Indian Administrative Service (IAS) running its defense. Nehru established the IAS stranglehold on the military, which Modi must end soon.

India also needs a thorough overhaul of its professional military education. This will help to “meaningfully work [in] the new structures that are taking shape.” India also has to improve its military R&D expenditure, which lags behind that of China and the US. It also has to improve its research institutions, many of which are bureaucratic and sclerotic. Autonomy, accountability and professional management of these institutions would improve India’s national security tremendously.

Improve the Balance of Power and Make a Deal with China

Kautilya teaches us that the enemy of our enemy is a friend. The US fears China’s ascendency. India also needs to enhance its balance of power equation with China. A deeper economic and security arrangement with the US is in India’s national interest. 

India must attract manufacturing away from China. It must compete to be the manufacturing hub of the world. China’s increasing tensions with Taiwan give India a unique opportunity. It must emulate key elements of the Chinese manufacturing model. Improving infrastructure, power generation and labor laws would give Indian manufacturing a great boost. 

Kautilya regards wars as expensive. The key driver of war with China is a boundary dispute. India claims the British boundary as legitimate, while China upholds the Qing dynasty. After 18 rounds of negotiations, both countries have been unable to end the impasse. 

From New Delhi’s point of view, China occupies 38,000 square kilometers of Indian territory in the Union territory of Ladakh. This includes the Shaksgam Valley (5,180 square kilometers) gifted by Pakistan in 1963 and Aksai Chin, which was a part of Jammu and Kashmir, that China occupied in the 1950s. Aksai Chin is a largely uninhabited cold high-altitude (4,200 meters above sea level) desert but it is of strategic value because this plateau links Tibet and Xinjiang. The Chinese have built an all-weather road in Aksai Chin. They have also built another road through Shaksgam Valley connecting China to Pakistan.

For China, militarizing both Aksai Chin and Shaksgam Valley is highly expensive. The same is true for India in the case of the Siachen Glacier. Both countries must accept facts on the ground and move on. In 1959, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai proposed maintaining “the long-existing status quo of the border” and that is what India should propose. Once India and China can define the border, the risks of war will plummet, freeing up valuable resources for both nations.

A creative way forward for India might be to seek compensation for its territory that China occupies. India could ask for 100,000 rupees, i.e. $1,216 per acre. This would amount to $11.59 billion, less than 0.07% of the 2021 Chinese GDP. Of course, the amount of money India claims could be higher and China would bargain hard to lower the price. But India must think creatively and pragmatically to end its border dispute with China. This modern version of the Alaska deal would be a win-win for all parties involved.

India must pay attention to Sun Tzu as well. He states that the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting. Besides new military alliances with the US and the West, India must recognize the power of its market. China is currently benefiting from trade with India with its trade surplus surpassing $70 billion in 2021. China accounts for no less than 40% of India’s total trade deficit. This also gives India negotiating power on border disputes. India must threaten to reduce its Chinese imports during negotiations. 

At the same time, India must reduce sensitive Chinese imports such as pharmaceuticals and mobile phones over the longer term. India’s high dependency on China is unacceptable from a security point of view. As a result of the Ladakh conflict, India shut down some foreign investments in April 2020. It banned Chinese apps like TikTok. 

[Here are Part 1 and Part 3 of this three-part series.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Kautilyan Perspective on How India Should Sort Out China appeared first on Fair Observer.

The extent of US cyber vulnerability

Despite the relatively recent creation of cyberspace in the history of national security, its impact has quickly become ever-present. The United States military depends on internet technology for tasks that run the gamut from maintaining satellites and directing missiles to checking email, increasing the number of potential cyber risk vectors for the country. In the future, this could even expand to cases such as the technology aiming the rifles US soldiers use, as in the case of auto-focusing rifles. Looking beyond military applications alone, both military and civilian Americans depend on cyberspace for their everyday lives, with recent research estimating over 8.4 billion internet-connected items in use around the world in 2017, and 49% of the world’s population online, up from a mere 4% in 1999.

The internet is an easy way to infiltrate the lives of billions and is integral to processes such as communications, financial management, industrial innovation, and national defense. This already ubiquitous but still growing presence gives cyber-actors an ever-increasing reach, allowing them access to both military and civilian targets. The focus of these attacks is not confined to any one size: individuals and larger entities, such as corporations and government agencies, are equally at risk. These risks are especially felt in a country where outdated laws and infrastructure have created a dearth of protection for citizens.

The Chinese administration enjoys plausible deniability

Due to the overwhelming availability of the internet, and the unregulated and outdated infrastructure in the United States, cyber actors can often obscure their true identity and location, making it extremely difficult for authorities at the state or federal level to react to these malicious actors in a timely manner. Anyone can claim to be “John Smith from Topeka, Kansas.” While non-standard language use or that user’s IP address could indicate that to be untrue, language use is highly variable even among native English speakers, and IP addresses can be faked using VPNs to support whatever geographic mask the user wishes to wear. The structure of cyber-attacks can make them hard or impossible to identify.

Even when an operation or an attack can be identified and then traced back to adversary country, like China, foreign governments can easily deny that a cyber-attack originated from someone acting on behalf of the government. Instead, the CCP may claim that the attack came from a “lone-wolf citizen-hacktivist”—meaning that the perpetrator was not authorized or condoned by the Chinese government—and that they would turn the bad actor over to the United States if they could be identified. The plausible deniability that an attack occurred and who conducted it is another reason cyber attacks are such a threat from the CCP.

US public opinion underprepared to respond to cyber attacks

It is, however, technological factors alone that render the United States especially vulnerable. The views of the populace within the US make it harder to respond seriously to cyber threats. Cyber-attacks and cyber-espionage, while causing significant economic and national security damage, are often not viewed as “real” attacks in the United States. By contrast, the Chinese population is more likely to view cyber attacks as a threat, even those that the US public might dismiss as insignificant. Cyber attacks can persist in the background for years, not causing tangible damage for the American citizen to see or feel and without a direct correlation to loss of life, severely hampering the ability to engender support from the average American for a counter-action.

What is more, China is not the sole perpetrator of spying over cyberspace—the United States has been caught exploiting cyber vulnerabilities, just as its allies and adversaries have. A kinetic response to non-kinetic Chinese attacks would be viewed as over-the-top in the United States, undermining public support for politicians’ actions. The United States thus finds itself hamstrung, and its inability to respond to cyber-attacks in a way that deters its adversaries sends the message that these attacks are an acceptable risk. Indeed, the perception is that the United States is unable to prevent unwanted access—an open invitation to continue.

On the Chinese side, this situation is markedly different. Many Chinese nationals are willing to support their government via cyber-attacks on the United States, something often seen as their civic duty. These cyber-attacks can be carried out by paid hackers working for the government, but are often carried out as a hobby, conducted by people who think of themselves as defending their homeland. Thus, the views of the Chinese populace allow for many more and farther-reaching cyber-attacks with legitimate plausible deniability for the CCP, a potent combination of the various factors that make the prospect of cyber-attacks so dangerous for the US.

Chinese cyber operations are already causing damage

In just the past few years, China has been linked to penetrating United States companies and government entities, hacking private German technology firms, targeting Southeast Asian nations in dispute with China over the South China Sea with malicious software, and possibly intercepting sensitive communications from United States defense and technology firms. This range of public, private, US and other government targets in a brief span of time indicates the wide extent of cyber-espionage that the People’s Republic is supporting. These, it bears noting, are only the efforts that have been caught and linked back to China.

Why Is the US Losing Against China in an Espionage War?

Even if the perpetrators are identified, however, cyber espionage is harder to punish than more traditional espionage techniques which may require direct contact, as the physical location of hackers can make extradition all but impossible, and, besides, the adversary government can easily claim that perpetrators operated of their own accord. Despite the United States government identifying CCP cyber-espionage, the current administration has not sanctioned China over the actions of their hackers.

The threat posed by China to the US, furthermore, does not stop with espionage. Physically destructive operations utilizing cyber technology are an increasingly feasible option for the People’s Republic. As critical US infrastructure is increasingly networked, yet still outdated, the threat from attacks on American infrastructure is increasing. The CCP is already capable of conducting cyber-attacks that temporarily disrupt critical infrastructure within the United States. Due to the age and design of the American power-grid, one of these attacks on a legitimate military target could cause cascading effects through the grid, knocking out everything from railroads to grocery stores and to hospitals. Because of the United States’ inability to counter these attacks, cyber operations in a military context could play a much larger role if China and the US find themselves on opposite sides of a war in the future. If America goes to war to defend Taiwan from China, and China targets the American power-grid as a response, the American people may quickly remove their support for a far-away war that does not directly benefit them but does cost them lives and livelihood on home soil.

Offensive operations need not be limited to outright destruction of US assets. The CCP already has deployed other mechanisms of influence that are currently ongoing and which depend in a large part on Chinese cyber prowess. Recent examples include Chinese shaping of the narrative on COVID-19, promoting CCP-preferred policy, and a contemplated, though not completed, information operation to change the outcome of the 2020 presidential election. These operations threaten the structure of American democracy, support for a national agenda, and mislead American citizens about what global outcomes support American needs.

In addition to national information operations originating from the government itself, the CCP has additional resources from what American would consider the “private sector.” In China, the 1993 Company Law mandates that all companies based in China allow specific groups in their company to operate on behalf of the CCP. In 2018 over 50% of private companies in China had members of the CCP, but for China’s largest 500 companies’ membership was over 92% and increasing. Two examples are TikTok and WeChat. These companies have data on millions of customers and potential access to millions more, which could potentially be used to manipulate those who interact with Chinese products.

What can the US do

There are two distinct strategies which the United States must pursue to reduce the cyber risk posed by the CCP. The first strategy is improving American cyber infrastructure; the second is ensuring effective punishment of malign cyber-actors who harm the United States.

To improve American cyber infrastructure, both government and private entities must secure systems, ensure data fidelity, and protect infrastructure. In 2020, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended ten critical actions that US public and private entities need to take in order to address cyber risks. These actions range from “develop[ing] and execut[ing] a comprehensive strategy for national cybersecurity” to “strengthen[ing] the federal role in protecting the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure (e.g., electricity grid and telecommunications networks),” and would reduce the vulnerabilities in American cyberspace, denying access to nefarious actors and decreasing the damage that these bad actors can do if they are able to penetrate cyber defenses. The Biden Administration has expanded on these goals in their National Cybersecurity Strategy, released March 2023. Simply put, if United States cybersecurity is stronger, it will be harder for the CCP to exploit.

In addition to hardening American cyberspace, the United States must also begin punishing nefarious actors for attempted and successful penetrations of American cyberspace. Cases of hacking which are linked back to the CCP must result in sanctions against the Chinese government. Sanctions limiting the transfer of American intellectual property (IP) to Chinese companies would be one way to make a dent in the effects of hacking, since many instances of cyber-espionage against American companies result in stolen IP, reduced profits, and lost American jobs. By penalizing the same industries that benefit from hacking, the United States can avoid escalating the standard set for in-kind retaliation in the case that American companies are caught committing espionage against Chinese corporations.

Cyber-espionage, while difficult to track, is not untraceable. Although CCP cyber-espionage takes advantage of ubiquitous connectivity, anonymity, and the United States’ reluctance to react, it can be detected and dealt with. Attackers are not always capable of entering and exiting networks without leaving a trail of evidence. This may ultimately lead to their arrest or, at the very least, the discovery of their identity and employment by state actors.

In summary, the Chinese Communist Party’s cyber capabilities are currently a severe threat to the United States through cyber-espionage, the risk of attacks, and influence operations. Without increasing American cyber defenses and sanctioning malign actors, the United States will remain vulnerable to CCP cyber operations. The United States government has already proposed specific steps for reducing cyber risk and strengthening the nation against a top threat. But actions must follow these statements. By following through on these recommendations, the United States can begin to defend itself against a dangerous adversary.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The US Must Act Now To Overcome Chinese Cyber Threat appeared first on Fair Observer.

As many as 13 NATO allied and partner nations with more than 20 ships, and 35 aircraft, including the F-35 fighter, and 4,000 personnel are participating in this exercise. As per the Pentagon “encompasses live-fire rehearsal events in a multidomain environment against subsonic, supersonic and ballistic targets.” In effect, this exercise is a shot across the bow of Russia.

Moscow has been active in the Arctic for decades. In 2007, two mini submarines (mini-subs)  planted a one meter-high titanium Russian flag more than two and a half miles beneath the North Pole. In a record-breaking dive, the mini-subs Mir-1 and Mir-2 descended to 4,300 meters. In Moscow’s words, this was “a serious, risky and heroic mission.” 

Riches Under the Sea and Across it too

It is an open secret that global warming is accelerating and climate change is already upon us. NASA tells us that polar ice is melting dramatically and Greenland is losing about 270 billion tons per year. This is leading to sea level rise, which will be catastrophic for the likes of Bangladesh, Maldives and New Orleans but offers polar powers access to natural resources and new trade routes.

The Arctic has major reserves of oil and natural gas. Large quantities of minerals, including iron ore, copper, nickel, zinc phosphates and diamonds, are also on offer. In 2008, the United States Geological Survey estimated “90 billion barrels of undiscovered, technically recoverable oil, 1,670 trillion cubic feet of technically recoverable natural gas, and 44 billion barrels of technically recoverable natural gas liquids in 25 geologically defined areas” in the Arctic.

The melting of the Arctic is also opening up new trans-Arctic routes, including the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP). The NSR and NWP are shorter maritime routes. They offer an economic boost to Arctic economies. New ports, both hydrocarbon and military, are opening in the region. With such riches on offer, the US, Russia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland stand to gain. 

Russia Ahead in Great Arctic Race

A great Arctic race is now on. As a resource-based economy that exports commodities, Moscow is taking the lead in the militarization and resource grab in the region. Elizabeth Buchanan, the author of Red Arctic, chronicles how Russia has cannily used “international rules for over two decades to secure its rights in the North Pole seabed.”

Russia ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1997. Since then, Moscow has worked ceaselessly for the recognition of its claims to the extended continental shelf. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) has deemed the majority of Russia’s claims in the Arctic to be valid. This February, Moscow gained rights to an approximately 1.7 million square kilometers of seabed.

Russia has used international law to its advantage because UNCLOS allows coastal states to establish the outer limits of their continental shelves beyond the limits of 200 nautical miles. The CLCS seeks scientific data and Russia has been diligent in providing this evidence. It also made its claims to the CLCS first. Danish (thanks to control of Greenland) and Canadian claims came later and might be a decade away from recognition. The US does not recognize UNCLOS and thus cannot make claims to the extended continental shelf.

While bolstering its legal claims, Russia has been building military strength in the Arctic. Last September, Reuters reported that “Russia has reopened tens of Arctic Soviet-era military bases, modernized its navy, and developed new hypersonic missiles designed to evade US sensors and defenses” since 2005. Russia’s bases inside the Arctic Circle outnumber NATO’s by about a third and the West is at least ten years behind.

Russia has seven nuclear-powered icebreakers and around 30 diesel-powered ones. The US and China have just two diesel-powered icebreakers each in operation. The US is the global superpower but Russia is the Arctic superpower.

Apart from resources and sea routes, the Arctic offers some of the best places to station ground stations for satellites. One such place is the island of Svalbard off the Norwegian mainland. SvalSat in Svalbard downloads time-sensitive data from most of the world’s commercial and scientific satellites.  In 2021 and 2022, fiber-optic cables on the Arctic seabed connecting the island and the mainland were severed. Norwegians suspect the Russians of sabotage. 

Norway is not alone in worrying about Russia. In the 1939-40 war, Finland lost 11% of its territory to the Soviet Union, which was then led by Joseph Stalin. Finns view Russian President Vladimir Putin as a grave threat to national security. In their eyes, he has reverted to expansionism that characterized both Stalin and the Tsars. In November 2022, Putin launched two nuclear-powered icebreakers capable of year-round navigation in the Western Arctic. Russian “Arctic power” is making its neighbors nervous. Exercises like Formidable Shield demonstrate that the US-led NATO can act in the Arctic.

New START Out: Is Nuclear War Back in Fashion?

The West Also Worries About China

China also has Arctic ambitions and claims to be a near-Arctic state. The United States Naval Institute tells us that “China is subtly installing a larger presence in the Arctic through an extensive partnership with Russia in areas ranging from multi-use ports and airfields to energy extraction.”

A Brookings paper tells us that Chinese President Xi Jinping and officials responsible for Arctic policy want their country to be a top polar power by 2030. They see this region as one of the “new strategic frontiers” where China can quench its thirst for energy and minerals. Some concerns about the future Chinese play for the Arctic seem overblown. What makes sense is that Chinese demand might fuel Russian supply.

The two countries are inching closer together even though China has not fully backed Russia on Ukraine. They have conducted naval exercises together in the Arctic. In 2021, Russian and Chinese ships circumnavigated Japan’s main island Honshu in a naval exercise of immense significance. China is the workshop of the world. Its demand for oil, natural gas and all the minerals under the Arctic is immense. It has the money to invest into Russian polar infrastructure from ports and naval vessels to pipelines and other infrastructure.

The opening up of trans-Arctic routes would allow these to be transported to Chinese ports at much cheaper rates than today. So, China has a stake in the Arctic and is therefore making a strategic bet by cozying up with Russia. Talk of polar silk roads is rife. Together, Russia and China could make a formidable Eurasian alliance, especially in the Arctic, despite their rivalry in Central Asia and elsewhere.

What Lies Ahead?

In August 2017, the Russian tanker sailed from Norway to South Korea in 19 days without needing an icebreaker. This Arctic passage along the conventional route through the Suez Canal would have taken over 50 days. In 2018, The Economist opined that “the Arctic route has drawbacks: a navigation season of three to four months each year, unpredictable ice conditions, high insurance fees, costly specialised vessels, and a lack of search-and-rescue teams and support infrastructure.”

The increasing rate of the melting of the poles might mitigate these drawbacks. Furthermore, instability and piracy along the traditional routes, especially in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, might add costs to traditional shipping. The Suez Canal and the Straits of Malacca could clog up. For China, they are trade arteries that could be cut off. The Arctic passage is far better for Chinese national security.

With the Russians beefing up their military in the region and the Chinese bankrolling them, the Arctic is set to change. The other Arctic powers will not stand idly by. They will inevitably respond both diplomatically and militarily. The mood in Washington is already increasingly belligerent. In December 2022, Kenneth R. Rosen argued in Politico that a battle for the Arctic was already underway and the US was behind. As the US gears up and its allies join in, the Arctic will heat up further and become a new theater for potential conflict.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Great Arctic Game Is Now in Full Swing appeared first on Fair Observer.

That past, though seemingly distant, is still shaping the world we live in. Those legendary generals and admirals are, of course, long gone, but the geopolitics they practiced at such a cost still has profound implications. For just as Washington encircled Eurasia to win a great war and global hegemony, so Beijing is now involved in a far less militarized reprise of that reach for global power.

And to be blunt, these days, China’s gain is America’s loss. Every step Beijing takes to consolidate its control over Eurasia simultaneously weakens Washington’s presence on that strategic continent and so erodes its once formidable global power.

A Cold War Strategy

After four embattled years imbibing lessons about geopolitics with their morning coffee and bourbon nightcaps, America’s wartime generation of generals and admirals understood, intuitively, how to respond to the future alliance of the two great communist powers in Moscow and Beijing.

In 1948, following his move from the Pentagon to Foggy Bottom, Secretary of State George Marshall launched the $13 billion Marshall Plan to rebuild a war-torn Western Europe, laying the economic foundations for the formation of the NATO alliance just a year later. After a similar move from the wartime Allied headquarters in London to the White House in 1953, President Dwight D. Eisenhower helped complete a chain of military bastions along Eurasia’s Pacific littoral by signing a series of mutual-security pacts — with South Korea in 1953, Taiwan in 1954, and Japan in 1960. For the next 70 years, that island chain would serve as the strategic hinge on Washington’s global power, critical for both the defense of North America and dominance over Eurasia.

After fighting to conquer much of that vast continent during World War II, America’s postwar leaders certainly knew how to defend their gains. For more than 40 years, their unrelenting efforts to dominate Eurasia assured Washington of an upper hand and, in the end, victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War. To constrain the communist powers inside that continent, the US ringed its 6,000 miles with 800 military bases, thousands of jet fighters, and three massive naval armadas — the 6th Fleet in the Atlantic, the 7th Fleet in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, and, somewhat later, the 5th Fleet in the Persian Gulf.

Thanks to diplomat George Kennan, that strategy gained the name “containment” and, with it, Washington could, in effect, sit back and wait while the Sino-Soviet bloc imploded through diplomatic blunder and military misadventure. After the Beijing-Moscow split of 1962 and China’s subsequent collapse into the chaos of Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution, the Soviet Union tried repeatedly, if unsuccessfully, to break out of its geopolitical isolation — in the Congo, Cuba, Laos, Egypt, Ethiopia, Angola, and Afghanistan. In the last and most disastrous of those interventions, which Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev came to term “the bleeding wound,” the Red Army deployed 110,000 soldiers for nine years of brutal Afghan combat, hemorrhaging money and manpower in ways that would contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

In that heady moment of seeming victory as the sole superpower left on planet Earth, a younger generation of Washington foreign-policy leaders, trained not on battlefields but in think tanks, took little more than a decade to let that unprecedented global power start to slip away. Toward the close of the Cold War era in 1989, Francis Fukuyama, an academic working in the State Department’s policy planning unit, won instant fame among Washington insiders with his seductive phrase “the end of history.” He argued that America’s liberal world order would soon sweep up all of humanity on an endless tide of capitalist democracy. As he put it in a much-cited essay: “The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident… in the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism… seen also in the ineluctable spread of consumerist Western culture.”

The Invisible Power of Geopolitics

Amid such triumphalist rhetoric, Zbigniew Brzezinski, another academic sobered by more worldly experience, reflected on what he had learned about geopolitics during the Cold War as an adviser to two presidents, Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan. In his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard, Brzezinski offered the first serious American study of geopolitics in more than half a century. In the process, he warned that the depth of US global hegemony, even at this peak of unipolar power, was inherently “shallow.”

For the United States and, he added, every major power of the past 500 years, Eurasia, home to 75% of the world’s population and productivity, was always “the chief geopolitical prize.” To perpetuate its “preponderance on the Eurasian continent” and so preserve its global power, Washington would, he warned, have to counter three threats: “the expulsion of America from its offshore bases” along the Pacific littoral; ejection from its “perch on the western periphery” of the continent provided by NATO; and finally, the formation of “an assertive single entity” in the sprawling center of Eurasia.

Arguing for Eurasia’s continued post-Cold War centrality, Brzezinski drew heavily on the work of a long-forgotten British academic, Sir Halford Mackinder. In a 1904 essay that sparked the modern study of geopolitics, Mackinder observed that, for the past 500 years, European imperial powers had dominated Eurasia from the sea, but the construction of trans-continental railroads was shifting the locus of control to its vast interior “heartland.” In 1919, in the wake of World War I, he also argued that Eurasia, along with Africa, formed a massive “world island” and offered this bold geopolitical formula: “Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; Who rules the World Island commands the World.” Clearly, Mackinder was about 100 years premature in his predictions.

But today, by combining Mackinder’s geopolitical theory with Brzezinski’s gloss on global politics, it’s possible to discern, in the confusion of this moment, some potential long-term trends. Imagine Mackinder-style geopolitics as a deep substrate that shapes more ephemeral political events, much the way the slow grinding of the planet’s tectonic plates becomes visible when volcanic eruptions break through the earth’s surface. Now, let’s try to imagine what all this means in terms of international geopolitics today.

China’s Geopolitical Gambit

In the decades since the Cold War’s close, China’s increasing control over Eurasia clearly represents a fundamental change in that continent’s geopolitics. Convinced that Beijing would play the global game by US rules, Washington’s foreign policy establishment made a major strategic miscalculation in 2001 by admitting it to the World Trade Organization (WTO). “Across the ideological spectrum, we in the US foreign policy community,” confessed two former members of the Obama administration, “shared the underlying belief that US power and hegemony could readily mold China to the United States’ liking… All sides of the policy debate erred.” In little more than a decade after it joined the WTO, Beijing’s annual exports to the US grew nearly five-fold and its foreign currency reserves soared from just $200 billion to an unprecedented $4 trillion by 2013.

In 2013, drawing on those vast cash reserves, China’s new president, Xi Jinping, launched a trillion-dollar infrastructure initiative to transform Eurasia into a unified market. As a steel grid of rails and petroleum pipelines began crisscrossing the continent, China ringed the tri-continental world island with a chain of 40 commercial ports — from Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, around Africa’s coast, to Europe from Piraeus, Greece, to Hamburg, Germany. In launching what soon became history’s largest development project, 10 times the size of the Marshall Plan, Xi is consolidating Beijing’s geopolitical dominance over Eurasia, while fulfilling Brzezinski’s fear of the rise of “an assertive single entity” in Central Asia.

Unlike the US, China hasn’t spent significant effort establishing military bases. While Washington still maintains some 750 of them in 80 nations, Beijing has just one military base in Djibouti on the east African coast, a signals intercept post on Myanmar’s Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal, a compact installation in eastern Tajikistan, and half a dozen small outposts in the South China Sea.

Moreover, while Beijing was focused on building Eurasian infrastructure, Washington was fighting two disastrous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in a strategically inept bid to dominate the Middle East and its oil reserves (just as the world was beginning to transition away from petroleum to renewable energy). In contrast, Beijing has concentrated on the slow, stealthy accretion of investments and influence across Eurasia from the South China Sea to the North Sea. By changing the continent’s underlying geopolitics through this commercial integration, it’s winning a level of control not seen in the last thousand years, while unleashing powerful forces for political change.

Tectonic Shifts Shake US Power

After a decade of Beijing’s relentless economic expansion across Eurasia, the tectonic shifts in that continent’s geopolitical substrate have begun to manifest themselves in a series of diplomatic eruptions, each erasing another aspect of US influence. Four of the more recent ones might seem, at first glance, unrelated but are all driven by the relentless force of geopolitical change.

First came the sudden, unexpected collapse of the US position in Afghanistan, forcing Washington to end its 20-year occupation in August 2021 with a humiliating withdrawal. In a slow, stealthy geopolitical squeeze play, Beijing had signed massive development deals with all the surrounding Central Asian nations, leaving American troops isolated there. To provide critical air support for its infantry, US jet fighters were often forced to fly 2,000 miles from their nearest base in the Persian Gulf — an unsustainable long-term situation and unsafe for troops on the ground. As the US-trained Afghan Army collapsed and Taliban guerrillas drove into Kabul atop captured Humvees, the chaotic US retreat in defeat became unavoidable.

Just six months later in February 2022, President Vladimir Putin massed an armada of armored vehicles loaded with 200,000 troops on Ukraine’s border. If Putin is to be believed, his “special military operation” was to be a bid to undermine NATO’s influence and weaken the Western alliance — one of Brzezinski’s conditions for the US eviction from Eurasia.

But first Putin visited Beijing to court President Xi’s support, a seemingly tall order given China’s decades of lucrative trade with the United States, worth a mind-boggling $500 billion in 2021. Yet Putin scored a joint declaration that the two nations’ relations were “superior to political and military alliances of the Cold War era” and a denunciation of “the further expansion of NATO.”

As it happened, Putin did so at a perilous price. Instead of attacking Ukraine in frozen February when his tanks could have maneuvered off-road on their way to the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, he had to wait out Beijing’s Winter Olympics. So, Russian troops invaded instead in muddy March, leaving his armored vehicles stuck in a 40-mile traffic jam on a single highway where the Ukrainians readily destroyed more than 1,000 tanks. Facing diplomatic isolation and European trade embargos as his defeated invasion degenerated into a set of vengeful massacres, Moscow shifted much of its exports to China. That quickly raised bilateral trade by 30% to an all-time high, while reducing Russia to but another piece on Beijing’s geopolitical chessboard.

Then, just last month, Washington found itself diplomatically marginalized by an utterly unexpected resolution of the sectarian divide that had long defined the politics of the Middle East. After signing a $400-billion infrastructure deal with Iran and making Saudi Arabia its top oil supplier, Beijing was well positioned to broker a major diplomatic rapprochement between those bitter regional rivals, Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia. Within weeks, the foreign ministers of the two nations sealed the deal with a deeply symbolic voyage to Beijing — a bittersweet reminder of the days not long ago when Arab diplomats paid court in Washington.

Finally, the Biden administration was stunned this month when Europe’s preeminent leader, Emmanuel Macron of France, visited Beijing for a series of intimate tête-à-tête chats with China’s President Xi. At the close of that extraordinary journey, which won French companies billions in lucrative contracts, Macron announced “a global strategic partnership with China” and promised he would not “take our cue from the US agenda” over Taiwan. A spokesman for the Élysée Palace quickly released a pro forma clarification that “the United States is our ally, with shared values.” Even so, Macron’s Beijing declaration reflected both his own long-term vision of the European Union as an independent strategic player and that bloc’s ever-closer economic ties to China

The Future of Geopolitical Power

Projecting such political trends a decade into the future, Taiwan’s fate would seem, at best, uncertain. Instead of the “shock and awe” of aerial bombardments, Washington’s default mode of diplomatic discourse in this century, Beijing prefers stealthy, sedulous geopolitical pressure. In building its island bases in the South China Sea, for example, it inched forward incrementally — first dredging, then building structures, next runways, and finally emplacing anti-aircraft missiles — in the process avoiding any confrontation over its functional capture of an entire sea.

Lest we forget, Beijing has built its formidable economic-political-military power in little more than a decade. If its strength continues to increase inside Eurasia’s geopolitical substrate at even a fraction of that head-spinning pace for another decade, it may be able to execute a deft geopolitical squeeze-play on Taiwan like the one that drove the US out of Afghanistan. Whether from a customs embargo, incessant naval patrols, or some other form of pressure, Taiwan might just fall quietly into Beijing’s grasp.

Should such a geopolitical gambit prevail, the US strategic frontier along the Pacific littoral would be broken, possibly pushing its Navy back to a “second island chain” from Japan to Guam — the last of Brzezinski’s criteria for the true waning of US global power. In that event, Washington’s leaders could once again find themselves sitting on the proverbial diplomatic and economic sidelines, wondering how it all happened.
[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Rise of China (and the Fall of the US?) appeared first on Fair Observer.

The visit is a sign that China intends to become a new power player in the region, with Saudi Arabia, one of China’s largest suppliers of oil, by its side. On the other hand, it also illustrated the strained nature of China’s relationship with Iran. According to John Calabrese, Director of the Middle East-Asia Project at the Middle East Institute, Xi’s attendance served as a clear reminder “of the frustrating reality that, in substantive terms, China-Iran relations have stagnated.” The visit only served to further exacerbate what “has long been an asymmetrical, limited partnership” continued Calabrese. 

However, the visit “should not be regarded as China no longer being interested in Iran,” Dr. Manochehr Dorraj of Texas Christian University said. “But that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) not only rank as the number one and number two trade partners for China, but they also have the financial capability to invest in the Chinese economy, something that Iran is currently lacking. This is among several factors why the Chinese leadership may prioritize bilateral ties with the Arab World as more significant.” 

Changing times and changing priorities

China’s engagement in the Middle East has steadily grown over years, building alliances with countries that are strong economically and stable politically. Before, the region occupied only a secondary role in China’s foreign policy. 

The two countries released a 4,000-word joint statement that outlined their alignment on everything from security to oil-related issues. The statement will likely worsen Sino-Iranian relations as the language painted Iran as a malignant actor in the region. This makes it appear to be more the work of the kingdom than China.  

Jacopo Scita, a Bourse and Bazar Foundation Policy Fellow concurs, noting it is striking and unexpected that the joint statement “does not reflect the usual, carefully choreographed balancing typical of China’s public discourse on Iran-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) relations.”

Barbara Slavin, a Stimson Center Distinguished Fellow, agreed that “Xi definitely seemed to be tilting toward the Saudi/Emirati point of view on a number of issues”. 

Dr. Dorraj deemed that China likely agreed to the “wording because Saudi Arabia is a top oil exporter to China and they want Saudi business. At the same time, China is very reluctant to become entangled in domestic affairs or meddle in regional conflicts and prefers stability in the region.” This perhaps explains why they were willing to spend the political capital to mediate a reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia which was announced on March 10th.

Where does Iran now fit?

The statement was a message of dissatisfaction that China wanted to convey to Iran, according to Scita. Naturally, Iran was not pleased by the visit or the statement. According to Scita, the administration of President Ebrahim Raisi perceived both “as a detriment to relations and in particular to its “Look to the East” policy, of which the partnership with China is one of the main pillars.” 

“Raisi understood the reasons for President Xi’s visit but was clearly unhappy because the language of the statement aligned more with Saudi Arabia,” Slavin said. This was evidenced in articles published by hardline Iranian media news outlets that expressed outrage over the visit and the language of the statement, according to Dr. Dorraj.

During the visit, China ensured that it will sell arms to Saudi Arabia without any human rights stipulations. Beijing has been assisting the kingdom with building drone factories and selling long-range missiles to Riyadh, which Iran is already aware of. 

According to Slavin, Tehran is worried about “Chinese willingness to assist Saudi nuclear development and efforts to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle.” Iran, “is irrelevant in the Saudi Arabia-China relationship and has other partners to rely on for weapons sales,” Dr. Dorraj continued. 

Old country seeks new friends

To add insult to injury, Beijing sent former Vice Premier Hu Chunhua’s visit to Tehran on December 13th. Despite having been recently removed from his post, Chunhua led the delegation to meet with President Ebrahim Raisi.

Dr. Dooraj believes that too much has been made about Chunhua’s involvement. On the other hand, Scita believes that this “implicitly conveys the message that China-Iran relations are subordinated to China-Arab relations.” Slavin agrees, that it’s “clear that Saudi Arabia is much more important to Beijing than Iran.” Despite cuts in oil prices, Iran remains a junior partner compared to Saudi Arabia and the GCC.

Examining China’s foreign policy in the region helps in understanding the subordinate role of Iran. For Scita, it’s classic strategic hedging with a focus on establishing ties with strong economies and stable political systems. 

Calabrese sees “China focused more on Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states in the near term, with an eye towards building its relationship with Iran in the long term if/when conditions allow”. 

Calabrese doesn’t foresee the status quo changing in the near future. Improving relations would require lifting Western sanctions and reopening negotiations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran is unwilling to do. Therefore, China will continue to sideline Iran as it reorients its regional diplomatic strategy.  

Tehran’s place within the Belt and Road Initiative

Tehran still remains valuable for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Calabrese noted that Iran’s location remains “a very important potential node along the BRI.” Dr. Dorraj agrees, adding that Iran is situated along the largest coast in the Persian Gulf with many ports to facilitate the movement of Chinese goods, while also possessing a large consumer base of around 85 million people.

Scita adds that “Iran’s prominent place in the BRI is an unfulfilled potential and it’s preventing Tehran from fully integrating into China’s westward infrastructural and investment projects.” Tehran has yet to fully integrate into the BRI primarily because “sanctions have made it more difficult for China to invest in Iran and there are no signs that Tehran is ready to accept a deal reviving the JCPOA that would provide sanctions relief.” 

In comparison, Chinese investment in Saudi Arabia and the UAE faces no such impediments. This is because “China formally states they are in favor of partnering with ‘Strong States,’” Dr. Dorraj said. In other words, China prefers countries that enjoy political stability and are able to safeguard their relations. 

As China’s vested interests grow in the Middle East, so will the need to protect them. The recent wave of protests in Iran has posed a serious challenge to the regime’s legitimacy. In contrast, Saudi Arabia (and the GCC more broadly) is politically stable, is largely free of domestic unrest, and has a relatively robust economy. All of this is important for Beijing, Dr. Dooraj said. 

Looming questions for the future

On February 14, President Ebrahim Raisi traveled to Beijing on an invitation from President Xi Jinping. While some analysts hailed the visit as an indication that “China-Iran relations are warming,” other experts contended that it was more symbolism than substance. 

For example, Slavin believes that the visit “seemed more like a way for Raisi to get away from his mounting domestic problems, including the protests over the enforced hijab and the sinking Iranian currency.” 

Raisi did not exactly return empty-handed. The Iranian president signed more than 20 cooperation agreements and memorandums of understanding but according to Calabrese, “the documents contained pledges, and nothing more.” “Even the Iranians realize they are junior partners,” Calabrese added.

Jason Brodsky, Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran, believes that China will still continue to balance its interests with Saudi Arabia and Iran, former regional rivals. In March, as previously mentioned, Iran and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement in Beijing to restore diplomatic ties after a 7-year rift.

Dr. Dooraj disagrees with the alarmism from many experts who argue that Beijing has essentially moved on from Iran. “China spent political capital to mediate and reconcile ties between both states and demonstrates how effective Chinese diplomacy has been in comparison to the United States,” Dr. Dooraj said. 

Calabrese adds that the Chinese-brokered deal also illustrates “the advantage that Beijing has over Washington in leading on this particular issue, namely a constructive relationship with and positive leverage over Tehran.”   

Let’s not forget, Calabrese said, that “There are six GCC states. There is only one Iran. Of those six Gulf Arab states, the energy and other ties with China have become far more extensive and promising than with Iran, especially because of the latter’s economic and political isolation.” 

For now, Slavin asserts that “Iran is losing ground to the Arabs in terms of Chinese foreign relations.” Beijing’s interests align with Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Nevertheless, China sees no reason to alienate Iran. Therefore, China will continue to maintain ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, even it prioritizes one over the other.

[Naveed Ahsan edited this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post President Xi Meets with MBS: What Does This Mean for Iran? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Since 1978, China has almost defied the economic laws of gravity. The loosening of state regulations have allowed the economy to thrive. Deng’s 1978 reforms allowed the Chinese dragon to soar into the skies. China hid its strength and bided its time. Deng doubled down on reforms in 1992 and China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.

The same year, 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington, DC caused the US to fixate on the so-called global war on terror. Uncle Sam spent two decades chasing shadows in the deserts of the Middle East and the rocks of Afghanistan. The blood and treasure it spent in both misadventures came to naught, and weakened the superpower.

Now, the Middle Kingdom is refashioning the world that the US created in 1945 and that emerged triumphant in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. Russian President Vladimir Putin challenged that world over the years and ended it by invading Ukraine in 2022. Large-scale war is now back in Europe after 1945. The US involvement in the Russia-Ukraine War has given China the opportunity to cultivate many non-European powers.

Recently, Beijing has brokered the restoration of diplomatic ties between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran, challenging American domination of the region for the first time since World War II. Notably, China is now the biggest importer of Saudi oil and is the largest trade partner of Iran. For many countries in Africa and Latin America, China is now their biggest export market and the greatest source of investment and debt. During the heyday of European imperialism, trade followed the flag. In this new era of Chinese ascendance, the flag is following trade.

Singh and Carle address three questions in their podcast:

1. If we are speaking about a new world order, we have to define the old world order. What was that old postwar world order?
2. What is this new world order that China is championing?
3. What are the implications of this new world order for the US, for China, for Europe, for major powers like Japan and India, and for the so-called “Global South”?

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Enter the Dragon: China Is Creating New World Order appeared first on Fair Observer.

President Donald Trump imposed punitive tariffs on Chinese goods worth $50 billion. He cited the theft of intellectual property and currency manipulation as reasons for penalizing China. Mike Pence, as Trump’s vice president, declared that the US would prioritize competition over cooperation in its relations with China. 

President Joe Biden’s administration is not only continuing with Trump’s tariffs, but it is also introducing restrictions on the export of certain semiconductor chips to China. Their goal is to prevent China from getting access to cutting-edge technology and to hobble the semiconductor industry.

Why Semiconductors Are a Really Big Deal

Industry experts estimate that Taiwan now “produces over 60% of the world’s semiconductors and over 90% of the most advanced ones.” Officially, Taiwan is a part of China. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the civil war, the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to an island off Mainland China. For decades, both the CCP and KMT maintained a “One China” policy.

Taiwan has since transitioned into a democracy. The KMT is no longer in power. Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen belongs to the Democratic Progressive Party. She has made a historic visit to the US and met the US House of Representatives Speaker Kevin McCarthy. The Chinese are clearly not pleased with this visit or this meeting. De facto, Taiwan has become militarily and politically independent of Beijing.

Taiwan has become a flashpoint for US-China relations. In the last few years, US media has been speculating about a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. China’s rhetoric has also been hardening. Beijing is restricting the exports of rare earths needed to build the batteries necessary for renewable power.

As US and China Clash, Taiwan Moves Closer to the Brink of Disaster

China has increased military spending as well. Chinese defense expenditure increased by 15% per year from 1990 to 2005. This trend has continued. In March 2023, China announced a defense budget of $224.8 billion, marking a 7.2% increase from 2022. Beijing is also prioritizing its navy, and navies can be used to enforce blockades.

The US Navy has long been dominant globally but now faces a challenge in the Pacific from the Chinese Navy. In any confrontation with China, the US can count on the support of  its allies in NATO, and from countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia. On the other hand, China has no significant allies, except perhaps Russia.

Interestingly, the country whose population feels most threatened by China is India. A poll found 73% Indians worrying about China’s military rise. A large majority of the Japanese are also worrying about the threat from China. Just before Christmas last year, Japan increased its defense spending, announcing it would double it over the next five years. In contrast, only 48% of the French and 40% of Germans feel China poses a risk to their respective countries.

Han and Hindu Nationalism Come Face to Face

The US has complained repeatedly about China not trading fairly with the rest of the world. Yet the US continues to weaken the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the only body that could discipline Chinese unfair trade practices. Thus, US-China trade tensions have been increasing steadily.

Kevin Rudd, the former Australian prime minister, has called for a structured relationship between China and the US. He calls for “managed strategic competition” between the US and China in his 2022 book, The Avoidable War. Strong institutions such as the WTO would help.

Working out the terms of this arrangement to manage relations between the world’s two biggest powers will not be easy. It would require creativity and goodwill on both sides. Statesmanship is the need of the hour.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is a US-China Conflict Inevitable Now? appeared first on Fair Observer.

China and India have many similarities. India has been shaped by Hinduism and China by Buddhism. Buddhism originated in India and has a similar value system to Hinduism. The roots of many systems considered Chinese are actually Indian, including martial arts, acupressure and acupuncture. China is also emerging as the new yoga superpower after the US. Logically, India and China should be friends, although China’s ambitions do not allow this.

India is a nuclear state with two nuclear-armed adversaries in China and Pakistan on its borders. China seeks to deepen economic relations with Pakistan via its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It has followed a “string of pearls” strategy to encircle India and makes constant revisionist claims about the India-China border.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that China had not supported Pakistan in the 1999 Kargil conflict. However, China’s assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon and missile programmes, and its BRI investments in Pakistan threaten India. Therefore, India faces the risk of a two-front war.

A Power-Hungry China Seeks to Dominate India

China only respects hard power. Money and military might are the operative metrics. Beijing is seeking to wrest the mantle of global leadership from Washington. India has traditionally played a passive role with China. New Delhi has consistently demonstrated reluctance to confront Beijing or take the initiative of proposing new solutions to sort out its border disputes. Indian foreign policy, influenced by Hindu philosophy, including ahimsa, has traditionally seen leadership as an exercise of soft power, moral pressure, and diplomatic negotiations.

This soft “head-in-the-sand” foreign policy of unending talk and little action is further aggravated by India’s inability to reduce import dependence on Chinese electronics and pharmaceutical intermediates. Thus, China’s authoritarian regime believes that it has a free pass to bully India. The Chinese test this periodically through persistently revisionist border skirmishes and aggressive rhetoric in different forums. 

Rising powers attempt to dominate their “near abroad” and this reflects clearly in China’s string of pearls, debt trap diplomacy and hexiao gongda—uniting with the small to counter the big—strategies. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, came up with five Panchsheel principles, which included the principle of non-aggression. Yet the 1962 India-China War broke out at the height of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai.

China has no problem with deception. Through the millennia, the Chinese have been guided by The Art of War, the classic penned by Sun Tzu in the 5^th century BC. He argued that “warfare is a way of deception” and the 1962 war serves as a good example of the application of this principle. China uses Sun Tzu’s psychological techniques to achieve its political goals. In the case of Uyghur Muslims and Tibetans, China has practiced cultural genocide. China is aggressive, persistent, and unpredictable in its constant attempts to redraw the borders. Even 18 rounds of border negotiations with India have yielded no results.

China’s BRI initiative through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) to Gwadar port creates a super link through which military equipment can be moved. China is weaponizing BRI and this is detrimental to India. In a future scenario, Chinese military bases in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) in Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Pakistan, acquired through debt trap diplomacy, would jeopardize Indian national security. Beijing is also cosying up with both Nepal and Afghanistan. In Nepal, China has had much success and the country even elected a communist government. In Afghanistan, success has been harder to come by because the Taliban runs a hardline Islamist regime.

India has to respond to Chinese aggression. It will only achieve peace when the country achieves adequate military and economic power. India could also turn to its very own political philosopher known as Chanakya or Kautilya who wrote Arthaśāstra in 300 BC.

Nuclear Pakistan’s Economic Woes Can Unleash Jihadism

The 1971 India-Pakistan War still scars the Pakistani psyche. India liberated Bangladesh, which until then was East Pakistan. Since then, Pakistan has been obsessed with India. As revenge it sought to “bleed India with a thousand cuts.” It funded and supported insurgencies in India. In Punjab, it led to a campaign of terror for Khalistan. Pakistan has always dreamt of annexing Kashmir and has persistently fomented trouble there since 1947. India and Pakistan have fought three major wars, one minor one and engaged in countless border clashes. So, a Pakistan-China nexus worries India.

India and US in the New World

Pakistan describes its friendship with China as being “higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey.”  Pakistan is the biggest recipient of BRI money. Chinese debt is $30 billion—30% of its external debt—and continues to grow. Because of this debt, Pakistan has lost its ability to be an independent voice for Muslims. Pakistanis speak about Kashmiris all the time but dare not mention fellow Muslim Uyghurs. So beholden is Islamabad to Beijing that Pakistan would have to follow China’s lead and could lead to a two-front war for India.

After years of military rule and a pseudo-democracy, Pakistan’s economy is in tatters. Both economic mismanagement and natural disasters have brought the country to its knees. The poverty rate has increased dramatically. Inflation has spiraled out of control. Thousands of madrassas have churned out tens of thousands of jihadis since the 1980s when Saudi money flooded into the country. Then, the goal was to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now, jihadis could cause civil war and the implosion of Pakistan. Since Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state, an implosion poses tremendous security risks for India. Fostering a peaceful Jihadi-free Sufi-believing Pakistan is in India’s direct security interests.

India Must Heed Kautilya’s Wise Words

Kautilya recommends that states strive for a balance of power and prevent rivals from becoming too powerful. He asks the king to become the most powerful among his peers (vijigishu) to achieve peace and security. He includes conquest, psychological influence, physical domination, seduction and assassination as tools of state policy.

Kautilya also speaks of security alliances as a key tool of foreign policy. The combined military spending of Pakistan and China was $263 billion in 2020. This was nearly 3.6 times India’s defense budget. China alone outspends India by $180 billion. China spends less than 33% on personnel costs, while India spends about 60%. Hence, China can spend much more on modernization with better combat potential. 

Needless to say, the Indian Army needs to focus on technology-driven modernization. Indian foreign policy wonks must deepen the country’s security arrangement with the US and Japan, which has just doubled its military spending.

The Chinese army has an edge over the Indian Army, but India is better prepared in high-altitude warfare and has more experienced troops. The Chinese air force is stronger than India’s in terms of fleet and strategic inventory, but India has more reliable platforms. China’s navy is the largest in the world. Its naval build-up outscores India’s by almost four times. The US still has the most advanced navy though. India needs closer naval ties with the US and greater expenditure on its navy.

India’s military spending of $76.6 billion is ranked third highest in the world after the US and China. It is one of the largest importers of arms. Indian armed forces are projected to spend around $130 billion in capital procurement from 2022 to 2027. Such large imports highlight repeated failures in indigenous defense production despite transfers of technology to the public sector companies. India must modernize and privatize this sector to lower its import bill and prepare better for war.

In Dec 2020, the government authorized the armed forces to raise their weapons and ammunition reserves so as to be able to  sustain 15 days of high-intensity conflict. Until then, Indian forces could have only sustained such a conflict for ten days. Once, India’s reserves could sustain 40 days of war. This dropped to 20 days in 1999 and further dropped to 10 days. The current 15-day reserves must go back up to the 40-day mark.

In a nutshell, India has to build up its military strength again. It also has to embark on the Kautilyan exercise of developing alliances with countries wary of China. Not only the US and Japan but also Vietnam and Australia are potential partners. Peace will come only through strength, not supplication.

[Here are Part 2 and Part 3 of this three-part series.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Can Kautilya Help Look at India’s War Risk Differently? appeared first on Fair Observer.

So far, the US has counted on its position of domination in the Middle East. Its military bases dot the region and oil is still denominated in dollars. Money from this region has long flowed into American stock markets, startups, universities and foundations. In particular, the US-Saudi relationship has been special. This deal signals that this relationship has soured. China might just have seduced the Saudis from US arms.

The US-Saudi Back Story

Appropriately, the US-Saudi romance began on Valentine’s Day (February 14) in 1945. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt hosted King Abdul Aziz Al Saud on the battleship USS Quincy and the rest is history. Since then, Americans have provided the Saudi royal family with protection in return for access to their oil.

The fabled US-Saudi romance has been fading in recent years. The US is now energy independent and the Middle Kingdom has replaced Uncle Sam as the biggest importer of Saudi oil. It is only natural that the economic center of gravity for the Saudis has moved east. Note that Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Saudi Arabia on a historic visit three months ago. For the Saudis, China is now their “number one trade partner, a major tech supplier, a long-term energy customer, and a comprehensive strategic partner with a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.” Both economically and geopolitically, Saudi Arabia no longer finds the US reliable.

Since 2018, a number of Americans have turned against Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) when his operatives allegedly killed journalist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018. To add insult to injury, this killing took place in the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul, scandalizing international opinion. On his campaign trail, US President Joe Biden promised to make Saudi Arabia a “pariah” state. This infuriated MBS. When Russian President Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine and sent oil prices skyrocketing, Biden humiliatingly ate his words and visited Saudi Arabia for a famous fist bump. MBS turned a deaf ear to the president’s requests to increase oil production. Instead, he cut production, much to Biden’s chagrin.

There were earlier pinpricks that irked MBS. He did not like Barack Obama’s 2016 Iran Deal—Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—or the president’s support for the so-called 2010 Arab Spring (it kicked off in December). For MBS, the US could no longer be relied upon to protect the House of Saud (meaning, he himself) any longer. As it would to many an absolute monarch or all-controlling autocrat, Biden’s democracy agenda also sounds dangerous to MBS’s ears.

The Saudi-Iran Back Story

Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran have a checkered past. They have both jockeyed for influence in the Islamic world. The Saudis are the custodian of the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. They have used their oil money to fund Wahhabi Islam around the world from Bosnia to Indonesia.  In contrast, Iran is a revolutionary power run by mullahs. They have won brownie points for standing up to imperial Uncle Sam and remained steadfast in their support of the Palestinian cause. Israel’s constant fist-shaking at Iran boosts their street cred among Muslims around the world.

As long as Iran was a monarchy, both Saudi Arabia and Iran were American allies. They exported oil to the West and made vast fortunes. In 1979, revolution erupted in Iran. Few remember that that same year gunmen took over the Grand Mosque at Mecca in Saudi Arabia, an event that has come to be known as “the siege of Mecca.” Several hundred armed jihadis—Arabs as well as American and Canadian converts—overpowered the guards, shut down the gates, took 100,000 hostage and proclaimed that the savior Mahdi had arrived to cleanse the Muslim world from the corruption of the West. Troops overpowered the jihadis but the specter of an Iran-style Islamic revolution has haunted the House of Saud since.

Saudi Arabia backed the Sunni-ruled Iraq under Saddam Hussein against Iran in their 1980-88 war. Relations remained tense until 1998. The reformist Mohammad Khatami became president.  Both countries signed a general cooperation agreement in 1998 and a security cooperation agreement in 2001.

Al Jazeera reminds us that Saudi security chief Ali Shamkhani signed a significant agreement with Iran. In 2001, he was defense minister and played a major role in bringing Iran and Saudi Arabia closer. The Saudis awarded him “the Order of Abdulaziz medal, the highest award offered by the kingdom, in the early 2000s.”

In 2016, all these efforts were washed away. Saudi-Iran relations were already strained because of a Hajj tragedy that killed thousands. Then, the Saudis executed Ayatollah Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, a towering Shia leader. Mobs attacked Saudi diplomatic missions. In response, Saudi Arabia broke off relations with Iran.

Note that Saudi-Iran interests clash in many theaters. Both countries have been at loggerheads in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq for many years. There is also visceral mutual dislike. With its memory of an empire, Iran sneers at the Saudis as uncouth upstarts. With its suspicion of revolution, the Saudis see Iranian mullahs as scheming plotters. 

Economically, Saudi-Iran interests clash as well. Saudi oil giant Aramco announced a record profits of $161.1 billion for 2022. Iran has the world’s fourth-largest oil reserves but sanctions prevent it from selling on the global market. If sanctions ended, Iranian oil would depress prices and reduce earnings for Saudi Arabia. No Saudi leader would like that to happen, especially MBS.

Enter the Dragon

Yet heightened tensions are not in the interests of either country, so the Saudis and Iranians have made up for now. They are both increasingly aligned to China, which relies on its energy on the Persian Gulf. In case of any war, the US will be fine but Xi’s “great wall of steel” would rust quite quickly. With no energy resources, the Chinese military might simply not have the fuel to sustain a major war. Hence, China is keen to calm the waters in this part of the world.

Under Xi, China is keen to play a bigger role in the world. It sees the US-led postwar order as unjust and against its interests. Therefore, it has launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI). Unlike the US postwar order, Chinese ideas are inchoate. Beijing relies on cliches far too much but they are certainly playing the realpolitik game.

The Russia-Ukraine War has demonstrated that US interests are not aligned with either Saudi or Iranian interests. The Saudis want to keep the price of oil high and are nervous about Biden’s talk of democracy. The Iranians feel scorned after Donald Trump scuppered JCPOA and Biden’s lack of ability to reinstate it. They are supplying drones to the Russians and rumors persist that some of these flying machines are really made in China but smuggled through Iran. Both the Saudis and Iranians now need the Chinese, giving them leverage. Xi’s diplomats have exercised that leverage and emerged as the biggest winners from the Saudi-Iran deal. The US is still top dog by a long way, but there is a new dog in the Persian Gulf and it is likely to stay.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Why Saudi Arabia and Iran Are Making Out Now appeared first on Fair Observer.

Unfortunately, much of the existing research published by Indian and foreign scholars covers only the Indian side of Kashmir. The POK has somehow escaped a careful and critical analysis due to lack of initiative by the mainstream media and the narrative of Indian aggression built and sustained by external powers. The only news channel broadcasting any information concerning the conditions in POK is the India Meteorological Department, and still, it only relays the weather forecast. The atrocities, human rights violations, ethnic cleansing and annihilation of Indian culture have all been swept under the rug, and have ultimately failed to raise alarm concerning the actions of the Pakistani military. 

Han and Hindu Nationalism Come Face to Face

The Strategic Significance of Gilgit and Baltistan 

The region of Gilgit Baltistan (GB) connects the Xinjiang region of China to Pakistan, providing China with easy access to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). This scenario weakens India’s position of power in both maritime and continental affairs. With presence in Gwadar, a port city that is “strategically located at the apex of the Arabian Sea and at the mouth of the Persian Gulf,” China will not only be able to monitor the area, but will also severely limit India’s  retaliation options during wartime. The modern day economic progress only sustains due to large scale manufacturing and impeccable human capital, and Pakistan has neither. Hence, Gwadar is unlikely to become a trading hotspot, or even a significant cargo hub.. 

Furthermore, the GB  region has  historically fallen  on the Silk Road trade route, by which Indian culture reached Central Asia and beyond. Not having a physical presence in GB imbibes a parochial  mindset and limits India’s  political influence to South Asian geopolitics. Currently, Indian trade with Central Asia is minuscule due to a variety of reasons, but the most significant inhibitor is a nonexistent land route. This is also the primary reason why Indian involvement in Afghanistan was so minimal, even though India’s  concerns in the conflict were much more immediate than other countries who intervened.

The GB region is also home to a treasure of glaciers which sustain Pakistan’s surface water-based economy. This region is also home to massive hydropower potential due to the presence of the Indus River and its many tributaries. The controversial Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 negotiated under the World Bank awarded a whopping 80% of water rights to Pakistan, robbing India of any edge when it comes to the hydrography of the subcontinent. These losses are of extreme importance, given India’s dependency on the area as a vital water source. 

What Lies Behind India’s Bold Bet on Kashmir?

China’s Long Game Strategy

In May 2022, China announced that it plans to connect the Chinese city of Kashgar with Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan and the largest city in Central Asia, via railways. This strategic development is meant to ensure China’s continued rise as a global superpower. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is of the opinion that its presence in the Pacific is not enough to replace the US as global leader. Hence, China is actively connecting its hinterlands to more industrial areas. Using these new railways connecting Kashgar to Tashkent, China will be able to reach Turkey and Europe more easily by avoiding its vulnerability in the IOR. For these reasons, the GB region is critical to Chinese expansion. 

China is also aware of the fact that, notwithstanding their quest for expansion, the geography of the IOR cannot be defied, and will remain the primary economic and geopolitical theater of warfare for the eastern side of the continent. In the words of 19^th century naval thinker Alfred Mahan, control over the IOR is “the key to the seven seas.” As of today, the new land routes being constructed are not designed to carry large amounts of cargo. This means that for now, China will continue to conduct trade via routes in the IOR. 

China is actively executing a twin strategy in the GB region. Its first goal is to establish a connection with Persia, and its second, more long-term goal is to encircle India, denying it any strategic depth. As part of this strategy, the “25 year pact” created between China and Iran plays a very important role. 

China’s push into West Asia is driven by its need for energy security as well as its long term quest to replace the US as global hegemon. A land route, via GB, is the most profound way of asserting its global role. Indeed, there are other factors at work in China’s persistent push towards Iran; however, China’s avid quest to increase land-based connectivity suggests that the main intent of the Chinese  is to perturb India. 

The Chinese are also looking to use Pakistan as a base to extract resources out of Afghanistan, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a vital part of that strategy. The BRI, the developing modern version of the Silk Road, intends to connect China to all major economic centers of Asia, Africa and Europe via maritime and land routes. It broadly defines five priority areas of investments in connectivity, policy coordination, unimpeded trade, financial integration and connecting people. 

Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Strategic Genius, Arrogant Overreach or Something Else?

Several Chinese scholars believe that “India is set out to replace China,” and thus must be mitigated. Within the GB region, China sees an opportunity to ensure that India is weakened and less likely to take action against China’s continued threat. 

Unsurprisingly, Chinese investments in Pakistan are above $60 billion, providing China with a major influence in Pakistan’s administration of the GB region. According to several reports from June 2022, Pakistan was seriously considering the lease of the GB region to China to pay off its “mounting debts.” However, Pakistan’s primary hesitation in finalizing this agreement is the fear that after empowering China, the United Nations (UN) will discontinue all financial assistance being provided to Pakistan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For all of these reasons, it is imperative that India prevent the fate of the GB to be decided by such avaricious powers.  

 War on the Horizon?

In June 2020, reports indicated the presence of Chinese transport and fighter aircraft at the Skardu air base, increasing fears of a possible two front war along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh, an Indian union territory. These reports however, were not verified by the Indian government or military.

Considering Chinese investments in Pakistan, it is likely that China will station its  troops in the GB region at Skardu airbase even during peacetime. The Galwan Valley dispute of 2020, in which Indian and Chinese soldiers fought using fatal hand-to-hand combat, also sparked concerns of impending war. Even more alarming are reports that Pakistani soldiers have been spotted consorting with People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Tibet, indicating a worrisome synchronization between the two hostile nations.

Many speculate that if India had not lost control of the GB region, the region would not have become a breeding ground for terrorism, and could have prevented thousands of casualties. Furthermore, India would have had a convenient land corridor to Afghanistan, sitting just 20 km away from Central Asia. It is also possible that the Sino-Indian War of 1962 could have been averted, or at least could have had a different outcome. India’s past mistakes will continue to haunt the nation in next two decades if the subcontinent’s political map remains the same. 

Governments Must Recognize the Importance of the Youth

India has tried to establish alternative routes to Central Asia via Chabhar, an Iranian port city, by joining it with a railway line to Afghanistan and then crossing into the Central Asian Region (CAR). However, Afghanistan’s volatile history threatens the security of these routes, and India cannot afford to become dependent on a regime as brutal as the Taliban. Therefore, India’s best alternate route still lies in the GB region, a region of immense strategic value involving three nuclear-armed powers. 

India’s potential for economic stability relies on its access to critical materials, including precious stones and rare earth minerals. The CAR is full of critical materials, enough to sustain a global transition from fossils to clean energy. Between 1850 and 2015, India has contributed only 3% of global carbon emissions. However, India’s expected economic boom will undoubtedly contribute to a rise in per capita and historical carbon emissions, both consequences which the CAR offers solutions to. 

Another vital resource that is abundant in the GB region is the availability of  freshwater. The Indus river system, Pakistan’s primary source of water, has major tributaries located in the India-controlled territory of Kashmir. This region also has some of the largest glaciers on the planet outside of the polar regions. The Upper Indus Basin (UIB), situated in Gilgit, is home to many small streams that flow from the melting glaciers, and have the potential to generate  50,000 GW of hydroelectricity. Access to this incredible power source provides a colossal advantage to whichever nation controls the region at the time.

For India, water security is likely to become a major issue in upcoming decades. Several reports by the UN and Indian government agencies have concluded that India is likely to face severe water shortages in the upcoming decades. The mismanagement of major bodies of water in Indian cities, rapid and poorly planned urbanization and uncontrolled population growth is only adding fuel to an already dire situation. 

Plastics Threaten the Himalayan Environment

In 2019, the Indian government’s public policy think tank, NITI Aayog, found that nearly 60% of cities in India have already run out of ground water. Even more threatening to the impending water crisis in India are China’s plans to construct dams over the Mabja Zangbo, the main tributary to the Ganges River. India is currently facing many major threats to water security – but will this increasing tension escalate into a full-blown water war?

India and China are poised to have an increasingly competitive relationship in the upcoming decades, and Gilgit and Baltistan will indeed be a recurring aspect of contestation. China will do everything in its power to ensure its control over Gilgit and Baltisan. For India, I believe that the most  prosperous future lies in the reintegration of the upper Himalayan region, which has water, navigable land routes and strategic significance far beyond any other region of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).

In 1963, Pakistan ‘gifted’ to China the Shaksgam Valley, an area ofJ&K rich in water potential and other resources, in an effort to secure a powerful ally in future conflicts. The Shaksgam Valley is home to 242 glaciers, and is known as the third most glaciated region in the world, after the North and South poles. 

In 2021, China unveiled plans to construct the world’s largest polysilicon manufacturing facility in a green oasis of the Taklamakan Desert, located in the western part of China. It is estimated that the production of a single 30 cm silicon wafer (used to make valuable microchips) requires approximately 10,000 liters of fresh water, for which China will rely on the oasis. When completed, China will reap great benefits from the facility as they cheaply manufacture microchips for itself and the rest of the world. While China also faces water scarcity, its occupation of Tibet provides it with control over much of the liquid veins throughout Asia. 

In the next few decades, India will need Central Asia to source energy and other resources more than ever before. China is already taking advantage of these resources, as it has been in the process of building a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Xinjiang since 2010. If India intends to become a truly influential power over the  POK,including the regions of the GB and the Shaksgam Valley, it must take critical action to regain access to much -needed resources. 

As early as 1904, British geographer Helford Mackinder underlined the importance of Eurasia and the CAR. Perhaps it was India’s strategic blindness, bureaucratic hassles, nonexistent national security measures, or isolationist attitude as a result of repeated invasions which culminated into the loss of the GB region. Whatever the reasons were, India’s neglect of the resource-rich region  was a critical mistake that has haunted the nation for decades. 

India must shed its habit of disregarding national threats until the damage has been done. In order to right our past mistakes, we need to prepare to use all means possible to reintegrate the region of Gilgit Baltistan. [Hannah Gage edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Resource Frenzy: Will India and China Make War? appeared first on Fair Observer.

The shutdown of the world’s third-largest port lasted for two weeks and had a huge impact on supply chains and logistics networks crisscrossing the planet, causing retailers around the world to worry about keeping their shelves stocked. The fallout continued for many weeks after, and the maritime logjam underlined how disruptions to manufacturing and logistics in China have far-reaching ramifications for the world.

China’s zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy and the impact on local infrastructure whenever outbreaks occur has contributed to soaring shipping costs since 2020, exacerbated by the Omicron outbreak and two-month lockdown of the city of Shanghai in early 2022. All this has led businesses and governments to raise questions about the risks of being so reliant on just one country.

“The fear of overexposure of supply chains to China has picked up, especially in the West. I think this is not just about China, but a global issue because politics plays a very big role,” says Dennis Chien, a senior analyst at Hong Kong investment firm HSZ Group. “Globalization might be coming to an end with nations trying to protect themselves.”

Lessons in logistics

Shipping costs and cargo delays were already high entering 2022, peaking in January. And although they later fell by around 50%, the average spot freight price in the third week of March still stood at $8,832 per 40-foot container, nearly five times the $1,832 cost at the start of 2020. Average transit times for containers from China to ports in Europe have also surged, with transit time from Dalian to the British port of Felixstowe up from 65 days in January 2020 to 85 days in January 2022.

The volatility of supply chain logistics costs is giving company executives around the world sleepless nights. Nearly one-third of 130 CFOs in North America surveyed by Deloitte in the last quarter of 2021 named supply chains as their biggest external worry, and almost two-thirds believed supply chain costs would increase substantially in 2022. At the same time, the increased prices have provided a windfall for shipping companies that have benefited from the price hikes.

Chinese businesses are also facing a sizable impact from the surge in costs, according to Chien. “For Chinese companies, shipping costs have gone up by seven or eight times since before COVID-19,” he says.

China’s strict COVID policy resulted in unpredictable lockdowns, idle ports, and congested infrastructure. “There were periodic disruptions on the China side, not least when there were outbreaks and ports were shut down, particularly in Shenzhen and Shanghai,” says Ben Simpfendorfer, a Hong Kong-based partner at global management consulting firm Oliver Wyman. “For periods, that also created disruptions to shipping costs.”

But China is not entirely to blame for the increase in costs over this period. The pandemic created a global container shortage as lockdown regulations around the world stranded both staff and containers in key trade locations, leaving companies in many cases unable to operate normally.

“There is a tremendous container shortage,” says Zhou Chen, associate professor at Georgia Tech’s Stewart School of Industrial and Systems Engineering, and an expert in sustainable supply chains. “And that’s because they’re all in the wrong places.”

A labor shortage is affecting industries related to supply chains too, especially in some developed economies. Trucking companies in the US suffered a record deficit of 80,000 drivers last year, while the UK was short of more than 100,000 qualified drivers in mid-2021. The resulting slowing of inland transportation meant poor container turnover in ports across the US and the UK.

Global supply chains have also been impacted in recent years by the US-China trade war and climate-related disruptions, adding complexity to logistics networks, such as more stringent and time-consuming inspections, that have increased costs. Other events that have tested the resilience of supply chains recently include the blockage of the Suez Canal by a container ship in mid-2021, severe flooding across China, and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Meeting in the Middle Kingdom

By building out the world’s best logistics network of ports, railways, and telecom networks to complement its manufacturing prowess, China has entrenched itself in global supply chains on an unprecedented level. But trade rifts and also COVID-19, are forcing countries and businesses to reconsider their high dependence on China-driven supply chains. This reckoning—combined with rising labor costs in China—has encouraged companies to look at moving manufacturing elsewhere.

“What COVID-19 did is freeze the supply chain to a large degree,” says Simpfendorfer. “Before the pandemic, there was a shift taking place where manufacturers were moving into primarily either Vietnam or Mexico. In the early days of COVID-19, there was an anticipation that those flows would accelerate because of the disruption to China’s supply base. In the end, we got the reverse because the impact on the rest of the world was more significant than it was in China.”

China’s swift return to normality in 2020 after its first battle with the pandemic, reinforced its integral role in global supply chains at the time. In that year, some 30% of global trade flowed through mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, up from 25% in 2010. China alone accounted for almost one-sixth of global goods exports—a record-high share that dwarfed the next-largest suppliers, the US and Germany.

Amid strong demand for exports, container throughput at China’s ports last year expanded by 4.5% to 4.7 billion tons, accelerating from a growth of 4% in 2020. Not content with dominating trade flows, China is increasingly controlling the infrastructure too. Three Chinese companies today monopolize global production of shipping containers, producing virtually every box in use, while China has four of the top five global container ports and seven of the top 10. Shanghai is the world’s largest port in terms of container throughput, while Ningbo-Zhoushan is the largest in terms of cargo tonnage.

Beijing has also accumulated significant ownership stakes in global ports. Chinese firms hold stakes in over a dozen European ports, with state-backed COSCO Shipping Ports purchasing a 35% stake in Hamburg’s container terminal in September 2021.

Government policy has helped Chinese companies establish a strong position in global supply chains over the past two decades and will continue to be a crucial source of support. The 14th Five-Year Plan, issued in March 2021 calls for implementing a “manufacturing great power strategy” and for policies to “guide key links in [manufacturing] industry chains to remain within China”—a clear reference to policies designed to resist pressure from Western countries for supply chain decoupling.

“The consistent thread throughout China’s economic rise has always been that the government spotlights several industries that they feel have strategic value for the long term,” says Chien. “Then they make huge investments or provide a huge incentive for private enterprise to enter. We are seeing it with manufacturing and we saw it with supply chains.”

Already home to one of the most advanced digital ecosystems in the world, China is still investing heavily in the “software” of digital infrastructure to complement its “hardware” of global physical assets. In doing so, it is looking to replicate the success of AT&T, the storied US multinational that spearheaded American dominance of global telecommunications for most of the last century.

China is working to unlock the potential of digitalized supply chains through the Digital Silk Road, which aims to link Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) countries through fiber optic cables, cellular towers, widespread internet and telecommunications connections, as well as “soft” digital infrastructure such as common technical standards, e-commerce platforms, mobile payment systems and other digital-economy applications. Chinese-owned ports around the world are prime candidates for this digitalization.

“China is investing in the future. They want to be a leader, they want to own it,” says Diane Long, managing director of Xanadu Enterprise, a strategic market entry firm for China. “The US owned the technology and infrastructure 30 years ago. They were the ones laying the undersea cables and launching satellites, but along the way, the government stopped making those investments, the in-roads, offering innovative concepts. China has replaced them.”

China’s supply high

The allure of globalization was that it promised an efficient division of labor by country. Developing economies would concentrate on the production of primary products or raw materials through low-paid labor, with the products then transported to deindustrialized economies, where other workers process, package, and market the product. But this has not materialized, as China has built robust production ecosystems for nearly every major industry.

The Middle Kingdom offers a hard-to-reproduce concentration of input suppliers, assembly factories, skilled workers and service providers—all at a massive scale and covering a broad range of low-tech, mid-tech and even high-tech products.

Over the past 20 years, profit margins in a wide range of industries and products have benefited from this concentration, according to Simpfendorfer. “It results in lower costs. Concentration allows for innovation in these clusters because you get scale.”

Higher productivity has also been the result of supply chain consolidation. “Productivity in China remains extremely high even if labor costs are not low anymore,” says Zhou. “It’s very common for businesses to be running 10-12 hours a day, six days a week. Where else could you find that? Even with higher labor costs, per unit costs remain very low because Chinese are so productive.”

Digital dividends

Beijing has made no secret of its desire for China to become a developed economy without losing its strong manufacturing export sector. With this positive outlook in mind, Chinese businesses have been willing to invest in bleeding-edge technology, such as AI and robots, to ensure their supply chain dominance endures.

Take SHEIN, China’s first global fashion giant, for example. In February, local government plans revealed the Guangzhou-based fast-fashion retailer intended to invest RMB 15 billion ($2.3 billion) to build a global supply chain center in the city this year. SHEIN boasts a unique business model that has helped it out-compete the likes of Zara and H&M—it constantly gathers and analyzes customer data and uses that knowledge to craft new designs via a vast network of small- to mid-sized workshops that bid for orders daily.

“Data assets and data management are becoming very important,” says Steven Zhong, lead partner for ESG strategy and value chain advisory at PwC China. “When we look at the more advanced digital supply chain capabilities, it’s more focused on the ability to forecast…on how you’re using historical data to forecast, and how you’re simulating different risk factors on business and sustainability impacts.”

Chinese supply chains are pushing the envelope in other ways. AI-powered robots are increasingly showing up on factory floors and in logistics warehouses, performing tasks previously handled by humans with greater efficiency than ever before. And many of these technologies are showing up in state-of-the-art factories across China that are part of the World Economic Forum’s ‘global lighthouse network’. These manufacturing sites are pioneering the adoption and integration of frontier technologies, and of the 90 “lighthouse” facilities worldwide last September, a record 28 were in China. As more of these lighthouse factories come online, China’s centrality in global supply chains is only likely to grow.

Chained up

In some ways, China has been a victim of its own success. The pandemic underlined China’s capture of supply chains and the extent to which it remains dominant even in the face of the bruising trade war with the US, forcing governments and businesses to examine their extraordinary dependence on China and the associated risks.

“If China had suffered a more serious virus outbreak, then the world would have suffered more,” says Zhou Chen. “We should be concerned about this amid a period of already-high inflation that is still rising.”

Simpfendorfer says he is worried that there will be an even greater impact on supply chains when China fully reopens its borders. “We can’t rule out the risk of potentially large disruptions, and that will have a serious impact on our ability to purchase goods and the price we pay. There is a risk that prices will rise sharply so our China exposure is a challenge.”

The strict, two-month lockdown in Shanghai, starting in late March, and a whole raft of restrictions in cities across the country caused delays that further strained global supply chains and increased costs. As the factory of the world, any disruptions to exports resulting in shortages could also drive up inflation internationally.

The relocation of manufacturing and supply chains to China in recent decades has also exacted a tremendous cost on the local environment. “There is a reason why some of the dirtiest industries are in China and not Europe or North America—they have been regulated out of business. Europeans and North Americans have to take some responsibility for that,” says Chien. Consumer demand for inexpensive goods means China’s economy has understandably gravitated toward cheaper inputs—such as dirty coal for producing low-cost electricity.

As countries reconsider whether the risks of global supply chains now outweigh the benefits, the once-unshakeable faith in globalization as a positive force and an irreversible process is now under threat with potentially seismic consequences. Unwinding decades of global economic integration has the potential to impact the free flow of goods that has underpinned growth since the Second World War.

Moving supply chains out of the world’s biggest manufacturing nation is also easier said than done, but some attractive alternatives have emerged. Southeast Asia, Vietnam in particular, has siphoned off low-end manufacturing from China in recent years, and the migration to Vietnam is expected to continue although investment slowed following the onset of COVID-19. In mid-June Apple announced for the first time that it was moving a part of its iPad manufacturing to the country.

Seeking to avoid US tariffs, Chinese factories themselves are increasingly setting up shop in Vietnam. “Chinese manufacturers tend to move as a group,” says Simpfendorfer. “Once they saw there was an ecosystem there, and that their competitors were there, then they were happier to invest in Vietnam.”

The Vietnamese are famous for their strong work ethic, a value shared with their Chinese neighbors that has helped attract factory bosses to relocate some operations across the border. But a shortage of skilled labor and problems in quality assurance remain barriers, according to PwC China’s Zhong.

The highly differentiated nature of markets in Southeast Asia can make it a headache to move sections of supply chains to the region. “China is a huge market governed by a single set of regulations across regions,” says Zhong. “You can still relocate a factory or build new distribution centers from region to region in China with attractive subsidies and support from local government, but Southeast Asia is a set of completely different markets. It’s very difficult to do the standardized model and to derive enough synergy out of the economy without evaluating pros and cons, especially risk factors on investments and cost benefits based on each country’s unique characteristics.”

Closer to home for American companies, Mexico has emerged as a strong contender as an alternative thanks to the US-China tariff war—particularly after the passage of the US-Mexico-Canada agreement in 2020. Proximity makes Mexico a tantalizing possibility for American firms because companies do not need to wait weeks for goods to be shipped from China.

Changing with the times

Geopolitical tensions that have erupted in Ukraine and global issues such as COVID are likely to have a continuing impact on the efficiency and cost of logistics networks. And China is, meanwhile, continuing to reconfigure its entire manufacturing sector, starting by de-emphasizing low-end and high-polluting production.

“The next stage will be a departure of the mid-range. Higher-end shoes or good-quality cellphones still have to be made in China as other countries are not ready,” says Zhou Chen. “But just wait—in five to 10 years, they will exit too. China will shift focus to the higher-end products.”

Another reason why China will remain the world’s manufacturing hub is that it is itself one of the world’s largest markets. This will ensure Beijing retains extensive influence over global supply chains, backed up by heavy investment in digitalization both at home and at Chinese-invested ports around the world, which puts the country in a commanding position.

“We went from a world that was relatively isolated to an interconnected one with global supply chains in China,” says Simpfendorfer. “We’re now entering the next stage of global trade where we don’t get a reversal or de-globalization, we simply get a fragmentation of the global supply chain, with China at the heart of it.

[CKGSB Knowledge first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Truth About China and Global Supply Chains appeared first on Fair Observer.

Perhaps you have a better map function on your phone. Sophisticated satellite imaging can capture details at a 30-centimeter resolution. That’s good enough to tell whether a road is paved or unpaved. It can also determine from space what infrastructure has been destroyed in a tornado or an earthquake. Or it can peer closely at suspected nuclear weapons facilities.

What a satellite can’t do yet is read a newspaper or a license plate from space. Until the more recent innovation of synthetic aperture radar, which relies on a variety of wavelengths, satellites couldn’t see through clouds either. They’re also expensive, and you need quite a lot of them to get any consistent view of an object on the ground over time.

Is China Now Emulating Epic Soviet Spy Balloon Program?

So, now you know why it might be useful—if you want to see something specific from the air—to rely on less sophisticated aerial surveillance devices, like relatively cheap weather balloons that sail through the stratosphere with whatever data collection devices you can cram into them. With Project Loon, which it started in 2011, Google even solved the navigation problem by devising sophisticated computer algorithms to steer high-altitude balloons.

Such balloons are now at the center of the latest spat between the United States and China. The United States recently shot down a Chinese weather balloon that drifted across the country from west to east. The Chinese government says its weather balloon had simply veered off course. Shortly thereafter, it accused the United States of sending its own weather balloons over China more than 10 times since the beginning of 2022.

The United States has subsequently shot down three unidentified flying objects—in Alaska, Canada, and over Lake Huron—which remain unidentified. The US government used to routinely dismiss claims of alien spaceships by calling them misidentified weather balloons, so the combination of an actual balloon and three unknown objects is catnip to conspiracy theorists. The commander of NORAD did little to dispel this speculation when he responded at a press conference this week to a question about alien involvement: “I haven’t ruled out anything. At this point, we continue to assess every threat or potential threat unknown that approaches North America with an attempt to identify it.”

Vietnam and India Are Now Acting to Contain Aggressive China

US authorities have recovered the first object they shot down. But they’re not providing a whole lot of details. Early reports suggest that it’s way bigger than an ordinary weather balloon able to carry a much larger payload.

Initially, the Pentagon was dismissive of the surveillance value of the balloon. Back on February 2, the Pentagon press secretary said that “currently we assess that this balloon has limited additive value from an intelligence collection perspective.” It has subsequently revised this estimate to conclude that the balloon is part of a global effort by the Chinese to spy pretty much everywhere, even sending four such balloons undetected across the United States over the last six years. According to the Pentagon, the fifth balloon hovered above an ICBM site in Montana before it was later shot down in the waters off South Carolina this month.

Here’s probably what happened. The weather balloon did indeed inadvertently drift off course, the Chinese tried to take advantage of its new trajectory to spy on a few things, and the other three objects the United States shot down have nothing to do with China, aliens, or Marjorie Taylor Greene (who has had plenty to say about all this, none of it sensible).

Meanwhile, this definitely happened: in a rare show of unanimous bipartisanship, the House of Representative voted 491-0 to condemn China over its balloon belligerence.

Why It Matters

Let’s assume that the Chinese ultimately used its errant weather balloon to peek into classified sites and perhaps also to test US aerial defenses. It was a violation of US airspace, but was it really such a big deal? Sure, no one likes to have strangers peering through their bedroom windows. But doesn’t the United States have a voyeurism problem of its own?

US monitoring capabilities are second to none. “With so much attention focused on how the Chinese government has been spying on the United States, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Washington has its own insatiable appetite for China’s secrets,” writes Robert Windrem of NBC. “The US effort, say experts in and out of government, is extensive, intrusive and very effective.”

Windrem wrote that nearly 25 years ago, in 1999. He quotes intelligence historian Jeffrey Richelson: “The methods by which the US can eavesdrop on Chinese communications range [from the] use of undersea platforms—like submarines—to a variety of antenna systems on the ground up to satellites up to 24,000 miles in space. Overall, it’s a multibillion-dollar effort, and China is a major target.”

In 2001, a Navy intelligence plane collided with a Chinese plane and had to make an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. The US crew, after destroying as much of the surveillance equipment on the plane as they could, were detained, interrogated, and eventually returned to the United States. This kind of surveillance has not stopped.

It was once a great deal more intrusive. As historian John Delury explains, US covert operations began shortly after China’s founding, from agents dropped onto the mainland in 1952 to stir up a counter-revolution against Mao to U-2 overflights through the 1960s. The CIA also developed eyes on the inside, with assets embedded in the military, the Communist Party, and the Chinese intelligence agencies.

When the Chinese uncovered and neutralized this network beginning in 2010, the Americans have had to rely increasingly on aircraft and ships to peer through the blinds to see what’s going on inside China. According to a Chinese-government-affiliated think tank, the United States has conducted as many as 2,000 surveillance flights a year near China’s borders along with numerous ship-based monitoring missions.

So, what’s a few balloon overflights among adversaries?

It’s rather naïve of Washington to expect Beijing not to try to achieve parity in the field of surveillance. China has plenty of satellites, around 500. In fact, it’s number two in the world. But it doesn’t really compare to the number the United States has in orbit: nearly 3,000.

Japan’s Strong Moves to Counter China Creates New Asia

How many of these satellites are state-operated and how many are commercial? Increasingly, it doesn’t matter. The amount and quality of material available to paying customers is extraordinary, and independent analysts have been able to use these services to scoop governments or force them to release their own imagery. Indeed, there’s now so much satellite data available that the race will be won by the analysts who best deploy artificial intelligence to sort through all the material. Balloons, for all their advantages in terms of price and proximity, will soon become a relic of a bygone era, like cassette tapes and penny farthings.

An Opportune Moment

The United States and China have nuclear weapons pointed at each other. They have large conventional armies that face off in the Pacific region. They have conducted cyber-operations to gather sensitive data and test their respective software and hardware security systems.

In other words, the two superpowers compete in practically every realm—on land, at sea, and in space. As such, perhaps it’s ridiculous to suggest a ceasefire in the competition over surveillance. True, in 2015, the two countries declared a truce on cyber-espionage for economic gain. And last year, China and the United States conducted nearly $700 billion in trade, a new record, which provides a strong economic rationale for good behavior on both sides. But it’s hard to see either government agreeing to rein in its intelligence agencies from doing what for them comes naturally.

In the end, it looks as though the “hullabaloon” will generate more strife in Congress than in US-China relations. But, as Fareed Zakaria writes in The Washington Post, something more serious will inevitably come along that will not be so easy to defuse, given rising tensions on both sides. So, what can be done?

It probably seems quaint to urge greater cooperation between Washington and Beijing, especially since support for engagement in US political circles has practically evaporated. Yet, greater cooperation on the surveillance of what matters—carbon emissions, humanitarian disasters, the spread of diseases—should be a no-brainer in this era of existential threats. Instead of shooting down each other’s weather balloons (or, potentially, satellites), let’s work together to put more eyes on the problems that negatively affect us all.
[Foreign Policy in Focus first published this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Truth About Spying: Both Chinese and US appeared first on Fair Observer.

The balloon’s travels ended at 14.39 local time  (19:39 GMT) on Saturday, February 4 when a US Air Force F-22 shot down what the US stated was a Chinese spy balloon. Meanwhile, the Chinese have maintained the balloon was a “weather monitoring device.” Not long after the first balloon was spotted, another hapless Chinese balloon was identified. The second zeppelin supposedly “seriously deviated” off course over Latin America and the Caribbean, but the proliferation of Chinese balloons seems to reveal broader ambitions. Nor have these ambitions sprung out of nowhere. In recent days, US officials have stated this was not the first time a Chinese balloon has entered US airspace, and they have recently identified at least four other occasions where the weather strangely coincided with large US military interests in Texas, Florida, Hawaii, and Guam. US officials have revealed that the downed balloon was 200 feet (about 60 meters) tall and carried an airliner-sized load of intelligence-gathering equipment. In the high stakes game of weather, size matters.

On Sunday, Rep. Mike Turner, the Republican chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said on NBC News’ Meet the Press, “If you ask somebody to draw an X at every place where our sensitive missile defense sites, our nuclear weapons infrastructure, our nuclear weapon sites are, you would put them all along this path.” The balloon transited, and at points loitered, over areas that included the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Billings, Montana, which is home to one of three US Air Force bases that operate and maintain intercontinental ballistic missiles.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken canceled his visit to China, China is miffed, with Beijing claiming the US used “indiscriminate force,” and everyone is curious about these enormous dirigibles.

What is the backstory of spy balloons?

China is not the first to use spy balloons. They first came into use in the late 19th century for military reconnaissance and observation. During World War I, Germany, France and Britain used unmanned balloons equipped with cameras to gather intelligence. 

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union employed aerial reconnaissance balloons to gather intelligence on each other’s military capabilities. Even then, these balloons were often equipped with sensors and cameras to monitor troop movements and military assets. With the development of satellite technology, spy balloons became less common. However, as China just demonstrated, they still have niche uses in some military and intelligence operations, and many predict a resurgence in the value of such aircraft.

The Soviets used spy balloons extensively, which were equipped with cameras, sensors, and other monitoring equipment. Launched from Soviet territory, these balloons floated across the Arctic and then drifted across North America. The Chinese seem to be following a similar playbook.

Was the Soviet spy balloon program a success?

The Soviet spy balloon program was one of the largest and most sophisticated military intelligence gathering operations of the Cold War. Soviet balloons gathered intelligence for extended periods of time and provided valuable information about NATO military installations and movements of NATO forces.

Balloons were not without their vulnerabilities. Then, as now, they could be intercepted and shot down easily as the Chinese just discovered. Additionally, balloons of the past were affected by weather conditions, making it difficult to maintain a stable flight path and gather accurate intelligence. Technology has evolved, and the Chinese have increasingly taken interest in navigation tools and patents for dirigibles, making them more stealthy, stable, and reliable.

On the whole, the Soviet spy balloon program was a significant success. Balloons fell out of fashion because advanced satellite technology proved to be more reliable and less vulnerable. More importantly, the Soviet Union collapsed and its balloon program came to an end. Might China be starting off where the Soviets stopped?

[This article was produced with assistance from ChatGPT.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is China Now Emulating Epic Soviet Spy Balloon Program? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Xi Jinping is now emperor. He has centralized all power. Xi followed a disastrous zero-COVID policy that decimated the economy. Protests forced him to make a U-turn. A little after the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi abandoned his zero-COVID policy suddenly and dramatically.

China did not reopen in a phased manner. It went from 0 to 100 kilometers per hour in less than five seconds. Chinese health authorities have admitted that 80% of the population has caught COVID since early December. This means 1.2 billion of China’s 1.41 billion people have caught COVID.

Official figures record a mere 72,000 deaths. There are lies, damned lies and statistics. And then there are Chinese statistics. This figure is patently and absurdly untrue. On January 22, the Chinese rang in the lunar new year. Family gatherings and temple visits shot up. So did COVID infections, hospitalizations and deaths.

Just as in other parts of the world before, reports are coming in from around China about hospitals running out of beds, oxygen and drugs. It is clear that the Xi-led CCP failed to prepare for this COVID surge. They neither have the right vaccines nor the right drugs. China’s vaccine development and deployment is in deep doubt.

Many Chinese, Taiwanese and Japanese analysts observe that Xi’s and the CCP’s competence is now in question. Even two years earlier, few Chinese students criticized Xi. Now, almost all of them are critical of the emperor. Xi’s legitimacy and the CCP’s hegemony are now in question.

In 2022, China admitted that the country lost 850,000 people. This might mark the start of China’s relative decline. The days of fast economic growth based on cheap labor are over. This will make China a more dangerous actor on the global stage. External aggression has often been a diversionary tactic to overcome internal tension. Xi might find patriotism and Wolf Warrior diplomacy a useful tool to rally public support.

Over the last few years, China has been acting increasingly aggressively against its neighbors in general and Japan in particular. In 2021, a joint Chinese and Russian fleet circumnavigated Honshu, Japan’s largest island. No foreign fleet had ever done this. Last year, Chinese warships and Russian bombers operated near Japan.

In December, Japan released two important documents: National Defense Strategy and National Security Strategy. Both of them outline how Japan plans a more robust foreign and defense policy to counter China. Japan is also doubling its defense budget from 1% to 2% of the GDP over five years. This will make it the third biggest defense spender after the US and China.

Japan does not want any unilateral changes to the status quo and will work with allies to counter any unilateral moves. Japan also aims to deter any invasion. It is clear that zeitenwende—an epochal tectonic shift—has come to Japan instead of Germany. While the latter is still dilly dallying as the speakers discussed earlier, Japan has acted decisively.

The increase in Japanese defense achievement will see innovation in technology. Japan has the memory of making good stuff. The land of Toyota might create new unmanned vehicles that operate both in the air and in water. Japan might also give a fillip to the use of robots in war.

Carle takes a very upbeat view of Tokyo’s recent moves. Until now, Japan has been a subordinate ally of the US. Now, Japan is acting in Africa to counter the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is no longer acting under the umbrella of the US but a strategic defense partner. It is no longer Pax Americana in Asia but it is an alliance that is fundamentally different from the past.

Japan is also investing big time in India. Osamu Suzuki invested in India, revolutionized India’s automobile industry and achieved historic success. More Japanese investment has followed in multiple industries. Japan is building the bullet train from Ahmedabad, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s home city, to Mumbai, India’s business capital. 

The Japanese are engaging with their allies from South Korea and Taiwan to Vietnam and India. The Quad—a group of Japan, India, Australia and the US—was the late Shinzo Abe’s idea when he was prime minister. In some ways, Xi’s actions have upset nearly all of China’s neighbors and gives Tokyo a historic opportunity to finally counter Beijing. Finally, Tokyo is reverting to the pre-1945 days when Japan was powerful and influential in Asia. At a time of historic shifts, the balance of power is changing profoundly.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Japan’s Strong Moves to Counter China Creates New Asia appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Pentagon is required by law to provide Congress and the public with an annual report on “military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China,” or PRC, over the next 20 years. The 2022 version, 196 pages of detailed information published last November 29th, focused on its current and future military threat to the United States. In two decades, so we’re assured, China’s military — the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA — will be superbly equipped to counter Washington should a conflict arise over Taiwan or navigation rights in the South China Sea. But here’s the shocking thing: in those nearly 200 pages of analysis, there wasn’t a single word — not one — devoted to China’s role in what will pose the most pressing threat to our security in the years to come: runaway climate change.

The World This Week: Climate Change Matters and So Do Other Species

At a time when California has just been battered in a singular fashion by punishing winds and massive rain storms delivered by a moisture-laden “atmospheric river” flowing over large parts of the state while much of the rest of the country has suffered from severe, often lethal floods, tornadoes, or snowstorms, it should be self-evident that climate change constitutes a vital threat to our security. But those storms, along with the rapacious wildfires and relentless heatwaves experienced in recent summers — not to speak of a 1,200-year record megadrought in the Southwest — represent a mere prelude to what we can expect in the decades to come. By 2042, the nightly news — already saturated with storm-related disasters — could be devoted almost exclusively to such events.

All true, you might say, but what does China have to do with any of this? Why should climate change be included in a Department of Defense report on security developments in relation to the People’s Republic?

There are three reasons why it should not only have been included but given extensive coverage. First, China is now and will remain the world’s leading emitter of climate-altering carbon emissions, with the United States — though historically the greatest emitter — staying in second place. So, any effort to slow the pace of global warming and truly enhance this country’s “security” must involve a strong drive by Beijing to reduce its emissions as well as cooperation in energy decarbonization between the two greatest emitters on this planet. Second, China itself will be subjected to extreme climate-change harm in the years to come, which will severely limit the PRC’s ability to carry out ambitious military plans of the sort described in the 2022 Pentagon report. Finally, by 2042, count on one thing: the American and Chinese armed forces will be devoting most of their resources and attention to disaster relief and recovery, diminishing both their motives and their capacity to go to war with one another.

China’s Outsized Role in the Climate Change Equation

Global warming, scientists tell us, is caused by the accumulation of “anthropogenic” (human-produced) greenhouse gasses (GHGs) in the atmosphere that trap the reflected light from the sun’s radiation. Most of those GHGs are carbon and methane emitted during the production and combustion of fossil fuels (oil, coal, and natural gas); additional GHGs are released through agricultural and industrial processes, especially steel and cement production. To prevent global warming from exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial era — the largest increase scientists believe the planet can absorb without catastrophic outcomes — such emissions will have to be sharply reduced.

Historically speaking, the United States and the European Union (EU) countries have been the largest GHG emitters, responsible for 25% and 22% of cumulative CO2 emissions, respectively. But those countries, and other advanced industrial nations like Canada and Japan, have been taking significant steps to reduce their emissions, including phasing out the use of coal in electricity generation and providing incentives for the purchase of electric vehicles. As a result, their net CO2 emissions have diminished in recent years and are expected to decline further in the decades to come (though they will need to do yet more to keep us below that 1.5-degree warming limit).

China, a relative latecomer to the industrial era, is historically responsible for “only” 13% of cumulative global CO2 emissions. However, in its drive to accelerate its economic growth in recent decades, it has vastly increased its reliance on coal to generate electricity, resulting in ever-greater CO2 emissions. China now accounts for an astonishing 56% of total world coal consumption, which, in turn, largely explains its current dominance among the major carbon emitters. According to the 2022 edition of the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook, the PRC was responsible for 33% of global CO2 emissions in 2021, compared with 15% for the US and 11% for the EU.

What Climate Debt Does the North Owe the South?

Like most other countries, China has pledged to abide by the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015 and undertake the decarbonization of its economy as part of a worldwide drive to keep global warming within some bounds. As part of that agreement, however, China identified itself as a “developing” country with the option of increasing its fossil-fuel use for 15 years or so before achieving a peak in CO2 emissions in 2030. Barring some surprising set of developments then, the PRC will undoubtedly remain the world’s leading source of CO2 emissions for years to come, suffusing the atmosphere with colossal amounts of carbon dioxide and undergirding a continuing rise in global temperatures.   

Yes, the United States, Japan, and the EU countries should indeed do more to reduce their emissions, but they’re already on a downward trajectory and an even more rapid decline will not be enough to offset China’s colossal CO2 output. Put differently, those Chinese emissions — estimated by the IEA at 12 billion metric tons annually — represent at least as great a threat to US security as the multitude of tanks, planes, ships, and missiles enumerated in the Pentagon’s 2022 report on security developments in the PRC. That means they will require the close attention of American policymakers if we are to escape the most severe impacts of climate change.

China’s Vulnerability to Climate Change

Along with detailed information on China’s outsized contribution to the greenhouse effect, any thorough report on security developments involving the PRC should have included an assessment of that country’s vulnerability to climate change. It should have laid out just how global warming might, in the future, affect its ability to marshal resources for a demanding, high-cost military competition with the United States.

In the coming decades, like the US and other continental-scale countries, China will suffer severely from the multiple impacts of rising world temperatures, including extreme storm damage, prolonged droughts and heatwaves, catastrophic flooding, and rising seas. Worse yet, the PRC has several distinctive features that will leave it especially vulnerable to global warming, including a heavily-populated eastern seaboard exposed to rising sea levels and increasingly powerful typhoons; a vast interior, parts of which, already significantly dry, will be prone to full-scale desertification; and a vital river system that relies on unpredictable rainfall and increasingly imperiled glacial runoff. As warming advances and China experiences an ever-increasing climate assault, its social, economic, and political institutions, including the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), will be severely tested.

According to a recent study from the Center for Climate and Security, “China’s Climate Security Vulnerabilities,” the threats to its vital institutions will take two major forms: hits to its critical infrastructure like port facilities, military bases, transportation hubs, and low-lying urban centers along China’s heavily populated coastline; and the danger of growing internal instability arising from ever-increasing economic dislocation, food scarcity, and governmental incapacitation.

China’s coastline already suffers heavy flooding during severe storms and significant parts of it could be entirely underwater by the second half of this century, requiring the possible relocation of hundreds of millions of people and the reconstruction of billions of dollars’ worth of vital facilities. Such tasks will surely require the full attention of Chinese authorities as well as the extensive homebound commitment of military resources, leaving little capacity for foreign adventures. Why, you might wonder, is there not a single sentence about this in the Pentagon’s assessment of future Chinese capabilities?

Even more worrisome, from Beijing’s perspective, is the possible effect of climate change on the country’s internal stability. “Climate change impacts are likely to threaten China’s economic growth, its food and water security, and its efforts at poverty eradication,” the climate center’s study suggests (but the Pentagon report doesn’t mention). Such developments will, in turn, “likely increase the country’s vulnerability to political instability, as climate change undermines the government’s ability to meet its citizens’ demands.”

Of particular concern, the report suggests, is global warming’s dire threat to food security. China, it notes, must feed approximately 20% of the world’s population while occupying only 12% of its arable land, much of which is vulnerable to drought, flooding, extreme heat, and other disastrous climate impacts. As food and water supplies dwindle, Beijing could face popular unrest, even revolt, in food-scarce areas of the country, especially if the government fails to respond adequately. This, no doubt, will compel the CCP to deploy its armed forces nationwide to maintain order, leaving ever fewer of them available for other military purposes — another possibility absent from the Pentagon’s assessment.

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Of course, in the years to come, the US, too, will feel the ever more severe impacts of climate change and may itself no longer be in a position to fight wars in distant lands — a consideration also completely absent from the Pentagon report.

The Prospects for Climate Cooperation

Along with gauging China’s military capabilities, that annual report is required by law to consider “United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters… including through United States-China military-to-military contacts.” And indeed, the 2022 version does note that Washington interprets such “engagement” as involving joint efforts to avert accidental or inadvertent conflict by participating in high-level Pentagon-PLA crisis-management arrangements, including what’s known as the Crisis Communications Working Group. “Recurring exchanges [like these],” the report affirms, “serve as regularized mechanisms for dialogue to advance priorities related to crisis prevention and management.”

Any effort aimed at preventing conflict between the two countries is certainly a worthy endeavor. But the report also assumes that such military friction is now inevitable and the most that can be hoped for is to prevent World War III from being ignited. However, given all we’ve already learned about the climate threat to both China and the United States, isn’t it time to move beyond mere conflict avoidance to more collaborative efforts, military and otherwise, aimed at reducing our mutual climate vulnerabilities?

At the moment, sadly enough, such relations sound far-fetched indeed.  But it shouldn’t be so. After all, the Department of Defense has already designated climate change a vital threat to national security and has indeed called for cooperative efforts between American forces and those of other countries in overcoming climate-related dangers. “We will elevate climate as a national security priority,” Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin declared in March 2021, “integrating climate considerations into the Department’s policies, strategies, and partner engagements.”

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Where in the world is most at risk from sea-level rise?

The Pentagon provided further information on such “partner engagements” in a 2021 report on the military’s vulnerabilities to climate change. “There are many ways for the Department to integrate climate considerations into international partner engagements,” that report affirmed, “including supporting interagency diplomacy and development initiatives in partner nations [and] sharing best practices.” One such effort, it noted, is the Pacific Environmental Security Partnership, a network of climate specialists from that region who meet annually at the Pentagon-sponsored Pacific Environmental Security Forum.

At present, China is not among the nations involved in that or other Pentagon-sponsored climate initiatives. Yet, as both countries experience increasingly severe impacts from rising global temperatures and their militaries are forced to devote ever more time and resources to disaster relief, information-sharing on climate-response “best practices” will make so much more sense than girding for war over Taiwan or small uninhabited islands in the East and South China Seas (some of which will be completely underwater by century’s end). Indeed, the Pentagon and the PLA are more alike in facing the climate challenge than most of the world’s military forces and so it should be in both countries’ mutual interests to promote cooperation in the ultimate critical area for any country in this era of ours.Consider it a form of twenty-first-century madness, then, that a Pentagon report on the US and China can’t even conceive of such a possibility. Given China’s increasingly significant role in world affairs, Congress should require an annual Pentagon report on all relevant military and security developments involving the PRC. Count on one thing: in the future, one devoted exclusively to analyzing what still passes for “military” developments and lacking any discussion of climate change will seem like an all-too-grim joke. The world deserves better going forward if we are to survive the coming climate onslaught.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Climate Change Is Now a Defense Matter appeared first on Fair Observer.

Mass protests are highly uncommon in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) keeps a tight lid on society, using mass surveillance, incarceration and economic pressure on recalcitrant individuals. Hence, people are too cowed down to protest.

The current protests reveal the scale of disaffection in China. Xi’s zero-COVID policy has clearly failed. It has imposed economic setbacks and social suffering on millions of Chinese families. The CCP’s reputation for competence has taken a beating and so has Xi’s prestige.

Xi’s failed zero-COVID policy has implications for the rest of the world. It shows that supply chains reliant on China face major risks and vulnerabilities. Unsurprisingly, countries are now decreasing investment in China, sourcing imports from other countries and making their supply chains more resilient.

Atul Singh and Glenn Carle make sense of protests in China and what this means for Xi, the CCP and the country.

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: China’s Zero-COVID Policy Comes to Zero appeared first on Fair Observer.

Ten individuals were killed in an apartment fire in Urumqi, Xinjiang, as their doors were locked from the outside due to lockdown restrictions, which sparked the initial protests. While lifting those limits was the protest’s main objective, it ultimately resulted in calls for Chinese President Xi Jinping to resign. Using white paper or plain white fabric as an anti-censorship symbol, protesters condemned the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and called for democracy and the right to free speech.

What led to the events?

There are a few things that can be noted from this mass protest. It’s hard to imagine such a large-scale event occurring in China, as the last major protest in China that attracted a military presence took place more than 30 years ago. But these demonstrations are not unique to Beijing. In 2019, a three-month pro-democracy demonstration took place in Hong Kong.

But last month’s protests came after nationwide tension was built when Xi addressed the 20th CCP Congress in October, stating: “In responding to the sudden outbreak of Covid-19, we put people and their lives above all else, working to prevent the re-emergence of cases arising from within or brought from abroad, and by persistent pursuit of a dynamic zero-Covid policy”.

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This statement illustrates China’s effort to contain the Covid-19 outbreak, including implementing a strict lockdown. However, such efforts led to the frustrations heard during recent protests. Indicating that despite the President’s party reappointment, certain groups still dare to delegitimize the power of Xi and the CCP.

When Xi was reappointed by Congress as the CCP’s general secretary. Following was this statement by party delegates, “We must resolutely uphold Comrade Xi’s core position on the Central Committee and in the Party as a whole and fully implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”

It will be interesting to see how this protest develops and what the Chinese government does next. Just days of protests at Tiananmen Square led to the CCP’s decision to use military force to disperse the crowds, which killed civilians and led to widespread arrests. As a result of these actions, China received international sanctions, especially from the US and other western countries.

Unlike the crackdown on Tiananmen Square, the CCP’s handling of the Hong Kong protests did not involve using live ammo or the military. Instead, Hong Kong security forces dispersed the protest using water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets. With current events, Beijing is mindful that deploying force, as it did in the past, could damage Hong Kong’s reputation as a free zone under China’s “One Country, Two Systems” principle. As a result, with Hong Kong as an economic hub, sanctions will impact China.

Another step to quell demonstrations in Hong Kong is to withdraw the Extradition Bill, which is the direct demand of protestors. The Chief Executive of Hong Kong carried out this action; however, there is speculation that Beijing was behind the decision.

What’s next and impact on Indonesia

Of course, it is too early to tell how these current protests will end. However, even if they escalate, Beijing will likely handle it how they did with the 2019 protest. On the other hand, if the CCP’s actions lose lives and damage the economy, it will lose more respect from Chinese citizens.

Even though these protests may last for some time, Beijing is likely to avoid using military force or violence and may slowly ease lockdown rules to prevent the spread of public sentiment. By doing this, the Chinese government and CCP could both maintain the people’s legitimacy and accelerate economic recovery.

A wave of protests have also emerged in Australia and Turkey and may continue to spread to Indonesia, mainly due to the growing negative sentiment towards China.

Based on the Indonesian National Survey Project in July 2022 by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute which interviewed a group of 1,600 diverse respondents directly regarding economic, domestic, and international politics, revealed that almost 25.4% of the Indonesian public believes the rise of China would negatively affect Indonesia. In contrast, only 30% of people believe establishing relations with China will benefit Indonesia.

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The survey also showed positive feelings towards China among Indonesia only reached 66%, compared to 76.7% five years ago. Not only that, many people are also worried about Indonesia’s involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project; as many as 41.5% of respondents think BRI can create a debt trap for other countries, including Indonesia. A belief, most likely based on events in other countries, such as the construction of the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, which resulted in economic losses.

Negative perceptions of China also extend to Chinese descendants in Indonesia. As demonstrated by 41% of survey respondents who think Chinese descendants are still loyal to China. 

A recent study by LAB45 showed that the re-election of Xi is a breath of fresh air for countries in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia. However, the recent protests in China may create obstacles to its continued presence in Indonesia, the closest of China’s ASEAN allies.

[Tasheanna Williams edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post What Protests in China Really Mean for Indonesia appeared first on Fair Observer.

Chinese newspaper Global Times claims that rising Indian nationalism and closer US-India cooperation are responsible for border tensions. A joint US-India military exercise in the border state of Uttarakhand has ruffled Chinese feathers. So has the building of roads and strengthening of Indian positions in border areas. Furthermore, Beijing sees New Delhi increasingly aligning with Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. It views the Quad, comprising India, Japan, Australia and the US, as an anti-China alliance.

Retired CIA officer Glenn Carle, one of Fair Observer’s regular authors and commentators, takes the view that Chinese transgressions are a part of a long term policy. Beijing pushes on all international issues where they have differences until they meet opposition. On Deutsche Welle, an Indian professor opined that Chinese transgression aims to keep India distracted and gain leverage in negotiations. Like many, he thinks that Beijing is signaling to New Delhi that Washington is far away. India should make peace with its more powerful northern neighbor, which is the top dog in Asia.

All these explanations are true but there is something more going on.

Chinese Communism v Tibetan Buddhism

It is important to note that the Chinese carried out this operation in the wee hours of a chilly winter morning at high altitude. This required detailed planning and effective execution, and was clearly not an accidental cross-border patrol, as some analysts have speculated. The aim was to occupy strategic heights near Tawang, one of the most sacred places in Tibetan Buddhism in India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh.

Nestled between China-occupied Tibet and Bhutan, Tawang is a district of about 2000 square kilometers (800 square miles) that is also home to the oldest and second biggest monastery in Asia. Tawang is one of the very few areas where there are thousands of Tibetan families in their traditional homeland outside China. The Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, was born in this area in March 1683. 

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The current Dalai Lama is now 87 and the question of succession looms. Already, the Tibetans and the CCP are clashing over this question. Note though that no Dalai Lama has emerged outside the traditional Tibetan homeland. Tawang is the only important center of this homeland outside Chinese control. For many Tibetans, it is desirable that this tradition continues. As many lamas have mentioned to the authors, the next Dalai Lama could well emerge from the Tawang area. Beijing wants to avoid such a possibility. Control over Tawang would help. Hence, China claims this area along with other bits of Arunachal Pradesh as a part of South Tibet.

In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) finally triumphed in its civil war and took over Mainland China. Within a year, the CCP sent the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. This imperial army of occupation posed as an army of liberation and has still not left.

In the early days, Beijing sought to avoid Tibetan unrest. Therefore, China signed a Seventeen Point Agreement with Tibet. It promised not to “alter the existing political system in Tibet” and “the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama.” China did not make these promises in good faith. Under Chairman Mao Zedong, the CCP began shaping a deeply spiritual and Buddhist Tibet into its vision of an atheistic communist utopia. For most Tibetans, this utopia was a nightmare. In 1959, they rose up in revolt. The PLA brutally crushed the revolt and the Dalai Lama fled to India.

Just as the Pope is the spiritual leader of the Catholics, the Dalai Lama is a similar figure for the Tibetans. His presence in India angers China and, as long as the Dalai Lama lives, he remains a focal point of Tibetan resistance to Chinese colonization. Once the Dalai Lama dies, Beijing aims to pick his successor. Control over the historic Tawang monastery would snuff out a key center of future resistance.

China has been following this playbook for a while. In 1995, Beijing rejected the Panchen Lama chosen by the Dalai Lama. Instead, the CCP appointed a Manchurian candidate in his place. Today, a puppet Panchen Lama signs from Beijing’s hymn sheet, warning Tibetans to stay away from separatist forces. This Beijing-appointed leader argues that Tibetan Buddhism must adapt to “socialism and Chinese conditions.” No wonder, the CCP’s wet dream is to install a puppet Dalai Lama who pledges fealty to Beijing.

Why Tawang Matters

Many Chinese nationalists regret the loss of Tawang. This area could very well have been a part of China. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister  was wedded to the idea of India-China unity. He wanted the two Asian giants to stand up to Western imperialism. Against the wishes of his statesmanly home minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru acquiesced to the 1950 Chinese takeover of Tibet.

As explained in a magnum opus on Fair Observer about India-China tensions, Nehru later realized that he had been duped by Mao. He kicked off the so-called “forward policy” as per which Indian troops took positions in territory that both India and China claimed as their own. In 1962, the PLA dealt India a devastating defeat. Chinese troops took over Tawang and advanced as far south as Bomdila. Although they later withdrew, India lost valuable territory and invaluable prestige.

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The fact that Tawang was in Indian hands is a historical accident. Nehru was a socialist and so were his top officials. They valued an anti-Western alliance with China. Major Ralengnao “Bob” Khathing did not have such Nehruvian delusions. He took matters in his own hands and marched to Tawang with merely two platoons. In 1951, this area, formerly under the control of the independent Tibetan government, was now in Indian hands. Except for a brief interlude in 1962, it has remained Indian territory since. The Chinese still lay claim to Tawang though.

The recent Chinese operation would have captured heights from where both the town and monastery in Tawang are clearly visible. They would have secured area domination and made a future move to capture Tawang easier. Artillery from the captured heights could have pummeled the monastery and the town. Also, once snow would have set in and weather turned inclement, Chinese troops would have dug into their new positions. Indian generals would have found it hard to move large numbers of troops to recapture these positions.

Note that the Chinese have tried to capture these heights before. They attempted in 2016 and, more recently, in October 2021. The Chinese have settled veterans in xiaokang (well-off) border defense villages. One such village is in the vicinity of the point of the latest clash. Intelligence officials tell officials that 600-700 such xiaokang encampments now exist along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the de facto India-China border. They form part of the aggressive defense policy that President Xi Jinping has unleashed on nearly all of China’s neighbors.

If the PLA got hold of Tawang, the CCP would control a historic Tibetan monastery. Its choice of the Dalai Lama would be rubber stamped by this venerable institution.

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Tibet is run per Mao’s dictum: “Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.” Neighboring Arunachal Pradesh, which the CCP claims as South Tibet, is a rambunctious multiparty democracy. The state’s chief minister won 41 out of 60 seats in the 2019 elections. On December 16, he blamed Nehru for appeasing China and thanked Patel for taking over Tawang. Such a statement about recent history is impossible across the border. Unsurprisingly, Arunachal Pradesh has emerged as an imperfect but viable democratic model for China-occupied Tibet. This makes the CCP nervous.

China-India Clash Wakes Up Tibet’s Ghost of Independence

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This nervousness has worsened because of recent protests. Only in October, the 20th Central Committee of the CCP crowned Xi as de facto emperor. Despite his disastrous zero-COVID policy, Xi’s vice-like grip on power looked more secure than ever. The last few weeks have turned out to be a rather long time in Chinese politics. Xi’s zero-COVID policy has fallen apart and he has quietly made a U-turn. As per Nature, scientists worry Xi’s abrupt reversal could lead to a rise in infections and overwhelm hospitals. 

Winter is peak influenza season. Also, many people will be traveling across China for the Lunar New Year and spring festival, further increasing viral spread. Now that Xi is omnipotent, all blame would fall on him. The CCP is anxious that protests could even spread to Tibet, making the party and Xi lose face.

The CCP is also worried about recent developments in India. Earlier this year, the Indian prime minister called the Dalai Lama to wish him a happy birthday. Chinese irritation further increased when New Delhi released photos of the Dalai Lama visiting “a remote Himalayan village in the disputed border region of eastern Ladakh.” The fact that he had been flown there by a military helicopter particularly aggravated Beijing.

The Chinese have not forgotten that the previous Dalai Lama fled to Darjeeling when Qing troops marched into Lhasa. The 1911 revolution gave the 13th Dalai Lama the opportunity to return from exile, and expel Chinese troops and officials from Lhasa in 1912. He declared complete self-rule and Tibet achieved de facto independence that lasted nearly four decades. The CCP is terrified of Tibetans achieving independence again. As long as the Dalai Lama lives in India, they fear that what happened in 1912 could recur.

For the CCP, Tibet is a tributary of China and the Dalai Lama should kowtow to Emperor Xi. For Indians, Tibet is home to Kailash and Mansarovar, the abode of Lord Shiva. They respect Tibetans for preserving Buddhism and many of India’s most revered tantric traditions. For Tibetans themselves, India is the land of the Buddha and now home to the Dalai Lama. They prefer democracy to autocracy, Buddhism to communism and the Dalai Lama to Emperor Xi.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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These talks have been an on-again, off-again proposition since President Barack Obama initiated them before the Paris climate summit of December 2015, at which delegates were to vote on a landmark measure to prevent global temperatures from rising more than 1.5 degrees Celsius (the maximum amount scientists believe this planet can absorb without catastrophic consequences). The US-Chinese consultations continued after the adoption of the Paris climate accord, but were suspended in 2017 by that climate-change-denying president Donald Trump. They were relaunched by President Biden in 2021, only to be suspended again by an angry Chinese leadership in retaliation for House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s August 2nd visit to Taiwan, viewed in Beijing as a show of support for pro-independence forces on that island. But thanks to Biden’s intense lobbying in Bali, President Xi agreed to turn the interactive switch back on.

Behind that modest gesture there lies a far more momentous question: What if the two countries moved beyond simply talking and started working together to champion the radical lowering of global carbon emissions? What miracles might then be envisioned? To help find answers to that momentous question means revisiting the recent history of the US-Chinese climate collaboration.

The Promise of Collaboration

In November 2014, based on extensive diplomatic groundwork, Presidents Obama and Xi met in Beijing and signed a statement pledging joint action to ensure the success of the forthcoming Paris summit. “The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China have a critical role to play in combating global climate change,” they affirmed. “The seriousness of the challenge calls upon the two sides to work constructively together for the common good.”

Obama then ordered Secretary of State John Kerry to collaborate with Chinese officials in persuading other attendees at that summit — officially, the 21st Conference of the Parties of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, or COP21 — to agree on a firm commitment to honor the 1.5-degree limit. That joint effort, many observers believe, was instrumental in persuading reluctant participants like India and Russia to sign the Paris climate agreement.

“With our historic joint announcement with China last year,” Obama declared at that summit’s concluding session, “we showed it was possible to bridge the old divides… that had stymied global progress for so long. That accomplishment encouraged dozens and dozens of other nations to set their own ambitious climate targets.”

Obama also pointed out that any significant global progress along that path was dependent on continued cooperation between the two countries. “No nation, not even one as powerful as ours, can solve this challenge alone.”

Trump and the Perils of Non-Cooperation

That era of cooperation didn’t last long. Donald Trump, an ardent fan of fossil fuels, made no secret of his aversion to the Paris climate accord. He signaled his intent to exit from the agreement soon after taking office. “It is time to put Youngstown, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; and Pittsburgh, PA, along with many, many other locations within our great country, before Paris, France,” he said ominously in 2017 when announcing his decision.

With the US absent from the scene, progress in implementing the Paris Agreement slowed to a crawl. Many countries that had been pressed by the US and China to agree to ambitious emissions-reduction schedules began to opt out of those commitments in sync with Trump’s America. China, too, the greatest greenhouse gas emitter of this moment and the leading user of that dirtiest of fossil fuels, coal, felt far less pressure to honor its commitment, even on a rapidly heating planet.

No one knows what would have happened had Trump not been elected and those US-China talks not been suspended, but in the absence of such collaboration, there was a steady rise in carbon emissions and temperatures across the planet. According to CO.2.Earth, emissions grew from 35.5 billion metric tons in 2016 to 36.4 billion tons in 2021, a 2.5% increase. Since such emissions are the leading contributor to the greenhouse-gas effect responsible for global warming, it should be no surprise that the past seven years have also proven the hottest on record, with much of the world experiencing record-breaking heat waves, forest fires, droughts, and crop failures. We can be fairly certain, moreover, that in the absence of renewed US-China climate cooperation, such disasters will become ever more frequent and severe.

On Again, Off Again

Overcoming this fearsome trend was one of Joe Biden’s principal campaign promises and, against strong Republican opposition, he has indeed endeavored to undo at least some of the damage wrought by Trump. It was symbolic indeed that he rejoined the Paris climate accord on his first day in office and ordered his cabinet to accelerate the government’s transition to clean energy. In August, he achieved a significant breakthrough when Congress approved the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which provides $369 billion in loans, grants, and tax credits for green-energy initiatives.

Biden also sought to reinvigorate Washington’s global-warming diplomacy and the stalled talks with China, naming John Kerry as his special envoy for climate action. Kerry, in turn, reestablished ties with his Chinese colleagues from his time as secretary of state. At last year’s COP26 gathering in Glasgow, Scotland, he persuaded them to join the US in approving the “Glasgow Declaration,” a commitment to step up efforts to mitigate climate change.

However, in so many ways, Joe Biden and his foreign policy team are still caught up in the Cold War era and his administration has generally taken a far more antagonistic approach to China than Obama. Not surprisingly, then, the progress Kerry achieved with his Chinese counterparts at Glasgow largely evaporated as tensions over Taiwan only grew more heated. Biden was, for instance, the first president in memory to claim — four times — that US military forces would defend that island in a crisis, were it to be attacked by China, essentially tossing aside Washington’s longstanding position of “strategic ambiguity” on the Taiwan question. In response, China’s leaders became ever more strident in claiming that the island belonged to them.

When Nancy Pelosi made that Taiwan visit in early August, the Chinese responded by firing ballistic missiles into the waters around the island and, in a fit of anger, terminated those bilateral climate-change talks. Now, thanks to Biden’s entreaties in Bali, the door seems again open for the two countries to collaborate on limiting global greenhouse gas emissions.  At a moment of ever more devastating evidence of planetary heating, from a megadrought in the US to “extreme heat” in China, the question is: What might any meaningful new collaborative effort involve?

Reasserting the Climate’s Centrality

In 2015, few of those in power doubted the overarching threat posed by climate change or the need to bring international diplomacy to bear to help overcome it. In Paris, Obama declared that “the growing threat of climate change could define the contours of this century more dramatically than any other.” What should give us hope, he continued, “is the fact that our nations share a sense of urgency about this challenge and a growing realization that it is within our power to do something about it.”

Since then, all too sadly, other challenges, including the growth of Cold War-style tensions with China, the Covid-19 pandemic, and Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine, have come to “define the contours” of this century. In 2022, even as the results of the overheating of the planet become ever more obvious, few world leaders would contend that “it is within our power” to overcome the climate peril. So, the first (and perhaps most valuable) outcome of any renewed US-China climate cooperation might simply be to place climate change at the top of the world’s agenda again and provide evidence that the major powers, working together, can successfully tackle the issue.

Such an effort might, for instance, start with a Washington-Beijing “climate summit,” presided over by presidents Biden and Xi and attended by high-level delegations from around the world. American and Chinese scientists could offer the latest bad news on the likely future trajectory of global warming, while identifying real-world goals to significantly reduce fossil-fuel use. This might, in turn, lead to the formation of multilateral working groups, hosted by US and Chinese agencies and institutions, to meet regularly and implement the most promising strategies for halting the onrushing disaster.

Following the example set by Obama and Xi at COP21 in Paris, Biden and Xi would agree to play a pivotal role in the next Conference of the Parties, COP28, scheduled for December 2023 in the United Arab Emirates. Following the inconclusive outcome of COP27, recently convened at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, strong leadership will be required to ensure something significantly better at COP28. Among the goals those two leaders would need to pursue, the top priority should be the full implementation of the 2015 Paris accord with its commitment to a 1.5-degree maximum temperature increase, followed by a far greater effort by the wealthy nations to assist developing countries suffering from its effects.

There’s no way, however, that China and the US will be able to exert a significant international influence on climate efforts if both countries — the former the leading emitter of greenhouse gasses at this moment and the latter the historic leader — don’t take far greater initiatives to lower their carbon emissions and shift to renewable sources of energy. The Inflation Reduction Act will indeed allow the White House to advance many new initiatives in this direction, while China is moving more swiftly than any other country to install added supplies of wind and solar energy. Nevertheless, both countries continue to rely on fossil fuels for a substantial share of their energy — China, for instance, remains the greatest user of coal, burning more of it than the rest of the world combined — and so both will need to agree on even more aggressive moves to reduce their carbon emissions if they hope to persuade other nations to do the same.

The Sino-American Fund for Clean Energy Transitions

In a better world, next on my list of possible outcomes from a reinvigorated US-Chinese relationship would be joint efforts to help finance the global transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. Although the cost of deploying renewables, especially wind and solar energy, has fallen dramatically in recent years, it remains substantial even for wealthy countries. For many developing nations, it remains an unaffordable option. This emerged as a major issue at COP27 in Egypt, where representatives from the Global South complained that the wealthy countries largely responsible for the overheating of the planet weren’t doing faintly enough (or, in many cases, anything), despite prior promises, to help them shoulder the costs of the increasingly devastating effects of climate change and the future greening of their countries.

Many of these complaints revolved around the Green Climate Fund, established at COP16 in Cancún. The developed countries agreed to provide $100 billion annually to that fund by 2020 to help developing nations bear the costs of transitioning to renewable energy. Although that amount is now widely viewed as wildly insufficient for such a transition — “all of the evidence suggests that we need trillions, not billions,” observed Baysa Naran, a manager at the research center Climate Policy Initiative — the Fund has never even come close to hitting that $100 billion target, leaving many in the Global South bitter as, with unprecedented flooding and staggering heat waves, climate change strikes home ever more horrifically there.

When the US and China were working on the climate together at COP26 in Glasgow, filling the Green Climate Fund appeared genuinely imaginable. In their Glasgow Declaration of November 2021, John Kerry and his Chinese counterpart, Xie Zhenhua, affirmed that “both countries recognize the importance of the commitment made by developed countries to the goal of mobilizing jointly $100b per year by 2020 and annually through 2025 to address the needs of developing countries [and] stress the importance of meeting that goal as soon as possible.”

Sadly enough, all too little came of that affirmation in the months that followed, as US-China relations turned ever more antagonistic. Now, in the wake of Biden’s meeting with Xi and the resumption of their talks on climate change, it’s at least possible to imagine intensified bilateral efforts to advance that $100 billion objective — and even go far beyond it (though we can expect fierce resistance from the new Republican majority in the House of Representatives).

As my contribution to such thinking, let me suggest the formation of a Sino-American Fund for Green Energy Transitions — a grant- and loan-making institution jointly underwritten by the two countries with the primary purpose of financing renewable energy projects in the developing world. Decisions on such funding would be made by a board of directors, half from each country, with staff work performed by professionals drawn from around the world. The aim: to supplement the Green Climate Fund with additional hundreds of billions of dollars annually and so speed the global energy transition.

The Pathway to Peace and Survival

The leaders of the US and China both recognize that global warming poses an extraordinary threat to the survival of their nations and that colossal efforts will be needed in the coming years to minimize the climate peril, while preparing for its most severe effects. “The climate crisis is the existential challenge of our time,” the Biden administration’s October 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) states. “Without immediate global action to reduce emissions, scientists tell us we will soon exceed 1.5 degrees of warming, locking in further extreme heat and weather, rising sea levels, and catastrophic biodiversity loss.”

Despite that all-too-on-target assessment, the NSS portrays competition from China as an even greater threat to US security — without citing any of the same sort of perilous outcomes — and proposes a massive mobilization of the nation’s economic, technological, and military resources to ensure American dominance of the Asia-Pacific region for decades to come. That strategy will, of course, require trillions of dollars in military expenditures, ensuring insufficient funding to tackle the climate crisis and exposing this country to an ever-increasing risk of war — possibly even a nuclear one — with China.

Given such dangers, perhaps the best outcome of renewed US-China climate cooperation, or green diplomacy, might be increasing trust between the leaders of those two countries, allowing for a reduction in tensions and military expenditures. Indeed, such an approach constitutes the only practical strategy for saving us from the catastrophic consequences of both a US-China conflict and unconstrained climate change.

[TomDispatch first published this article.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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