Leftist observers have long characterized several entities as the “Axis of Resistance.” This group includes Iran, Iraq’s militia groups, Assad’s Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbollah and more recently Gaza’s Hamas and Yemen’s Ansar Allah (a.k.a. “the Houthis”). They are seen as a collective counterweight to the American Empire’s regional domination. This domination is enforced via Israeli military strength and the Gulf states’ financial heft.

A failed response to Gaza

There is some geopolitical truth to that characterization. While one can debate the strategic wisdom of Hamas’ October 7 attack, many argue it was inevitable. Few options were left available due to the unending blockade of Gaza, the stifling of all diplomatic and non-violent means to resist occupation and expulsion and the abandonment of the Palestinians throughout the region, particularly by Gulf monarchies.

Once fighting started in Gaza, feckless Arab regimes did not offer anything useful to the Palestinian resistance — indeed, several continue to collaborate with the Israeli state. Yes, Hezbollah launched an effective war of attrition against the Zionist regime and imposed real costs on Israel’s ongoing aggression against Gaza, as did Yemen’s Ansar Allah. Such responses further highlighted the ineffectual, even hypocritical, complaints lodged by Arab autocrats acting as US allies throughout the region.

However, how much support did Iran, the supposed anchor of this Axis of Resistance, actually offer Palestinians? In their tit-for-tat exchanges with the Israelis, Iran demonstrated prowess with ballistic missile technology sufficient to potentially overwhelm Israeli air defenses and trigger catastrophic military and economic losses. But the Iranian regime was not about to go to war for Palestine. Their responses were calibrated to save face, while re-establishing a limited measure of deterrence.

A harsh truth is that the Iranian regime has often treated its Arab allies as kindling, using them to generate smokescreens when necessary. They do this to deflect American and Israeli military designs against their sovereignty. Iran deftly exploited the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq to tie down the US military for years, likely preventing an American attack on Iran under George W. Bush. Similarly, the Iranian regime has long used Hezbollah for geopolitical leverage, as they are a useful mercenary force, no matter the expense to broader Lebanese society.

​​Hezbollah’s attempt to relieve Israeli military pressure on Gaza this past year stands in glaring contrast to the rest of the Arab and Islamic world’s inaction at the state level. Meanwhile, the people of Lebanon, particularly southern Lebanon, can take pride in their support for Gaza.

Hezbollah’s role in the region

At the same time, is it fair that Hezbollah has operated effectively unchecked inside the Lebanese state, in turn preventing Lebanon from being governed normally? Is it right that as Lebanon’s economy collapsed, its politics remain gridlocked by Hezbollah? Is it right that no one was held accountable when the port of Beirut suffered a nuclear-sized explosion because fertilizer was carelessly left in a warehouse for months by Hezbollah, which runs the ports and siphons off tax revenues?

While Hezbollah’s militia has proven quite effective in fighting Israel, its political strategy has remained a failure. How strong can Hezbollah be if it continues to paralyze Lebanon? When push came to shove, the group largely chose to answer to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) rather than the people of Lebanon.

Once the current dystopian conflict subsides, Hezbollah fighters in Lebanon’s south could be reorganized into a national guard or territorial army to defend the country from future Israeli invasions. If Lebanon were a functioning state with a functioning military, that state might also choose to uphold international law and intervene in an attempt to stop the genocide in Gaza — but such a decision belongs to Beirut, not Tehran.

Around the beginning of the Syrian revolution, Arab militia leaders faced a similar choice. Khaled Mashal, the Hamas leader, and Hassan Nasrallah, the now-departed leader of Hezbollah, visited Bashar al-Assad and encouraged him to moderate and compromise with the still peaceful demonstrators. Assad thundered back, in effect stating, “it’s my way or the highway,” demanding they support his crackdown.

On behalf of Hamas, Mashal refused to obey, promptly moving Hamas’ main office from Damascus to Qatar, where it remains today. As a result, Hamas remained estranged from Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” coalition for years afterward.

In contradiction, Nasrallah led Hezbollah into a needless civil war in Syria, massacring thousands in Qusayr, Aleppo, around Damascus and elsewhere. Hezbollah’s intervention even included the use of starvation in Madaya and Zabadani — where militia members on loan to the Assad regime laid siege to opposition enclaves and mocked their starvation with social media posts of banquets boasting the hashtag “in solidarity with Madaya.”

Before the rebel victory, Hezbollah was admired among both Sunni and Shia populations throughout the Arab world. Still, their intervention on behalf of this ruthless sectarian regime poisoned relations between different religious and ethnic groups for years. Only in recent years did those divisions begin to ease, largely due to how destructive they were throughout the region.

Syria’s past, present and future

As long as Assad was in power, no path forward was open for Syria. He devastated the country instead of relinquishing any control. At least half a million Syrians died in the process. Before Assad’s fall, as many as half of all Syrians were displaced — about 12 million in total — scattered throughout the country, Turkey, Germany and multiple other safe havens.

Syria was reduced to a bankrupt narco-state, led by a regime financed by smuggling Captagon on international drug markets. Bashar al-Assad’s regime never confronted Israel directly. Syria’s military stopped fighting for its external defense decades ago, including for the liberation of occupied Golan. Like every other Arab military, Syria’s existed only to oppress its own population. That ended when its soldiers voted with their feet and put an end to the oppression.

What now? The Assad regime was brutal and useless to everyone, including Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. From Syria’s perspective, external powers such as Turkey, Russia, Iran, Israel and the United States will happily manipulate or even dismember Syria for their own state or imperial interests. Israel has already underscored that point over the past few days, seizing several villages in Golan’s Mt. Hermon as a “buffer zone” and mounting a punishing new bombing campaign.

However, Syria’s people have agency. Against all expectations and after a lengthy civil war, they recently shattered this brutal regime with astonishing speed, without incurring massive civilian casualties and without significant external support. They put an end to the Iranian regime’s cynical game of defending their own interests in Syria while using Arabs as cannon fodder. By liberating Syria, they shattered the Arab republican dictatorship model of governance.

For the first time in decades, the people of Syria have a chance for a future. Syrians have long had to emigrate abroad to succeed, and many who did so made remarkable achievements. Now, they have an opportunity to build a country that can harness the talents of its people. That alone is worth celebrating today and fighting for tomorrow — but for this liberation to succeed, external powers must exercise restraint and let the Syrian people chart their own future.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Axis of Resistance: Fault Lines and Fallout appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Assad regime recently collapsed after opposition groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Syrian National Forces (SNF), backed by Turkey, launched a military push. At the same time, Russia and Iran reduced this support for Assad. This shift offers a glimmer of hope for a nation scarred by war and oppression. 

With the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has effectively come under the de facto influence of Turkey and Israel. The October 7 events, when Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, further weakened Iran’s axis of resistance and its strategic project aimed at undermining Israel, delivering a significant blow to Iran. The attack triggered a full-scale war, leading to devastating Israeli retaliatory strikes on Gaza and escalating regional tensions.

Additionally, Russia anchored its foothold in the Middle East through a close alliance with the Assad regime and a naval base in Latakia, which gave it access to the Mediterranean. This allowed Russia to project power in the region and counter Western influence directly. The loss of this strategic leverage has diminished Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence and shape events in the Middle East. 

Turkey and Israel stand to benefit from this new dynamic. They will use their influence to combat terrorist organizations within Syrian borders.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: savior or threat?

Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, established the Assad regime in 1971 and entrenched a model of authoritarian rule centered on the Baʿath Party and the military security apparatus. Hafez consolidated power through ruthless suppression. He favored sectarian divisions and had an extensive patronage network. Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000. He initially offered hope for reform but quickly reverted to autocracy. The authorities brutally cracked down on the 2011 Arab Spring protests. The war plunged Syria into a devastating civil war. Assad’s regime, backed by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, clung to power through scorched-earth tactics. They massively used chemical weapons and a campaign of mass terror.

At the forefront of the opposition is HTS. It traces back to al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate that emerged in 2012 during the early years of the Syrian conflict. Initially committed to global jihad, the group rebranded itself as HTS in 2017 under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. It declared a break from al-Qaeda and positioned itself as a nationalist force focused on Syria’s liberation.

Over the years, HTS has transitioned from a shadowy jihadist group to the dominant force in Syria’s northwest. It achieved a level of military and administrative control unmatched by other opposition factions. Its leadership claims a commitment to inclusive governance and minority rights, but its history of draconian social policies and sectarian leanings undermines these assertions.

Despite its pivotal role in Assad’s ouster, HTS faces challenges in gaining legitimacy. Turkey, the United States and other international actors still designate it as a terrorist organization. This limits HTS’s ability to secure external support. Allegations of corruption, intimidation and arbitrary detention have marred its governance in areas under its control. Moreover, its Islamist orientation raises alarms about the safety of Syria’s minority communities, particularly Alawites and Christians.

The fall of Assad is a blow to Iran and Russia’s regional ambitions

Iran’s intervention in Syria’s civil war after the Arab Spring was critical in sustaining the Assad regime. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was instrumental in Iran’s involvement. Soleimani coordinated a network of militias, including Hezbollah from Lebanon and other Shiite paramilitary groups from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to bolster Assad’s forces. His maneuvers in battles, such as the recapture of Aleppo in 2016, not only saved Assad’s government but also cemented Iran’s influence in Syria.

Iran invested billions of dollars in Syria, financing military operations and rebuilding infrastructure in areas under Assad’s control. This financial and material backing was coupled with an extensive military presence, including IRGC forces, advisors and bases across Syria. Syria became a conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah, enabling Tehran to transfer advanced weaponry, including missiles and drones, to its Lebanese proxy. Establishing weapons factories and logistical hubs in Syrian territory allowed Iran to bypass international sanctions and enhance Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

The fall of Assad’s regime dismantled the axis of resistance that Tehran painstakingly built. Following the October 7 escalation and the broader war with Israel, Hamas suffered devastating losses, and its leadership, including Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, was eliminated. Hezbollah, already stretched thin from years of engagement in Syria, faced intensified Israeli retaliation that crippled its command structure. During this period, Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, dealing a symbolic and operational blow to the group.

Moqtada-al Sadr, a Shiite cleric and leader of the Sadrist Movement in Iraq, refused to stand by Assad during his downfall, underscoring Tehran’s waning influence, even among its Shiite allies. Among Iran’s loyal partners, only the Houthi movement in Yemen remains severely curtailing Iran’s ability to project power in the region.

Now, Iran faces the prospect of direct confrontation with Israel, which has set its sights on Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. The fall of Assad underscores Iran’s growing vulnerability. Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, may confront the possibility that it could be the next target in a reshaped Middle East dominated by Israeli and Turkish influence.

Russia’s intervention in Syria, beginning in 2015, was a game-changer for the Assad regime. Vladimir Putin aimed to stabilize Assad’s rule and preserve Moscow’s influence in the Middle East by deploying airpower and special forces. Russian military support, including the bombing campaigns in Aleppo and Idlib, turned the tide of the war in Assad’s favor. Putin also leveraged diplomatic efforts, such as the Astana peace talks, to secure Russia’s position as a key power broker in the conflict.

Syria was more than an ally for Russia — it was a strategic asset. The naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Hmeimim allowed Moscow to project power into the Mediterranean to counterbalance NATO’s presence.

Syria represented a symbolic victory for Putin’s broader geopolitical strategy. It demonstrated Russia’s resurgence as a global power capable of challenging the West, especially after the annexation of Crimea and tensions in Ukraine.

The collapse of Assad’s regime undermines Russia’s ambitions in the region. The loss of its military bases jeopardizes Moscow’s ability to counterbalance NATO and maintain a foothold in the Mediterranean.

Alexander Dugin, known as Putin’s “brain,” has remarked that the fall of Assad symbolizes a collapse of Moscow’s ability to shape outcomes in the Middle East. This failure, he argues, is a profound setback for Putin’s vision of a multipolar world where Russia stands as a counterweight to Western dominance.

Moreover, the downfall of the Assad regime questions Russia’s reliability as an ally. It parallels the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s subsequent rise to power. Just as the chaotic exit from Kabul signaled a blow to American credibility, Assad’s fall marks a significant setback for Russia’s regional strategy. For Putin, the challenge now is twofold: to salvage Russia’s position in the Middle East and to manage the domestic fallout from another costly foreign venture that failed.

Turkey and Israel as Syria’s de facto decision-makers

Before Bashar al-Assad came to power, Israel’s relationship with Syria was full of hostility and conflict. Syria, under Hafez al-Assad, supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and harbored Palestinian militant organizations. Israel captured the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War in 1967, and it has remained a focal point of tension. Syria demands its return, while Israel prioritizes its strategic importance for security.

The 1990s saw limited attempts at peace negotiations, including the 1991 Madrid Conference and subsequent talks mediated by the US. However, these efforts failed to yield a breakthrough due to mutual distrust and irreconcilable differences over the Golan Heights.

When Bashar al-Assad assumed power, hopes for reform and improved relations with Israel were quickly dashed. Assad’s regime deepened its alliance with Iran. He continued providing support to Hezbollah. Then, the Syrian Civil War entrenched hostility as Assad’s government accused Israel of backing rebel factions.

Israel primarily focused its involvement in the Syrian conflict on countering Iranian influence and preventing the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) targeted Iranian bases, arms depots, and convoys. IDF has admitted to hundreds of strikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions to prevent arms transfers and deter threats near its borders. 

With the fall of the Asad regime, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has hailed it as a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. It marks a continuation of Israel’s strategic policies aimed at dismantling terrorist organizations and curbing Iran’s influence in the region. Netanyahu’s celebration is not merely symbolic; it underscores Israel’s proactive stance in shaping the Middle East. Israel sends a clear message that it will not tolerate any actor that threatens its sovereignty or regional stability.

Netanyahu explicitly warned the new leaders of Syria that they must not emulate Assad’s policies, cautioning that they would face the same fate if they did. Israel’s post-Assad policies should include:

• Preventing the Iranian regime’s entrenchment.
• Securing the Golan Heights to prevent cross-border attacks.
• Collaborating with international partners, especially Turkey, to support a political solution that prioritizes regional security and limits the resurgence of extremist factions.

Turkey has experienced shifting dynamics in its relationship with the Assad regime. Initially, Ankara and Damascus shared a pragmatic relationship during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as both countries sought to resolve border disputes and enhance economic ties. The Adana Agreement of 1998, which led to Syria expelling the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — designated as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, Turkey and Israel — leader Abdullah Öcalan exemplified this period of cooperation. However, the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 caused a significant rift. President Erdoğan openly opposed Assad’s brutal crackdown on protesters and began supporting opposition groups.

Turkey became a key supporter of SNF to bolster their fight against Assad. Turkey’s military operations, such as Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring, were aimed at establishing a buffer zone along its southern border. These operations targeted ISIS and Kurdish terrorist organizations. They also indirectly benefited factions such as HTS, which capitalized on the chaos to expand their influence in northern Syria.

In the post-Assad era, Turkey’s ambition to expand its regional influence is evident in its efforts to position itself as a key power broker in Syria. Alongside Israel to shape the postwar order, Turkey has established de facto Turkish-administered zones in northern Syria, complete with Turkish schools, hospitals, and currency.

As a NATO member, Turkey’s active role in Syria enhances the alliance’s presence in the Middle East as it counters Russian and Iranian influence. Ankara’s strategic location and military capabilities make it a pivotal regional player. Turkey aligns its interests with those of NATO while pursuing its national objectives.

Neutralizing Kurdish threats and managing the refugee crisis are central to Ankara’s agenda. Turkey has committed to continued operations aimed at dismantling Kurdish terrorist organizations to ensure that they do not exploit the post-Assad vacuum to establish a foothold near its borders. 

[Liam Roman edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Assad’s Fall Starts a New Era in the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

Israel won that war and at least 750,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled from the new Israel and became refugees in surrounding and other countries. That enforced diaspora, including their descendants, now numbers approximately 6 million registered refugees plus a further 2.5 million unregistered.

Of the Palestinians who remained in Israel, and their descendants, approximately 2 million live in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem, with a further 2.3 million in Gaza. Some Palestinians in the West Bank have Israeli citizenship while the majority have residency papers. Although many areas are officially designated as under administration by the independent Palestinian Authority, in reality, the entire West Bank is under Israeli military law.

Israel also won subsequent wars declared by a variety of Arab neighbors, in 1956, 1967 and 1973. Territorial gains for Israel included: part of Golan Heights (from Syria), part of Sinai (from Egypt, returned in a peace accord), Gaza (from Egypt, relinquished to autonomous Palestinian administration in another peace accord), and the West Bank and East Jerusalem (from Jordan).

In September 2024, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Israel’s continued occupation of Palestine and demanding it cease and desist. However, given Israel’s notorious decades-old contempt for the United Nations, and its ultimate rejection of all previous resolutions and internationally brokered attempts to secure Palestinian rights and nationhood (examples include the 1947 UN Resolution 181 (II), the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords, and the two-state solution), it is highly unlikely that Israel will comply.

Over two decades, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has never been more than equivocal about a two-state solution. Since 2015, he has rejected the idea and since 2023 has outright rejected any possibility of Palestinian statehood at all. By June 2024, despite Israel’s best efforts to deny Palestinians any claim to statehood, 146 out of the 193 nations of the UN had recognized Palestine as an independent state.

Intermittent Israeli military attacks and temporary occupation of large parts of Lebanon have also occurred on numerous occasions over decades. Many feared that the latest, from October 1 to November 26, 2024, ostensibly to eradicate Hezbollah rocket attacks on Israel, was also a “dry run” for an indefinite annexation of the southern half, if not the whole, of Lebanon.

Israel’s response to Hamas terror attack of October 7, 2023

Hamas’s savage cross-border terror attack from inside Gaza on Israeli settlements on October 7, 2023 inevitably provoked a justifiable Israeli military response. Israel sought to capture or kill the perpetrators, and then to eliminate the terrorist organization. Varying official estimates from different sources agree that at least 1,139 were killed by the October 7 attack, plus some 3,400 wounded and 251 (75% Israelis) captured and taken into Gaza. Of those captured and held as hostages, many have been confirmed dead, 105 were released by negotiation, and 2 were released by Israeli special forces, leaving 97 plus 4 others from earlier Hamas abductions currently still in captivity. 

Israel’s steadfast rejection over decades of a two-state solution, coupled with its demonstrable disregard for mass civilian casualties in its war on Gaza since October 7, 2023, has perplexed and infuriated long-standing allies of Israel. The gross disproportionality of the Gazan casualty numbers and the fanatical destruction of almost all infrastructure belie Israel’s stated objectives and strongly suggest a deliberate mass punishment of the population, contrary to the laws of war. Israel rejects this evaluation.

However, the initial “search and destroy” Israeli mission to eradicate an estimated 30,000 armed Hamas operatives quickly turned into what looked like an indiscriminate assault against the entire population, using sophisticated weaponry and brutal tactics to destroy entire neighborhoods and life sustainability. That relentless daily assault has gone on for over a year, with no sign that the Israelis intend to stop. By mid-November 2024, over 43,000 Gazans (including some 11,500 women and 16,800 children) had been killed, according to their identity and death certificates held by the Hamas-run Gaza Health Ministry, plus at least 10,000 missing, presumed dead under rubble, and over 103,000 wounded. The UN Human Rights report of November 2024 confirms that 70% of deaths have been women and children.

Over the past 12 months, the Israelis have been accused of systematically blocking food, medical and other humanitarian supplies, carrying out targeted daily bombardment of hospitals, schools, residential areas, food depots and refugee camps (including so-called “safe places” designated by the Israelis themselves), and conducting repetitive enforced mass displacements of the population throughout Gaza. By the end of May 2024, the UN officially estimated that 1.7 million (or 75%) of the Gazan population had been internally displaced. That estimate had increased to 1.9 million (or 90% of the population) by early September 2024. 

In late October 2024, UN and WHO chiefs declared that “the entire population of north Gaza” was now at serious risk of death from starvation, privation and lack of health care, and castigated Israel’s “blatant disregard for basic humanity and the laws of war.” In May 2024, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled that Israel’s recent conduct in Gaza was not genocidal (proto rather than actually achieved so far), but did state, quoting the Genocide Convention, that Israel “must immediately halt its military offensive” and warned against harming civilians. The International Criminal Court (ICC) followed this by seeking arrest warrants for Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for crimes against humanity. These cast Israel’s political leaders and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) as culpable villains. The arrest warrants were issued on November 21, 2024.

The Nation-State Law and land grabs

There are multiple well-documented reports of violent attacks and land grabs against Palestinians and other minorities (for example, Armenians) in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem by so-called “Israeli settlers.” These reflect the apparent determination of Netanyahu’s government and the judiciary to sanctify de facto ethnic cleansing and accelerate the practical implications of Israel’s 2018 Nation-State Law. The latter stipulates that Israel is a Jewish state in which only Jews have full rights. Article 7 specifically prioritizes Jewish settlements as “a national value” and for which the state will “act to encourage and promote its establishment and consolidation,” i.e. ethno-religious segregation and usurpation of non-Jewish land as the desirable norm.

By mid-2024, some 380,000 Israeli settlers had already occupied Palestinian land in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with a further 500,000 planned for the short term by Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, who denies that Palestinians are a nation or have ever had land rights. Former Israeli generals are advancing a similar plan for a settler takeover of Gaza after the Palestinian population has finally been removed.

More recently, Article 7 intent has been pursued through a new Israeli law banning the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) from operating inside Israel, including Gaza and the occupied Palestinian territories. Israel accused UNRWA of being infested with Hamas agents. Apart from removing the majority of international aid that would normally barely keep the Palestinian population fed, medicated and educated, the new law also has the effect of falsely declassifying Palestinians as UN refugees and removing any Israeli judicial recognition of their prior title rights to land the Israelis confiscated. 

Self-defense or neo-imperialism?

There is no question that Israel is surrounded by states that, to varying degrees, are hostile. Some of them also harbor anti-Israeli extremists who have engaged in terrorist attacks, both cross-border and inside Israel. The Hamas attack of October 7, 2023, and the ongoing rocket barrages from Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon into Israel are high-profile examples. Some of these extremists call for the total annihilation of Israel and all Jews. The majority of neighboring Arab and Muslim states have, however, opted for a more “tolerated difference” approach whereby a modus vivendi has emerged, such as Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, UAE, Dubai, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and even Lebanon. Others, such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and Yemen, have not.

In such a historically hostile and turbulent context, Israel has created an extensive, sophisticated and multi-faceted defense “fortress” to prevent, deter or neutralize any kind or scale of attack from any source, external or internal. Israel’s population is minuscule compared to hostile states in total and, even if including its full citizen reservist capacity, its numbers of military personnel are dwarfed by theirs. Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that Israel’s weapon systems, firepower, electronic warfare capacity, sophisticated electronic surveillance and intelligence systems, espionage agencies, motivation and training are vastly superior.

With Israel’s small population and modest GDP, all this has only been possible as a result of decades of financial, political and defense systems support from the United States. According to Reuters (September 26, 2024), scheduled US military aid over the next 10 years to Israel comprises $35 billion for essential wartime defense plus a further $52 billion for air defense systems, At an annual average of $8.7 billion, the US aid to Palestinians pales in comparison, at a mere $300 million.

Many independent observers have become increasingly reluctant to accept Israel’s stated justifications for its relentless response to the October 7 massacre. Their Gaza campaign, Lebanon campaign and violent land grabs from non-Jews in the West Bank no longer appear to be just about Israel’s “right to exist,” “right to self-defense,” and “right to pursue implacable and murderous enemies.” The daily video footage of mass civilian carnage in the immediate aftermath of Israeli bombardments of all kinds in Gaza contradicts Israeli official denials.

Beyond Israel’s stated military objectives, the elephant in the room now exposed is that the Gaza campaign also appears to be part of an aggressive nationalist territorial expansion project (or land grab), involving cleansing the ground of all opposition (actual and potential), as well as Palestinian population masses and infrastructure. Israel’s apparent ulterior motives in Gaza surface in the following examples:

Extra land and commercial development

Groups of settlers have been setting up temporary camps along the Israeli side of the Gaza border, waiting for the IDF to confirm that it is safe for them to cross over and mark out their desired settlements. These settlers firmly believe that God, through a proclamation of Abraham, granted all Jews the unchallengeable jus divinum right to exclusively occupy the “whole land” of Israel. They assert that it stretches from the west bank of the River Nile in Egypt to the Euphrates in Iraq, as implied in the Bible (as in Genesis 15:18-21) and other ancient tracts.

A separate style of land grab in Gaza involves Israeli property developers, some of whom appear to have already moved in. Such developers are offering Israelis beachfront, new-build properties on Palestinian land, which employees wearing IDF military reservist apparel are now clearing of war-damaged, abandoned homes. According to one developer’s own promotional video, its employees are already erecting these new buildings.

Lawyers point out that all such land grabs are in breach of international law and may also constitute a war crime. In all such citizen actions, the Israeli perpetrators believe that, in addition to the claim of jus divinum, they can also now rely on Article 7 of the Nation-State Law 2018 to legitimize their conduct.

The Ben Gurion Canal Project

Originating in the 1960s, the Ben Gurion Canal Project centered on a plan to cut a deep-water canal from the Mediterranean, from Ashkelon near Gaza, into and across Israel and down to the port of Eilat and access to the Red Sea. This canal would thus bypass the Suez Canal and greatly reduce international shipping’s reliance on it. The plan’s bold vision might well have transformed Israel’s economy, but for some 50 years, it remained dormant, primarily because its unilateral implementation and annexation of Palestinian land would doubtless have inflamed the Arab world, rendered the canal vulnerable to Hamas attacks and sabotage, and probably provoked war again.

Over the past 20 years however, with the inexorable rise of militant ultra-Zionist groups in Israel and their increasing influence on government, serious discussion of the Canal Project has restarted. Some right-wing interests in Israel are now advocating that the route of the canal should go directly through central Gaza. The suspicion is that under the current wartime regime of Netanyahu, with several aggressive ultra-Zionists in his Cabinet, the Gaza campaign provides an ideal opportunity to clear central Gaza of all Palestinians under the guise of military necessity. This may partly explain the IDF’s extensive scorched earth actions in Gaza.

The “whole land” justification and its scope

Both the Ben Gurion Canal project and the annexation of Gaza for Israel’s economic growth are consistent with the Greater Israel concept and its operationalization as it has evolved over a century or more. Numerous papers and articles on the subject of annexation of Palestinian land, Greater Israel and “the whole land” have appeared over the past twenty years, for example: The Guardian (2009), the Rossing Center, Migration Policy (2023), The Week (2024).

Recent independent research (MEPEI 2024) notes that the acknowledged founder of Zionism in the 19th century, Theodor Herzl, recorded in his own diaries that Eretz Yisrael included not only the traditional Jewish areas within Palestine but also the Sinai, Egyptian Palestine, and Cyprus, with the totality stretching from “the brook of Egypt to the Euphrates”.

This view is rooted in a dogmatic belief that around 2000 BC, Abraham declared that God had revealed to him that he had granted him and all his descendants the exclusive right to the “whole land” of Israel, as later loosely defined in various verses of the Book of Genesis in the Bible, the Judaic Torah and other related ancient tracts. Maps of the claimed Greater Israel show it encompassing not only the territories cited above, but also approximately 30% of Egypt, most of Iraq, a large area of Saudi Arabia, the whole of Kuwait (1,300 kilometers from Tel Aviv), Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and parts of southern Turkey.

As noted above, Herzl clearly favored an extended geographical scope for the “whole land,” once a national Jewish homeland had been secured in Palestine. However, in his overtures to and negotiations with European leaders to seek support, such a subsequent “ultimate phase” appears to have gone unmentioned. The proposed homeland was presented as a benign, multi-ethnic, multi-religious polity with equal rights for all and in which none of the rights of the pre-existing Palestinians would be jeopardized.

Herzl’s colleague Chaim Weizmann very effectively championed the Zionist movement, before and after Herzl’s death in 1904. He successfully persuaded Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary during the onset of the British Mandate, to support the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The short Balfour Declaration crucially stated: “It being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” Clearly, a coach-and-horses have been driven through that “understanding” long ago.

The erudite paper by Professor Chaim Gans in 2007 on historical rights to the “Land of Israel” distinguishes between historical rights and sovereignty, rights and “taking account of,” and between the concept and geography of the “whole land.” Others have argued that the “whole land” was always a spiritual concept that was never meant to be interpreted literally in objective, geographical terms.

Gans further notes the self-defining and self-serving nature of ultra-Zionists’ arguments, which are “valid only for those who believe them” and observes that “…they do not make the slightest attempt to provide moral or universally valid arguments, only reinforcing the prejudices of the already persuaded.” He continues that one nation’s extreme quest for self-determination may expunge another’s legitimate quest and may involve a criminal land grab. The jus divinum justification for wholesale repression, land grabs, massacres and expulsions presents as being holy, righteous and praiseworthy. However, many regard it as a primitive expression of assumed a priori ethno-religious superiority and selfish entitlement at the expense of “the others.”

Neo-imperialist motives?

Why is Israel’s Gaza campaign against an enemy that is vastly inferior in all respects (now extended to its Lebanon campaign) so relentless and ruthless over such a long period and over so much foreign territory? Why is their firepower targeted so heavily on the civilian population and civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals, schools, food supplies and utilities? 

The official Israeli justification is military necessity in the face of terror attacks. Yet, far-right Israeli cabinet ministers, such as Bezalel Smotrich, Itamar Ben-Gvir, Avigdor Lieberman and Amihai Eliyahu, have been pushing extreme nationalist Zionist justifications and policies way beyond national defense. On January 3, 2023, Ben-Gvir and Smotrich publicly expressed their desire to expel Palestinians from Gaza. The Times of Israel described the policies and stance of the ultra-Zionist Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Power) party, to which Ben-Gvir and Eliyahu belong, as “neo-fascist.” 

Cabinet Minister Ben-Gvir, leader of the Otzma Yehudit Party, joined other senior far-right politicians from the Religious Zionism Party and the Likud Party at a Preparing to Settle Gaza Conference on October 21, 2024. While there, he restated that the Palestinian population of Gaza should be “encouraged” to leave Gaza forever. Likud MP May Golan opined that “taking territory” and re-establishing Jewish settlements in Gaza would be a lesson that “the Arabs” would never forget. The conference organizer Daniella Weiss advocated an ethnic cleansing of Gaza since the Palestinians had “lost their right to live” there. Weiss’s Nachala organization claimed so far to have already marshaled 700 settler families prepared to move into Gaza once the Palestinians had been removed.

Eliyahu said in an interview on November 5, 2023, that Israel should take back control of Gaza and move in Israeli settlers, a position he has since repeated, and said that the Palestinian population “can go to Ireland or deserts…the monsters in Gaza should find a solution themselves.” Asked if Israel should drop a nuclear bomb on Gaza to flatten it and kill all the inhabitants, he replied, “That is one of the options.” He further stated in January 2024 that the entire Palestinian population of Gaza (not just the Hamas militants) should be subject to painful retribution as a means to break their morale and destroy any thoughts of independence.

Nations threatened by the Greater Israel plan

Few citizens of the nine sovereign nations (excluding Palestine) are aware of the predatory threat of Israeli annexation. These nations include:

Syria

Although a frontline Arab state that fought Israel in the 1948, 1967 and 1973 wars, Syria has tried to avoid any major confrontation with Israel for some years. Since 2011, the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad had been largely preoccupied with a bloody civil war against pro-democracy groups, as well as an Islamic State (ISIS) insurgency from 2013 to 2017. Israel captured two-thirds of the Golan Heights from Syria in the 1967 war and it remains an occupied territory that is a de facto annexation by Israel. Since October 2024, Israel has launched a series of air strikes on Syria and reports surfaced of the IDF creating a fortified buffer zone within the separation corridor between the Israeli and Syrian-held areas of the Golan Heights. 

The sudden overthrow of the Assad regime in early December 2024 by a variety of Syrian opposition forces, led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group, introduces great uncertainty over Syria’s future governance and national security. The interim government has made clear that foreign military forces and their proxies in Syria must leave. 

Russia, Iran and Hezbollah appear to be complying, but the US and Israeli compliance intentions are unclear. Israel has, however, taken the opportunity to pre-emptively destroy much of Syria’s naval fleet and air force assets, and bomb military targets in and around the capital Damascus. IDF forces have also crossed the Golan Heights buffer zone and reached some 25 kilometers from Damascus to create a “sterile defense zone.” How temporary or limited this incursion will be remains to be seen.

The whole of Syria is marked on the Greater Israel map as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Lebanon

In addition to its ongoing Gaza campaign, Israel opened up a new war front in Lebanon in October 2024 against Hezbollah. The military tactics employed by Israel during this invasion of Lebanon, including seemingly indiscriminate bombardment of Beirut and other population centers and short notice mass evacuation orders to hundreds of thousands of civilians, had all the hallmarks of their Gaza campaign. Despite a ceasefire agreed on November 26, 2024, is the Israeli seek-and-destroy self-defense operation against terror groups masking a much bigger long-term objective of depopulating much, if not all, of Lebanon so as to facilitate its annexation into Greater Israel? The whole of Lebanon is also marked on the Greater Israel map as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Cyprus

Since the Republic of Cyprus was formed in 1960, it has had a cordial relationship with Israel. The two countries share common interests in many matters. Israeli tourists and wedding parties are common sights in the southern Greek Cypriot-controlled area where I lived for many years. Greek Cypriot police officers often receive training in Israel. Israeli gamblers frequent the numerous casinos in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

In the past few years, both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas have also enjoyed an influx of investment by mainland Turks, Russians, Lebanese, Iranians, Gulf Arabs and Israelis. In the Turkish Cypriot northern third of the island, Israeli investors have become predominant, especially large property developers and entrepreneurs attracted by the real estate boom. The TRNC has welcomed foreign direct investment with few restrictions and relaxed anti-money laundering controls. However, such investment has caused property price inflation to such an extent that ordinary Turkish Cypriots can no longer afford to buy even a modest home. Such economic distortion has resulted in the TRNC administration effecting legislation in September 2024 to restrict residential property purchases to TRNC and Turkish citizens only and to one per person.

Turkish Cypriots are also concerned that Israeli investors and landowners are becoming so embedded in the TRNC economy that there is a risk that some of them are, or could become, fifth-columnist agents for the Israeli government against Turkish Cypriot interests. Such concern received added piquancy when, in October 2024, President Erdogan of Turkey (TRNC’s political and financial guarantor) issued a stark warning about Israel’s alleged Greater Israel territorial ambitions against Turkey.

Israeli investment in the Greek Cypriot controlled southern Cyprus has seen involvement of fewer large Israeli property developers and entrepreneurs than in the TRNC area. This may reflect the much tighter EU regulation and anti-money laundering controls in the south. Smaller Israeli operators are in evidence in the south, plus a large number of individuals buying a property for their own use (such as a holiday home). Since the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack in Israel, the number of individual Israelis and families buying or long-term renting properties in the south has rocketed, presumably as an “insurance” bolt-hole in case things go badly in Israel. Affluent Lebanese have also flooded the Greek Cypriot property market to escape the Israeli military onslaught.

As in the TRNC area, the rapid influx of large numbers of Israelis in 2024 has distorted the property market in the Greek Cypriot south to the extent that ordinary citizens can no longer afford to buy and traditional tourists from northern Europe can no longer easily find holiday properties to rent. However, unlike the TRNC administration, the Republic government in the south has yet to take any action on this.

Although Herzl included Cyprus as a potential Jewish homeland in his original scope of Greater Israel, he later dropped it in favor of Palestine. However, some ultra-Zionists today still regard Cyprus as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Turkey

Turkey has had good relations with Israel since 1948. However, in recent years, Turkey’s President Erdogan has been increasingly critical of Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and his anti-Israel rhetoric has become increasingly harsh. In early October 2024, Erdogan bluntly warned of Israel’s alleged long-term plan to annex parts of Anatolia into Eretz Yisrael. He also threatened to defend Lebanon militarily should Israel try to annex it. Certainly, any move by Israel to annex or even temporarily occupy north Lebanon or Syria would threaten Turkey’s national security.

It should be noted that Turkey has large and well-equipped armed forces, ranking 8th out of 145 countries in the Global Firepower review, and is the second largest military force in NATO after the US. Erdogan’s anti-Israel rhetoric and accusations have caused much discussion and debate.

Parts of Anatolia in south-eastern Turkey are marked on the Greater Israel map as being part of Eretz Yisrael.

Likely success of Israel’s expansionist plan

In a limited sense, some of the Greater Israel Plan’s objectives have already been achieved. Some territorial gains were made in previous wars, and subsequent imposition of Israeli laws, decrees and policies in the occupied Palestinian territories have dispossessed large numbers of remaining Palestinians. Israel’s military, administrative and armed settler actions against the Palestinian populations of Gaza and the occupied West Bank before and since October 7, 2023, and repeated statements by its government ministers about permanently removing all Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, are consistent with the Plan and Article 7 of the Nation State Law.

There is, however, a need to consider:

1. The apparent existence of a Greater Israel Plan, which in its various elements is being openly promoted by ultra-Zionist Israeli government ministers and extremists.
2. The practical viability of executing the Plan beyond annexation of currently occupied territories, given Israel’s very small population and therefore inability to field long-term occupation personnel in other territories.
3. The current high level of support (risen from 39% in May 2024 to an estimated 45-60%) among the Israeli population for Netanyahu’s ruthless Gaza and Lebanon campaigns and his hard-line rejection of any ceasefire, two-state solution or other peace deal brokered by the international community, but which may collapse if the government fails to produce its promised concrete, permanent safety results for citizens.
4. Netanyahu’s steadfast and dismissive refusal to listen to US and other allies’ entreaties to agree to a two-state solution for Palestine.
5. Israel’s growing international isolation resulting from its intolerable treatment of the Palestinians and a determination even by friendly nations to make Israel accountable to international laws and standards.
6. Uncertainty over whether the US will continue its unswerving and undiluted financial and military support for Israel.
7. The Netanyahu regime increasingly imposing sanctions against “ordinary” Israeli Jews and news media who dare to challenge its apparent proto-genocide campaign in Gaza, or who call for a two-state solution and peace accord with the Palestinians, such as the attacks on Haaretz.

It is clear that the current Israeli regime ideologically supports the Greater Israel Plan, and several Cabinet Ministers are actively promoting its execution as far as the occupied Palestinian territories are concerned. Less clear is how Israel views Lebanon and whether its recent bombardment and invasion was limited to a short-term “search and destroy” mission against Hezbollah, or whether it will be later resurrected by more gung-ho IDF and ultra-Zionist leaders as an opportunity for a partial or total permanent annexation of Lebanon into Eretz Yisrael. Hopefully, cooler heads will prevail.

Israel may be assumed to conduct desktop “war gaming” exercises covering all its known and likely enemies and even others within the 1,300-kilometer reach from Tel Aviv on the Greater Israel map and beyond, but actual military invasion of the vast majority is highly unlikely. Vast numbers of trained military personnel are required for “boots on the ground” invasions and then occupation, often against much resistance, and Israel’s tiny forces make most invasions not viable. Then there is the problem of supply lines, communications and control over great distances, the environment, and the weather. Napoleon learned the hard way, as did Hitler, in their respective invasions of Russia and retreats from Moscow.

Given Donald Trump’s unconditional support for Israel and his rhetoric encouraging their uninhibited military aggression against all enemies, his second US presidency heralds an even less restrained Israel. Territorial expansion à la Greater Israel is now more likely. Even the threat of a regime-change war with Iran (beyond the Greater Israel map), led by Israel as Washington’s “local Rottweilers,” may convert to action.

However, it is not feasible for Israel (or any country with only 3 million combatants) to subdue — much less conquer, annex and control — surrounding territories whose antagonistic populations far exceed 150 million (and that’s excluding Iran’s 90 million). Nor can they rely on superior technology and weaponry to close the “strategic gap.” The US has still failed to grasp the latter weakness despite effectively losing in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan to low-tech peasantry. Even if achieved, subjugation of the region, including regime change in Iran, would not and could not impose a Pax Americana/Pax Judaica on the region. It would simply alter the systemic topography of endless power struggles and conflict.

Finally, beware hubris. Most “grand plan” empires emanating from megalomaniacs and extremist zealots fail because these involve narcissistic delusions of grandeur, supreme power, invincibility, glory, and of righteousness, which do not recognize their own limitations and feet of clay.

[Will Sherriff edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The “Greater Israel” Plan Has a Colossal Reach appeared first on Fair Observer.

Why is this moment significant? The downfall of the brutal dictatorship that has held Syria in an iron grip since 1971 — first under Hafez al-Assad, and later under his son, Bashar al-Assad — is a moment of triumph for millions of Syrians who have suffered under its rule. Over the past decade, more than 13 million Syrians, or roughly 60% of the population, have been displaced by the brutal repression and the civil war that ensued. Of these, 7 million have fled to neighboring countries or further abroad as refugees. With the Assad regime now toppled, these refugees may now dare to dream of returning to their homeland.

This turn of events also signals a strategic defeat for the “axis of resistance” led by Iran. The axis, which includes Hezbollah (a Shiite militant group based in Lebanon), has relied on a land bridge through Iraq and Syria to maintain its influence in the region. With the fall of Assad, this land corridor is severed, isolating Hezbollah from its Iranian backers and cutting off vital supply lines. This is a significant blow to Iranian and Hezbollah ambitions in the region.

Russia, too, finds itself on the losing side. Despite its military intervention in support of Bashar al-Assad in 2015, Russia has been unable to protect its ally. The fall of Assad puts Russia’s strategic interests at risk, including its naval bases on the Mediterranean coast of Syria, which have served as key outposts for Russian influence in the region.

In contrast, Turkey stands to emerge as the new central player in the region. Turkey has long opposed Assad and has supported various factions in the Syrian conflict, particularly in northern Syria. With the Assad regime weakened, Turkey’s role in shaping Syria’s future becomes all the more crucial. Israel, too, stands to gain from the fall of Assad, as it weakens two of its most formidable regional enemies — Syria and Hezbollah — while simultaneously diminishing Iran’s influence in the region.

Who are these people?

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a movement that emerged from the remnants of al-Qaeda in Syria. It controls the northwestern region of Syria, along the Turkish border. Over the past few years, with significant assistance from Turkey and Western countries, HTS has made efforts to rebrand itself, trying to present a more palatable face to the international community. Despite these efforts, many Syrians, especially the country’s Christian minority (which makes up around 5-10% of the population), are deeply apprehensive about the possibility of HTS establishing a vengeful Islamist regime. These groups fear that under HTS’s control, they would be subjected to harsh treatment and persecution, given the group’s hardline interpretation of Islam.

However, HTS does not control all of Syria. There are at least three other major militias that hold significant territory. The Kurds of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), particularly the YPG (People’s Defense Units), are one of the most prominent. The YPG is closely linked to the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a Kurdish militant group that has been involved in an ongoing insurgency against Turkey. The United States has supported the YPG and its allies in the fight against ISIS, and the group controls northeastern Syria, including areas rich in oil resources.

Meanwhile, ISIS (Islamic State) continues to have a presence in central and eastern Syria, particularly in tribal areas. Despite being defeated as a territorial entity, ISIS remains active as a guerilla force, capable of launching insurgent attacks and destabilizing the region. This ongoing conflict between various militias complicates the situation in Syria, as different factions, often backed by external powers, vie for control of the country’s future.

To be continued…

The future of Syria remains uncertain: will it progress toward an orderly transition, or will it descend further into civil war? One of the key players in this evolving situation is Turkey, which has set its sights on creating a 30-kilometer buffer zone along its border with Syria. This zone would be cleared of Kurdish militias, particularly the YPG, which Turkey views as an extension of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), a group it considers a terrorist organization. Turkey’s objective of establishing this buffer zone is difficult to imagine being realized without significant military action and possible conflict with the Kurdish forces.

The role of the United States in the future of Syria is also a pressing question, especially with the potential return of Donald Trump to the presidency. During his first term, Trump advocated for the withdrawal of the small contingent of U.S. troops stationed in Syria alongside Kurdish forces, a position he reiterated recently. If Trump follows through on his desire for disengagement, the U.S. might reduce its involvement, which could shift the balance of power in Syria, leaving Kurdish groups more vulnerable to Turkish aggression and potentially influencing the broader regional dynamics.

Israel’s role in Syria is also evolving, with its military forces advancing into key areas of the country. Israeli forces have deployed to the east and north of the Golan Heights, a strategically important region, particularly around Mount Hermon, which is often referred to as the “water tower” of the region due to its significance in controlling water resources. Israeli forces are now positioned just about 20 kilometers from Damascus, Syria’s capital, raising the stakes and complicating the security situation in the area. Israel’s continued military presence in Syria suggests that it has strategic objectives in play, particularly concerning Iranian influence in the region and the threat posed by Hezbollah and other hostile groups.

Syria’s roadmap for a peaceful transition, which was agreed upon by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Syria’s neighboring states, dates back to June 30, 2012. At the time, the international community seemed committed to finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict, with Didier Burkhalter, the Swiss Foreign Minister at the time, playing a key role in the conference. Yet, over a decade later, this plan seems increasingly distant, as the situation in Syria has devolved into an ongoing war with no clear path toward peace.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Uncertain Transition in Syria After the Surprise End of Assad appeared first on Fair Observer.

People are wondering today what role the United States has played in the events in the region since 2011. A leaked State Department document from December 2012 signed by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton throws some light on that role with regard to Syria.

Wondering how ChatGPT might help to put these facts into a new historical perspective, I proposed the following prompt:

“Wikileaks published a State Department memo signed by Hillary Clinton and dated December 31, 2012. It was officially declassified in November 2015. In it, the Obama administration clearly defined the policy it intended to implement with regard to Syria. One statement in that email might seem surprising today is this:

‘But other than the laudable purpose of saving Libyan civilians from likely attacks by Qadaffi’s regime, the Libyan operation had no long-lasting consequences for the region.’

Given that a lot of things have happened in Libya since then, how accurate is this denial of long-lasting consequences?”

“The assertion from the Obama administration that the 2011 intervention in Libya ‘had no long-lasting consequences for the region’ appears deeply inaccurate when viewed in retrospect. The situation in Libya and its broader impact on the region has had profound and far-reaching consequences, many of which continue to unfold. Here’s an overview of the long-lasting effects:

1. Libya’s Fragmentation and Persistent Instability

• After the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya descended into political and social chaos. The country fractured into a patchwork of competing militias, tribal factions, and rival governments.
• By 2014, the conflict escalated into a full-scale civil war, pitting the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli against forces loyal to General Khalifa Haftar in the east (Libyan National Army – LNA).
• The collapse of state authority left a power vacuum that remains largely unfilled to this day, leading to a prolonged state of instability.

2. Militancy, Terrorism, and Proliferation of Armed Groups

• The fall of Gaddafi led to the unchecked spread of weapons across Libya and neighboring regions. Libya became an arms hub, supplying weapons to insurgents, militias, and terrorists throughout North Africa and the Sahel.
• Extremist groups, including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS, exploited Libya’s chaos to gain a foothold. In 2015, ISIS even established a stronghold in the city of Sirte.
• This has turned Libya into a base for jihadist networks and a staging ground for terrorist operations across the region.

3. Regional Spillover Effects: The Sahel and Beyond

• One of the most significant consequences of Libya’s collapse was the destabilization of Mali and the broader Sahel region.
• After Gaddafi’s fall, Tuareg fighters who had served in his army returned to northern Mali with weapons, leading to the 2012 Tuareg rebellion. This rebellion was quickly overtaken by Islamist militants, plunging Mali into crisis.
• This instability has spread throughout the Sahel, with countries like Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad struggling to contain growing insurgencies fueled by weapons and fighters spilling out of Libya.

4. The Refugee and Migrant Crisis

• Libya became a major transit hub for refugees and migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. The absence of effective state authority has allowed human trafficking networks to thrive.
• This contributed significantly to the European migrant crisis in 2015, straining EU resources and fueling political tensions across the continent.

5. Geopolitical Competition in Libya

• Libya has become a theater for proxy wars involving foreign powers. Countries such as Turkey, Russia, the UAE, Egypt, and others have backed rival factions, turning the conflict into an internationalized proxy struggle.
• Russia’s increasing involvement in Libya (through the Wagner Group) has added a new dimension to geopolitical competition in North Africa.

6. Economic Collapse and Humanitarian Crisis

• Libya’s oil-dependent economy, once a source of prosperity, has been devastated by the conflict. Oil production has been repeatedly disrupted by battles between factions.
• The humanitarian situation remains dire, with millions of Libyans affected by conflict, food insecurity, and lack of healthcare.

Conclusion: Far-Reaching and Ongoing Consequences

The Obama administration’s statement in 2012—claiming no long-lasting regional consequences—significantly underestimated the fallout of the Libyan intervention. The collapse of the Libyan state triggered a chain reaction that destabilized the Sahel, contributed to the rise of terrorism, fueled migration crises, and intensified geopolitical competition. Today, Libya remains a symbol of the unintended consequences of foreign interventions, with its instability continuing to impact regional and global dynamics.”

I continued the conversation with the following prompt.

“The Clinton email contains the following recommendations: ‘Washington should start by expressing its willingness to work with regional allies like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to organize, train and arm Syrian rebel forces. The announcement of such a decision would, by itself, likely cause substantial defections from the Syrian military. Then, using territory in Turkey and possibly Jordan, U.S. diplomats and Pentagon officials can start strengthening the opposition. It will take time. But the rebellion is going to go on for a long time, with or without U.S. involvement. The second step is to develop international support for a coalition air operation. Russia will never support such a mission, so there is no point operating through the UN Security Council. Some argue that U.S. involvement risks a wider war with Russia. But the Kosovo example shows otherwise.’

‘Arming the Syrian rebels and using western air power to ground Syrian helicopters and airplanes is a low-cost high payoff approach.’

Does this accurately represent the role the US has played over the past 13 years?”

Below is a short version of ChatGPT’s response, including only the initial assessment and conclusion.

“The recommendations outlined in the Clinton email—organizing, arming, and supporting Syrian rebels, combined with a potential coalition air operation—reflect ideas that did, to some extent, align with U.S. policy in the Syrian conflict. However, the email oversimplifies the complexities of U.S. involvement and the consequences that unfolded. Over the past 13 years, the U.S. role in Syria has been shaped by a series of strategic choices, hesitations, and unintended consequences. Here’s a more accurate analysis of U.S. involvement in Syria since 2011:

Conclusion: Partial Alignment, but Limited Success

The email’s recommendations—arming rebels, organizing opposition forces, and using air power—align with aspects of U.S. policy, but the outcomes were far more complex and problematic:

• The U.S. did arm and train rebels, but with limited success due to fragmentation and extremist infiltration.
• The U.S. focused on ISIS rather than Assad, abandoning broader regime-change goals as the war progressed.
• A no-fly zone or air operation against the Syrian regime never materialized, largely due to fears of direct conflict with Russia.
• The conflict evolved into a geopolitical quagmire involving Russia, Iran, Turkey, and others, limiting U.S. influence.

In hindsight, the claim that this approach would be ‘low-cost and high-payoff’ was overly optimistic. The Syrian conflict became a prolonged and devastating war with significant human, political, and geopolitical consequences—many of which remain unresolved to this day.”

I must add one final observation concerning ChatGPT’s curious claim that “the email oversimplifies the complexities of U.S. involvement and the consequences that unfolded.” ChatGPT clearly lives in the eternal present. Unlike most of us, it confuses the future and past. What can it possibly mean to say that an email from 2012 “oversimplifies” events that took over the following 13 years? You can only oversimplify a complexity that already exists, not a future one.

This exchange underlines a more fundamental problem of oversimplification: the kind of strategic decision-making that has occurred regularly in the formulation of US foreign policy. ChatGTP points to this when it notes that the email “underestimated the fallout of the Libyan intervention.”

This formulation is itself an understatement. The email foresaw “no long-lasting consequences.” “No” means zero. ChatGPT lists 15 grouped under six headings. There’s quite a gap between 0 and 15. But isn’t that part of a pattern that has been repeated in Iran in 1953; Vietnam in 1964, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, to mention only those from prominent cases?

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

*[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At Fair Observer, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Outside the Box: ChatGPT Gets Lost in Time in Syria appeared first on Fair Observer.

In the early hours of October 17, news started to filter in that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had been killed by a small group of IDF soldiers in Tal as-Sultan, Rafah. Hunted by a drone, Sinwar displayed courage until his last moments.In the early hours of October 17, news started to filter in that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had been killed by a small group of IDF soldiers in Tal as-Sultan, Rafah. Hunted by a drone, Sinwar displayed courage until his last moments.

For many, Sinwar will be remembered as just another assassinated terrorist. His entire life’s work and the complexities of his humanity will collapse into a neat box, easily dismissed. But there is something about Sinwar that speaks to the undying battle for liberation. Despite being the leader of Hamas, Sinwar fought alongside the same men he was appointed to lead. He possessed qualities that one of the authors recently noticed in the documentary Dope is Death, a remarkable story about tenacious resistance in the face of insurmountable odds. Echoing the legacy of resistance groups like the Black Panther Party and the Young Lords, Sinwar stands as a symbol of hope and reminds us of the power of community-born resistance.

Resistance in the time of the Young Lords and Black Panthers

In Dope is Death, the Black Panthers and Young Lords join together to establish holistic support for addicts during the heroin epidemic in New York City. One moment in particular struck us in how it captured what resistance could actually feel like going up against insurmountable odds — and how that feeling persists throughout time and space. It was the recounting of the historic events of July 14, 1970 at Lincoln Hospital in the South Bronx. 

After hospital administration refused to address mounting complaints about poor care conditions, members of the community decided to take matters into their own hands. The New York chapter of the Young Lords stormed the hospital and seized control of the facility while ensuring there were no disruptions to medical treatment for patients. Using the hospital occupation and the attention it garnered as leverage, the Young Lords and members of the Black Panther Party were able to negotiate resolutions to the people’s demands, including the creation of a detox center within the hospital. 

The opening of Lincoln Detox laid the groundwork for a community-led effort to get to the root of addiction. The center was no longer just a detox center — it evolved into a conscious effort to invest in one another. Those coming in to deal with their afflictions were treated by members of their own community, receiving care that went beyond just treating symptoms. The center and the resources it provided became the seeds that were planted to imagine a different life. This was a truly visionary project, well ahead of its time, and it demonstrated to people in black and brown communities the possibilities of what their neighborhoods could look like. 

The Black Panthers’ early successes can be seen in the initiatives they enacted locally. Their revolutionary roots were deeply ingrained in the neighborhoods that molded their minds. As a result, the group’s message and mission were a source of empowerment and security for the people, providing for their necessities and giving them the tools to engineer their own liberation. 

Although the Black Panther Party disbanded in 1982, this didn’t dissolve their impressive influence on future visionaries who can quote Stokely Carmichael, Angela Davis and Fred Hampton at will. Their impact has endured through the years despite attempts by the US government to stifle the movement. Their vision and actions were built upon their communities, becoming an eternal reminder of where true power lies. Decades later, the legacy of strength in community and undying commitment to a cause has once again been evoked through Sinwar’s death for the Palestinian resistance movement. 

The Palestinian fight for freedom

For many Palestinians, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, incursion into Israel wasn’t a random act of aggression. It was a response to an ever-escalating threat to their collective future in Gaza. They ask: Who can justify trapping two million people in an open-air concentration camp without any resistance? 

The world isn’t just watching the extermination of Palestinians. The world bears witness to the desecration of the land they so cherish and the cruelty of illegal settlers tearing them away from their ancestral homes. Their lives have been toyed with and trivialized at the hands of soldiers who do not hesitate to shoot, be it a Palestinian man, woman or child.

In the darkest hour, no country sent its military to aid the two million Palestinians who have been repeatedly victimized by a genocidal regime every day since October 2023. The only group standing up for the Palestinian people and facing the enemy is Hamas. The men who choose to fight have had their entire lives shaped by this unconscionable occupation. 

Sinwar’s novel The Thorn and the Carnation echoes the sentiments of many resistance fighters. He wrote, “A minute of living with dignity and pride is better than a thousand years of a miserable life under the boots of the occupation.” When much of the world was against Palestinians and did everything to normalize their displacement, the people’s will to resist stood as a constant reminder that Palestinians would not go gently into the night.  

The nature of resistance

Many Palestinians do not see their resistance as terrorism. In its early days, Hamas provided varied social services to Palestinians in Gaza, building medical centers, food banks and schools. The group took on the role of a community organizer that advocates for its people’s needs. Similar to the services the Black Panthers and the Young Lords provided in their own communities, Hamas works to establish protection and security for its people. 

The parallels between these groups are most evident in the communities that sparked their ascent to power. When facing systemic and exploitative oppression, fighting back is the only option for survival. For Palestinians, Hamas represents the only entity standing between them and total annihilation. So when Sinwar’s death was announced, the motivations behind divergent narratives coming from US media and social media were as clear as day.

News outlets and media agencies rushed to announce that the terrorist leader of Hamas and conspirator of the October 7 attacks was killed by the heroic IDF. Meanwhile, social media communities paid tribute to what his life’s work meant for the Palestinian people, and how the future of the resistance would be shaped by his legacy. Whether it be the Black Panthers and Young Lords or Hamas, every resistance movement essentially boils down to the one incontrovertible truth that the real power lies with the people.

Israel publishing the drone footage of Sinwar’s last moments further cemented his status as a fierce fighter who refused to back down. He was fearless even as he was faced with advanced IDF weaponry. A quiet but strong display of heroism, his death conveys a raw truth that transcends any attempted manipulation of who the man was and what his legacy will be. 

Years from now, people will learn about the Palestinian resistance and remember it for its tenacity in standing up to an unrelenting oppressor. Yahya Sinwar’s legacy is not just one of personal martyrdom, but a tribute to every Palestinian who dreams of freedom and will hold fast to a collective vision to the very end.

[Emma Johnson edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post A Tribute to the Life and Death of Yahya Sinwar appeared first on Fair Observer.

With the toppled President Bashar al-Assad’s departure to Moscow, Russia, the entire Assad family’s 54-year hold on Syria has reached its end. Now many in the country and the international community ask which one is the real al-Jolani.

In a recent interview, al-Jolani, the face of the Syrian rebels, insisted that his evolution was natural. “A person in their twenties will have a different personality than someone in their thirties or forties, and certainly someone in their fifties. This is human nature,” al-Jolani said.

The real al-Jolani will likely emerge in the way he approaches the formation of a post-Assad transition government, as well as the rights, security and safety of minorities. These include the Shiite Muslim Alawites from which the Assads hail and who long supported their brutal rule.

Moreover, even those who question the sincerity of his conversion suggest that al-Jolani may be the one rebel commander who can hold Syria together. “There is no local military power to stand (up to) or compete with Jolani,” an associate of the rebel leader said when he still publicly identified himself as a jihadist. The former associate warned that if al-Jolani fails, Syria, like Libya, will become a state torn apart by rival armed militias.

Al-Jolani “hasn’t changed at all, but there’s a difference between being in battle, at war, killing, and running a country,” the former associate said. He suggested the rebel leader’s more moderate and conciliatory posture stemmed from a recognition that the Islamic State’s sectarian bloodlust was a mistake. He also stated that al-Jolani “now considers himself a statesman,” and claimed the rebel leader may follow suggestions that he turn the group into a political party by transferring its military wing to a reconstituted Syrian military.

Meanwhile, the HTS paramilitary group moved quickly to safeguard public buildings in Damascus and manage the presence of heavily armed factions in the capital. “We will soon ban gatherings of armed people,” said Amer al-Sheikh, a HTS security official.

Al-Jolani needs to earn international trust

On December 10, 2024, the rebels appointed Mohammed al-Bashir as caretaker prime minister for four months. It was not immediately clear what the next step would be.

Al-Bashir ran the rebel-led Salvation Government in their stronghold in Syria’s northern Idlib region. Since HTS launched its offensive, he has assisted captured cities, including Aleppo, Hama and Homs, in installing post-Assad governance structures.

Beyond ensuring domestic security and stability, al-Jolani will need to secure international support for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of traumatised and war-ravaged Syria. To do so, al-Jolani and HTS will have to convince Syrian minorities, segments of Syria’s majority Sunni Muslims and the international community that they have genuinely changed their colors and are not wolves in sheep’s clothing.

A questionable human rights record that has persisted long after they disavowed jihadism compounds HTS and al-Jolani’s reputational problems. As recently as August 2024, the United Nations accused the group of resorting to extrajudicial killings, torture and the recruitment of child soldiers.

“HTS detained men, women, and children as young as seven. They included civilians detained for criticising HTS and participating in demonstrations,” the UN Human Rights Council said in a report. “These acts may amount to war crimes.”

Even so, this week, UN Special Envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen acknowledged that HTS has sought to address concerns in recent days.

“The realities so far is that the HTS and also the other armed groups have been sending good messages to the Syrian people,” Pedersen said. “They have been sending messages of unity, of inclusiveness… We have also seen… reassuring things on the ground.”

Pedersen was referring to rebel assurances given to minorities, a pledge not to impose restrictions on women’s clothing, amnesty for conscripted personnel of Assad’s military, the rebels reaching out to Assad government officials and efforts to safeguard government institutions.

United States officials echoed Pedersen despite the US designation of HTS as a terrorist organization.

Incidents in Damascus and Hama

Against the backdrop of his track record in recent years in administering the Idlib region, the last rebel-held stronghold in Syria when the civil war’s battle lines were frozen in 2020, al-Jolani has sought to project an image of tolerance, reconciliation and ability to deliver public goods and services.

Al-Jolani turned Idlib, historically the country’s poorest province, into its fastest-growing region, despite his autocratic rule and frequent Syrian and Russian air attacks. To his credit, there were no major reports of attacks on Christians, Alawites and other minorities or acts of revenge against representatives of the Assad regime, including the military. Further, there was no mass looting as HTS fighters took over cities and towns, including Damascus.

That is not to say that everything unfolded incident-free. One Damascus resident reported that unidentified armed men had knocked on the door of an acquaintance and asked about his religion. A neighbor returned home to find his door broken down and his apartment looted. Similarly, a nearby government building was looted despite instructions from rebel leaders against violating public property. The rebels imposed an overnight curfew in Damascus to maintain law and order.

Earlier, a man in Hama told prisoners sitting on the ground with their hands tied behind them in a video on social media, “We will heal the hearts of the believers by cutting off your heads, you swine.”

HTS’s statement on Syrian chemical weapons

Meanwhile, with Israel bombing Syrian arsenals of strategic weapons, including suspected chemical weapons sites, HTS missed an opportunity to unequivocally garner trust. In a statement, the group said it will safeguard the country’s remaining chemical weapons stockpiles and ensure they aren’t used against citizens. This is a stark contrast to the Assad regime, which used chemical weapons on several occasions against Syrian civilians.

In the wake of Assad’s fall, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the UN chemical weapons watchdog, said it had contacted unidentified Syrian authorities “with a view to emphasising the paramount importance of ensuring the safety and security of all chemical weapons-related materials and facilities.”

HTS responded, saying, “We clearly state that we have no intention or desire to use chemical weapons or any weapons of mass destruction under any circumstances. We will not allow the use of any weapon, whatever it may be, against civilians or [allow them to] become a tool for revenge or destruction. We consider the use of such weapons a crime against humanity.”

The group would have done itself a favor by offering to destroy under international supervision what chemical weapons stockpiles fall into its hands and/or ask OPCW to assist in searching for such weapons.

[The Turbulent World first published this piece.]

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Will the Real al-Jolani Stand Up? appeared first on Fair Observer.

“I was angry. I told him it had to stop, or our entire future relationship was endangered. I used the word holocaust deliberately & said the symbol of his war was becoming a picture of a 7-month-old baby with its arms blown off,” Reagan noted in his diary.

The August 1982 phone call between Reagan and Begin provides a template for the US’s ability to twist Israel’s arm and the limits of the Western giant’s influence.

Begin wasted no time in halting his saturation bombing of the Lebanese capital in response to Reagan’s threat. Yet, he rejected the president’s demand that he allow an international force to enter Beirut to protect the hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees in the Israeli-besieged city. His refusal had dire consequences.

A month later, at least 800 Palestinians, many of them women and children, were massacred in their homes in Sabra and Shatila in West Beirut by Lebanese Christian gunmen under the watchful eyes of the Israeli military. Public outrage in Israel forced Begin to resign, ending his career.

Biden failed where Reagan succeeded

More than four decades later, US President Joe Biden understood the stakes when Israel went to war in response to Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack on Israel. He also knew the levers of power at his disposal after test-driving Reagan’s approach in 2021.

At the time, Biden, like his predecessor, picked up the phone to read Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the riot act. As a new book on Biden, The Last Politician, describes, it was his fourth phone call to the Israeli leader in ten days in which behind-the-scenes diplomacy and cajoling failed to end fighting between Israel and Hamas. The president advised him that he “expected a significant de-escalation today on the path to a ceasefire.” When Netanyahu sought to buy time, Biden replied: “Hey man, we’re out of runway here. It’s over.”

Netanyahu and Hamas agreed to a ceasefire a day later. Even so, he knew then and now that he had less to worry about than Begin did with the Reagan presidency.

In contrast to Reagan’s administration, which allowed the United Nations Security Council to pass 21 resolutions criticizing, if not condemning, Israel’s policies, Biden gave Israel blanket diplomatic cover and provided it with arms. With these, it could prosecute wars that make 1982 pale in comparison.

Biden’s test-driving of Reagan’s template, familiarity with the Israeli interventions in Lebanon and annexationist policies in the 1980s and beyond, coupled with his predecessor’s willingness to confront Begin in the 1982 war leave the president with little excuse for refusing to rein Israel in over the past year.

Biden’s failure has tangibly devastating consequences for the Palestinians and yet to materialize fallouts for Israelis and the rest of the Middle East. These will haunt the region for a generation, if not more.

Like Begin, Biden will likely see his legacy sullied by Israeli conduct on the Middle East’s battlefields.

Historic destruction may only increase

A heated encounter with Begin during the 1982 war, which involved finger jabbing and fists pounding on a table, spotlights Biden’s lack of an excuse. Echoing Reagan, Biden warned Begin that Israeli settlement policy could cost it US support. In response, Begin snapped, “I am not a Jew with trembling knees.”

Forty-two years later, Biden studiously ignores the fact that Israel’s latest Gaza and Lebanon wars are a repeat of the early 1980s on steroids.

Begin created the template for Israel’s systematic targeting of militants irrespective of the risk to civilians with the 1981 bombing of Fakhani. This densely populated Beirut neighborhood was home to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its affiliates. The bombing destroyed a seven-story building and damaged four nearby structures, killing some 90 people and wounding hundreds of others.

In a letter to Reagan, written during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Begin compared the carpet bombing of Beirut to the Allied destruction of Berlin during World War II.

“I feel as a prime minister empowered to instruct a valiant army facing ‘Berlin’ where, amongst innocent civilians, Hitler and his henchmen hide in a bunker deep beneath the surface,” Begin said.

Begin’s equation of PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and his organization with Adolf Hitler and his associates, like Netanyahu equating Hamas with the Nazis, served to justify civilian casualties in operations that were as much about targeting fighters as they were designed to incite the local population against the militants.

“In certain cases, the Israeli shelling and bombing were carefully targeted, sometimes on the basis of good intelligence. All too often, however, that was not the case. Scores of eight-to twelve-story apartment buildings were destroyed… Many of the buildings that were levelled…had no plausible military utility,” recalled historian Rashid Khalidi, who lived in Beirut at the time of the 1982 bombings.

The strategy produced mixed results but, on balance, hardened rather than weakened popular resistance to Israeli policies.

There is little reason to believe that the impact of Israel’s current wars will be any different. Israel has already prepared the ground by turning Gaza into what onetime Australian human rights commissioner and United Nations rapporteur Chris Sidoti calls a “terrorism creation factory.”

[The Turbulent World first published this piece.]

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Israel’s Wars Repeat the 1980s on Steroids appeared first on Fair Observer.

The obvious answer is the media. But few people in the United States trust the media these days. Surely, in a democracy “of the people, by the people and for the people,” there will be a few scoundrels who make their way into government, but we can assume that the majority merits our confidence. Well, according to a Pew survey titled, “Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024,” the current level of trust has fallen to 22%.

December 2024 offers us a vision of exacerbated tensions in various parts of the globe. At such moments, we expect our leaders to speak with some degree of honesty. Especially when the stakes are high and decisions become a matter of life or death. We accept that some things must remain secret. But the democratic principle implies an effort on the part of our governments to offer a minimum of clarity concerning the facts and their intentions.

Alas, the duty of obscurity seems to have replaced the ideal of clarity as the norm. Clever government officials have good reasons to justify their brazen stonewalling. First, national security requires concealing one’s true intentions. After all, if revealed, the enemy will profit. Then there is the fact that in any situation of conflict, we should accept the reality of the “fog of war,” a concept erroneously but persistently attributed to Prussian general and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz by commentators, some of whose brains may be subjected to a permanent fog.

What are US presidents for if not guiding the nation towards an understanding of the truth? In August 2023, US President Joe Biden informed us that “Putin has already lost the war” in Ukraine. An obvious fact. The truth teller now describes the recent history of US policy towards Syria. “Over the past four years, my administration pursued a clear and principled policy toward Syria. First, we made clear from the start sanctions on Assad would remain in place unless he engaged seriously in a political process to end the civil war.”

Today’s Fair Observer Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Principled policy:

A course of action relentlessly pursued thanks to the capacity of some people in a position of authority to persistently ignore surrounding reality.

Contextual note

Biden uses two epithets, “clear” and “principled,” to describe his policy. The word “clear” is certainly the most overused word by any spokesperson for the White House or State Department. At briefing sessions with personalities such as the White House’s Karine Jean-Pierre and the State Department’s Matthew Miller, whenever a journalist poses embarrassing questions that highlight potential ambiguity or equivocation with regard to the “noble” principles that guide US actions, they respond with the formula, “We have been very clear about…” In one random example, the press briefing session of March 27, 2024, Max Miller crafted this litany of explanations:

• So we have been very clear about this matter.
• So we have made that quite clear to them.
• So I will say that we have a fundamental disagreement with the Israeli Government over this issue, and we have made that quite clear.
• … we will continue to be clear about what we think about these actions.
• …we have made clear that we believe that allegations of genocide are unfounded.
• …we have made clear that the United States is not going to send any troops to Ukraine.
• And I think it’s clear that these claims are categorically false. (this was a response to the claim that the US created ISIS.)
• …and we’ll make the same thing clear privately.
• …we have made clear since the outset of this administration that the promotion of democracy is one of the top priorities for the President.
• So we continue to make clear in our conversations with the Government of Bangladesh… that we wanted to see free and fair elections and we will continue to support free, full, open democracy in Bangladesh.
• So we have been very clear about this matter. We’ve been unequivocal. (This concerned the fact that “Ben-Gvir’s coalition would be annexing additional land in the Jordan Valley.”)
• So we have made that quite clear to them. We’ve been very direct and candid about it in our conversations with them. (On the same topic of land seizures.)

This obsessively repeated verbal tic brings home the point that “being clear” means quite simply: “Whatever we say must be accepted as truth.” As for the “principled policy” Biden cited, his logic consists of announcing a simple principle — that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad must be removed from office — and never deviating from it. Even if circumstances change, and even if hundreds of thousands of people may die or be displaced as a result of clinging to that principle.

Biden has already vowed to support the new Syrian government. Some may find this a bit strange. At this point, nobody has even a vague idea about what the new government will look like. On principle, can the US support it? What if it turns out to be a Wahhabi terrorist government, fulfilling its leader’s initial allegiance? Moreover, Syrian Head of State Abu Mohammed al-Joulani still has a $10 million bounty on his head because the US branded him a terrorist. Does Joulani’s success in overthrowing a dictator, Assad, automatically mean that democracy is on its way? Biden might profitably consult the the poem, “The Great Day” by the Irish poet, William Butler Yeats::

“Hurrah for revolution and more cannon-shot!
A beggar upon horseback lashes a beggar on foot.
Hurrah for revolution and cannon come again!
The beggars have changed places, but the lash goes on.”

Substitute “regime change” for “revolution” and Yeats has defined the principle that defines at least 50% of US foreign policy. In the meantime, Biden and his good friend, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are providing “more cannon-shot.” Within a day of the announced liberation of Syria, the US and Israel conducted multiple bombing raids on the military infrastructure and other threatening elements within a country that is rife with threatening elements. Can anyone seriously doubt that the lash will go on?

Anyone struggling with the question of which “clear principles” to apply to a dramatic situation in which multiple interests both converge and diverge would do well to follow Caitlin Johnstone’s advice. “I personally don’t blame people for misunderstanding what’s been happening in Syria all these years. Some of my favorite analysts got Syria wrong in the early years of the war. It’s a complicated issue. It’s hard to sort out the true from the false, and it’s hard to sort through the moral complexities and contradictions of it all as a human being. What matters is that you stay curious and open and sincerely dedicated to learning what’s true instead of bedding down and making an identity out of your current understanding.”

Johnstone’s wisdom tallies with the advice our fictional journalist and his AI assistant are intent on following in the video above.

Historical note

As US President Barack Obama’s vice president and then as president, Joe Biden has been associated with the framing and enforcing of the principles he claims to be at the core of US policy with regard to Syria.

But what are those principles? In 2015, The Guardian revealed that the most obvious one has been to ignore any initiative aiming at peace and mutual security, especially if the initiative comes from Russia.

The Guardian was clear. “Russia proposed more than three years ago that Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, could step down as part of a peace deal, according to a senior negotiator involved in back-channel discussions at the time. Former Finnish president and Nobel peace prize laureate Martti Ahtisaari said western powers failed to seize on the proposal. Since it was made, in 2012, tens of thousands of people have been killed and millions uprooted, causing the world’s gravest refugee crisis since the second world war.”

Biden’s principles are clear. He once again demonstrated that clarity in December 2021 when he refused to consider security arrangements Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed that could have avoided an invasion and a prolonged war in Ukraine, in which an estimated one million people have died. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson applied the same principle when he instructed the Ukrainians not to sign a peace treaty in April 2022.

During a 2015 television interview, Former French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas recounted how his British friends told him they were planning to overthrow Assad because the “Syrian regime said things that were anti-Israeli.” Another case of applying a principle, this time by British allies of the US.

These cases illustrate what has become clear as far as principles are concerned. Negotiation and diplomacy can never replace kinetic action, whatever the eventual cost. The principle of regime change for Syria has already been in place for 12 years. It has finally succeeded. Just as it had in Iraq and Libya and even in Afghanistan in 2001.

One may legitimately ask, is it more about principle or about interest?

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of Fair Observer Devil’s Dictionary.]

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post For the US in Syria, Is It About Principle or Interest? appeared first on Fair Observer.

“Soldiers,” the general insisted, “we must emerge from this fight not only victorious but also beyond reproach. It must be said of you: They fought valiantly when necessary, but they showed themselves everywhere to be humane and generous.” He then detailed the categories of people to be protected: women, children, the elderly, members of the clergy and, even less obviously according to the customs of the time, prisoners and the wounded, who “deserve your consideration and compassion all the more since you often found yourselves with them in the same camps.”

Here, in embryo, we have the international humanitarian law that, following World War II, would be enshrined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional protocols of 1977. This is what is called jus in bello, literally, law in war. Belligerents have the obligation to protect civilians and combatants who are wounded or taken prisoner. These obligations are legally binding on all states and on all armed groups, both state and non-state. For example, the use of force is prohibited if the number of civilian victims is disproportionate to the military objective sought.

Jus in bello and jus ad bellum

The right to war (jus ad bellum), or the right of a state to resort to armed force, is governed by the United Nations Charter. It authorizes the use of force only in two cases: self-defense and express authorization by the United Nations Security Council. The right of a non-state actor such as Hamas to armed resistance is only mentioned in resolutions of the General Assembly, which do not have the same legal value as those decided by the Security Council.

Until the early 1990s, the international system lacked a mechanism to punish violations of the rules governing the use of force. Following the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian Muslims and others in Yugoslavia in and the genocide of the Tutsi by the Hutus in Rwanda, the international community laid the groundwork for an international criminal justice system by establishing the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (1993) and for Rwanda (1994).

The advent of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 2002 established a general mechanism for repressing violations of international humanitarian law. The ICC statute defines four categories of crimes: war crimes, crimes against humanity, the crime of genocide and the crime of aggression. War crimes are serious violations of the Geneva Conventions. Crimes against humanity are essentially the same, but carried out systematically against the civilian population. The crime of genocide is defined as acts of murder and other acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part a population group. The crime of aggression consists in acts of war carried out by a state without the legal right to do so.

How does this apply to Israel?

A consensus exists within the international community to recognize Israel’s right to defend itself after the deadly attack on its soil by Hamas and other Palestinian groups on October 7, 2023. But Israel is required to respect the jus in bello in the conduct of hostilities. Both sides are accused of crimes punishable by the ICC.

The high number of civilian casualties would indicate that Israel is not seeking to protect civilians or that it is deliberately targeting them. According to the UN, 70% of the approximately 44,000 people who have died in Gaza since October 7, 2023, are women and children. Israel defends itself by saying that it warns the population before strikes and that military objectives justify attacks on civilian facilities because Hamas operates from inside them.

Israel has also been accused of blocking or limiting humanitarian aid to Gaza, which has an impact on the food and health situation of Gazans, and of mistreating prisoners. According to the UN, 53 Palestinian detainees died in prison between October 7, 2023 and July 15, 2024. There are also documented cases of sexual violence.

Accusations against Hamas and other Palestinian factions focus primarily on the October 7 massacres in neighboring Gaza kibbutzim that killed 1,205 Israelis. According to Israeli social security, there were 695 civilians among the victims, including 36 children. In addition, 251 people were kidnapped, though the proportion of civilian to military hostages has not been determined. There are said to be less than a hundred alive today. Palestinian militias have also been accused of sexual violence, including rape, as well as using the civilian population as human shields.

Accusations of genocide are flying in both directions. Hamas is accused of wanting to eliminate any Jewish presence between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River. The 1988 founding charter of the Islamist movement cites a verse from the Koran calling for the murder of Jews. A 2017 document issued by Hamas is much more moderate and can be read as compatible with the two-state solution. However, the original charter has never been denounced by the movement.

On the other hand, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and some of his ministers, in particular Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir, have made potentially incriminating statements. The former referred to a passage from the Bible relating to Amalek, considered the archetypal enemy of Israel. God, according to a passage from the Bible, orders the Israelites to exterminate the Amalekites, including women and children. Other potential evidence of genocidal intent on the part of the Israeli government may include the systematic destruction of infrastructure such as roads, water supply facilities, schools, universities, hospitals, mosques and churches. The scale of civilian casualties, as well as population displacements, completes the picture.

Legal proceedings

Two proceedings are underway, one before the International Court of Justice, the other before the ICC. The first, tasked by the UN Charter with settling disputes between states, established in January 2024 that there was a plausible risk of genocide and ordered measures, including improved humanitarian access to Gaza. On July 19, the same court issued an advisory opinion declaring that Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem was illegal. As for the ICC, its prosecutor requested in May 2024 that the Court issue arrest warrants for 3 Palestinian leaders and 2 Israelis accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The three Palestinian suspects have since been eliminated by Israel, although doubts remain over the fate of the head of the military branch, Mohammed Deïf.

On November 21, 2024, the ICC, a chamber composed of three judges, one French, one Beninese and one Slovenian, confirmed the indictments proposed by the prosecutor and issued arrest warrants for the accused Netanyahu, Gallant and Deïf. As expected, the reactions were apoplectic in Israel and Washington.

It is necessary to correct two criticisms Netanyahu’s administration has systematically and virulently leveled against the Court by pointing out that:

• The Court says nothing about the legality or otherwise of the military operation in Gaza. It states that there are reasons to believe that crimes were committed during the war. But it does not say that the war is illegal. Israel’s right to self-defense is not called into question.
• The Court has not indicted either the State of Israel or Hamas. Its mandate, which it has respected to the letter, is to prosecute individuals, not institutions. So it is individual citizens Netanyahu, Gallant and Deïf who are now wanted for war crimes and crimes against humanity. The state of Israel has neither been attacked nor prosecuted before the ICC.

Risks for the survival of the system

It is in the interest of Europe and the world that these cases follow their judicial course. After the tragedies of the first half of the twentieth century, the international community sought to create a system of global governance where law prevails over force rather than the other way around. The ICC is the keystone of the system. 125 countries from all continents are parties to the Rome Statute that created it.

Furthermore, only the ICC is capable of establishing the facts and their legal determination in an impartial manner. Thus, as the UN Tribunal in the former Yugoslavia did for the Balkan wars of the 1990s, its judgments, based on what really happened, will discredit the propaganda that today dominates on all sides.

There is a significant risk that the pressure on international judicial personnel will become so great that ongoing cases will be dropped. International prosecutors and judges have reason to fear smear campaigns, visa denials aimed at themselves or their families, as well as financial sanctions intended to prevent them, for example, from carrying out banking transactions. 

Pro-Israel lobbies, supported by the US government, are likely to exert pressure on European governments to refrain from executing ICC arrest warrants in the event that one of the accused shows up on their soil. Washington, Jerusalem and their allies in Europe may well seek to convince national parliaments to cut funding to the ICC. We should recall that, under US President George W. Bush, the US Congress gave the president the authority to use all means to prevent American citizens or those of allied countries — including Israel — from being brought to justice before the ICC. Following the publication of the arrest warrants targeting Israeli leaders, US Senator Tom Cotton penned a tweet reminding the public of this Bush-era law, known informally as the “Hague Invasion Act.”

Yielding to this pressure would be throwing away one of the most useful investments ever made by European countries, which finance the bulk of the ICC’s budget, to put an end to the impunity of the powerful, promoting peace and an international order based on law. It has been a worthwhile and inexpensive investment. Its budget of €200 million ($212 million) is 4,000 times less than the American defense budget. And no one can seriously claim that the American military has contributed much to peace in recent decades.

At the opening of the trial of former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević in 2002, Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte stated the principle in these terms: “No one is above the law, or beyond the reach of international justice.” The ICC has just proven that these strong words can still hold true. Every honest leader should post that quotation on the wall of their office.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Law and War: The Middle East, Laboratory of the Future World Order appeared first on Fair Observer.

The agreement is based on the terms of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701, which ended the previous Israeli assault on Lebanon in 2006. The truce will be enforced by 5,000 to 10,000 Lebanese troops and the UN’s 10,000-strong United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) peacekeeping force, which has operated in that area since 1978 and includes troops from 46 countries.

The truce has broad international support, including from Iran and Gaza’s Hamas leaders. Israel and Hezbollah were apparently glad to take a break from a war that had become counterproductive for them both. Effective resistance prevented Israeli forces from advancing far into Lebanon, and they were inflicting mostly senseless death and destruction on civilians, as in Gaza, but without the genocidal motivation of that campaign.

People all over Lebanon have welcomed the relief from Israeli bombing, the destruction of their towns and neighborhoods and thousands of casualties. In the Lebanese capital of Beirut, people have started returning to their homes.

In the south, the Israeli military has warned residents on both sides of the border not to return yet. It has declared a new buffer zone (which was not part of the truce agreement) that includes 60 villages north of the border, and has warned that it will attack Lebanese civilians who return to that area. Despite these warnings, thousands of displaced people have been returning to south Lebanon, often to find their homes and villages in ruins.

Many people returning to the south still proudly display the yellow flags of Hezbollah. A flag flying over the ruins of the Lebanese city of Tyre has the words, “Made in the USA,” written across it. This is a reminder that the Lebanese people know very well who made the bombs that have killed and maimed thousands of them.

The truce’s success seems unlikely

There are already many reports of ceasefire violations. Israel shot and wounded two journalists soon after the truce went into effect. Then two days after the ceasefire began, Israel attacked five towns near the border with tanks, fired artillery across the border and conducted airstrikes on southern Lebanon. On December 2, as a UN peacekeeper told CNN that Israel had violated the truce “roughly a hundred times,” Hezbollah finally retaliated with mortar fire in the disputed Shebaa Farms area. Israel responded with heavier strikes on two villages, killing 11 people.

An addendum to the truce agreement granted Israel the right to strike at will whenever it believes Hezbollah is violating the truce, giving it what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called “complete military freedom of action,” which makes this a precarious and one-sided peace at best.

The prospect for a full withdrawal of both Israeli and Hezbollah forces in 60 days seems slim. Hezbollah has built large weapons stockpiles in the south that it will not want to abandon. Netanyahu himself has warned that the truce “can be short.”

Then there is the danger of confrontation between Hezbollah and the Lebanese military, raising the specter of Lebanon’s bloody civil war, which killed an estimated 150,000 people between 1975 and 1990. 

So violence could flare up into full-scale war again at any time, making it unlikely that many Israelis will return to homes near the border with Lebanon, Israel’s original publicly stated purpose for the war.

The truce agreement was brokered by the United States and France, and signed by the European Union, Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. France was a colonial power in Lebanon and still plays a leading role in UNIFIL, yet Israel initially rejected France as a negotiating partner. It seems to have accepted France’s role only when French President Emmanuel Macron’s government agreed not to enforce the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant against Netanyahu if he comes to France.

The United Kingdom also signed the original truce proposal on November 25, but doesn’t appear to have signed the final agreement. The UK seems to have withdrawn from the negotiations under US and Israeli pressure because, unlike France, its new Labour government has publicly stated that it will comply with the ICC arrest warrants against Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Gallant. However, it has not explicitly said it would arrest them.

Netanyahu justified the truce to his own people by saying that it will allow Israeli forces to focus on Gaza and Iran, and only die-hard “Security” Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir voted against the truce in the Israeli cabinet.

While there were hopes that the truce in Lebanon might set the stage for a ceasefire in Gaza, Israel’s actions on the ground tell a different story. Satellite images show Israel carrying out new mass demolitions of hundreds of buildings in northern Gaza to build a new road or boundary between Gaza City and North Gaza. This may be a new border to separate the northernmost 17% of Gaza from the rest of the Gaza Strip, so Israel can expel its people and prevent them from returning, hand North Gaza over to Israeli settlers and squeeze the desperate, starving survivors into an even smaller area than before.

Syria complicates the conflict

And for all who had hopes that the ceasefire in Lebanon might lead to a regional de-escalation, those hopes were dashed in Syria when, on the very day of the truce, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a surprise offensive. HTS was formerly the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front. It rebranded itself and severed its formal link to al-Qaeda in 2016 to avoid becoming a prime target in the US war in Syria, but the US still brands it a terrorist group.

By December 1, HTS managed to seize control of Syria’s second largest city, Aleppo, forcing the Syrian Arab Army and its Russian allies onto the defensive. With Russian and Syrian jets bombing rebel-held territory, the surge in fighting has raised the prospect of another violent, destabilizing front reopening in the Middle East.

This may also be a prelude to an escalation of attacks on Syria by Israel, which has already attacked Syria more than 220 times since October 2023, with Israeli airstrikes and artillery bombardments killing at least 296 people.

The new HTS offensive most likely has covert US support, and may impact US President-elect Donald Trump’s reported intention to withdraw the 900 US troops still based in Syria. It may also impact his nomination of Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence. Gabbard is a longtime critic of US support for al-Qaeda-linked factions in Syria, so the new HTS offensive sets the stage for an explosive confirmation hearing, which may backfire on Syria hawks in Washington if Gabbard is allowed to make her case.

Arab and Muslim state strategies

Elsewhere in the region, Israel’s genocide in Gaza and war on its neighbors have led to widespread anti-Israel and anti-US resistance.

Where the US was once able to buy off Arab rulers with weapons deals and military alliances, the Arab and Muslim world is coalescing around a position that sees Israel’s behavior as unacceptable and Iran as a threatened neighbor rather than an enemy. Unconditional US support for Israel risks permanently downgrading US relations with former allies, from Iraq, Jordan and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Yemen’s Ansar Allah (or Houthi) government has maintained a blockade of the Red Sea, using missiles and drones against Israeli-linked ships heading for the Israeli port of Eilat or the Suez Canal. The Yemenis have defeated a US-led naval task force sent to break the blockade and have reduced shipping through the Suez Canal by at least two-thirds, forcing shipping companies to reroute most ships all the way around Africa. The port of Eilat filed for bankruptcy in July, after only one ship docked there in several months.

Other resistance forces have conducted attacks on US military bases in Iraq, Syria and Jordan, and US forces have retaliated in a low-grade tit-for-tat war. The Iraqi government has strongly condemned U.S. and Israeli attacks on its soil as violations of its sovereignty. Attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria have flared up again in recent months, while Iraqi resistance forces have also launched drone attacks on Israel.

An emergency meeting of the Arab League in Cairo, Egypt on November 26 voted unanimously to support Iraq and condemn Israeli threats. US–Iraqi talks in September drew up a plan for hundreds of US troops to leave Iraq in 2025 and for all 2,500 to be gone within two years. The US has outmaneuvered previous withdrawal plans, but the days of these very unwelcome US bases must surely be numbered.

Recent meetings of Arab and Muslim states have forged a growing sense of unity around a rejection of US proposals for normalization of relations with Israel and a new solidarity with Palestine and Iran. At a meeting of Islamic nations in Riyadh on November 11, Saudi crown prince Mohammed Bin-Salman publicly called the Israeli massacre in Gaza a genocide for the first time.

Arab and Muslim countries know that Trump may act unpredictably and that they need a stable common position to avoid becoming pawns to him or Netanyahu. They recognize that previous divisions left them vulnerable to US and Israeli exploitation, which contributed to the current crisis in Palestine and the risk of a major regional war that now looms over them.

On November 29, Saudi and Western officials told Reuters that Saudi Arabia has given up on a new military alliance with the US, which would include normalizing relations with Israel. It is opting for a more limited US weapons deal.

The Saudis had hoped for a treaty that included a US commitment to defend them, like treaties with Japan and South Korea. That would require confirmation by the US Senate, which would demand Saudi recognition of Israel in return. But the Saudis can no longer consider recognizing Israel without a viable plan for Palestinian statehood, which Israel rejects.

On the other hand, Saudi relations with Iran are steadily improving since they restored relations 18 months ago with diplomatic help from China and Iraq. At a meeting with new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian in Qatar on October 3, Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal Bin Farhan declared, “We seek to close the page of differences between the two countries forever and work towards the resolution of our issues and expansion of our relations like two friendly and brotherly states.”

Prince Faisal highlighted the “very sensitive and critical” situation in the region due to Israel’s “aggressions” against Gaza and Lebanon and its attempts to expand the conflict. He said Saudi Arabia trusted Iran’s “wisdom and discernment” in managing the situation to restore calm and peace.

The ball is in Trump’s court

If Saudi Arabia and its neighbors can make peace with Iran, what will the consequences be for Israel’s illegal, genocidal occupation of Palestine, which has been enabled and encouraged by decades of unconditional US military and diplomatic support?

On December 2, Trump wrote on Truth Social that if the hostages were not released by the time of his inauguration, there would be “ALL HELL TO PAY in the Middle East.” “Those responsible,” he warned, “will be hit harder than anybody has been hit in the long and storied History of the United States of America.”

Trump and many of his acolytes exemplify the Western arrogance and lust for imperial power that lies at the root of this crisis. More threats and more destruction are not the answer. Trump has had good relations with the dictatorial rulers of the Gulf states, with whom he shares much in common. If he is willing to listen, he will realize, as they do, that there is no solution to this crisis without freedom, self-determination and sovereignty in their own land for the people of Palestine. That is the path to peace, if he will take it.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Truce in Lebanon: Can Diplomacy Rise from the Ruins? appeared first on Fair Observer.

However, this is not the first time that a lethal terror group has faced such a threat. The present situation recalls the history of the Black September Organization (BSO), a Palestinian militant organization that caused chaos in Jordan in the 1970s. With Israel’s recent assassinations, history may well repeat itself.

The formation and function of the Black September Organization

A little history is needed to understand where the BSO came from. The Third Arab-Israeli War in 1967 saw hundreds of thousands of people displaced from their homes, fleeing the fighting. Many Palestinians living in the West Bank region fled to Jordan. Israel continued to occupy the West Bank afterwards, leading to Palestinian fedayeen (guerilla fighters; a more literal meaning being “those willing to sacrifice themselves”) setting up a new base in Jordan and launching attacks against Israel from there.

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) gained further Arab support when Israel retaliated against the fedayeen strikes. Groups within the organization began calling for the toppling of the Jordanian monarchy. Eventually, after further disagreements and violent confrontations, King Hussein of Jordan decided to go on the offensive. This led to Black September, where the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) surrounded cities with significant PLO presence and attacked them. The latter half of September 1970, had the most concentration of fighting in the entire conflict.

In the end, leaders on both sides signed many ceasefires and agreements, but none were upheld in their entirety. The PLO and Palestinian people moved to Syria in droves. However, some fedayeen remained, angered by Jordan’s actions. They continued to fight back, but the JAF eventually drove the last of them out by July, 1971. A small group of men from Fatah, the biggest faction of the PLO at the time, formed the BSO in September, 1970. They rallied around Abu Ali Iyad, a commander who had remained in Jordan after the PLO withdrew. There was only one goal in mind: revenge against King Hussein and the JAF.

The BSO operated very differently to typical militant terrorist organizations of the time. John K. Cooley was a notable journalist of the period, specializing in Islamist terrorism. In his book, Green March, Black September, he stated that, “Black September represented a total break with the old operational and organizational methods of the fedayeen. Its members operated in ‘air-tight’ cells of four or more men and women. Each cell’s members were kept ignorant of other cells. Leadership was exercised from outside by intermediaries and ‘cut-offs’.”

By operating in this manner, every detail of their movements and the members of the organization itself could be kept secret. This drastic change in structure and operation showed a strong intent to succeed in their goals. Everything was on a need-to-know basis, with their leaders hidden. The BSO could easily cut off any cell that failed a mission and disassociate from any actions carried out, as could Fatah. One cell’s failure did not affect the rest. 

The Black September Organization’s attacks

The BSO managed to carry out multiple, successful terrorist attacks across the globe. The most tragic was the 1972 Munich massacre, where the BSO murdered 11 Israeli Olympic athletes and one German police officer. The BSO planned and carried out assassinations, hijackings and bombings over the course of four years, from 1970 to 1973. Apart from the Munich massacre, these operations were covert, like the 1973 letter bombing incident. The BSO sent dozens of letter bombs from Amsterdam to various Israeli diplomatic places around the world. Many were intercepted on the way, but one managed to make its way to Ami Shachori, the agricultural counselor at the Israeli Embassy to the UK. He mistakenly believed it contained seeds he had ordered and the resulting blast fatally wounded him.

The BSO even managed to somewhat fulfill their original goal of revenge. They assassinated Wasfi Tal, the Jordanian prime minister at the time, for his role in the events of Black September. Aside from Jordan, Arab nations widely denounced Tal, as they had supported the Palestinian fedayeen. However, his loyalty to his king and country was rewarded with his popularity among the people. He was elected prime minister three times: in 1962, in 1965 and again in 1970.

Israel’s wrath and the fall of the Black September Organization

After the Munich massacre, Israel’s Mossad launched a long, covert operation to assassinate key members of the BSO, known as “Wrath of God.” Mossad got to work quickly, taking out various senior BSO members and those involved in the Munich massacre specifically. Many of these operations happened between the events of Munich and September 1973. Mossad’s success and ruthlessness likely played a major factor in the PLO decision to shut down the BSO. The exact date is contested, with Israeli historian Benny Morris saying September 1973, and other sources claiming that it was December 1974. Either way, there was only one more attack BSO claimed to have carried out after 1973, which was the Antwerp synagogue bombing in 1981.

Mossad’s actions led to an existential crisis for the BSO. With senior members and leaders out of commission, being either dead or constantly in hiding, running the organization became exceedingly difficult. There were also disagreements internally on how to continue operations and what direction the BSO should go in. Furthermore, Fatah had begun to engage Israel in diplomacy, shifting away from the use of violence to further the Palestinian cause.

The dissolution of the BSO potentially occurred for three reasons. Firstly, the ideological fervor that drove the BSO, and possibly even Fatah, forward in the first place was running out. Secondly, anti-Zionist sentiment was weakening. Thirdly, Fatah and the BSO did not have the necessary resources to maintain an armed struggle.

While the existence of Israel was a thorn in the side of the Arab Middle East, it was clear that Israel would not fall easily. They survived attack after attack, held their ground and even claimed other countries’s territories at times. Israel was there to stay. The Middle Eastern countries were not united in their desires either. They often fought with each other as well, like how the PLO fought with Jordan and how the Lebanese civil war broke out. Terrorist attacks outside of the region surely didn’t please other countries as well, whose opinions may have changed from such events, leading to less interest in the Arab struggle.

Within the PLO, there were, and still are, many factions and opinions. General sentiment leaned away from continuing the armed struggle. It ate up their funds and only had limited success. It was not achieving what they had hoped. Given that the Palestinian people had no guaranteed home and no land to call their own anymore, resources were always limited. Mossad’s offensive operations against the BSO were also burning through Fatah’s and the BSO’s resources, as well as personnel. The BSO was practically backed into a corner.

Israel’s actions weren’t without its dissenters and mistakes however. While ruthless, the operations were more about revenge than trying to stop terrorism. Israeli author and journalist Aaron J. Klein quoted a Mossad senior intelligence source, saying, “Our blood was boiling. When there was information implicating someone, we didn’t inspect it with a magnifying glass.” Given that the BSO was shut down within a year or two of the Munich massacre, it shows Mossad’s effectiveness. But in terms of stopping terrorism entirely, it was a complete failure.

As Fatah falls, Hamas rises

In December 1974, PLO chairman and Fatah leader Yasser Arafat called for his followers to cease violence outside of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 242 and 338 in 1967 and 1973 respectively, which shows that the PLO had managed to bring the Palestinian plight to the attention of the West. Attacks continued through the 1970s, but once the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, the PLO’s attention shifted. Given that they mostly operated out of southern Lebanon at the time, it’s no wonder. 

In time, those Resolutions led to the Oslo Accords, a pair of agreements signed by Israel and the PLO, in an attempt to bring about a long-lasting peace. One of the most important outcomes of the Accords was the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), which is an elected body of representatives for the Palestinian people, allowing them some level of self-governance.

Unfortunately, this did not create the desired effect. A large number of Palestinian people and organizations vehemently opposed the Accords, with various terrorist attacks occurring afterwards in retaliation. Even some Israelis weren’t happy about it. A far-right Israeli extremist carried out an assassination on the Israeli prime minister at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, who was the one to sign the Accords.

In 1996, Palestine held its first general elections. Fatah dominated these elections, with their leader Arafat becoming President with 89.82% of the vote. He was incredibly popular at the time and the Palestinian people believed he would lead them to peace. However, the negotiations between Palestine and Israel never led to a true peace agreement. As the years went on, the Palestinian people grew weary. Their struggle was never ending and unchanging.

During this time, Hamas, the only other potential rival to Fatah, began to grow in popularity. Hamas had never agreed to the Oslo Accords and still continued to bombard Israel with attacks in any way they could. Disagreements between Fatah and Hamas caused continuous postponements of the elections. The passing of Arafat in 2004 left Fatah without its charismatic leader. Finally, in January 2006, Palestinian elections were held. Hamas won a majority of the seats, to the shock of the world. Most Western countries expected a re-election of Fatah. Hamas now controlled 74 of the 132 seats in the PNA. The two factions’s disagreements escalated, and they were unable to form a government that held together for the sake of the Palestinian people.

It only took until June 2007 for the tensions to come to a head. In the Gaza Strip, Hamas-affiliated and Fatah-affiliated forces came to blows. After a series of violent clashes, Hamas took full control of the Gaza Strip and that has been the situation up until now. Hamas controlled Gaza and the PNA controlled the West Bank.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched their largest attack ever against Israel, killing around 1,200 people and taking around 250 as hostages. Israeli forces mounted an aggressive counter-attack, announcing their intent to eradicate Hamas entirely. Since then, it’s been a war between the two. Allegedly, over 40,000 Palestinians have been killed in the fighting. Israel has also assassinated many Hamas leaders across the world, including the aforementioned Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar.

Is this a dead end for terror proxies?

Hamas had clearly been preparing for the October 7 attacks for a long time. They built up their forces, their funds and their ammunition. What they didn’t seem prepared for though was the Israeli retaliation. While the war is still ongoing at the time of writing, Hamas is certainly not in a winning position. Their people are suffering and their leaders are dead. If Hamas even survives as an organization once Israel is done, it will be a miracle. But will the idea of armed struggle live on?

There are many parallels between Hamas and the BSO. Both were born of strong ideals and strong condemnation of their enemies. Their enemies retaliated ruthlessly as well. The BSO was shut down and Hamas looks to be on the same path. Hamas is not the only terror proxy fighting against Israel. Hezbollah, from their territories in southern Lebanon, have been firing missiles into Israel. The Houthis in Yemen have been attacking sea routes in the waters around their territory, ones that would reach the south Israeli port of Eilat, in an attempt to curb their supplies. Whether their Iranian backers incited them or if they all did this of their own accord is up for debate, but the results are the same. Israel brought their might down upon their adversaries.

As an outsider looking in, it may seem futile to repeat the same actions as those who came before, when the results are always the same. Maybe they believe it will be different with them or maybe they simply have no choice. There is a constant struggle between the Israeli people and the Palestinian people. However, there is no change without action. The Palestinian people believe that they cannot continue without doing something. The deadlock must be broken.

Despite this drive, armed struggle has only proven, time and again, to be ineffective. The only area which it succeeds is bringing their cause to the attention of the globe. This never lasts in the long run though. In the end, nothing changes. There are only two options left: to drop the idea of armed struggle, perhaps taking the diplomatic route as Fatah has, or find a solution with Israel to put an end to things once and for all. Hamas has already shown signs of changing course. They have held talks periodically with Fatah since July, with the latest being in Cairo in October 2024, hoping to resolve their differences. When the US general election results announced Donald Trump as the victor, Hamas quickly sent out a statement saying that they were “ready for a ceasefire.”

Proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah are in a standoff with Israel over the Palestinian issue, but it’s clear that their current methods are unsuccessful. Like the BSO and other proxies before them, Israel is pushing these organizations into existential crises. History may repeat itself and we will see this endless cycle repeat once more.

[Will Sherriff edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Hamas Leaders Assassinated: Terror Proxies’ Destiny To Fall? appeared first on Fair Observer.

To address this crisis, Egypt has turned to international lenders and allies, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European Union (EU) and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. They have secured over $50 billion in financial commitments in 2023 alone.

These interventions have allowed Egypt to implement critical short-term measures, such as devaluing its currency, reducing subsidies and increasing interest rates. Meanwhile, the IMF has offered an $8 billion loan package as part of its 2022 program for Egypt, aiming to mitigate currency overvaluation and fiscal imbalances. Yet analysts like Steven Cook, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, note that Egypt’s economic resilience remains uncertain without deeper structural reforms. This is particularly true given the limited progress on divesting military-controlled businesses and liberalizing the private sector.

Egypt’s exchange rate has shown significant volatility over the past two decades, with the Egyptian pound (EGP) experiencing sharp depreciations against the United States dollar (USD). In 2024, the EGP/USD rate dropped by 37.03%, driven by shrinking foreign currency reserves, a widening trade deficit and rising demand for USD amidst persistent economic uncertainties. The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has responded with various stabilization measures, including devaluations, interest rate hikes and capital controls. However, structural economic challenges and market pressures continue to weigh on the EGP, signaling ongoing currency instability for the near term.

Historically, Egypt’s crisis reflects a dependence on international financial aid to address chronic fiscal issues. The country has experienced at least eight significant BOP crises since 1952, each leading to IMF programs or financial interventions from international partners to stabilize the economy temporarily. However, these interventions have rarely resulted in lasting reforms, as Egypt often returns to fixed or highly stabilized exchange rates following periods of financial distress. This recurring cycle is largely driven by Egypt’s state-centric governance model and persistent cronyism, which have deterred sustainable growth and prevented the formation of a resilient market economy.

While Egypt’s strategic importance makes it “too big to fail” for many international partners, questions remain about whether the current assistance will drive meaningful change or merely delay another crisis. According to a report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and research from the IMF, without comprehensive reform, Egypt risks continued fiscal and economic instability. Experts argue that structural adjustments — including reducing military control of the economy and allowing a fully flexible exchange rate — are essential for breaking the cycle of economic instability and achieving sustainable growth.

Case comparisons: Argentina and Turkey’s currency crises

The economic trajectories of Argentina and Turkey offer insights into the cyclical nature of currency crises in emerging markets, particularly those burdened with high levels of external debt and recurrent currency depreciation. These cases demonstrate the limitations of short-term financial fixes in the absence of comprehensive structural reforms and robust fiscal management, with implications relevant to Egypt’s current economic challenges.

Argentina’s financial history is marked by chronic fiscal mismanagement, high external debt and recurrent reliance on IMF bailouts. Since the early 2000s, Argentina has defaulted on its debt multiple times, eroding investor confidence and creating a volatile investment environment. The country’s approach has typically focused on immediate crisis resolution through IMF assistance, currency devaluation and austerity measures, rather than on deep structural reforms. For instance, Argentina’s 2000–2002 crisis, during which it defaulted on $95 billion in debt, led to a sharp devaluation of the peso and significant social hardship. Despite an IMF bailout and subsequent restructuring, Argentina’s pattern of accumulating debt and renegotiating it without establishing a sustainable fiscal framework has continued. This culminated in additional defaults in 2014 and 2020.

The core of Argentina’s instability lies in its weak fiscal discipline, characterized by chronic budget deficits and a lack of political consensus on sustainable economic policies. This instability has created a self-perpetuating cycle: High debt burdens lead to recurring defaults, eroding trust among foreign investors, which then necessitates further reliance on external support and austerity measures, perpetuating economic fragility. Argentina’s experiences underscore the limitations of debt-driven growth and the dangers of relying on short-term financial infusions without addressing underlying structural issues, such as public spending control and inflation stabilization.

Turkey’s recent economic difficulties stem from a combination of high inflation, excessive reliance on foreign-denominated debt and an unorthodox approach to monetary policy under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Unlike Argentina, Turkey’s crisis has been driven by its refusal to adhere to conventional monetary strategies, particularly concerning interest rate management. Erdoğan’s insistence on maintaining low interest rates, despite high inflation, has led to significant currency depreciation; the Turkish lira has lost over 80% of its value against the dollar from 2018 to 2023.

Turkey’s debt dynamics, particularly its dependence on short-term foreign debt, have exacerbated this volatility. Turkish corporations and financial institutions, heavily indebted in foreign currency, face severe financial strain as the lira depreciates, making dollar-denominated debt more expensive to service. This high level of exposure to external financing has heightened Turkey’s vulnerability to global economic conditions, such as interest rate hikes by the US Federal Reserve. It has increased the cost of borrowing for emerging markets.

Jeffrey Frankel, a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, notes that Turkey’s reliance on foreign capital, paired with its unorthodox policy stance, has deterred investors. It has further devalued the currency and intensified inflation.

Policy shifts and economic reforms

Egypt’s rising external debt raises concerns about the government’s capacity to service it without continuous outside assistance. This debt burden puts downward pressure on the currency, as investors demand higher returns to offset the risks associated with holding Egyptian assets. Moreover, declining foreign exchange reserves have limited the Central Bank of Egypt’s (CBE) ability to stabilize the currency, contributing to further depreciation. Countries like Argentina have encountered similar difficulties, with diminishing reserves constraining options for currency defense and increasing reliance on the IMF.

The CBE’s recent shift to a more flexible exchange rate is intended to attract foreign investment and fulfill IMF requirements, allowing the EGP to fluctuate more freely. While a floating currency can provide stability over time, Egypt’s experience reflects the risks associated with rapid depreciation. This phenomenon is also evident in Turkey’s recent currency challenges.

To counteract inflation, the CBE has raised interest rates, hoping to draw in foreign investment; however, this has not been sufficient to prevent the EGP’s decline. This underscores the need for comprehensive economic reforms to secure long-term stability.

Strategic economic reforms for Egypt

Ruchir Agarwal, a Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business & Government (M-RCBG) research fellow at Harvard Kennedy School, and Adnan Mazarei, a non-resident senior fellow at Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), argue that Egypt’s recurring economic crises, exacerbated by governance and policy shortcomings, require a fundamental shift in approach. They emphasize that Egypt has to address governance and policy deficiencies, military dominance and cronyism to implement necessary economic reforms and break its cycle of recurring crises, rather than relying on international financial bailouts.

To stabilize and attract foreign investment, Egypt should prioritize macroeconomic stability and regulatory reform using four steps. First, maintaining a flexible exchange rate will help reduce speculative pressure on the EGP, creating a more predictable environment for investors. Second, focusing on inflation control through targeted subsidies and supply chain improvements would further support this stability. Third, by adopting global standards in transparency and corporate governance, Egypt can build investor confidence; streamlining regulatory processes would make foreign investment more accessible. Finally, reducing the military’s role in the economy, curbing cronyism and enforcing anti-corruption measures could help establish a more equitable environment for private businesses.

The Egyptian conundrum: elite capital flight and economic stability

Egypt’s economic journey has frequently involved partnerships with the IMF to address persistent fiscal challenges and stabilize the macroeconomic framework. However, one of the most significant yet underexplored dynamics undermining Egypt’s fiscal stability is elite capital flight — the large-scale transfer of domestic wealth by political and economic elites to offshore financial centers. This practice has far-reaching consequences for economic development, governance and societal equity.

Egypt’s case exemplifies the challenges of elite capital flight. Over decades, economic and political elites have transferred vast sums of wealth to offshore havens, facilitated by weak anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks and global financial opacity. While exact figures are difficult to ascertain, estimates of the financial assets held abroad by Egyptian elites highlight the magnitude of this issue.

These outflows coincide with structural economic inefficiencies and governance gaps, leaving the state financially constrained. In turn, the government is often forced to implement austerity measures or seek external funding, amplifying socio-economic pressures.

Elite capital flight undermines economic stability and development through several interrelated mechanisms. It exacerbates socio-economic disparities. While elites secure their wealth abroad, the general population faces the consequences of reduced public spending and austerity measures. This creates a dual economic reality where the wealthy remain insulated from domestic economic pressures, while lower-income groups bear the brunt of fiscal challenges.

Elite capital flight is a longstanding feature of Egypt’s economic landscape, deeply rooted in governance inefficiencies and weak regulatory frameworks. Economic and political elites often perceive domestic instability, potential expropriation or shifts in policy as triggers for safeguarding wealth abroad. These dynamics are facilitated by global financial systems that accommodate opaque wealth transfers and shield assets from domestic scrutiny.

Egypt’s economic elite have historically diversified their financial portfolios, funneling resources into offshore financial centers such as Switzerland, the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions with favorable conditions for wealth concealment. This “insurance” mechanism not only provides security against domestic uncertainties but deprives the nation of critical resources that could otherwise bolster infrastructure, public services and social programs. As Andreas Kern, a Teaching Professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown University, argues, “the ability to draw on the IMF creates perverse economic incentives so that a country’s elites can privatize economic gains by moving funds into offshore financial destinations before the arrival of the Fund.”

Egypt’s economic trajectory highlights the interplay between governance failures, elite capture and external financial interventions. Without addressing the systemic drivers of elite capital flight, external assistance risks perpetuating a cycle of dependency rather than fostering sustainable growth. As global scrutiny on financial transparency intensifies, Egypt’s experience offers valuable lessons for crafting more equitable and resilient economic policies.

Egypt’s next steps

To effectively implement and sustain the policy recommendations made in this piece, in addition to macroeconomics and government reform, Egypt must prioritize the development of expertise in AML and counter-financing of terrorism (CFT). This will require a skilled workforce across financial regulation, law enforcement and compliance to ensure that Egypt’s AML/CFT frameworks align with international standards while addressing the country’s unique economic challenges. Building this expertise will involve continuous training, technical assistance and collaboration with global organizations such as the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and IMF.

Elite capital flight also represents a significant barrier to Egypt’s economic development and stability. By diverting critical resources from the domestic economy, it exacerbates fiscal deficits, perpetuates inequality and undermines trust in governance. Addressing this issue requires a comprehensive approach that combines domestic reforms with international cooperation to foster a more equitable and resilient economic framework. For Egypt, tackling elite capital flight is not only a question of fiscal prudence but also of social and economic justice.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Egypt’s Policy Challenges and Deep Reforms for Lasting Financial Stability appeared first on Fair Observer.

The only area where there might be some hope for ending a war is Ukraine. Rubio has come close to Trump’s position on that matter, praising Ukraine for standing up to Russia, but recognizing that the US is funding a deadly “stalemate war” that needs to be “brought to a conclusion.”

But in all the other hotspots around the world, Rubio is likely to make conflicts even hotter, or start new ones. Here are eight reasons why he would make a dangerous secretary of state:

Rubio’s obsession with Cuban regime change will sink any chance of better relations there

Like other Cuban-American politicians, Rubio has built his career on vilifying the Cuban Revolution and trying to economically strangle and starve the people of his parents’ homeland into submission.

It is ironic, therefore, that his parents left Cuba before the Revolution, during the US-backed dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista. Batista’s executioners, secret police and death squads killed an estimated 20,000 people, leading to a wildly popular revolution in 1959.

When President Barack Obama began to restore relations with Cuba in 2014, Rubio swore to do “everything possible” to obstruct and reverse that policy. In May 2024, Rubio reiterated his zero-tolerance for any kind of social or economic contacts between the US and Cuba, claiming that any easing of the US blockade will only “strengthen the oppressive regime and undermine the opposition… Until there is freedom in Cuba, the United States must maintain a firm stance.” Two months earlier, Rubio introduced legislation to ensure that Cuba would remain on the US “State Sponsor of Terrorism List,” imposing sanctions that cut Cuba off from the US-dominated Western banking system.

These measures to destroy the Cuban economy have led to a massive wave of migration in the past two years. But when the US Coast Guard tried to coordinate with their Cuban counterparts, Rubio introduced legislation to prohibit such interaction. While Trump has vowed to stem immigration, his secretary of state wants to crush Cuba’s economy, forcing people to abandon the island and set sail for the US.

Applying Rubio’s anti-Cuba template to the rest of Latin America will make enemies of more of our neighbors

Rubio’s disdain for his ancestral home has served him so well as a US politician that he has extended it to the rest of Latin America. He has sided with extreme right-wing politicians like Argentinian President Javier Milei and former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. He rails against progressive ones, from Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to the popular Mexican former President López Obrador, whom he called “an apologist for tyranny” for supporting other leftist governments.

In Venezuela, Rubio has promoted brutal sanctions and regime change plots to topple the government of Nicolas Maduro. In 2019, he was one of the architects of Trump’s failed policy of recognizing opposition figure Juan Guaidó as president. He has also advocated for sanctions and regime change in Nicaragua.

In March 2023, Rubio urged President Joe Biden to impose sanctions on Bolivia for prosecuting  leaders of a 2019 US-backed coup that led to massacres that killed at least 21 people. He also condemned the government of Honduras for withdrawing from an extradition treaty with the US this past August. This was a response to decades of US interference that had turned Honduras into a narco-state riven by poverty, gang violence and mass emigration, until the election of democratic socialist President Xiomara Castro in January 2022.

Rubio’s major concern in this part of the world now seems to be the influence of China, which has become the second-largest trade partner of most Latin American countries. Unlike the US, China focuses on economic benefits and not internal politics. Meanwhile, US politicians like Rubio still see Latin America as the US’s “backyard.”

While Rubio’s virulent anti-leftist stands have served him well in climbing to senior positions in the US government, and now into Trump’s inner circle, his disdain for Latin American sovereignty bodes ill for US relations in the region.

Rubio insists that the US and Israel can do no wrong, and that God has given Palestine to Israel

Despite the massive death toll in Gaza and global condemnation of Israel’s genocide, Rubio still perpetuates the myth that “Israel takes extraordinary steps to avoid civilian losses” and that innocent people die in Gaza because Hamas has deliberately placed them in the way and used them as human shields. The problem, he says, is “an enemy that doesn’t value human life.”

In November 2024, when CODEPINK asked if Rubio would support a ceasefire, he replied, “On the contrary. I want them to destroy every element of Hamas they can get their hands on. These people are vicious animals.”

There are few times in this past year that the Biden administration has tried to restrain Israel, but when Biden begged Israel not to send troops into the southern city of Rafah, Rubio said that was like telling the Allied forces in World War II not to attack Berlin to get Adolf Hitler.

In a letter to Secretary of State Antony Blinken in August 2024, Rubio criticized the Biden administration’s decision to sanction Israeli settlers linked to anti-Palestinian violence in the occupied West Bank.

“Israel has consistently sought peace with the Palestinians. It is unfortunate that the Palestinians, whether it be the Palestinian Authority or FTOs [Foreign Terrorist Organisations] such as Hamas, have rejected such overtures,” Rubio wrote. “Israelis rightfully living in their historic homeland are not the impediment to peace; the Palestinians are,” he added.

No country besides Israel subscribes to the idea that its borders should be based on 2,000-year-old religious scriptures, and that it has a God-given right to displace or exterminate people who have lived there since then to reconquer its ancient homeland. The US will find itself extraordinarily isolated from the rest of the world if Rubio tries to assert that as a matter of US policy.

Rubio’s enmity toward Iran will fuel Israel’s war on its neighbors, and may lead the US to war

Rubio is obsessed with Iran. He claims that the central cause of violence and suffering in the Middle East is not Israeli policy but “Iran’s ambition to be a regional hegemonic power.” He says that Iran’s goal in the Middle East is to “seek to drive America out of the region and then destroy Israel.”

He has been a proponent of maximum pressure on Iran, including calls for more and more sanctions. He believes the US should not re-enter the Iran nuclear deal, saying: “We must not trade away U.S. and Israeli security for vague commitments from a terrorist-sponsoring regime that has killed Americans and threatens to annihilate Israel.”

Rubio calls Lebanon’s Hezbollah a “full blown agent of Iran right on Israel’s border” and claims that wiping out Hezbollah’s leadership, along with entire neighborhoods full of civilians, is a “service to humanity.” He alleges that Iran has control over Iraq, Syria and the Houthis in Yemen, and is a threat to Jordan. He claims that “Iran has put a noose around Israel,” and says the goal of US policy should be regime change in Iran. This would set the stage for war.

While there will hopefully be leaders in the Pentagon who will caution Trump about the perils of a war with Iran, Rubio will not be a voice of reason.

Rubio is beholden to big money, from the weapons industry to the Israel lobby

Rubio has reportedly received over $1 million in campaign contributions from pro-Israel groups during his career. The Pro-Israel America PAC was his single largest campaign contributor over the last five years. When he last ran for re-election in 2022, he was the third-largest recipient of funding by pro-Israel groups in the Senate, taking in $367,000 from them for that campaign.

Rubio was also the fourth-largest recipient of funding from the “defense” industry in the Senate for the 2022 cycle, receiving $196,000. Altogether, the weapons industry has invested $663,000 in his Congressional career.

Rubio is clearly beholden to the US arms industry. He’s even more beholden to the Israel lobby, which has been one of his largest sources of campaign funding. This has placed him in the vanguard of Congress’s blind, unconditional support for Israel and subservience to Israeli narratives and propaganda. Therefore, it is unlikely that he will ever challenge the ongoing extermination of the Palestinian people or their expulsion from their homeland.

Rubio is so antagonistic towards China that China has sanctioned him — twice

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation in 2022, Rubio said: “The gravest threat facing America today — it is the challenge that will define not just this century, but my generation and every generation represented here in this room today — that challenge is not climate change, it’s not the pandemic, it’s not the left’s version of social justice. The threat that will define this century is China.”

It will be hard for our nation’s “top diplomat” to ease tensions with a country he has so maligned. He antagonized China by co-sponsoring the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which allows the US to bar Chinese imports over alleged Uyghur rights abuses — abuses that China denies and independent researchers question. In fact, Rubio has gone so far as to accuse China of a “grotesque campaign of genocide” against the Uyghurs.

On Taiwan, he has not only introduced legislation to increase military aid to the island, but actually supports Taiwanese independence — a dangerous deviation from the US government’s long-standing One China approach.

The Chinese responded to Rubio by sanctioning him, not once but twice: once regarding the Uyghurs and once for his support of Hong Kong protests. Unless China lifts the sanctions, he would be the first US secretary of state to be banned from even visiting China.

Analysts expect China to try to sidestep Rubio and engage directly with Trump and other senior officials. Steve Tsang, the director of the China Institute at the United Kingdom’s School of Oriental and African Studies, told Reuters, “If that doesn’t work, then I think we’re going to get into a much more regular escalation of a bad relationship.”

Rubio knows sanctions are a trap, but doesn’t know how to escape them

Rubio is a leading advocate of unilateral economic sanctions, which are illegal under international law, and which the UN and other countries refer to as “unilateral economic coercive measures.”

The US has used these measures so widely and wildly that they now impact a third of the world’s population. Officials from Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen to Rubio himself have warned that using the US financial system and the dollar’s reserve currency status as weapons against other countries is driving the rest of the world to conduct trade in other currencies and develop alternative financial systems.

In March 2023, Rubio complained on Fox News, “We won’t have to talk sanctions in five years, because there will be so many countries transacting in currencies other than the dollar that we won’t have the ability to sanction them.”

And yet Rubio has continued to be a leading sponsor of sanctions bills in the Senate. These include new sanctions on Iran in January 2024 and a bill in July to sanction foreign banks that participate in alternative financial systems.

While other countries develop new financial and trading systems to escape abusive, illegal US sanctions, the nominee for secretary of state remains caught in the same sanctions trap that he complained about on Fox.

Rubio wants to oppress US free speech

Rubio wants to curtail the right to free speech enshrined in the First Amendment of the US Constitution. In May, he described campus protests against Israel as a “complete breakdown of law and order.”

Rubio claimed to be speaking up for other students at US universities. “[They] paid a lot of money to go to these schools, [but are being disrupted by] a few thousand antisemitic zombies who have been brainwashed by two decades of indoctrination in the belief that the world is divided between victimizers and victims, and that the victimizers in this particular case, the ones that are oppressing people, are Jews in Israel,” Rubio said.

The Florida senator has said he supports Trump’s plan to deport foreign students who engage in pro-Palestinian campus protests. In April, he called for punishing supporters of the Israel boycott movement as part of efforts to counter antisemitism, falsely equating any attempt to respond to Israel’s international crimes with antisemitism.

And what about those crimes, which the students are protesting? After visiting Israel in May, Rubio wrote an article for National Review in which he never mentioned the thousands of civilians Israel has killed. He instead blamed Iran, Biden and “morally corrupt international institutions” for the crisis.

Rubio expects US citizens to believe that it is not genocide itself, but protests against genocide, that are a complete breakdown of law and order. He couldn’t be more wrong if he tried.

Students are not Rubio’s only target. In August 2023, he alleged that certain “far-left and antisemitic entities” may have violated the Foreign Assistance Registration Act by their ties to China. He called for a Justice Department investigation into 18 groups, starting with CODEPINK. These unfounded claims of Chinese connections are only meant to intimidate legitimate groups that are exercising their free speech rights.

Conclusion: Rubio is a dangerous choice for secretary of state.

On each of these issues, Rubio has shown no sign of understanding the difference between domestic politics and diplomacy. Whether he’s talking about Cuba, Palestine, Iran or China, or even about CODEPINK, all his supposedly tough positions are based on cynically mischaracterizing the actions and motivations of his enemies and then attacking the straw man he has falsely set up.

Unscrupulous politicians often get away with that, and Rubio is no exception. He has made it his signature tactic because it works so well for him in US politics. But that will not work if and when he sits down to negotiate with other world leaders as secretary of state.

His underlying attitude to foreign relations is, like Trump’s, that the US must get its way or else. Additionally, other countries who won’t submit must be coerced, threatened, couped, bombed or invaded. This makes Rubio just as ill-equipped as Blinken to conduct diplomacy, improve US relations with other countries or resolve disputes and conflicts peacefully, as the United Nations Charter requires.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Eight Reasons Marco Rubio Would Be a Disastrous Secretary of State appeared first on Fair Observer.

Timeline of escalations

The first significant event in this recent escalation occurred on April 1. On that day, Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria’s capital. This strike killed multiple high-ranking Iranian officials. Israel was targeting Iran’s growing influence in Syria and the presence of its leaders close to Israeli borders.

Iran quickly retaliated. On April 13, Iranian allies in the Axis of Resistance captured the MSC Aries, a commercial ship linked to Israel. Iran also launched direct attacks on Israeli territory. The Axis of Resistance, which supports Iran in its regional aims, includes Shia groups like the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Popular Mobilization Forces, the Syrian government, and the Houthi movement in Yemen. It may also involve Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas.

In response, Israel conducted limited airstrikes on April 19. These strikes hit targets in both Syria and Iran, signaling Israel’s willingness to counter any action that could threaten its security. After this exchange, tensions cooled temporarily. Both sides proclaimed victory, and hostilities reverted to indirect, proxy conflict.

The fragile calm shattered on July 31. On that day, Israeli operatives carried out two major assassinations. The first was Fuad Shukr, a senior Hezbollah military commander, who was killed early that day. Shortly after, Ismail Haniyeh, the chairman of Hamas’s Political Bureau, was assassinated in Tehran. These targeted killings heightened tensions dramatically.

A few months later, Iran struck Israel directly. On October 1, Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles toward Israel, marking an escalation into open warfare. Israel’s response came nearly a month later.

In retaliation for Iran’s October 1 attack, Israel launched an extensive assault on Iranian targets on October 26. Dozens of Israeli warplanes traveled over 1,300 kilometers from their bases to target critical Iranian facilities. The strikes targeted Iranian air-defense systems, specifically S-300 radar and missile systems, as well as missile factories in three different provinces, including areas near Tehran.

Will Israel and Iran go to war?

Fair Observer’s sources suggest that Israeli leaders are planning further strikes. Potential targets could include Iranian oil terminals, missile sites, and nuclear facilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might consider targeting Kharg Island, Iran’s primary oil terminal in the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. Special forces from the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) may also conduct further targeted killings, specifically against key personnel in Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Iran has made clear that it wants to avoid a full-scale war with Israel or the United States. The US has played a significant role in trying to limit the scope of this conflict. American officials have issued warnings to both Iran and Israel, urging Iran to avoid any large-scale attacks on Israel while also advising Israel not to escalate the situation. However, the US no longer has as much leverage over Israel as it once did. Continued US military aid is not as vital, in Jerusalem’s view, as the destruction of Iran and Hezbollah’s ability to harm Israelis. They see Iran as weak and believe they must strike while they can.

Iran’s proxy forces, designed to provide a buffer around Iran and deter Israel, have shown limited effectiveness. These proxies can carry out attacks and spread fear, but they have been unable to inflict lasting damage on Israel, which has bolstered Israeli confidence. Despite occasional successful strikes, Iran’s allies cannot challenge Israel’s military defenses over an extended period. Iran’s regime knows that any sustained direct war would push it past the breaking point. Popular resentment against the regime for its repressive religious policies and poor handling of the economy is already high. If the Islamic Republic found itself on the losing end of a foreign war, it would topple.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu also has a precarious political situation. His coalition includes far-right members who advocate for reoccupying Gaza and restoring Israel’s biblical borders. He needs to maintain their political support in order to remain prime minister and avoid pending prosecution for corruption charges. Thus, Netanyahu needs to appeal to this faction, posturing himself as a strong leader capable of resisting Palestinian and Iranian threats. So, he is incentivized to be aggressive, whether or not it is in Israel’s long-term interests.

While Israel may enjoy short- to medium-term security through its aggressive actions, it faces long-term challenges. Its aggressive tack against Iran may push the Islamic Republic to develop a nuclear deterrent as its last defense given Israeli military superiority.

Further down the timeline, Israel faces a demographic risk. Its Muslim population now makes up more than 20% of its citizens, posing a challenge to Israel’s identity as a Jewish state. This trend could reshape Israel’s political landscape — as long as it remains a democracy — by gradually weakening the position of the Jewish majority.

Israeli leadership seems to think it can rescue the country from its precarious position by inflicting a sound defeat on enemies nearby and afar. It remains to be seen how far they will go and whether the gamble will pay off.

[Anton Schauble wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: The Israel–Iran Conflict Is Getting More Dangerous appeared first on Fair Observer.

“To my Israeli friends,” said Biden, “this is no doubt a day of relief and reminiscence, similar to the scenes witnessed throughout the United States after President [Barack] Obama ordered the raid to kill Osama Bin Laden in 2011.”

This appears to be the first time a senior U.S. official has publicly admitted that Obama did in fact “order the raid to kill” Bin Laden. Official accounts previously maintained the fiction of a kill-or-capture mission, in which US troops were to capture Bin Laden alive if possible, but were forced to kill him. 

Biden also implied that people all over the United States had publicly celebrated the death of bin Laden, but that was not true. A few thousand people gathered at the site of the World Trade Center in New York and in front of the White House, but, unless they were watching those gatherings on cable news, most Americans did not witness the mythical nationwide “scenes” Biden described.

At the time, US media reflected the public’s mixed feelings about bin Laden’s assassination more truthfully than Biden did. An NPR article titled, “Is it Wrong to Celebrate Bin Laden’s Death?” quoted a beer-drinking “reveler” at the World Trade Center site who questioned what they were all doing there. “It’s weird to celebrate someone’s death,” she said. “It’s not exactly what we’re here to celebrate, but it’s wonderful that people are happy.”

An article in The Atlantic described the gathering at the White House as “surreal,” saying it was “jubilant and fiercely American, but, other than that, it did not know what it was.” The author, Alexis Madrigal, wrote that the only focal points for the gathering were a few roving TV cameras. Many in the crowd were Georgetown students, who led chants of “USA, USA”, and “Na na, na na na na, hey hey hey, goodbye,” interspersed with renditions of the Georgetown fight song. When the students flagged, Washington Capitals hockey fans stepped up, chanting “Caps, Caps, Caps.”

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“There were no transcendent moments,” Madrigal observed, “Perhaps people did their own private accounting, but as a public, we were loud and boorish and silly. We treated the killing of a man who promoted the killing of thousands of Americans like a game with no consideration of the past or future costs.”

Biden’s linking of Yahya Sinwar’s killing to Bin Laden’s relied on the mythical, potted version of American history peddled by cable news and corporate politicians like himself, his Vice President Kamala Harris and his predecessor Donald Trump.

 Whatever they say becomes the news, and what really happened in the real world is swept down the memory hole as in George Orwell’s 1984. Their version of reality is a dumbed-down, politicized view of the world tailored for political TV ads and teleprompters, leaving Americans hopelessly misinformed about the world we live in, and dangerously so in times of real crisis.

It is no wonder that young people who want to understand the crisis in Gaza turn directly to firsthand accounts and images of the genocide to find out what our “leaders” and the “news” refuse to tell or show us.

So how should we see Yahya Sinwar?

The context in which Americans hear “Hamas” from politicians and the media defines it as a “terrorist” group, setting the stage for Biden to claim that killing its leader “proves once again that no terrorists anywhere in the world can escape justice, no matter how long it takes.”

The whole premise of America’s war on “terror” was that terrorism is the product of religious indoctrination and an irrational view of the world that leads people to “hate our freedom.” The warmongers used this framing to deprive the public of the natural ability to put ourselves in somebody else’s shoes and apply the “golden rule”: to treat others the way we would want them to treat us.

After 76 years of gradual genocide in Palestine, there are Palestinian exiles all over the world, including in the United States. Many Americans know Palestinians and know that they are remarkably patient and tolerant people. They have lived under successive occupations, by the Ottoman Turks, the British and now the Israelis. They have never been quick to resort to armed resistance, and many still reject it and continue to work peacefully toward their liberation.

But to deny that they have a legitimate right to resist the militarized theft of their homeland by Israel, after 76 years of seeing it invaded, seized, occupied and annexed, piece by piece, is not “justice.” It is a historic injustice.

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My Experience Working Alongside a Former Member of Hamas

To say that Israel “has a right to defend itself” cannot possibly justify the genocidal mass slaughter of civilians in Gaza, every day for the past year, now escalating yet again in northern Gaza. Israel does have a right to defend itself — that is a truism — but only within the limits of necessity and proportionality, and not in Gaza, which it has illegally occupied since 1967. As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in July, international law requires Israel to withdraw its forces from all the territories it occupied in 1967, including Gaza.

So, if the Palestinians have a right to resist their illegal military occupation by Israel, who is to lead that resistance? Hamas emerged as the leading resistance group after the previous Fatah government let Israel use the 1990s Oslo Accords as cover to keep building Israeli settlements all over the land it was supposed to withdraw from and return to the Palestinians. 

The failure of the Oslo Accords persuaded most Palestinians that they needed new leadership, and so they elected Hamas to a majority in the Palestinian parliament in 2006, with Ismail Haniyeh, also now killed by Israel, as prime minister. 

The Hamas government rejected the previous government’s recognition of Israel, its renunciation of armed resistance and its commitments under the Oslo Accords. This was met with international opposition led by Israel and the United States, who imposed economic sanctions while continuing to support and fund President Mahmoud Abbas and an unelected Fatah government in the West Bank. 

Fighting between Fatah and Hamas killed 600 people and left the elected Hamas government in power in Gaza, with Abbas and Fatah in control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

The fog of war on October 7, 2023

Israel tightened its economic blockade of Gaza and conducted regular bombing campaigns and invasions of Gaza that killed 1,965 people in 2008 and 2009, and 2,327 in 2014. By the time it launched its full-scale genocide in October 2023, Israel had already killed 7,087 Palestinians since 2008. 

Hamas’s breakout from Gaza on October 7, 2023, was initially a well-planned military operation that surprised Israel’s defense forces and the whole world. But it went badly wrong when the Israeli military crumbled and militiamen from different Palestinian groups found themselves confronting civilians in kibbutzes and thousands of young people at the Nova music festival.

It is still impossible to be sure how many civilians the Palestinians really killed that day, and how many more were killed by Israeli forces responding to the break-out with overwhelming force. Israeli journalists Ronen Bergman and Yoav Zitun have documented how Israel activated its “Hannibal Directive,” under which Israeli forces were ordered to kill their own people rather than allow them to be taken to Gaza as prisoners. Israeli forces also destroyed homes in kibbutzes with both Palestinian militants and Israeli civilians still inside them.

Of the 780 unarmed Israeli civilians killed on October 7, Palestinians are presumed to have killed hundreds, while Israeli military forces killed hundreds more. The Israeli military deployed far more powerful weapons than the Palestinians, including 8 Apache attack helicopters, 2 F-16 and 2 F-35 warplanes, 2 Hermes drones and 23 Merkava tanks. 

If an accurate count were to be made, it is entirely possible that the Israeli forces killed more civilians than the Palestinians did, as well as some of the 374 Israeli troops, police and security forces who were also killed that day.

After a year of brutal, indiscriminate, criminal Israeli assaults, the fact that Hamas is still an effective military force defending Gaza reveals a high level of military organization and discipline, which stands in sharp contrast to the Israeli-propagated image of a bloodthirsty rabble on an undisciplined killing spree on October 7. 

It is also still unclear how many of the Palestinians who surged into Israel that day were fully trained Hamas special operations forces, how many were members of other armed groups, and how many were just stunned Palestinian civilians excitedly joining an unexpected jailbreak. So we also don’t know how many civilians were killed by each of these different groups of Palestinians.

Conclusion

What Yahya Sinwar and the Palestinians of Gaza have shown the world for the past year is that they will never surrender their rights to self-determination and the universal protections of international law. And, when all else fails, as it has for 67 years, some of them will continue to turn to armed resistance, a right that most Americans would passionately uphold if the United States was militarily invaded and occupied like Palestine.

On the US and Israeli side, our governments and armed forces have shown the world that they are prepared to commit genocide, arguably the most serious international crime of all, before they will give up their insatiable ambitions to impose their will on the world by military force.  

The last thing Yahya Sinwar did before he was killed by an Israeli tank shell was to pick up a stick and throw it at an Israeli drone. To the last, he understood the power and symbolism of resistance.His example will endure as an inspiration to oppressed people everywhere, but especially throughout the Global South.

In July, a UN panel of human rights experts hailed the ICJ ruling that the Israeli occupation must end. “The Court has finally reaffirmed a principle that seemed unclear, even to the United Nations: Freedom from foreign military occupation, racial segregation and apartheid is absolutely non-negotiable,” the experts said.

Like Nelson Mandela, who led the movement against apartheid in South Africa, Yahya Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh and other martyred Hamas leaders, though branded terrorists by Western leaders, will live on in the hearts of many.Biden and Netanyahu, on the other hand — like Hendrik Verwoerd, South Africa’s “father of apartheid” — are more likely to be remembered as brutal colonialists who tried to hold back the tide of history. Verwoerd’s government sentenced Nelson Mandela to life in prison in 1964 for planning a revolution that Mandela and his people eventually won. Yahya Sinwar’s people will continue their struggle, until they too win their freedom, from the river to the sea.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Biden Calls Sinwar a Terrorist, but He Was a Leader and a Martyr appeared first on Fair Observer.

Politics of terror

For decades, Pakistan has used state-sponsored terror as an instrument to buy geopolitical rent from the United States via Afghanistan. In the past, Pakistan gave operational control to terror proxies to cultivate ground for unconventional warfare against India.

However, the strategy of using terror did not last long. On May 2, 2011, the US killed al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad. This incident sowed seeds of distrust between the two nations.

Similarly, Iran supported Pakistan in the 1971 war against India. However, ideological confrontations have led to distrust and hostility between the parties. Iran also believes that Pakistan is sponsoring Baloch jihadists to please the West and Saudi Arabia.

Evidently, politics of terror have cost Pakistan heavily, without much reward. The state is clearly weakening, as several signs indicate. The Afghan Taliban’s is being more assertive than it otherwise would be. Pakistan is targeting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamist nationalist network opposing the Pakistani military. Pakistan’s approach against Afghanistan’s Supreme Council Quetta Shura is also telling.

Middle Eastern terror conflicts have increased following Israel’s 2023 invasion of Gaza. Pakistan seems to be negotiating with a few proxies, and allegedly with ISIS. These actions may be in order to de-escalate terror attacks in Pakistan and deter the TTP.

The nation may also be seeking openings for security and strategic cooperation with the West. In December 2023, Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir and former Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) chief Nadeem Anjum, visited Washington, DC. The US didn’t show any interest in engaging with Pakistan; it is already locked in multiple fronts from Ukraine to Israel. The nation also believes that TTP is already weakening the ISIS threat.

However, the ISIS attacks in Iran in January paint a worrisome picture of regional security. The attack on Moscow’s Crocus City Hall in March stoked fear of revival of ISIS regional branches, especially in Central Asia.

Islamization and flashpoints

Pakistan’s politics of terror typically end poorly, which complicates its negotiation of geopolitical rent. It suffers from the usual dilemma that comes with terror politics; proxies can be useful for some time, but eventually, their radicalism becomes too extreme.

One can argue that the US, too, had relations with terror proxies. In December 1979, the CIA’s Operation Cyclone provided arms and logistics to jihadist groups in Afghanistan to drive out the Soviet Union. Unlike Pakistan’s relationship with proxies, however, this was a limited relationship.

Pakistan’s continued engagement with proxies may come from former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in the 1970s and 1980s. He established Sharia Benches in the High Court to align the nation’s legal statutes with Islamic doctrine. His Islamization policies brought in officers who wanted to pursue an active Islamic agenda in military matters. A new breed of military thinkers and strategists also emerged. They pushed for a merger of social jihadism with military plans.

Islamization had far-reaching consequences. It led non-state actors, directed by Pakistan’s ISI, to quell opposition to Zia’s pro-Sunni Islamization measures. This in turn created the extremist Jaish-e-Mohammad and Soviet jihad groups.

Zia’s radical Islamization continues to permeate the Pakistani Army, which has prevented action against Islamic terror groups such as TTP. The virus of Islamization has removed Pakistan’s ability to think like a rational nation, putting it in a state of poly-crises.

In January, Pakistan witnessed new flashpoints, including Iranian strikes against the Baluch terror group Jaish al-Adl. This attack on the Pakistani province of Balochistan further deteriorated Iran–Pakistan relations.

Pakistan’s response was limited to diplomatic protests and the expulsion of Iran’s ambassador. However, Pakistan likewise carried out retaliatory precision strikes against Baluch camps on Iranian territory. This indicates a strategy of deterrence similar to the one it used against India in 2019. 

Pakistan does have the option to use force against Iran; it did so in a limited manner on January 17, when it launched a series of air and artillery strikes inside Iran’s Sistan and Balochistan province. The limited strike demonstrated Pakistan’s deterrence capabilities, but terror groups inside Pakistan continue to complicate its situation.

Attacks on Chinese workers

On October 7, Baloch terrorists in the Pakistani city of Karachi conducted a suicide bombing that killed two Chinese nationals. Before that, on March 26, Baloch insurgents conducted a suicide bombing that killed five Chinese workers in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. These are merely the most recent instances of deadly attacks on Chinese nationals. In 2022, a suicide bombing in Karachi killed three Chinese instructors. In 2021, yet another suicide bombing killed two Chinese nationals in the Gwadar region.

These incidents have raised serious questions over Pakistan’s credentials of being a safe investment for China. In defense, China shut its firms and launched a sound probe into these incidents.

Pakistan is attempting to revive its economic situation and its relations with China, but such incidents might jeopardize long-term Pakistan–China economic relations. The issue of terror attacks paints Pakistan as an unsafe investment, to China and the rest of the world. Regardless, for the time being, China intends to collaborate with Pakistan to protect its personnel.

For Pakistan, going full throttle against insurgents raises the concern of a mass insurgency. However, Pakistan has gradually begun cross-border operations in relation to Afghanistan. The consequences may put Pakistan into a severe security headache as the capital of Islamabad is now caught in a twin terror trap with the TTP and Baloch militants. If flared, this situation could heavily impede Pakistan’s strategic and economic interests.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Pakistan’s Terror Could Ruin Its Last Chance With China appeared first on Fair Observer.

Despite the ongoing strife, world leaders at the 79th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA 79) in September merely reiterated the same sentiments that they have been repeating over the past six months. They condemned Houthi terrorism, but they did not put forward a coherent strategy to halt the strikes and force the Sana’a rebels back to negotiations.

Tensions grow amid broken promises

The people of South Yemen, in particular, cannot wait another year for solutions. Conditions on the ground are ripe for instability. The areas under the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), the Yemeni institution officially recognized by the international community, remain fragile across South Yemen. The PLC and its Saudi-led international allies cannot afford distractions from the fight against Houthis. Neither can the Southern Transitional Council (STC), the secessionist organization backed by the United Arab Emirates. While the PLC and the STC signed the Riyadh Agreement in April 2022, joining forces against the Houthis, the STC still advocates for the South’s secession. As discontent against both leaderships grows, leaders must advance the interests of the marginalized population to sustain momentum against the Houthis.

Via Borysk5 on Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

The Riyadh Agreement not only transferred power from former president Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi to the newly established PLC, but it also served to recognize the STC as the representative of the people of South Yemen. STC chief Aidarus al-Zubaidi stated that the agreement would pave the way “to develop a negotiating framework” wherein “determining the future, the solution of the issue of the people of the South [should come] naturally.” However, more than two years since the STC joined with the PLC, South Yemenis remain marginalized.

Initially, the PLC didn’t aim to resolve the political conflict in the South, but rather to unite ranks with the STC against the Houthis. However, the PLC has not made much progress on this front. Lack of trust between the parties prevented military unity. While the lack of success undoubtedly affects the STC, the PLC became the main focus of criticism when it proved unable to counter Houthi strikes that halted all oil and gas production.

The government has made no progress regarding the issue of southern independence. When al-Zubaidi joined the talks in 2022, he aimed to situate the southern issue front and center. However, a year later, PLC leader Rashad al-Alimi claimed that “now is not the right time to discuss southern independence.” STC officials immediately shot back at al-Alimi, claiming he “showed a lack of seriousness.”

Alimi’s comments inflamed feelings across the South, not only among pro-STC elements but also among the tribes of eastern Yemen, an area that is formally under PLC control. The PLC has failed to meet basic demands for public services in areas like the eastern region of Hadhramaut. When al-Alimi visited Hadhramaut in July, he was met by protests. Then, on October 14, thousands in Seiyun, Hadhramaut sent a clear message to al-Alimi. During a celebration commemorating the 61st anniversary of independence from Britain, citizens of Hadhramaut expressed their support for the STC. On October 19, another event in al-Ghaydah, al-Mahra promoted “Southern Identity” as a symbol against PLC leadership. 

A deepening economic crisis stokes tensions in the South

South Yemenis are dissatisfied. The PLC has failed to eliminate security threats, public services are diminishing, and an economic crisis is deepening. Over the last year, the Houthis have been attacking commercial vessels transiting through the Red and Arabian Seas. Their tactics and weapons have evolved with potency and efficiency. Al-Zubaidi points out that failures to deal with Houthis are “no longer acceptable.” He maintains that “it is in the interest of our people to end the conflict and find a permanent solution.”

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FO° Exclusive: Houthis Cause Chaos in the Red Sea

Not only have the Houthis interfered with international shipping lanes, they have also devastated southern Yemeni ports. This dramatically increases the difficulty of getting imports into South Yemen, exacerbating inflation and choking supplies of international food aid.

According to the OCHA, food imports in the southern ports of Aden and Mukalla declined by 13%. The UN Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA) notes that shortages in incoming aid left “around 3.6 million [Yemenis] with reduced rations.” More funding crises could affect a further 2.5 million. The Yemeni rial also slid “to an all-time low of YER1,681/USD by the end of April 2024.”

The failure to stop Houthi attacks has also prevented Yemen from exporting oil, a potential source of much-needed cash. In mid-2021, the Houthis attempted to take over oil facilities across Shabwa. After they failed to do so, in October 2022 their strategy shifted to using missiles and drones against factories, ports and oil tankers, effectively shutting production down.

Just prior to al-Alimi’s arrival in New York for the UNGA 79, reports surfaced claiming the PLC had failed to produce a new budget. Al-Alimi held meetings with a number of UN officials and representatives of Western donor countries but failed to gain a public commitment for financial support. Until the PLC is able to put forth a cohesive plan to unite the country of Yemen against Houthi threats, Yemen will not receive international support. In the meantime, public unrest will only grow.

[Cheyenne Torres edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Yemen’s Government Cannot Ignore Looming Unrest appeared first on Fair Observer.

Covert games on the edge of war

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), one of the longest and most devastating conflicts in the Middle East, covert operations played a critical role behind the scenes. Mossad, Israel’s intelligence agency, made the calculated decision to support Iran, despite their sworn enmity, to counterbalance the threat posed by Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This strategy was part of Israel’s “periphery doctrine,” which sought to build alliances with non-Arab nations to counter Arab adversaries.

Israel covertly supplied arms to Iran, with US approval to sell unsophisticated weapons. However, Mossad deviated from this agreement, secretly providing advanced, American-made arms to Iran to gain its trust and secure intelligence on Iraq’s main nuclear reactor. This intelligence was crucial for Israel’s Operation Opera in 1981, in which Israeli jets successfully destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor to prevent Saddam from developing nuclear weapons.

The arms trade between Israel and Iran ran smoothly until 1982, when The New York Times exposed Israel’s front company in the US, which was purchasing sophisticated weapons for resale to Iran. In response, Israel shut down its operations in the US and relocated them to London by 1983. Despite the US launching Operation Staunch in 1983 — a campaign to prevent arms sales to Iran — American intelligence largely turned a blind eye to Israel’s ongoing violations of the secret agreement.

This espionage episode underscored three key risks: first, Israel jeopardized its relationship with the US; second, it armed an enemy with advanced weaponry; and third, its strike on Iraq’s nuclear reactor during an ongoing war risked escalating the conflict further. Iran retaliated in 1980 by striking Iraq’s nuclear reactors in Operation Scorch Sword, though with less success than Israel’s Operation Opera.

Throughout this period of covert arms deals and strategic strikes, the US intelligence community remained largely silent, observing from the shadows. Israel’s calculated gamble in supporting Iran, despite their animosity, paid off in the short term. However, such high-stakes moves in geopolitics carry significant risks, and while Israel’s actions yielded favorable outcomes, they could have easily backfired, altering the course of the war and regional dynamics dramatically.

Mossad’s missteps and misjudgments

Mossad’s assessment of Saddam Hussein went off track. One key example was Israel’s belief that Saddam would deploy non-conventional weapons against Israel during the buildup to the Iraq War, particularly between 2002 and 2003. This conviction ignored the reality that Saddam was struggling for survival and lacked the capacity to follow through on such threats. This miscalculation, along with similar errors by British MI6 and the American CIA, contributed to heightened insecurity in the region and played a role in the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The invasion destabilized the region further and contributed to the rise of terror groups like ISIS.

Mossad also misjudged during the 1973 Yom Kippur War when the agency underestimated the threat of an imminent Arab attack. Israel was caught off guard by the Egyptian and Syrian surprise assault on October 6, 1973. This miscalculation could have had dire consequences if not for a timely intelligence input that helped redirect Israel’s military focus, preventing a potentially catastrophic outcome. Despite these lapses, Mossad’s high-risk strategies have at times been necessary, such as in the recent assassination of a Hamas leader.

In October 2024, within a span of just two days, Israel targeted two high-value individuals. On October 15, Israeli forces struck in Lebanon, killing a top Hezbollah commander in an airstrike. The following day, on October 16, Israel carried out a sophisticated operation in Iran, assassinating Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. The attack, which involved a bomb reportedly planted two months earlier in an IRGC-protected guesthouse, was triggered using AI technology once Haniyeh entered the room. Although Israel has not claimed responsibility for the operation, Iran has accused Mossad of orchestrating the assassination. Haniyeh had been a marked target for some time, with Israel labeling him a “dead man walking” and systematically targeting his family members in the months leading up to his death.

For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, this assassination provided a temporary reprieve from mounting political pressure amid the ongoing conflict and deadlocked hostage negotiations. The operation is seen as Israel’s retaliation for the October 7, 2023 attacks, during which Hamas launched a large-scale assault on southern Israel. However, questions remain about the broader impact of Haniyeh’s assassination. Some experts argue that his removal might facilitate more productive negotiations and increase the likelihood of reaching a deal, while others caution that the complexities of such high-stakes operations make the outcome uncertain.

Risky business, deterrence and escalation 

The core argument remains: Mossad’s risky tradecraft maneuvers, especially in the context of escalating conflicts, carry the risk of crossing red lines and reducing the space for negotiation — something Israel needs to resolve its hostage dilemma. The issue isn’t about protecting national security interests; it’s about the timing and level of risk Mossad chooses to take, which can sometimes lead to undesirable outcomes. Currently, Israel’s aggressive stance could escalate the conflict and complicate its hostage deal efforts.

There are two perspectives on the risks Mossad is taking. The first suggests that maintaining an offensive posture will deter and weaken the “axis of resistance” (a coalition of anti-Israel groups), forcing them to negotiate and eventually de-escalate. The second perspective warns that prolonging the conflict could dangerously expand Middle East brinkmanship, creating external and internal consequences for Israel.

While a prolonged conflict isn’t in the best interest of the region, it offers Iran a strategic opportunity to pressure the US-Israel alliance, potentially forcing negotiations on Iranian terms. In this context, Mossad may once again engage in high-stakes gambles to weaken Iran’s proxies politically and militarily. However, Mossad’s actions might also prompt the CIA to intensify deterrence efforts to preserve regional stability, illustrating the fragile balance of power in West Asia.

The historical example of Abu Jihad’s assassination by Mossad in 1988, one of the founders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), had unintended consequences. Rather than weakening Palestinian resistance, it fueled the First Intifada, which lasted until 1993 and resulted in 227 Israeli deaths. Mossad’s assessment seemed to contradict that of Israel’s Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who believed Abu Jihad was a moderate leader who could have restrained Yasser Arafat. According to Israel’s Military Intelligence Chief, Amnon Lipkin, Abu Jihad’s charisma might have prevented Hamas from gaining the significant foothold it did among the Palestinian population. This illustrates the long-term risks of Mossad’s operations, where tactical successes may lead to strategic setbacks.

Iran-Israel conflict: “grey” in the balance of power

The Middle East has faced the complexities of Cold War 2.0 and grey zone conflicts since the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 2000s. However, the current grey zone dynamics are more pronounced than ever, suggesting that the region may oscillate between states of “no peace, no war” and periods of heightened conflict. In the near term, the “no peace, no war” scenario seems more likely, which could strategically shift the balance of power in favor of Israel. This shift would not only undermine Iran’s credibility but also set the stage for Israel’s resurgence, reminiscent of the post-1967 Arab-Israeli War period.

Such a reconfiguration of power could encourage more active US involvement in the Middle East, as a weakened Iran and a strengthened Israel open the door to diplomatic and political opportunities that serve both Western interests and regional stability. However, this strategic realignment may also heighten security concerns, disrupting the economic and political potential of Gulf states like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which rely on stability for growth.

On the other hand, if the region settles into a prolonged “no peace, no war” scenario, security concerns will persist but at more sustainable levels. In this context, Iran could find space to regroup and rebuild its proxy networks. While Israel’s rise and the weakening of Iranian proxies might seem like a strategic advantage, history shows that such situations can lead to the resurgence of these very factions. For instance, the US failure to capture Osama bin Laden during the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001 eventually facilitated the Taliban’s resurgence. Similarly, Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, known as Operation Peace for Galilee, is often seen as a strategic miscalculation that contributed to the emergence of Hezbollah.

This historical precedent suggests that Iran’s weakened proxies could regroup and wage an enduring proxy war against Israel. While this dynamic may disrupt peace and stability, it is unlikely to escalate into full-scale war. Iran seems to have learned crucial lessons about the effective and restrained use of proxy forces, leading to a more cautious approach. Thus, while the potential for conflict remains, the likelihood of another extensive war seems low, leaving the region in a state of fragmented peace.

Iran’s options and future

Having run out of strategic patience, Iran has escalated tensions by launching ballistic missile strikes against Israel. These actions are almost certain to trigger a strong retaliatory response. In this volatile situation, Iran faces two main choices.

First, it could engage in a limited war with Israel. While this option risks significant damage to Iran, which is already at a strategic disadvantage, it could also help revive its proxy networks, allowing Tehran to reassert its regional influence.

Alternatively, Iran could pursue backchannel diplomacy to initiate serious negotiations with Israel, seeking to avoid direct conflict. This option becomes more attractive as Israel deals with urgent concerns about hostages, making negotiations a more viable path to de-escalation.

Following Iran’s rocket attack, which may have caused moderate damage in Tel Aviv, Israel has vowed to retaliate. However, this escalation raises concerns about a broader regional war. While the US is advocating for a measured response, Israel prefers a swift and decisive strike. Recent comments by Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu suggest that Israel will focus on military targets rather than civilian infrastructure like oil and gas facilities, which Iran has previously targeted. A moderate but effective strike is expected.

Iran’s reaction to Israel’s retaliation will be crucial to watch. Although Israel has received THAAD missile systems for defense, targeting Iran’s military, particularly IRGC sites, could lead to direct confrontation between the two rivals and increase US involvement. A limited strike on key locations could have a similar impact as targeting strategic sites in Iran. Israel’s calculated, swift offensive will be a decisive response, but Iran’s next move remains uncertain and will be critical in the coming days.

[Tara Yarwais edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Mossad’s Gambling Has Exposed Dangers of Brinkmanship In the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

In Gaza, Israel appears to be launching its “Generals’ Plan” to drive the most devastated and traumatized 2.2 million people in the world into the southern half of their open-air prison. Under this plan, Israel would hand the northern half over to greedy developers and settlers who, after decades of encouragement from the United States, have become a dominant force in Israeli politics and society. The redoubled slaughter of those who cannot or refuse to move south has already begun.

In Lebanon, millions are fleeing for their lives. Israel is blowing thousands to pieces in a repeat of the first phase of the genocide in Gaza. Every person it kills or forces out and every building in a neighboring country it demolishes opens the way for future Israeli settlements. The people of Iran, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia ask which of them will be next.

Israel attacks UNIFIL

Israel is not only attacking its neighbors — it is at war with the entire world. The nation is especially threatened when the world’s governments convene at the United Nations and in international courts to try to enforce the rule of international law. Like every other country, Israel is legally bound by the rules of the UN Charter, the Geneva Conventions and other multilateral treaties.

In July, the International Court of Justice ruled that Israel’s occupation of Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem since 1967 is illegal, and that it must withdraw its military forces and settlers from all those territories. In September, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution giving Israel one year to complete that withdrawal. If Israel fails to comply, as expected, the UN Security Council or the General Assembly may take stronger measures. These could include an international arms embargo, economic sanctions or even the use of force.

Now, amid the escalating violence of Israel’s latest bombing and invasion of Lebanon, Israel is attacking the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). This peacekeeping force’s thankless job is to monitor and mitigate the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the Iran-backed Shiite militia and political party in Lebanon.

On October 10 and 11, Israeli forces fired on three UNIFIL positions in Lebanon. At least five peacekeepers were injured. UNIFIL also accused Israeli soldiers of deliberately firing at and disabling the monitoring cameras at its headquarters, before two Israeli tanks later crashed into its gates, destroying them. On October 15, an Israeli tank fired at a watchtower in what UNIFIL described as “direct and apparently deliberate fire on a UNIFIL position.” Deliberately targeting UN missions is a war crime.

This is far from the first time Israel has attacked the soldiers of UNIFIL. The force has the worst death toll of any of the UN’s 52 peacekeeping missions since 1948. Since UNIFIL took up its positions in southern Lebanon in 1978, Israel has killed UN peacekeepers from Ireland, Norway, Nepal, France, Finland, Austria and China. The South Lebanon Army, Israel’s Christian militia proxy in Lebanon from 1984 to 2000, killed many more, as have other Palestinian and Lebanese groups. In fact, 337 UN peacekeepers from all over the world have perished trying to keep the peace in southern Lebanon, which is sovereign Lebanese territory and should not face repeated Israeli invasions. 

A full 50 countries contribute to the 10,000-strong UNIFIL peacekeeping mission, anchored by battalions from France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Italy, Nepal and Spain. All those governments have strongly and unanimously condemned Israel’s latest attacks, and insisted that “such actions must stop immediately and should be adequately investigated.”

Israel works to dismantle UNRWA

Israel’s assault on UN agencies is not confined to attacking its peacekeepers in Lebanon. The vulnerable United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), staffed by unarmed civilians, is under an even more vicious assault by Israel in Gaza. In the past year alone, Israel has bombed and fired on UNRWA schools, warehouses, aid convoys and UN personnel, killing nearly 230 workers.

UNRWA was created in 1949 by the UN General Assembly to provide relief to Palestinian refugees after the 1948 Nakba (catastrophe). The Zionist militias that later became the Israeli army violently expelled over 700,000 Palestinians from their homes and homeland, ignoring the UN partition plan. They forcibly seized much of the land the UN plan had allocated to form a Palestinian state.

In 1949, the UN recognized all that Zionist-occupied territory as the new state of Israel. The state’s most aggressive, racist leaders concluded that they could get away with making and remaking their own borders by force — the world would not lift a finger to stop them. Emboldened by its growing military and diplomatic alliance with the US, Israel has only expanded its territorial ambitions.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu now brazenly stands before the whole world and displays maps of “Greater Israel” that include all the land it illegally occupies. Meanwhile Israelis openly talk of annexing parts of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Israel has long desired to dismantle UNRWA. In 2017, Netanyahu accused the agency of inciting anti-Israeli sentiment. He blamed UNRWA for “perpetuating the Palestinian refugee problem” and called for its elimination.

After Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, Israel accused 12 of UNRWA’s 13,000 staff of involvement. The agency immediately suspended those workers, and many countries pulled their UNRWA funding. However, a UN report later found that Israeli authorities did not provide “any supporting evidence” to back up their allegations. Since this revelation, every country that previously supported UNRWA except the US has restored its funding.

Israel’s assault on the refugee agency has only continued. There are now three anti-UNRWA bills in the Israeli Knesset. One aims to ban the organization from operating in Israel, another to strip UNRWA’s staff of legal protections afforded to UN workers under Israeli law and a third to brand the agency as a terrorist organization. Israeli members of parliament are also proposing legislation to confiscate UNRWA’s headquarters in Jerusalem and use the land for new settlements.

UN Secretary General Guterres warned that if these bills become law and UNRWA is unable to aid the people of Gaza, “it would be a catastrophe in what is already an unmitigated disaster.”

The US obstructs resolution

Israel’s relationship with the UN and the rest of the world is at a breaking point. When Netanyahu addressed the General Assembly in New York in September, he called the UN a “swamp of antisemitic bile.” But the UN is not an alien body from another planet. It is simply the world’s nations coming together to try to solve our most serious common problems. One of these problems is the endless crisis that Israel’s actions are causing for its neighbors and, increasingly, the whole planet.

Now Israel wants to ban UN Secretary General António Guterres from even entering the country. AsIsrael invaded Lebanon on October 1, Iran responded to a series of Israeli attacks and assassinations by launching 180 missiles at Israel. Guterres put out a statement deploring the “broadening conflict in the Middle East,” but did not specifically mention Iran. Israel responded by declaring him persona non grata in Israel, a new low in relations between Israel and UN officials.

Over the years, the US has partnered with Israel in its attacks on the UN. It has used its veto in the Security Council 40 times to obstruct the world’s efforts to force Israel to comply with international law.

US obstruction offers no solution. As chaos grows and spreads and the US’s unconditional support gradually pulls it deeper into the conflict, this policy can only fuel the crisis.

The rest of the world is looking on in horror. Many world leaders are making sincere efforts to activate the collective mechanisms of the UN system. US leadership helped build these mechanisms in 1945 so that the world would never again be consumed by global conflict and genocide after World War II.

A US arms embargo against Israel and an end to US obstruction in the UN Security Council could tip the political power balance in favor of the world’s collective efforts to resolve the crisis.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Israel’s Surging War on the World appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Cypriot character

The 50-year intractability of the Cyprob shows a great deal about the character of Cypriots. Over the past 25 years, both sides have engaged in political posturing and rhetoric about achieving an enduring solution, and have participated in an endless series of UN-mediated talks and negotiations. Yet they have found every excuse imaginable to withdraw. Their defining characteristics are stubbornness and a compulsion to secure total partisan victory and globally recognized justice at all costs.

As my Cypriot lawyer once observed, “Ah, Alan-mou, you British are so sensible when you weigh up the pros and cons of taking legal action. All my Cypriot clients are hell bent on their day in court! They really do believe that venting their indignation in court will guarantee them a well-deserved just outcome for all the world to see. Regrettably, it is rarely so. Einai megalo diskolo [it’s a big problem]. They fail to recognize that the other party also has rights and maybe a good case and that compromises and trade-offs may be required. They refuse to accept that getting 80% of something is better than getting 100% of nothing.” So far, both sides in the Cyprob dispute have obtained the latter.

Despite such obstinacy, the hostility between them has markedly declined over the past 25 years. They have developed a healthy modus vivendi — an agreement for conflicting parties to coexist peacefully. GCs and TCs tend to regard themselves as Cypriots first and foremost, and value their shared heritage. Although they acknowledge a vague fealty to their respective ancestral origins — Greece and Turkey, respectively — Cypriots tend to trust their Cypriotness first. They back away from any perceived diktats or interference from the capitals of Athens or Ankara.

Official crossing points over the Green Line first opened up in 2003. There are now nine. The nearest to my house was in the next village of Pyla (Pile); it provides the most scenic rural route up to north Nicosia, then across the Pentadaktylos Mountains and down to Kyrenia (Girne) and its picturesque harbor surrounded by quayside restaurants. Looking down on Kyrenia from the north slopes of the Pentadaktylos is the village of Bellapais. Its name means “beautiful land” in its original Italian, and sure enough, it is home to an old abbey from the Venetian era. Bellapais (Beylerbeyi) was also the home of famous English author Lawrence Durrell, and the site where he wrote his acclaimed novel, Bitter Lemons of Cyprus.

Opposite the abbey is the Tree of Idleness corner. Legend suggests that countless writers and others who sat under a 200-year-old robinia tree here were overcome with a soporific lack of motivation. Today, the Tree of Idleness Restaurant is the legend’s legacy.

From my many visits, I can attest to the restaurant’s good food and hospitality. On one occasion, it was closed for a private party: the annual dinner and awards ceremony of a wrestling and martial arts society. Yet the maître d’ found a spare table and invited me in, provided I did not mind sharing the private party’s menu. Mind? Of course not! It was a wonderful evening with great cuisine, Kavaklidere red wine, Efes beer, raki and a cabaret, plus socializing with Turkish wrestlers!

Readers may have noticed that most Cypriot towns and villages have multiple names: one Greek, one Turkish and sometimes one English. The capital, known outside Cyprus by its English name of Nicosia, is Lefkosia to the GCs and Lefkosha to the TCs. The eastern city known as Famagusta in English is Ammochostos to the GCs and Gazimaguza to the TCs. Road signs may chop and change between all versions, which can confuse inexperienced foreigners.

Every day, many TCs travel across the Green Line to work or trade in the GC-controlled south. Meanwhile, GCs travel across to the TRNC area for leisure and to purchase cheap commodities. On weekends, GCs head up to Kyrenia in droves to gamble in the casinos there, which are more numerous and lightly controlled compared to the stricter regulation in the south.

Cyprus’s split population totals some 1.36 million. Approximately 933,500 people live in the Republic controlled by the GCs, which covers the southern two-thirds of the island. The rest dwell in the breakaway TC-controlled northern third. Additionally, the summer period from early April to late October sees another four million tourists temporarily swell the population by over 500,000 per month in the GC-controlled area alone. Foreign tourists also arrive in the TRNC via the Erjan (Tymbou) international airport near north Nicosia.

A culture of warmth and pleasure

Present-day Cypriots reflect their rich heritage, not only genetically, but culturally and linguistically. For example, the GCs in the Republic-controlled south still officially use Turkish terms and concepts from the Ottoman period. Some examples include the aforementioned mukhtar for the local mayor, donum for a measure of land and kochan or gotchan for a title deed.

There is a distinctly cosmopolitan feel about Cyprus, mainly owing to the broad spectrum of foreigners who are either residents, tourists or business visitors. Cypriots are relatively sophisticated and as up-to-date with technology, business and social trends as any developed European nation. Yet, paradoxically, the Cypriot culture is essentially that of a big village, with all the parochial characteristics that implies. The GCs even have a descriptive word for it: choriatiki, derived from the Greek word chorio (village). Everyone in a village seems to be somehow related to the next person and to others in neighboring villages or beyond. Foreigners often forget the close-knit familial links; many have incurred displeasure when they criticized a particular Cypriot, unaware that the listener is his/her relative.

Cypriots are highly sociable people. Strangers exchange greetings in the street, just like they did in my childhood village in England during the 1950s and 1960s. They enjoy being with people and talking a lot. They call each other mou, eg Alan-mou (“my Alan”) or fili mou (“my friend”), as a term of endearment. When sitting at a table chatting to someone, they touch the other person’s forearm as a sign of trust and affection.

To Cypriots, time is an elastic concept — ignoring timetables, schedules and deadlines a part of etiquette. After all, why rush and get stressed when having a chat and a metrio or sketo coffee in the kafeneon or taverna is much more pleasant? “Siga-siga!” (“Slow down!”) the GCs say, while the TCs invoke, “Yavash-yavash, rahatlamak!” (“Slow down, relax!”)

In Cyprus, a stop into the local taverna (coffee shop) for a half-hour of relaxation is a daily ritual for locals and expat foreigners alike. In the summer months, al fresco tables and chairs under awnings or umbrellas offer a welcome respite from the blazing sun and daily bustle. Every year, the country enjoys up to 340 days of sunshine and, in the June–September period, temperatures may reach 40–45 degrees Celsius (104–113 degrees Fahrenheit). When I lived there, it was almost a guarantee that I could sunbathe from the end of January to mid-November.

Cypriot friendliness and hospitality are legendary. In a GC establishment, friends, acquaintances and servers typically greet new arrivals, even strangers, with a welcoming “Kalimera, fili mou! Eistai kala?” (“Good day, my friend! Are you okay?”) This person may then reply, “Eimai kala, efcharisto poli,” (“I’m good, thanks a lot,”) or perhaps “Etzi-getzi” (“So-so”) or “Beninda-beninda” (“50/50”).

In TC establishments, the call would be, “Günaydin, hoshgel deniz! Iyi misin?” (“Good day, welcome! Are you okay?”). A positive response would be, “Tashaköl, ben iyiyim. Tchok mamnoun.” (“Thanks, I’m fine. Much obliged.”) If you are not feeling on top form, you might reply, “Shül-e bül-e, yari-yariya” (“So-so, 50/50”).

Incredible nightlife and weddings

Cypriots like to party but they tend to start late. Bouzoukias (tavernas with live bouzouki music, more of a nightspot than simply a taverna) rarely start to fill up before 9:30 PM. Spontaneous Greek dancing starts around 10:30 PM or once enough alcohol has been consumed. It may last for hours, going well beyond midnight.

The sound of a well-played bouzouki is spell-binding. Everyone is invited, even expected, to join in. One of the most enthralling dances is the mono dance, which involves a single dancer watched by gathered patrons. The irregular dance steps and moves are beyond description but take great skill to perform. I spent years trying to understand it. Then one day, a Cypriot confided that the mono dance’s other name is the “drunkard’s dance.” This name is spot-on!

Despite that nickname, it is rare to see Cypriots get drunk. Unlike some northern Europeans, they do not descend on hostelries to get rip-roaringly intoxicated. Locals do consume beer, but tend to imbibe more wine and the local zivania spirit — a beverage similar to the Italian grappa (a clear, grape-based alcohol similar to vodka). I can attest to the fact that zivania is not for the fainthearted. I can hold my own with tequila but getting inebriated on zivania once was enough for me!

The smoking of tobacco products is now officially banned in all enclosed bars, restaurants, tavernas, nightclubs and similar establishments throughout the Republic including TRNC-controlled areas. During the seven summer months (May–November), patrons can sit outside; smoking is widely allowed in such al fresco areas. As a cigar smoker, I welcome this dispensation. Police raids are very infrequent in villages, and some establishment owners may turn a blind eye to indoor smoking.

When it comes to parties, my wife and I agree that nothing competes with a full-on Greek wedding, especially a traditional “village wedding.” Typically, the whole village and beyond are invited to the reception. This can easily amount to 500–1,000 people and sometimes many more. When our mukhtar’s son married, the family had to hire a special stadium miles away that could accommodate the 2,500 guests and catering facilities.

Many weddings are held in special wedding halls. There is no dress code, so some guests wear tuxedos, others casual clothes and even work garb. I vividly recall a brawny male guest at one wedding who was in well-worn denim dungarees with his shirt sleeves rolled up, making him look like a farm worker who had just gotten off a tractor! He walked back from the buffet to his table carrying a piled-up plate of food in one hand and three large bottles of Keo beer between the fingers of his other hand. These celebrations attract all types! This behavior was totally acceptable, but still provided conversation for the other chattering guests. The “anything goes” nature of Greek wedding receptions is always wonderful.

Cypriot enterprise culture

Another Cypriot characteristic is business acumen and a high prevalence of entrepreneurship, from small to large businesses. Today, these are typically in the broad spectrum of tourism, including hotels, restaurants, bars and travel; real estate, including developers, contractors, sales agents and rental agents; retailers of all description, and agriculture. Professional, business and IT services, both within Cyprus and regionally, also flourish.

Cyprus has long been a location for registration of marine fleets from around the world. I got to know representatives from most of these sectors, including some high-profile individuals. Some became my good friends.

The enterprise ethos does, however, mask a more difficult characteristic of a minority of participants, whether private business people or public servants. While most Cypriots are law-abiding and try to conduct themselves with integrity, some are less scrupulous and adopt a “what can we get away with?” attitude. This comes at a cost to customers and clients, as well as society and the economy as a whole. These rogues believe that they are entitled to enrich themselves or gain unfair advantage by questionable if not unlawful means.

Such miscreants exist in every country, but in Cyprus they have developed fraud and corruption into an art form. Fraud is widely regarded not as a “real” crime, but as a game and battle of wits. Even government ministers and attorney generals have referred to it by the quaint, minimalizing term, “cheating.” This implies that even when vast sums of money have been defrauded, it is only a trivial matter — just a bit of naughtiness by lovable scallywags. Unfortunately, few are truly lovable, and this bad minority has a disproportionate impact on the country.

The social attitude towards fraud and corruption is summed up by the typical reaction Cypriots have when challenged on the subject: “Afti einai i Kypros. Stin Kypro, ola einai pithana” (“This is Cyprus. In Cyprus, anything is possible”), coupled with a shoulder shrug and a knowing look. They imply that a person’s objectives can still be reached using corruption if more honest attempts have failed.

When the Council of Europe’s Groupe d’États Contre la Corruption (GRECO) anti-corruption body initially reviewed Cyprus in 2005, its report found that senior government representatives were in flat denial that corruption even existed in Cyprus. Since then, successive GRECO reports, including the latest report (2023–2024), suggest that authorities have made some progress in combating corruption but still have some way to go.

Over the past 20 years, Cyprus has seen huge scandals involving fraud and corruption. One of the most pervasive and notorious was the Cyprus Property Fraud and Title Deeds Scandal. I wrote a whole section on it, including seven case studies, in my 2013 book, Corporate Risk and Governance. By 2008, over 30,000 properties fully purchased by an estimated 60,000 foreign buyers had not been issued with title deed transfers after five years. Mine took eight years to obtain, and some have taken over 30!

From 2007 to 2016, I contributed to the Cyprus Property Action Group (CPAG), led by Denis O’Hare and Nigel Howarth. This organization fought to bring justice to thousands of mainly foreign buyers of residential real estate in Cyprus who had been scammed. CPAG lobbied in Cyprus, the UK and in the European Parliament for changes to and enforcement of legislation concerning property purchases in the Republic of Cyprus.

Additionally, many buyers had lost their invested money to one of at least 12 categories of fraud perpetrated by developers, agents or lawyers, aided and abetted by corrupt officials. So many property fraud cases were reported to police that, by 2009, the Attorney General decreed that property fraud was no longer a criminal offense. Therefore, the police would no longer take reports from defrauded buyers who instead would have to raise their own cases in civil court.

Cyprus authorities, banks and lawyers often assert that Cyprus law closely follows English law, including property law. As I noted, “It is puzzling why property crime has been singled out for this dispensation. Why not also for murder, rape, robbery or blackmail? Why are long-winded civil cases forced on property victims before a criminal investigation is allowed, even when strong prima facie evidence of a crime exists? A perverse parody of English law appears to be acted out.”

The Cyprus Financial Crisis of 2013 escalated things. It involved the collapse of Marfin Laiki Bank, the country’s second-largest bank; the near collapse of the Bank of Cyprus, the country’s largest bank, and the near bankruptcy of the government. The crisis was precipitated largely by the property market debt bubble and financial mismanagement by the banks and government. In order to get an emergency bailout by the EU, the European Central Bank and the IMF (dubbed The Troika), the government had to enforce stringent and radical change requirements for numerous practices. These included corporate governance, banking practice, due diligence, loan applicant background checks, non-performing and delinquent loans recovery, foreclosure and title deeds transfer.

Cyprus has made some advances. Title deeds issuance and transfer has seen process improvements, so its huge backlog has been reduced substantially. The policy of requiring a search certificate before transfer can proceed has reduced the level of hidden liens, earlier mortgages and encumbrances springing nasty surprises on innocent buyers. Nevertheless, Cyprus property expert Nigel Howarth agrees that unacceptable delays in title deed transfers still remain, as does the requirement for innocent buyers to pay for prior planning infringements. As he told me recently, “the ‘victim pays’ culture is embedded.” Corrupt practices involving state actors also continue to evolve.

Encouragingly, in 2014, a new Auditor General, Odysseas Michaelides, heralded a determination by authorities to clamp down on corporate and institutional fraud and corruption. As my December 2014 article for Financial Mirror reported, a whole bevy of individuals in public and private sector organizations suddenly found themselves charged with major crimes, convicted and receiving long jail sentences. There was then hope for justice in Cyprus after all.

Nevertheless, new cases have arisen. The most high profile one followed an Al Jazeera exposé in October 2020 of the Cyprus “passports for cash” scandal. This ongoing case eventually had eight indicted defendants, including former Transport Minister Marios Demetriades, awaiting trial in September 2024.

Michaelides’s anti-corruption success and personal style eventually became too much for the patricians of the Cyprus Establishment. In September 2024, he suddenly faced a barrage — or perhaps an orchestrated attack — of pious public criticism by politicians and state officials. They received backup from a Supreme Constitutional Court decision that he had abused his position, exceeded his authority and prejudiced due legal process by his media statements. Michaelides’s dismissal as Auditor General was publicly announced as a fait accompli. Moreover, the “passports for cash” trial suddenly “disappeared.” Recidivism and “sovereign corruption” are alive and well.

Cynics suggest the whole saga was engineered so the republic could slip back into its timeless, undisturbed, cozy and corrupt culture of yesteryear. This development does not bode well for Cyprus.

Shady characters, big and small

Among a Cyprus population of law-abiding citizens exists a minority cadre of what can best be described as shady characters. In addition to the white-collar crime proclivities described above, there are a few prominent gangsters running protection rackets, trafficking operations, money laundering and other well-honed criminal activities.

Arguably the most notorious gangster in recent times was Antonis Fanieros, who died in 2017. Tales of his activities became legendary. He seemed to revel in what he portrayed as a Robin Hood persona — he was “helping” ordinary citizens obtain some justice, as they allegedly could not rely on the police or courts to resolve their issues. His protection rackets around the city of Larnaca were well-known; several of my acquaintances who ran small businesses there paid up to avoid retribution.

I even met one of Fanieros’s enforcers. This man regularly visited one of my taverna haunts to check that nothing untoward was afoot. He was a pleasant, affable fellow who would sit at my table and chat. He was even a talented Greek dancer. But, I always watched my words and behavior, just in case!

Fanieros was so prominent that he tried to stand as a Member of Parliament. However, he failed to obtain the essential “good character” certificate from the police. Rather than landing a parliamentary position, he earned a public rebuke from the Police Chief for his audacity.

Even the innocent can sometimes fall foul of perceptions, as I once discovered at a wonderful mezedopoleon restaurant and nightspot in the village of Skarinou. The place was packed with Cypriots. I seemed to be the only anglos (Englishmen) in the place, but with my Cypriot friends around, I wasn’t at all nervous. The meze — a meal style consisting of small plates of various foods — served here was superb, the beer and wine were flowing and the live bouzoukia-style music had everyone in a good mood.

Once the meal was over, I noticed that some Cypriots at surrounding tables had lit cigarettes; this was customary. So, enjoying cigars as I do, I lit up a Cuban decimos cigar and started to puff contentedly. I became aware that several patrons at other tables were looking at me with slightly anxious expressions. Were cigars not allowed? Was I smoking in a non-smoking zone? What was the problem?

One of my companions explained: “It’s not the cigar that’s the problem. It’s you and the way you are smoking it. With several scars on your face and close-cropped hair, you look quite tough. And you hold your cigar like someone out of a gangster movie. They probably think you are one of the Limassol Russian mafioski [mafia member]. They are wondering why you’re here and if there’s going to be trouble.”

Me? I wouldn’t hurt a fly. I love Nisi-mou Afroditi too much.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post My Long Love Affair with Aphrodite’s Island appeared first on Fair Observer.

Continued escalation by Israel, on the other hand, will increase the likelihood of another Lebanese Civil War or a wider regional conflagration. It may also play right into the hands of Hezbollah.

What is the US policy towards Lebanon?

Ever since the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Friday, September 27, US policy regarding Israel’s invasion of Lebanon has been opaque. Earlier that week, the US had collaborated with France and several allied nations in presenting a 21-day ceasefire proposal to Israel and Lebanon, as well as indirectly to Hezbollah. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu flip-flopped on the proposal throughout much of that week.

At the same time, there are reports that the US, while publicly calling for the ceasefire, tacitly gave Israel some form of approval to escalate heavily in Lebanon. Lebanese Foreign Minister Abdallah Bou Habib has also stated that Israel was aware Hezbollah accepted the proposal and then decided to assassinate the organization’s leader Hassan Nasrallah and proceed with a bombing campaign and ground invasion of Lebanon.

War in Lebanon is not in Israel’s interests

Israel’s official war objective vis-à-vis Lebanon is to create a safe border area so that the roughly 60,000 Israelis displaced by Hezbollah rocket attacks in the north can return to their homes. Yet the US has publicly stated that the fastest and ultimately the most sustainable way to achieve this is diplomacy. Israel has invaded Lebanon four times over the past five decades and has, to date, been unable to eliminate all threats to its security by force. In any event, there can be no diplomatic deal while Lebanon is under invasion.

Further, the longer Israel continues to escalate with Hezbollah, the greater the risk of a state-to-state war with its backer Iran becomes.

A ceasefire is the first step in the diplomatic process. It would enable the deployment of US-supported Lebanese Armed Forces to the border area and ultimately facilitate the demarcation of the Israel–Lebanon land border so that civilian communities are protected for generations to come.

Israel’s current invasion and bombing campaign of Lebanon are going far beyond their stated goal. It appears Israel is trying to eliminate Hezbollah completely, and there is no clear timetable or roadmap for how to do that.

Israeli escalation may strengthen Hezbollah

It is quite likely that Israel’s overreach will backfire. Widespread civilian death and displacement are fueling resentment and anger towards Israel that ironically may drive people to join Hezbollah or other aligned groups.

Hezbollah’s origins as an organization trace back to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It bills itself as the defender of Lebanon. So, Israel’s land invasion of Lebanon is justifying the organization’s raison d’être. 

Furthermore, at a time when Hezbollah’s popularity has been waning in Lebanon, Israel’s brutal assaults in the country may actually be resuscitating the group. Hezbollah’s 2006 war with Israel greatly boosted its legitimacy and led to its heightened influence in government for years to come. While there is no doubt the organization is greatly weakened today, it is likely, with the violent assault against it, to revert back to its original framework, operating outside the state rather than cooperating with it. The last time this was the case, the group carried out brutal attacks and assassinations even outside the borders of Lebanon. Hezbollah may again pivot away from its affiliation with a corrupt political establishment and use popular resentment against Israel and, by extension, the US to justify itself and attract new followers.

The interests of the US are in a resolution, not a prolonged conflict 

There are two dangerous scenarios that continued hostilities in Lebanon can lead to. 

First, Israel’s invasion may destabilize Lebanon. Even prior to the outbreak of the ongoing Israel–Hamas war on October 7, 2023, Lebanon was one of the most fragile states in the world. The delicate balance of power between the country’s various sects had created a prolonged political gridlock. The humanitarian crisis Israel is creating, with already one million people internally displaced, will likely exacerbate social tensions that could quite easily erupt into civil conflict and effective state collapse. In this scenario, malign actors will exploit the resulting power vacuum. The corresponding instability will be to Israel’s detriment. 

Secondly, the Israeli invasion may lead to a hot war with Iran. The US policy aim for the last year has been to diplomatically resolve this conflict, not to go to war with Iran and its terrorist allies. If Israel provokes such a conflict, it will put US forces and interests at threat of being attacked and would likely necessitate a direct US military commitment.

Even though Hezbollah is greatly crippled presently, it is still part of Iran’s axis. Iran has already responded to Israel’s escalation and attacked it directly. Israel’s strategy as of late appears to be to try and provoke Iran into a larger conflict. If the US is not careful, Iran may change its posture from avoiding a full-scale war with Israel to preparing for one. If this calculus changes, the US would necessarily have to intervene and then this conflict will have escalated to one between states with no clear offramp.

However, there is still time. Hezbollah Deputy Chief Nasim Qassem’s apparent de-linking of a ceasefire in Lebanon from a truce in Gaza could be a major breakthrough and indicator that Hezbollah may pivot its operations internally. Right now, Hezbollah does not pose the same threat to Israel’s security as it did one year ago and is signaling to Israel it is ready to end this conflict.

The US should leave no stone unturned in pushing Israel, Lebanon and Hezbollah towards a ceasefire and diplomatic solution before it is too late.

[The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the American Task Force on Lebanon.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post As Israel Invades, the US Must Push for Peace in Lebanon appeared first on Fair Observer.

A nation in transformation

Saudi Arabia, long overshadowed by outdated perceptions, is emerging with a renewed vigour, redefining its identity on the world stage. The Crown Prince’s Vision 2030, unveiled in 2016, is not merely a document; it is a beacon of aspiration that illuminates the path forward, guiding the nation toward unprecedented economic growth, social reform and cultural openness. The very air is thick with energy, a palpable sense of anticipation and possibility that invigorates both Saudis and expatriates alike.

As a lawyer who has recently relocated to this enchanting land, I find myself enveloped in a wave of warmth and camaraderie. The close bonds between Saudi Arabia and my homeland, Pakistan, resonate deeply within me, making this country feel like a second home. The hospitality I have encountered here is extraordinary, shattering the preconceived notions that often cloud the Western perspective. It is a kindness that transcends borders, a gesture of friendship that welcomes all who seek to embrace this remarkable transformation.

One of the most striking aspects of this new Saudi Arabia is its progressive approach toward introducing new laws and inviting foreign investment. The kingdom has rolled out a red carpet for international businesses, showcasing its commitment to creating a dynamic economy. The recent landmark investment law exemplifies this shift — a comprehensive piece of legislation that not only outlines the regulations but also provides a roadmap for investors, answering their queries with clarity and precision. The Saudi Ministry of Investment has crafted a detailed guide, ensuring that the path to doing business in the kingdom is as seamless as possible.

This endeavor is not merely about economic growth; it reflects a profound commitment to creating an environment where innovation thrives and opportunities abound. The kingdom is embracing technology, encouraging startups and investing in industries that will shape the future. As I navigate this landscape, I see a burgeoning entrepreneurial spirit that echoes the dreams and aspirations of a youthful population eager to carve their niche in a rapidly evolving world.

Beyond the realm of economics, Saudi Arabia is undergoing a renaissance in terms of quality of life. The bustling streets of Riyadh and Jeddah pulse with a vibrant energy, offering rich culture, entertainment and recreation. The government is investing in infrastructure, education and healthcare, ensuring that the people of Saudi Arabia can enjoy a higher standard of living.

Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman’s vision for the future encompasses not only economic prosperity but also social progress. The once-restrictive societal norms are giving way to a more inclusive environment where women are stepping into roles traditionally dominated by men. The winds of change are empowering women, allowing them to participate actively in various sectors — from entrepreneurship to leadership positions — ushering in a new era of gender equality.

As an expatriate, I have witnessed firsthand the remarkable strides being made in this area. Women are breaking barriers, shattering glass ceilings, and contributing to the kingdom’s development in profound ways. The enthusiasm and determination of Saudi women are inspiring, creating a ripple effect that is felt across the nation.

A hospitable, warm and optimistic people

While certain Western narratives have long painted Saudi Arabia in hues of conservatism and restriction, the reality on the ground is a kaleidoscope of progress and openness. The kingdom is cultivating a global identity, one that embraces cultural exchange and fosters international partnerships. The Vision 2030 initiative encompasses not only economic aspirations but also a commitment to cultural heritage, education and tourism.

The energy of the youth is infectious; students are pursuing higher education both locally and abroad, eager to acquire the skills that will propel them into the future. Universities and institutions are collaborating with global partners, creating knowledge and innovation that is reshaping the educational landscape. The kingdom is no longer a passive participant in the global discourse but an active contributor, eager to share its story with the world.

At the heart of this transformation is the innate hospitality of the Saudi people — a trait that has long been woven into the fabric of their culture. The warmth with which expatriates are embraced is a testament to the kingdom’s desire to foster understanding and camaraderie. From the bustling markets filled with vibrant colors to the tranquil evenings spent sharing stories over cups of Arabic coffee, there is a profound sense of belonging that permeates the air.

The love and generosity I have experienced resonate deeply within me, inviting me to delve deeper into the rich traditions and customs of this beautiful land. The Saudi Arabian spirit of hospitality transcends mere politeness; it is an invitation to connect, to share and to grow together. As an expatriate, I find myself swept up in this current of goodwill, fostering friendships that bridge cultures and build understanding.

As the sands of time shift in Saudi Arabia, I invite readers to embark on their own journey of discovery. It is a land brimming with potential, a nation on the cusp of greatness and an experience that promises to be nothing short of transformative. Whether you seek adventure in the majestic landscapes, cultural enrichment in its museums, or connection with its warm-hearted people, Saudi Arabia has much to offer.

The implementation of Vision 2030 is just around the corner, and the kingdom is poised to become a global hub of trade, culture and innovation. For those who may harbor doubts or preconceptions, I urge you to take that leap of faith. Immerse yourself in the beauty of this land, the richness of its culture and the kindness of its people. You may find, as I have, that Saudi Arabia isn’t merely a destination — it’s a place that will beckon you to call it home.

As the sun sets over the dunes, painting the sky in shades of orange and purple, I am filled with hope for what lies ahead. Saudi Arabia is not just shifting; it is soaring, embracing its destiny with open arms and a heart full of love. From Saudi Arabia with love, I invite you to discover a nation transformed, a people united and a future bright with promise.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Shifting Sands in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia appeared first on Fair Observer.

For years, followers of Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s son and the former Iranian crown prince, have advocated for a transition from an Islamofascist dictatorship to a monarchy for Iran, almost similar to what happened in Spain. They compare Pahlavi to Juan Carlos, who ascended the throne and abolished the dictatorship with the support of Franco’s military.

Pahlavi followers claim he can achieve the same with the support of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Pahlavi himself has stated many times that he is in touch with the Iranian regime and has been open to IRGC overtures.

Spain’s transition from the dictatorship of Francisco Franco to a constitutional monarchy under King Juan Carlos I was a pivotal moment in Spanish history. Franco ruled Spain as a right-wing military dictator following his overthrow of the left-wing republic in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). Ultranationalism, authoritarianism and repression and persecution of political opposition characterized his regime. Before his death in 1975, Franco designated the exiled Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón as his successor, hoping that he would perpetuate the ultranationalist regime.

Contrasting Iran and Spain’s political landscapes

Juan Carlos dismantled the authoritarian regime and moved Spain towards democracy instead of following in Franco’s footsteps. The first step was the Political Reform Act of 1976, which allowed for the dismantling of Francoist institutions and paved the way for democratic elections. In 1977, the legalization of political parties led to the first free elections since the 1930s. Subsequently, a new democratic constitution was drafted and approved by a popular referendum in 1978, establishing Spain as a democratic parliamentary monarchy and guaranteeing fundamental rights and freedoms for all citizens.

However, Iran today is far from Spain, and there are fundamental differences between the two countries. The most significant is that the IRGC is not a regular military like Spain’s army was towards the end of Franco’s rule. The Guards are more akin to the SS in Nazi Germany and the Red Army in the Soviet Union, created with the specific purpose of enforcing the ideological agenda of their totalitarian regime. This makes them dependent on the regime’s core belief system, values and interests to stay relevant.

Even today, the Islamist regime’s warmongering across the Middle East and crimes against humanity in Iran and around the world deeply involve the IRGC, a US- and Canadian-designated “state terrorist organization” that is also likely to be designated by the EU. It is bent on the defeat of the United States, the destruction of Israel and the conquest of the Arab world. As such, the IRGC cannot possibly provide the building block for a democracy or even a normal regime in Iran.

The general behavior of Pahlavi’s Iranian supporters has not proved promising for democracy, either. His associates and followers have started a regime of oppression in exile even before getting to power in Iran. They have assaulted non-Pahlavist protesters during anti-regime demonstrations abroad, ran campaigns of harassment and intimidation against journalists and democracy activists, pushed IRGC talking points about political prisoners and Iran’s ethnic minorities and welcomed all kinds of nefarious regime affiliates, including antisemitic IRGC members, among their ranks.

The reality of Iran’s political transition

To cap it all, Pahlavi himself recently rejected democracy and instead suggested that he roots for some kind of an authoritarian regime. By erroneously comparing Iran to Afghanistan and putting forward a fallacious essentialist argument, Pahlavi claimed that Iran’s society, like Afghanistan, has its own “traditions, norms and means of governance” and imposing an “inauthentic Western construct” like “democracy” on it will lead to anarchy similar to Afghanistan. While the West and most of the free world widely praised the recent nationwide “Woman, Life, Freedom Revolution” in Iran for its progressive values, Pahlavi boldly made that argument to the contrary.

Pahlavi’s willingness to blatantly distort the truth about Iran and what most Iranians want explains why he and his supporters were disturbed by the Woman, Life, Freedom Revolution in the first place. Not only did they not fully support it, but they also took issue with many aspects of it because the progressive nature of that revolution nullified the Pahlavist narrative regarding the “backwardness” of Iranian society to legitimize an authoritarian regime, most likely in the form of an absolutist monarchy with Reza Pahlavi as its Shah.

Unlike Spain, Iran would not transition from fascism to democracy even if they put the prince on the throne and allowed the IRGC to continue to exist. The Guards are unlikely to relinquish power and become a regular army subordinated to a constitutional system. Instead, they would exploit their newfound legitimacy as Pahlavi’s praetorians to continue their campaign of terror in Iran and abroad.

Pahlavi himself would serve as a figurehead to legitimize the existence of the new fascist order. His advocacy for what inherently goes against American values, his dynasty’s historical hostility to democracy and his followers’ reactionary rhetoric and anti-democratic bent will further empower the Guards and their Russian allies to prevent Iran from shifting towards the West once the current Islamofascist regime falls.

As we have seen in the past decade, Moscow has learned that promoting far-right positions and politicians worldwide helps keep the world divided. At the same time, it continues to push for conquest and global domination. Iran is already within the Russian sphere of influence. Still, if the Islamist regime were to fall, the Kremlin would prefer to have an ultranationalist junta run the country rather than a Western-friendly liberal democracy. In other words, the Russians don’t want to see Iran as a powerful pillar of Western security strategy like the post-WWII Germany and Japan.

As things stand, Iran risks passing from one totalitarian regime to another. If things unfold in that direction, the country will remain a hotbed of tyranny and radicalism, oppressing its people while continuing to threaten its neighbors and the wider world. The democratic world needs to intervene to help the Iranian people establish a liberal democracy and bring Iran back to the West.

[Liam Roman edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is Reza Pahlavi Iran’s Key to Democracy? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Many Israelis openly rejoiced at the audacity and efficiency of the two-day operation that left a toll of 39 dead and thousands injured. Jokes and memes circulated on social media not just about the damage done but even about the type of life-changing injuries it produced. Pennsylvanian Senator John Fetterman couldn’t suppress his glee, commenting, “I absolutely support that. In fact, if anything, I love it.”

Compare that with the assessment of Barack Obama’s former CIA Director: “When asked whether Israel’s attack constituted terrorism, Panetta was unequivocal. ‘I don’t think there’s any question that it’s a form of terrorism.’”

Is this truly a case of not mincing his words? He doesn’t say “terrorism,” but more cautiously calls it a “form of terrorism.” Are there degrees of mincing? How unminced was Panetta’s assessment?

Today’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Form:

1. Following the Platonic tradition, the idea of something that exists beyond the empirical world of our senses.
2. When used with modern concepts the locution “a form of” serves as a rhetorical ploy to remove the object from the real world and turn it into an abstraction.

Contextual note

Panetta goes far beyond any other commentator from the political establishment. But his locution, “form of terrorism,” appears designed to avoid expressing the idea that Israel should be thought of as a pariah nation, an unthinkable initiative anywhere within the Beltway. If he truly thinks this is terrorism, it would certainly demand a strong response from Washington, such as sanctions or an embargo on arms shipments.

This unique assessment by a qualified observer stimulated my curiosity. Were there any other Beltway insiders, present or past, who shared this assessment? I interrogated ChatGPT, which offered the following response:

“As of now, no major figures from the Biden administration or other prominent officials in Washington have publicly supported Panetta’s characterization of the incident as terrorism. The U.S. government continues to maintain a strong alliance with Israel, focusing on diplomatic and security partnerships, while also emphasizing a desire to avoid further escalation in the region​.”

Here is where the language used to describe international relations appears to break down completely. As head of the CIA, Panetta was specifically tasked with leading the high priority global combat against terrorism. If someone of his stature can now make a statement of this kind, one would normally expect such an accusation to call into question the value of an “alliance.” As a rule, we don’t cozy up to terrorist nations. And speaking of “diplomatic and security partnerships,” isn’t it true that any partner suspected of engaging in terrorism should immediately earn the label of “pariah state?” That would presumably mean cutting off all support or even imposing sanctions. Didn’t Biden do precisely that with Saudi Arabia because of its alleged assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi?

The explanation becomes frankly comic when ChatGPT tells us that what guides the decision-making is the “desire to avoid further escalation.” It then adds this:

“This divide highlights the nuanced and often controversial nature of U.S. policy toward Israel, especially when military operations result in civilian harm.”

Let’s accept the description of the policy as “controversial” because clearly — and despite Washington’s valiant efforts at censoring all dissenting voices — US policy remains controversial among US residents, just as it did during the Vietnam War. Despite the docile media’s best efforts, there is no glorious national consensus of unconditional support for Israel, despite the quasi-unanimity among Congress, the White House or the State Department.

But calling the policy “nuanced” risks leaving an observer both laughing and crying. Crying, because of the unmitigated marathon of civilian deaths and casualties, along with starvation and the uncontained spreading of disease in a Gaza bombed to the point of being uninhabitable. And laughing, when considering the idea that the most powerful nation in the history of the world is rendered helpless because of a policy deemed too “nuanced.”

Historical note

The concept of terrorism made its grand debut in European history when the leaders of the French Revolution, after overthrowing the monarchy, became pathologically paranoid after they realized that not everyone was ready to align with their newly defined hyper-rational order. There were a multitude of dissidents and contrarians out there whose necks were perfectly adapted to the efficient design of a guillotine, France’s most obvious contribution to the just emerging Industrial Revolution. This post-revolutionary period is known in English as the “Reign of Terror” but in French more simply as La Terreur. This was, of course, state-sponsored violence, the opposite of what terrorism would later come to mean.

It was only towards the end of the 19th century that the idea of terrorism as a political act became associated with non-state actors seeking to overthrow the established order. Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s 1872 novel, The Demons (Бесы) describes the link between the highly intellectualized theorization of political power by anarchists and nihilists, and the planning and execution of atrocities intended to destabilize the existing order.

This period culminated with a banal but fateful terrorist act: the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, on June 28, 1914. Instead of provoking a revolution, it set off a devastating World War.

The drama of World War I and the establishment of the revolutionary Soviet Union ultimately reduced the attraction of classic terrorism for many decades. In the late 20th century, suicide bombings, particularly in the context of the ongoing Israel–Palestine conflict but also relating to “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland, gave terrorism a modern twist, changing the perception of what it was all about. Both of those dramatic contexts pitched people of two religious identities against one another. They contributed to the meme of a “clash of civilizations” — religion against religion — popularized by Samuel Huntington.

Ultimately, it was Osama bin Laden’s monumental September 11 operation that redefined our understanding of the term terrorism. Terrorism was no longer an intimate act of sabotage. It had become big, bold and very public. Moreover, it was now identified with a theological, civilizational mission. No longer a type of random, annoyingly political crime, it achieved the status of a massive act of formal warfare.

September 11 empowered US President George W. Bush to consolidate and put into active practice the neo-conservative ideology his circle of collaborators bathed in. Here was a noble cause with a universal application. Civilized people were united in the cause of defeating global terrorism. Its supposed hard-nosed rationality combined with its sense of a fanatical purpose reinforced a deep-seated belief in its historical mission. The only difference from the ideology of Dostoyevsky’s demons lay in the fact that, instead of seeking to overturn established power, it operated from the position of defending and reinforcing institutional power. It played on the combined emotions associated with political, economic and theological identity. What could have been perceived as an egregious criminal act to be brought before justice and punished turned into the illusory mission of destroying terror itself, as if terror was an identifiable enemy.

To destroy terror, the new crusaders came to embody a publicly funded and administratively managed terror of their own making, a process that is still developing. Since then, those in power, whether Republicans or Democrats, have sought to strengthen and refine their control of the instruments essential to a modern reign of terror. Censorship of their own population — now called the war on disinformation — is at the top of the list alongside varied forms of warfare and lawfare.

On the warfare side, technology has dominated. The emergence of drone warfare, privileged by the “peace president” Obama, played a major role as war came to imitate the logic of video games, with no risk to the attacker. Lawfare became a feature linked to mass surveillance mediated by the tech giants who earned money commercially and politically by amassing data on its own and other populations, in ways that Maximilien Robespierre would certainly have envied.

We now have new “forms of warfare” and “forms of lawfare.” Panetta has revealed that there are also “forms of terrorism” that we are undoubtedly learning to classify as essential tools of modern government.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of Fair Observer Devil’s Dictionary.]

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Has an Ex-CIA Chief Really Accused Israel of Terrorism? appeared first on Fair Observer.

By the most conservative accounting, ceasefire tactics have been more effective than military tactics by a factor of 10 in saving Israeli lives.

In starting this most recent war in Gaza, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu no doubt was remembering his brother, who led the daring rescue of hijacked passengers at the Entebbe airport in 1976 (and died in the process). Now the younger Netanyahu was facing his own hostage crisis. He decided, like his brother, to pursue force. He entertained fantasies of destroying Hamas, saving the 251 people kidnapped on October 7, and salvaging his own dismal political reputation.

It hasn’t worked out quite that way. The war hasn’t eliminated Hamas, and even the Israeli military cautions that this isn’t possible. The Israeli military has been spectacularly unsuccessful — and in some cases unforgivably negligent — in freeing hostages. Speaking of unforgivable, Israeli forces have also killed nearly 42,000 Palestinians in Gaza. The Netanyahu government has escalated its policy of expulsion in the West Bank and is now poised to go to war with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The recent coordinated explosions of the pagers that the Iran-backed militia purchased to avoid Israeli surveillance, followed by a second set of explosions involving walkie-talkies, could well be the starting gun for the war.

Despite (or perhaps because of) these horrors, Netanyahu is making a political comeback. Although his coalition would lose against the opposition if an election were held today, the prime minister’s Likud Party remains by a thin margin the most popular party in Israel today.

In other words, Netanyahu has some reason to believe that he has a winning strategy: talk tough, be tough, hang tough. He thinks that he can safely ignore the pleas of the hostages’ families, the demands of the demonstrators on the street, and the advice of his own military advisors — not to mention anything that the US government has said. The Israeli prime minister has dismissed evidence that the failures of his own intelligence agencies played a role in the events of October 7. As long as he visits punishment upon Israel’s enemies — Palestinians, Hezbollah in Lebanon, selected targets in Iran — he can secure the support of the Israeli far right and continue to present himself as his country’s savior.

As such, Netanyahu believes that he has two more enemies to fight against: compromise and ceasefire.

Thus, each time Israeli and Palestinian negotiators seem close to a negotiated ceasefire, Netanyahu has pulled the rug out from underneath them. So, for instance, Hamas withdrew its initial insistence on Israel committing to a permanent ceasefire from the beginning. As for the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Gaza, another key element of the three-part plan put forward by US President Joe Biden’s administration, Netanyahu is now insisting that Israel retain control of the Philadelphi corridor, the section of Gaza that borders Egypt, in order to interdict any potential weapons shipments to Hamas.

This apparently non-negotiable demand from Netanyahu does not reflect any real consideration of Israeli security needs. The New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman, not exactly the most pro-Palestinian voice in journalism, points out that the Israeli military did not consider this supposedly indispensable corridor

important enough to even occupy for the first seven months of the war. Israeli generals have consistently told Netanyahu there are many alternative effective means for controlling the corridor now and that supporting Israeli troops marooned out there would be difficult and dangerous. And they could retake it any time they need. Staying there is already causing huge problems with the Egyptians, too.

Netanyahu’s own defense minister, Yoav Gallant, has reportedly said that “the fact that we prioritize the Philadelphi Corridor at the cost of the lives of the hostages is a moral disgrace.”

So, if his own defense minister can’t change Netanyahu’s mind, what can be done to dislodge the prime minister from his unyielding position?

Cutting off the arms supply

Since the Labour Party took over in the United Kingdom in July, it has made three consequential decisions related to Israel/Palestine. First, it resumed funding for the UN agency that aids Palestinian refugees. Next, it reversed the Tory decision to challenge the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Netanyahu.

And, at the beginning of September, it blocked a certain number of arms sales to Israel. Not surprisingly, Netanyahu condemned the decision as “shameful” and “misguided.”

In fact, the UK’s move was both tepid and not hugely important. The decision affected only 30 out of 350 export licenses. And Britain supplies just 1% of Israeli imports.

Netanyahu wasn’t worried so much about the UK weapons per se but rather the domino effect the decision might have on the three biggest suppliers of the Israeli military. Between 2013 and 2023, the United States provided around 65% of the country’s military imports, Germany roughly 30%, and Italy a bit under 5%.

Italy claims that it has basically stopped arms exports, only honoring existing contracts if they don’t involve the use of those weapons against civilians (no one really knows how the Italians are making this determination). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has made a great show of pledging military support for Israel, but the country’s Federal Security Council has effectively stopped providing the promised assistance. “Ultimately, the growing concerns [against Israel] are the reason why fewer approvals are being granted, even if no one wants to say it out loud,” an employee of a representative on the Federal Security Council told The Jerusalem Post.

Which leaves the United States. The Biden administration announced $20 billion in weapons sales to Israel in mid-August, after ordering a pause in deliveries of heavy bombs (subsequently reversed) and threatening to cancel shipments if Israel invaded Rafah (it did and the US did nothing).

The weapons that the United States delivers to Israel are its only real leverage over the Netanyahu government. It could be argued that this doesn’t amount to much leverage, particularly when Israel isn’t asking for as much these days. Also, Israel has its own military-industrial complex and can produce a lot of what it uses. Still, the nearly $4 billion that the United States sends Israel every year is a significant chunk of the Israeli military budget ($27 billion and rising). And that should translate into political capital that an American administration could use to influence Israeli policy.

But Biden did not condition aid on Netanyahu signing a ceasefire deal. Talk about a non-transactional president!

Lest anyone imagine that Donald Trump would do any different if he returned to the White House, the infamously transactional candidate suspended that particular aspect of his character when dealing with Israel. During his four years in office, he gave Israel everything it wanted and got nothing in return (other than the adulation of Netanyahu and the Israeli far right).

What can be done?

Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza has generated considerable international condemnation. The UN’s highest court, the International Court of Justice, ruled in July that Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory is illegal and must end. The International Criminal Court, meanwhile, has issued an arrest warrant for Benjamin Netanyahu (along with Defense Minister Gallant and three Hamas leaders, two of whom have already been killed).

The UN Security Council has approved several ceasefire resolutions, including one that called for a Ramadan pause, which was ignored. In June, the Security Council passed a resolution introduced by the United States that supports (not surprisingly) the three-part ceasefire plan devised by the Biden administration. Netanyahu has so far ignored this one as well.

Plenty of countries have registered their protests against Israel in other forms. Several European countries — Norway, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia — recently went ahead and recognized an independent Palestinian state. They join 143 other countries around the world that have already made that decision.

Turkey has executed an about-face from being a key Israeli trade partner to a leader of the economic boycott of the country. Now, Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan is threatening to assemble a Sunni coalition, along with Egypt, in support of the Palestinians.

People around the world have voted with their feet by joining protests. In the days following the October 7 attack and the start of the war in Gaza, there were thousands of pro-Palestinian gatherings in dozens of countries. Demonstrations spread on campuses, particularly in the United States and Europe but also in Australia and India.

Meanwhile, in Israel, sentiment has shifted. A week ago, half a million people thronged the streets of Tel Aviv, with 250,000 rallying in other Israeli cities, demanding an immediate ceasefire. The overriding issue in Israel is the release of the remaining hostages. Interestingly, polling for the first time shows that a majority of Gazans now believe that the Hamas attack on October 7 was a mistake. This is a marked reversal from the early days of the war, when both Israelis and Palestinians were convinced that the military actions of their political representatives were correct.

So, at this point, it’s not a question of persuading the people of Israel and Palestine of the importance of negotiations or the need for a ceasefire. The machinery of international law has been mobilized to put pressure on the Israeli government. The country most committed to Israel’s military defense, the United States, has also been pushing for a ceasefire.

The problem is that the Biden administration has not used its most powerful levers of influence — the flow of cash and armaments to Israel — to persuade Netanyahu to bend. The Israeli leader and his right-wing allies listen to the American voices they want to hear — the Republican Party, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee — and ignore what they consider to be a lame-duck administration. Netanyahu would no doubt prefer Donald Trump to win in November. But even if Kamala Harris wins, he doesn’t worry that the Democrats will make any significant changes in US policy, especially if the Republicans manage to win the Senate.

If anything, Netanyahu is moving even further away from compromise. Israel has ramped up operations in the West Bank in the furtherance of its campaign of ethnic cleansing. The Israeli army is preparing for a sustained military campaign against Hezbollah, which is now mulling a response to the two recent waves of bomb attacks — pagers, walkie-talkies — that were the result of an Israeli operation to insert explosive devices in the devices somewhere along the supply chain.

According to the most pessimistic analysis, Israel will eventually settle for a ceasefire in Gaza in order to turn its attention more fully to the West Bank and Hezbollah. Achieving a ceasefire and a hostage deal would also remove the chief obstacle to a national unity government that would give Netanyahu the political cover for these expanded operations.

So, calling for a ceasefire in Gaza is necessary but not sufficient. The Biden administration must attach strings to Israeli aid related to the country’s overall policies of expulsion. Time is running out. Biden must back Palestinian demands for political autonomy before Israel has occupied all Palestinian land. He must push for regional negotiations that address the essential conflict between Israel and Iran that lies behind the dispute with Hezbollah.

It’s not likely that the administration will push anything so ambitious before the election. But when Biden enters his lame-duck period, he will have one last chance to back a ceasefire-plus scenario. He can even shoehorn this effort into the “Abrahamic Accords,” the Trump-era initiative to negotiate the Arab world’s recognition of Israel.

On November 6, regardless of who wins the election on the day before, Biden needs to withdraw all his political capital from the bank and spend it in the Middle East. Netanyahu and his far-right allies are a threat to Israel, to Palestine, to the entire region. Biden gave an enormous gift to the United States when he stepped aside as a presidential candidate. In his lame-duck session after the election, he can make one final, legacy-making gift by applying just the right combination of carrots and sticks to contain Netanyahu and end the horrors in and around Israel/Palestine.

[Foreign Policy in Focus first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Even a New Ceasefire Will Not Fix Israel and Palestine appeared first on Fair Observer.

Despite Israeli violations of international law, the United States continues to support Israel, driven by political and economic interests. Support for the Israeli occupation is considered crucial for US geopolitical strategies in the region. If Israel disappears or weakens decisively, Washington worries that BRICS countries, particularly Russia and China, may obtain control of much of the world’s oil, which would be cataclysmic for US national security. Washington’s goal is to keep the world in “balance” by keeping Eurasia divided as we shall see later.

Divisions in both Eurasia and the world are rising with the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas (as well as Palestine). The current armed conflict has created a humanitarian disaster in Gaza. As of August 15, 2024, Israeli military actions have killed over 40,000 Palestinians, including women and children, and wounded over 92,000 more. The actual deaths may be higher due to war induced underestimation. Ending this conflict requires addressing its root causes, including historic and ongoing Palestinian displacement, occupation and the reality of Zionist apartheid. Shifts in the international political economy may offer opportunities for a lasting resolution to the Israel–Palestine conflict.

History of Israeli settler colonialism

During the British Mandate from 1922 to 1947 there was large-scale Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe to historic Palestine. Jewish migration especially surged in the 1930s due to Nazi persecution. In 1947, the United Nations mandated the partition of historic Palestine into separate states for Jews and Palestinians, leading to the establishment of Israel. Since then, the Israeli state has engaged in settler colonialism.

Two parts of Israel’s settler colonialism shaped the modern conflict we see today. First is the expulsion of the indigenous Palestinian population. Following the partition, many Palestinians were expelled from the Israeli part of historic Palestine. This violated Chapter 3, Point 1 of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 (II), which states:

“Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine [modern-day historic Palestine] outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights.”

The second is Israel’s establishment of illegal occupations and settlements in Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, violating international law. Moreover, Israel’s occupation extends beyond Palestinian territories to regions such as the Shebaa Farms (which is part of Lebanon) and Golan Heights (which is part of Syria).

Israeli settler colonialism in Palestine, like all forms of colonial rule, is driven by political and economic motives. The primary objectives are to dominate land and resources — water, natural gas reserves and fertile soil — while systematically subjugating the Palestinian population. Additionally, settler colonialism serves to suppress socio-political conflict within Israel.

Limited access to basic necessities such as clean water, electricity and food has devastated the Palestinian people. Poverty, malnutrition and health crises are widespread. Furthermore, the systematic denial of rights to nutrition, healthcare, education, employment and freedom of movement by the Israeli occupation has caused immense suffering and deprivation. The occupation has displaced millions of Palestinians, making them refugees outside historic Palestine. Millions more face forced expulsion from their lands.

Despite these harsh measures, the US steadfastly supports Israel

Since the 1960s, the US has played a pivotal role in providing extensive material and diplomatic support to Israel, establishing it as its foremost ally in West Asia. Despite ongoing human rights abuses and international criticism, why do US policymakers, who ostensibly champion human rights, continue to support the Israeli occupation of Palestine?

One possible explanation is that US policymakers have been integrated into the Zionist project. However, this theory raises questions, as the US also supports various regimes in Eastern Europe with anti-Semitic “founding myths” and histories of complicity in the Nazi genocide — most notably in Ukraine.

Another explanation suggests that American policymakers feel a kinship with Zionism due to its roots in European colonialism against non-white peoples. However, this overlooks the history of conflicts among European and North American countries before 1945. It also ignores the ethnic diversity within Israel, where a significant fraction of Jews are not of white descent. Mizrahi Jews of Middle Eastern and North African descent are the largest Jewish ethnic group in Israel, comprising approximately 40%-45% of the country’s population.

The third, more strategic explanation posits that Washington’s support for the Israeli occupation of Palestine is crucial in maintaining a divided Eurasia as we mentioned earlier. As Hal Brands, a professor of global affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, describes it:

“All the great conflicts of the modern era have been contests over Eurasia, where dueling coalitions have clashed for dominance of that supercontinent and its surrounding oceans. Indeed, the American Century has been the Eurasian Century: Washington’s vital task as a superpower has been keeping the world in balance by keeping Eurasia divided.”

The same view was previously articulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, arguing that the United States’s task is to establish itself as the sole political arbiter in Eurasia and prevent the rise of any potential rival power (or alliance) that could threaten its material and diplomatic interests. Israel plays a crucial role in helping US policymakers achieve this goal. This understanding widely pervades mainstream US politics.

Therefore, considerations of the international political economy likely drive US policymakers’ support for the Israeli occupation. However, this does not negate the validity of the other two explanations.

Zionism and white racism serve as ideological tools that obscure underlying political and economic motivations. In Western Europe, legitimate rejection of the Nazi genocide legacy is often invoked to make it politically unviable to criticize US support for Israeli occupation. This effort aims to maintain European countries’ limited strategic autonomy vis-à-vis the US. In the Global South, support for Palestinian freedom has varied with the consolidation of the neoliberal project, but remains present. Today, many Global South countries commonly condemn Israeli violations of international law.

Washington continues to support Israel even as the Israel–Hamas war persists, with Israel being accused of war crimes and causing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza.

The state of the Israel–Palestine conflict today

For years, Gaza’s two million residents have endured Israeli-imposed blockades marked by violence, severely restricting travel, trade and daily life. Under these conditions, Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation has evolved and intensified.

Tensions between Israel and Palestine have often run high, but the events of October 7, 2023 marked a new level of horror. The current round of armed conflict began when Hamas launched attacks against Israel. The subsequent Israeli armed response, primarily targeting Gaza (but also on the West Bank), demonstrates a now genocidal colonial policy.

Israel has launched indiscriminate airstrikes and heavy artillery attacks on civilian-occupied areas of Gaza. The Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has destroyed most buildings there, including hospitals, schools and residential structures. Particularly egregious is the use of artificial intelligence to target buildings without human corroboration of the generated kill lists, resulting in mass civilian deaths among Palestinians.

Besides attacking cities where Palestinians seek refuge, Israelis have seized control of the crossing into Rafah on the Egyptian border in violation of the Camp David Accords. This control allows Israel to use the blockade as a tool of war, causing mass starvation by preventing food, medical supplies and essential aid from entering Gaza. The insufficient aid that makes it through fails to meet escalating needs, leading to starvation and disease. This exacerbates an unprecedented humanitarian crisis and violates international law.

Despite the IDF’s assaults, Hamas resistance fighters persist in operating through extensive tunnel networks, complicating Israeli efforts to neutralize them.

In addition to these ongoing attacks on Gaza and the West Bank, Israel has also engaged in military conflicts with Hezbollah in Lebanon. The border between the two countries has witnessed daily exchanges of fire since the current conflict broke out. The fight with Hezbollah has not yet escalated into a full-fledged war, but fears are growing as both sides continue to carry out strikes. It remains to be seen whether the most recent Israeli attacks on Hezbollah using exploding pagers and walkie-talkies will ignite the situation further.

Iran’s mission to the UN has warned that any “full-scale military aggression” by Israel in Lebanon could trigger “an obliterating war.” Tensions have run high between Tehran and Jerusalem following Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria and the assassination of  Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas in Teheran. However, repeated rounds of  mediation seems to have defused the situation for now.

The Ansarallah (Houthi) forces in Yemen have imposed a naval blockade on ships passing through the Red Sea to and from Israel, excluding those of Israel’s supporters. Reportedly, their goal is to pressure for a resolution to the conflict stemming from Israeli attacks on Palestine. Despite military operations on Yemen led by the US and its “allies,” these ineffective efforts have not ended the naval blockade.

The scale and intensity of Palestinian killings by the Israeli armed forces have sparked unprecedented political reactions in the US, particularly outside the mainstream. Students and educators across many universities are protesting en masse, urging their institutions to sever financial ties with Israel and calling for a shift in US foreign policy toward Israel. These protests are concerning for the Biden administration, as they resonate strongly with the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. If the administration continues its unwavering support for the Israeli government, it may adversely affect Democratic Vice President Kamala Harris’s prospects in the 2024 presidential election.

Consequently, the current administration is attempting a balancing act. It publicly critiques some Israeli policies, such as calling for the replacement of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and imposing sanctions on certain Israeli settler groups in the West Bank. It has also publicly stated that weapons will not be supplied to the Israeli armed forces for attacks on Gaza. However, in practice, the administration continues to support Israel through military aid, even during attacks, and provides diplomatic cover. This was evident when the administration vetoed a UN Security Council resolution advocating full membership status for Palestine.

The nuanced public posture of Washington regarding its verbal policies is also influenced by another factor. With the end of the unipolar moment, marked by increasing strategic alignment between China and Russia, many countries in the Global South are asserting greater strategic autonomy. This was evident in the overwhelming United Nations General Assembly vote in favor of full membership for Palestine.

Given that US support for Israel’s policies is driven by its aim to maintain division in Eurasia, excessive support in a multipolar world may counteract this objective.

Two examples illustrate this point clearly. First, Saudi Arabia, now aligned with the BRICS nations, has insisted that any strategic engagement with the US must exclude Saudi recognition of Israel. This stance appears not to have been opposed by the US government, despite directly contradicting the intentions of the Abraham Accords.

Second, many countries in the Global South, historically aligned with the US such as Egypt — also a BRICS member — are actively pursuing a genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice (ICC). This legal action was initiated by South Africa and highlights shifting alliances and strategic autonomy among these nations.

Within Israel, Netanyahu is concerned that ending the military offensive without achieving a clear “victory” could not only end his political career but also result in his conviction on corruption charges. This partly explains his repeated escalatory interventions. Meanwhile, family members of Israelis held by Hamas are advocating for negotiations between Hamas and the Israeli government to defuse the situation. Israel’s increasing international isolation, coupled with military setbacks and economic challenges, is prompting calls for a change of course from some quarters within the country.

How do we achieve lasting peace in the region?

To bring an end to the war, addressing the roots of the conflict is essential, including historic and ongoing Palestinian displacement, occupation and the reality of apartheid. Against this backdrop, any lasting resolution to the Israel–Palestine conflict must include the following elements:

First, the ongoing genocidal attacks on innocent Palestinians by the IDF must be universally condemned. Those responsible for Israeli crimes against international law must be held legally accountable. Second, there must be an immediate ceasefire. Proposals are currently being discussed. Hamas has announced that it is willing to accept the proposal of the US  President Biden that was put forward in May 2024 but Israel remains recalcitrant. Third, immediate humanitarian assistance and relief measures, including infrastructure rebuilding, must be provided to Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

These are initial steps, but addressing the root cause of the conflict — the Israeli occupation of Palestine — is essential for achieving a lasting resolution. Several steps are required to make this happen:

One, Israeli occupation of all Palestinian territories must end unconditionally.

Two, all Palestinians displaced from historic Palestine must be accorded the right to return and live with full human rights. If Israel cannot agree to this, it should make mutually acceptable territorial concessions from its share of historic Palestine to rehabilitate displaced Palestinians. These lands should be fully integrated with Palestine.

Three, both Israel and Palestine must recognize each other’s right to exist as an independent country, with Palestine having membership in the UN to match Israel’s.

As discussed earlier, fundamental shifts in the international political economy have made a lasting resolution more achievable. Countries in the Global South and like-minded nations are increasingly vocal in their opposition to Israeli occupation. The international community urgently needs to increase its measures to pressure Israel and its external supporters into agreeing to a sustainable solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict.

[Ting Cui and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Examining the Urgent Israel–Palestine Conflict and Its Shameless Political Economy appeared first on Fair Observer.

On September 6, a member of Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) fatally shot Aysenur Eygi in the head as she was taking part in a protest near the Palestinian village of Beita. The IDF immediately claimed it was “looking into reports that a foreign national was killed as a result of shots fired in the area.”

Eygi’s family was unimpressed by the Israel promise to “look into” the killing. The New York Times cited the complaint expressed by Aysenur’s father, Suat Eygi. “I know that when something happens, the U.S. will attack like the eagle on its seal. But when Israel is in question, it transforms into a dove.”

Secretary of State Antony Blinken had the temerity to describe the killing as “unprovoked and unjustified.” He used the occasion to helpfully clarify US policy: “No one — no one — should be shot and killed for attending a protest.” That clarity should serve to correct an ambiguity that many people will appreciate 54 years after the Kent State killings. Protesters should be reassured. The worst they have to fear in this far more enlightened era is being arrested and accused of antisemitism and eventually complicity in terrorism for speaking their mind.

As the official Democratic candidate for the presidency, Kamala Harris undoubtedly felt obliged to weigh in on such an egregious violation of a US citizen’s rights. “Israel’s preliminary investigation indicated it was the result of a tragic error for which the [Israeli military] is responsible. We will continue to press the government of Israel for answers and for continued access to the findings of the investigation so we can have confidence in the results.” Al Jazeera cites these deeply empathetic words spoken by the vice president while at the same time noting that she “stopped short of endorsing requests for an independent investigation into the incident.” 

Today’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Press for answers:

Make a rhetorical request that one expects will never be fulfilled and will eventually be forgotten with the passage of time.

Contextual note

The verb “to press” contains the idea of pressure. The literal meaning of the expression “press for answers” suggests a sustained series of actions to put pressure on the party concerned until a positive result is obtained. Anyone curious enough to watch the regular State Department press briefings concerning the Gaza conflict will have witnessed multiple instances of members of the press literally pressing the administration’s spokespersons not just to request, but to require independent investigations of alleged war crimes. Harris’s choice of the expression “press for answers” seems to fall somewhere between “request” and “require.” Most observers agree the Biden administration’s approach to Israel’s “excesses” has been to multiply the requests for restraint in some cases or for an investigation in others, without ever requiring such action.

What exactly is the difference between these two concepts? Requesting means the demand may be legitimately refused. It tells us that the person requesting is not willing to use any power they may have over the person to whom the request is addressed. Requiring implies exercising one’s power to act. The US clearly has the power to force Israel’s hands if it chooses. But it typically chooses not to.

Al Jazeera notes that “Eygi’s family had called on the US to conduct its own probe into the killing. But Washington has all but ruled out the request, saying that it is awaiting the results of the Israeli investigation.” Given what we know about the Israeli “investigation” of the 2022 shooting of American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh, this reminds us of O.J. Simpson’s promise to probe the murder of his ex-wife in order to unveil the true killer. But this is a deceptive comparison. Simpson only killed two people at one isolated moment of his life. Israel has made it a daily habit for decades, before radically accelerating the pace over the past 11 months.

A brief sample of dialogue from a press briefing by State Department spokesman Matthew Miller from earlier this year will give a good idea of how the process works. In this typical exchange, the press presses. The government, in contrast, exercises its infinite trust in the professionalism of Simpson…, I mean, the Israelis.

QUESTION: Right. In terms of accountability, though, you talk about the fact that Israel has open investigations. So, what kind of timeline did Israel provide you to conclude those investigations?

MR MILLER: So, we have made clear to Israel that those investigations ought to proceed expeditiously. They ought to reach conclusions as soon as possible.

QUESTION: And have they provided you a timeline?

MR MILLER: I’m not – I’m not going to – I’m not going to speak to our internal discussions or speak for the Israeli Government. But everyone – it is very difficult always to put a timeline on any kind of investigation, certainly on a criminal investigation, and I wouldn’t want to do that on behalf of the foreign government other than to say our expectation on behalf of the United States is that they should proceed and finish as soon as possible – but not at the expense of thoroughness.

Apart from the very professional waffling about grand principles, such as “thoroughness” and “respect” for foreign governments, the message should be clear: “We have no reason to press forward.”

Historical note

Given the long and fundamentally equivocal history of investigating war crimes, murders of journalists and massive destruction of hospitals and schools, an observer of today’s news may legitimately raise the question Japanese filmmaker Akira Kurosawa explored in his classic movie, Rashomon. We may know the effects of a crime, but can we ever know the story of a crime? Kurosawa’s film tells us we cannot. And the reason is that all crimes must be recounted from someone’s point of view. When politics is involved, there is good reason to conclude not that we cannot but that we will not. We can usually be certain that a greater effort will be made to disguise the crime than to reveal its true narrative.

Classic movie

Sixty-one years after the John F. Kennedy assassination, even though all implicated persons have either died, retired or removed themselves from public life, no truly independent investigation has ever been commissioned. It should be obvious that the Warren Commission was not independent, despite former Chief Justice Warren’s personal reputation for independence. The mere presence of former CIA Chief Allen Dulles obviated any semblance of independence.

I raise this question today only because it took six decades for the world to discover the most obvious, credible and easily available evidence, evidence far more credible than courtroom style testimony taken under the intimidating conditions of cross-examination. The document is the raw broadcast footage of Dallas TV station WFAA during the first hour following the assassination. Two journalists and two bystanders who were standing on the lawn below the triple underpass speak at length about hearing the shots coming from behind them on the grassy knoll. One of the journalists even draws a map of the shooting on a blackboard, indicating the origin of all the shots they heard. None came from the direction of the Book Depository where Lee Harvey Oswald worked.

At precisely the time of that broadcast, Oswald had already been identified as the suspect. How strange!

I asked ChatGPT whether the Warren Commission had consulted the WFAA tapes. Its response: “The Warren Commission did not consult the WFAA broadcast tapes that captured the immediate aftermath of the assassination, largely because those tapes were not widely known or considered crucial at the time.”

An answer worthy of Matthew Miller’s reasoning.

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of Fair Observer Devil’s Dictionary.]

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post One Dead American. Will Israel Investigate? Don’t Count on It appeared first on Fair Observer.

If Israel, predictably, fails to heed a General Assembly resolution calling on it to withdraw its occupation forces and settlers from Palestine and the United States then vetoes or threatens to veto a Security Council resolution to enforce the ICJ ruling that these resolutions are based on, then the General Assembly could go a step further.

It could convene an emergency session to take up what is called a Uniting for Peace resolution, which could call for an arms embargo, an economic boycott or other UN sanctions against Israel — or even call for actions against the United States. Uniting for Peace resolutions have only been passed by the General Assembly five times since the procedure was first adopted in 1950.

The ICJ ruling against Israel

The September 18 vote comes in response to a historic ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on July 19, which found that “Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the regime associated with them, have been established and are being maintained in violation of international law.”

The court ruled that Israel’s obligations under international law include “the evacuation of all settlers from existing settlements” and the payment of restitution to all who have been harmed by its illegal occupation. The passage of the General Assembly resolution by a large majority of members would demonstrate that countries all over the world support the ICJ ruling, and would be a small but important first step toward ensuring that Israel must live up to those obligations.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cavalierly dismissed the court ruling with the claim that “the Jewish nation cannot be an occupier in its own land.” This is exactly the position that the court had rejected, ruling that Israel’s 1967 military invasion and occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territories did not give it the right to settle its own people there, annex those territories or make them part of Israel.

The violence is not limited to Gaza

While Israel used its somewhat embellished account of the October 7 events as a pretext to declare open season for the mass murder of Palestinians in Gaza, Israeli forces in the West Bank and East Jerusalem used it as a pretext to distribute assault rifles and other military-grade weapons to illegal Israeli settlers and unleash a new wave of violence there, too.

Armed settlers immediately started seizing more Palestinian land and shooting Palestinians. Israeli occupation forces either stood by and watched or joined in the violence, but did not intervene to defend Palestinians or hold their Israeli attackers accountable.

Since last October, occupation forces and armed settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have killed at least 700 people, including 159 children. The escalation of violence and land seizures has been so flagrant that even the US and European governments have felt obligated to impose sanctions on a small number of violent settlers and their organizations.

In Gaza, the Israeli military has been murdering Palestinians day after day for the past 11 months. The Palestinian Health Ministry has counted over 41,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza, but with the destruction of the hospitals that it relies on to identify and count the dead, its records are incomplete. Medical researchers estimate that the total number of deaths in Gaza from the direct and indirect results of Israeli actions will be in the hundreds of thousands, even if the massacre ends soon.

Traditional allies may turn against Israel and the US

Israel and the United States are undoubtedly more and more isolated as a result of their roles in this genocide. Whether the United States can still coerce or browbeat a few of its traditional allies into rejecting or abstaining from the General Assembly resolution on September 18 will be a test of its residual “soft power.”

US President Joe Biden can claim to be exercising a certain kind of international leadership, but it is not the kind of leadership that any American can be proud of. The US has muscled its way into a pivotal role in the ceasefire negotiations begun by Qatar and Egypt, and it has used that position to skillfully and repeatedly undermine any chance of a ceasefire, the release of hostages or an end to the genocide.

By failing to use any of its substantial leverage to pressure Israel and disingenuously blaming Hamas for every failure in the negotiations, US officials are ensuring that the genocide will continue for as long as they and their Israeli allies want, while many Americans remain confused about their own government’s responsibility for the continuing bloodshed.

This is a continuation of the strategy by which the United States stymied and prevented peace since 1967, falsely posing as an honest broker, while in fact remaining Israel’s staunchest ally and the critical diplomatic obstacle to a free Palestine.

Diverging plans for Gaza’s future

In addition to cynically undermining any chance of a ceasefire, the United States has injected itself into debates over the future of Gaza, promoting the idea that a post-war government could be led by the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, which many Palestinians view as hopelessly corrupt and compromised by subservience to Israel and the United States.

China has taken a more constructive approach to resolving differences between Palestinian political groupings. It invited Hamas, Fatah and 12 other Palestinian groups to a three-day meeting in Beijing in July, where they all agreed to a “national unity” plan to form a post-war “interim national reconciliation government,” which would oversee relief and rebuilding in Gaza and organize a national Palestinian election to seat a new elected government.

Mustafa Barghouti, the secretary-general of the political movement called the Palestinian National Initiative, hailed the Beijing Declaration as going “much further” than previous reconciliation efforts, and said that the plan for a unity government “blocks Israeli efforts to create some kind of collaborative structure against Palestinian interests.” China has also called for an international peace conference to try to end the war.

The UN can break out of its inertia

As the world comes together in the General Assembly on September 18, it faces both a serious challenge and an unprecedented opportunity. Each time the General Assembly has met in recent years, a succession of leaders from the Global South has risen to lament the breakdown of the peaceful and just international order that the UN is supposed to represent, from the failure to end the war in Ukraine to inaction against the climate crisis to the persistence of neocolonialism in Africa.

Perhaps no crisis more clearly embodies the failure of the UN and the international system than the 57-year-old Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories it invaded in 1967. At the same time that the United States armed Israel to the teeth, it vetoed 46 UN Security Council resolutions that either required Israel to comply with international law, called for an end to the occupation or for Palestinian statehood, or held Israel accountable for war crimes or illegal settlement building.

The ability of one permanent member of the Security Council to use its veto to block the rule of international law and the will of the rest of the world has always been widely recognized as the fatal flaw in the existing structure of the UN system. When this structure was first announced in 1945, French writer Albert Camus wrote in Combat, the French Resistance newspaper he edited, that the veto would “effectively put an end to any idea of international democracy… The Five would thus retain forever the freedom of maneuver that would be forever denied the others.”

The General Assembly and the Security Council have debated a series of resolutions calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, and each debate has pitted the United States, Israel, and occasionally the United Kingdom or another US ally, against the voices of the rest of the world calling in unison for peace in Gaza.

The US stands uniquely in Gaza’s way

Of the UN’s 193 nations, 145 have now recognized Palestine as a sovereign nation comprising Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and even more countries have voted for resolutions to end the occupation, prohibit Israeli settlements and support Palestinian self-determination and human rights. For many decades, the United States’ unique position of unconditional support for Israel has been a critical factor in enabling Israeli war crimes and prolonging the intolerable plight of the Palestinian people.

In the crisis in Gaza, its military alliance with Israel involves the US directly in the crime of genocide, as it provides the warplanes and bombs that are killing the largest numbers of Palestinians and literally destroying Gaza. The US also deploys military liaison officers to assist Israel in planning its operations, special operations forces to provide intelligence and satellite communications, and trainers and technicians to teach Israeli forces to use and maintain new American weapons, such as F-35 warplanes.

The supply chain for the US arsenal of genocide crisscrosses America, from weapons factories to military bases to procurement offices at the Pentagon and Central Command in Tampa. It feeds plane loads of weapons flying to military bases in Israel, from where these endless tons of steel and high explosives rain down on Gaza to shatter buildings, flesh and bones.  

The US role is greater than complicity — it is essential, active participation, without which the Israelis could not conduct this genocide in its present form. And it is precisely because of the essential US role in this genocide that the United States has the power to end it, not by pretending to plead with the Israelis to be more “careful” about civilian casualties, but by ending its own instrumental role in the genocide.

Every American of conscience should keep applying all kinds of pressure on their government, but as long as it keeps ignoring the will of its own people, sending more weapons, vetoing Security Council resolutions and undermining peace negotiations, it is by default up to its neighbors around the world to muster the unity and political will to end the genocide.

It would certainly be unprecedented for the world to unite in opposition to Israel and the US to save Palestine. The world has rarely come together so unanimously since the founding of the UN in the aftermath of World War II in 1945.

Even the catastrophic US-British invasion and destruction of Iraq failed to provoke such united action. But the lesson of that crisis, indeed the lesson of our time, is that this kind of unity is essential if we are ever to bring sanity, humanity and peace to our world. That can start with a decisive vote in the UN General Assembly on Wednesday, September 18, 2024.

The views expressed in this article/podcast are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Can the World Save Palestine from US-Israeli Genocide? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Back then, the airport was like a fortress. I was a young officer having my last thrill by riding around on the machine gun nests of military trucks and walking to posts on the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. Some of the fighters we had been facing were battle-hardened Pashtuns who would come swinging down from Afghanistan, which was then (as now) ruled by the Taliban.

After my flight reached its destination, I went to my parents’ home and unpacked my uniform. In a few days, I would leave for Oxford to read for a Philosophy, Politics and Economics degree that would change my life. My parents and I were having a late dinner when a fellow officer, now in India’s Intelligence Bureau, called on our landline. (In those days, we did not yet have mobile phones.) He told me that the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York were crumbling after a spectacular terrorist attack.

The following is a piece about the man who engineered those attacks and changed the world as we knew it that day.

A story of a chap named Osama

Osama bin Muhammad bin Awad bin Laden, better known as Osama bin Laden, was the one of more than 50 children of Muhammad bin Laden, a self-made billionaire who made his fortune executing construction projects for the Saudi royal family. Osama’s mother, Hamida al-Attas, was Syrian whom good old Muhammad divorced promptly after the child’s birth. Muhammad recommended Hamida to an associate, Muhammad al-Attas, with whom she had four more children. Of his father’s $5 billion, Osama inherited $25–30 million.

Osama reportedly liked reading the works of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery and French President and General Charles de Gaulle. Osama also played football — soccer for our American friends — as a center forward. He was an Arsenal fan.

For all his wealth and Western interests, Osama was discontented with the state of the world. As a devout Sunni Muslim, his main interests were the Quran and jihad. In 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Osama left for Pakistan and used his own money to fund the mujahideen fighting the Soviets. Soon, he was in bed with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who were fighting Charlie Wilson’s War to give the Soviets a bloody nose.

The carousing and cavorting Congressman Wilson funded the mujahideen lavishly. Yet this did not endear Wilson’s beloved homeland to Osama. This pious Muslim (who left behind 20–26 children and probably had more sex than the playboy Wilson) founded al-Qaeda in 1988. As per the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the goal of this organization was a worldwide jihad. Osama was virulently opposed to American presence on Muslim lands, especially his native Saudi Arabia.

Osama began training young men in places like Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan to unleash a campaign of terror against the US. On February 26, 1993, two al-Qaeda operatives drove a van packed with explosives into the public parking garage beneath the World Trade Center and set off a big blast. Six people, including a pregnant woman, died, and over a thousand were injured. The FBI arrested five of the seven plotters promptly and found the mastermind Ramzi Yousef later in Pakistan.

Yousef’s plan was to topple North Tower with his bomb, and the collapsing debris of this tower was to knock down South Tower. This cunning plan failed, but his uncle, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, succeeded in knocking the towers down more than eight years later.

The 9/11 attacks (known this way because unlike the British or the Europeans, Americans put the month before the day) involved 19 of Osama’s boys four hijacking planes and flying them to kamikaze-style suicide attacks on chosen targets. A third plane struck the Pentagon, and a fourth, which crashed in Pennsylvania, was apparently meant to hit the White House. Osama’s Pakistani henchman had pulled off a huge massacre on a shoestring budget, killing 2,997 people and injuring an estimated 25,000. Now, Osama had worldwide attention for his global jihad.

The US tilts at windmills

The 9/11 attacks led to mourning and shock in the US. Even the Japanese had only struck Pearl Harbor in distant Hawaii, which was not even a state yet. Osama had managed to strike the mainland US itself. This was a really big deal.

Later, the 9-11 Commission Report concluded that Osama’s al-Qaeda was “sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal.” Osama had issued two fatwas, one in August 1996 and in February 1998, calling for a jihad against the US. He declared that it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than to kill other infidels. This charming chap was inspired by Egyptian Islamist author Sayyid Qutb and rationalized “unprovoked mass murder as righteous defense of an embattled faith.”

The murderous ideology that had inflicted such spectacular 9/11 attacks was bound to provoke a response. Under George W. Bush, who was not as bright as his father George H. W. Bush, this came in the form of the War on Terror, later jargonized as the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The US rushed into Afghanistan to get rid of the Taliban and succeeded speedily. Then, they engaged in a quixotic endeavor to build democracy in this famously fractious, mountainous land.

The US installed one notoriously corrupt leader after another into office. These men stole hundreds of millions of American taxpayer dollars. In the end, US darlings Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani became lackeys of the Taliban, who are now back in power despite the blood and treasure successive US administrations poured into Afghanistan.

More importantly, the GWOT morphed into an invasion of Iraq in 2003. This was both unwise and unnecessary. Certainly, Saddam Hussein was no lovey dovey cuddly teddy bear. He was a murderer fond of chemical weapons and had gassed both Shia Arabs and ethnic minority Kurds.

Hussein had invaded Iran (in 1980) and Kuwait (in 1990) as well. The latter provoked the 1990–1991 Gulf War, where US troops annihilated Iraqi forces spectacularly. By 2003, Hussein’s Iraq was a shell of its former self. Besides, Hussein was a Baathist — a political philosophy that advocates a single Arab socialist nation — and no friend to al-Qaeda. Yet deranged American neoconservatives — many of whom were the children of Trotskyites — argued that Hussein would collaborate with Osama to unleash weapons of mass destruction on the US. This argument was bunkum but, just like their fathers, neoconservatives did not let reality get in the way of ideology. As a result, more American blood and treasure were lost.

The Iraq War destroyed the goodwill the US had attracted after the 9/11 attacks. Few people around the world bought the neoconservative bullshit. Even old allies like France and Germany refused to go along. Tony Blair valiantly sided with Bush Junior but lost his reputation at home for doing so.

Worse, the US under Bush Junior justified torture. My co-author Glenn Carle, a White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) with nine ancestors on the Mayflower, resigned from the CIA and wrote The Interrogator, a riveting read that captures the madness of this era. Needless to say, this US recourse to torture damaged its reputation globally and caused a crisis of confidence in the idea of America at home.

The US takes its eye off the ball

Arguably, the US has been the greatest superpower in history. The 9/11 attacks were spectacular, but they were perpetrated by little men in the shadows. Crazy ideologies always come up from time to time, and Islamist fanaticism is not new. Muslim countries tend to have very few minorities for a reason. After all, believers have a religious duty to convert everyone to Islam. Fanatical Muslims have resorted to torture and murder in their aim to convert pagans and dissenters from truth with a capital T. The medieval Mughal emperor Aurangzeb and the more modern Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini are just two examples from a long line of crazy nutters. 

If the neoconservatives had read some history, they would have realized that the War on Terror was a bloody stupid idea. You can go to war against a state, but not against an idea, especially not if this idea has been around for a long time and just refuses to die. Plenty of disgruntled young men and even others need a villain whom they can blame for everything. When an ideology offers 72 virgins in heaven, it is an attractive proposition to many testosterone-filled fanatics.

The US got distracted by the War on Terror and ignored other key developments. Few remember that 2001 is not only the year of the 9/11 attacks but also the year in which China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Enter the Dragon was the blockbuster movie Americans somehow missed. The 2016 paper “The China Shock” explains how the entry of China into the global market deindustrialized many economies and depressed worker wages as well. The Rust Belt, where much of Donald Trump’s core support base lives, is a classic example of this shock.

Anyway, fast forward to today and a new Cold War, which includes a full-blown trade war, has broken out between the US and China. If the US had woken up to the Chinese challenge earlier, this would have been entirely avoidable.

There is also an argument to be made that the US was blind to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tightening grip on power. For years, the US and its allies, especially the UK, were happy to enjoy Russian cash pilfered from oligarchs from Mother Russia. They never really used their leverage against Putin to contain him or, earlier, to help build a Russian economy that was less extractive or exploitative.

To this day, Russians blame Bush Junior for unilaterally pulling out of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that prohibited both countries from “deploying nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles.” Putin had promised the US full support after 9/11, and Russians still view the US abandonment of ABM as a stab in the back. Fueled by irrational fears post-9/11, it was entirely unnecessary and extremely unwise.

A weaker, more divided post-9/11 US

I am convinced that many neoconservatives were well-meaning. I met some of them during my time at Oxford. Some of them were Rhodes Scholars and were convinced that an American invasion would lead to democracy. By their logic, there would be rivers of milk and honey in the region, and everyone would sing kumbaya. This is exactly what many Bolsheviks believed in 1917. Yet what they got was lovely Joseph Stalin’s paranoid mass killings and secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria’s rampant raping.

Naive neoconservatives forgot that the road to Hell is paved with good intentions. The invasion of Iraq was followed by the rise of the Islamic State and a savage civil war that spilled out into Syria, where the Russians got involved. A former commandant of Sandhurst (the legendary British military academy) who came from a gloriously imperial family remarked to me in 2003 that the borders in the Middle East were all in the wrong place. Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot had not quite got everything right. Yet the trouble is, where do you draw new lines in this famously volatile region? Neoconservatives shook the hornet’s nest, and the results will remain with us for decades to come.

Japan and Germany after World War II were relatively homogenous industrial societies. Neither Afghanistan nor Iraq was one. Both are multiethnic concoctions where the idea of a Westphalian state is still an alien import. The likes of Paul Wolfowitz and Paul Bremer were infernally arrogant and criminally ignorant in their policy prescriptions. De-Baathification in Iraq led to the disbanding of the military, the police, the firefighters, the teachers, the doctors and other employees of Hussein’s state. To survive, not just thrive, everyone joined the Baathist Party. Instead of creating a thriving democracy, neoconservatives unleashed chaos and civil war. We are still reaping the bitter harvests of the toxic seeds they sowed. 

Like the War on Drugs and the War on Crime, the War on Terror failed. Simplistic solutions to complex problems always fail, even when they may seem successful for decades. Neither Nazi Germany nor Soviet Russia were able to create the utopias they promised. Instead, both led to nightmares. So did the War on Terror.

Osama’s aim was to weaken the US. He succeeded. Trump won the presidency first by defenestrating Jeb Bush from the Republican Party and then by beating Hillary Clinton in the presidential election. The reality television star blamed both of them for the Iraq War. The neoconservatives’ chest-thumping form of American nationalism had paved the way for him. Trump offered a rawer version of patriotism to those on the Right who feared that America had become weak. To them, “Make America Great Again” proved to be an irresistible offer.

At the same time, the Left lost faith in the idea of America. American campuses started viewing the CIA and the FBI as sinister organizations. Many young Americans see their country as an unjust superpower dominated by the military-industrial complex. Osama had blamed the Great Satan — the term used in many Muslim countries for the US — for the sad plight of Palestine and Lebanon. Thousands of students camping in campuses seem to agree.

The Taliban is back in power in Afghanistan. Terrorism still persists even though we have avoided a repeat of 9/11-style spectacular attacks. Airport security is a pain in the wrong part of the anatomy because no one wants to be on a plane headed into a monument. No one trusts President Joe Biden’s democracy agenda because they have seen this American movie before. The soft power that Harvard Kennedy School’s Joseph Nye speaks of stands greatly damaged. Worst of all, a coarsened, far more divided US seems ill-prepared to lead a more fractious world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Now It’s Clear, Osama bin Laden Won the War on Terror appeared first on Fair Observer.

The Kurds have a historical connection to Palestine that dates back to the time of Salah ad-Din, the great Muslim Kurdish leader revered for his role in defeating the Crusaders in the Holy Land. To expand and protect the vast Ayyubid sultanate which he founded, Salah ad-Din placed many Kurdish settlers in Palestine, Egypt and Syria. The descendants of those Kurdish settlers continue to live in Palestine today, but they have largely assimilated into Arab culture, abandoning their Kurdish roots and language.

Similarly, Jews have lived in Kurdistan for centuries, dating back to the 12th century by some accounts. However, most migrated to Israel with the establishment of the Jewish state and the Right of Return law, which gave all Jews the legal right to immigrate to Israel. Today, there are between 200,000 to 300,000 Kurdish Jews in Israel who continue to celebrate their Kurdish roots but have adopted the Hebrew language.

Religious identity and Kurdish supporters of Hamas

While the Kurds have a historical connection with the two nations, they are not monolithic in their views on the Israel–Palestine conflict. This has become more evident since the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli invasion of Gaza.

Recently, pictures of assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh have circulated in Kurdish social media. This attention to Haniyeh has alarmed many Kurds, including myself, about the growing number of Kurds who seem to support Hamas. They are expressing solidarity with Hamas due largely to the fact that Kurds and Palestinians share a common Muslim identity. Furthermore, Kurds see their own struggle mirrored in the Palestinian experience.

Yet the Kurdish and Palestinian situation is different. Kurds are a diverse people. Not all Kurds are Muslim. Some belong to ancient religious communities like the Yezidi and the Yarsani, who have faced persecution by Muslims seeking religious homogenization.

Islamist Kurdish factions that support Hamas, including some political groups in the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq, add another layer of complexity to the matter. Many of these groups have praised Haniyeh as a martyr and resistance fighter despite Hamas’s use of terrorist tactics like suicide bombings and its support for leaders like Saddam Hussein, who murdered countless Kurds or their alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran that continues to imprison and execute Kurdish teachers and activists; and assassinate Kurdish leaders. Furthermore, I have searched both in English and Kurdish and found no evidence that these Islamist Kurds expressed any sorrow over the unjust killings of Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023. These Islamists do not care about the fact that Human Rights Watch termed Hamas’s actions war crimes because to them Jewish lives do not matter. 

Support for Hamas among these more religiously radical Kurds reveals a key tension in Kurdish society. Despite a century of Kurdish nationalism, many Kurds still seem to prioritize their religious identity over their ethnic one. The Kurdish political class has yet to win the hearts and minds of more religious Kurds. For instance, Ali Bapir, the current leader of the Islamic Justice Group, and members of his party were reported to have refused to stand up for the Kurdish national anthem due mainly to a line in the anthem that reads, “Our faith and religion are our homeland.”

These Islamists often align with regional powers like Iran or Turkey despite both countries engaging in a silent cultural genocide against Kurds that is decades long. Clearly, they still put their religious identity first. This prioritization of religion over ethnic or national identity informs their support for Islamic powers like Iran and Turkey or organizations like Hamas.

Being muslim does not mean that one has to sacrifice his own nation like many of these islamists do. Many prominent historical Kurdish leaders like Sheikh Ubeidullah of Nehri, Sheikh Mehmoud Barzanji, Sheik Said of Piran and Qazi Muhammad were quite religious yet struggled and even gave their lives for the Kurdish nation’s struggle for liberation. 

The Islamist Kurdish agenda and its implications 

These Islamist Kurds are not merely supporting Hamas because they feel for the oppressed Palestinians. They seek what all Islamist groups seek: a strict Islamic state. This is clear if one examines the history of these groups in Kurdish regions. In Turkish-occupied Kurdistan, a radical armed Kurdish Islamist group known as the Kurdish Hezbollah emerged around the same time as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the 1980s.

This Islamist organization launched a conflict against the PKK and anyone who disagreed with their extremist views. They carried out kidnappings, assassinations and mass murders. There are now concerns that this terror group has reformed into the Islamist party known as the Huda-Par, which won 4 seats in the Turkish parliament in the 2023 election.

Similarly, in the Kurdistan region in Iraq, long before the Islamic State, secular Kurdish parties like the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) faced severe security challenges in dealing with radical Islamist groups like the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK). The IMK later morphed into Ansar al-Islam and many other Islamist groups. These groups sought to establish a strict Wahhabist Islamic state. Before PUK forces drove them out, they even imposed sharia law in some villages. These were similar to the laws favored by al-Qaeda and Taliban, who incidentally trained many of the founders of Ansar al-Islam. They fought in Afghanistan alongside both these organizations.

So, support for Hamas by Islamist groups is not just mere support of fellow oppressed people or co-religionists. This support is part of a broader Islamist agenda that spans the Middle East region and poses a serious threat to local, regional and international security.

Kurdish neutrality and geopolitical realities

It is important to note that Islamists do not represent all Kurds. The Kurdish position on the Israel-Palestine conflict is quite varied. Major political parties across greater Kurdistan take a neutral position on the Israel-Palestine conflict. They are not completely immune to the strong anti-Israel sentiment in the region. Yet Kurds can sympathize with embattled Israel’s geopolitical position. They recognize that their primary adversaries are Muslim-majority states like Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq. These states, not Israel, have historically and continue to oppress Kurds and occupy Kurdish lands.

It was Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, not an Israeli leader, who used Islamic scripture to justify the Anfal Genocide, which killed some 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds. He killed 5,000 more using chemical weapons in the city of Halabja. It is Turkey that has jailed, killed and tried to erase Kurdish culture and identity for a century. The mere utterance of the words “Kurd” or “Kurdistan” can land you in Turkish jail for a long time, if not forever. Turkey, not Israel, massacres Kurds and calls them “mountain Turks.”

Muslim states like Iran have been handing heavy prison and even death sentences to teachers, activists and protesters advocating Kurdish rights. This bloody crackdown on Kurdish civil society in Iran has been unceasing since the establishment of The Islamic Republic of Iran’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, issued a fatwa to kill Kurds advocating for their rights. Recently, Kurdish girls like Jina Amini were murdered or  imprisoned for how they dressed, what they thought or who they were. Thousands were seized during the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi movement that spread all over Iran and capitals across the world. Even now, teachers are tortured or executed in Evin Prison for teaching the Kurdish language.

It was Syria, not Israel, that stripped 120,000 Kurds of their citizenship and made them foreigners in their own land. These Kurds are now stateless. However, since the Syrian civil war, the Kurds under the PYD and its military forces like the YPG have established their own regional self-administration with the cooperation of local tribes and dealt a major defeat of ISIS. Despite the countless lives given in the war against ISIS, the Turkish government has decided to carry out operations that are ongoing against the Kurds in Syria to ethnically cleanse them out of their regions and settle Turkish-backed Islamists and Syrian refugees currently residing in Turkish camps. The gruesome videos and reports of war crimes and human rights abuses carried out by Turkish forces and Turkish backed Islamist forces reveal that Turkey’s efforts to create a safe zone in North Syria are motivated largely by its animosity towards the Kurds inhabiting the region. 

It is quite shocking then that these very states that committed and continue to commit crimes against Kurds tell them that “we are brothers in Islam.” These states that occupy Kurdish lands are carrying out a genocide or erasure of Kurdish identity and culture that is killing thousands of people gradually and silently without any real opposition by regional and international powers. 

The double standard: Kurdish cause vs. Palestinian cause

Why is it then that these states speak out so vocally against oppression or aggression against Palestinians yet continue to occupy and oppress Kurds in their own backyard? If Palestinians have the right to statehood, so too do Kurds. Yet, the blatant hypocrisy and double standard of these states shows the insincerity of their policy and stance on Palestine. 

These states are not interested at all in what is just but what will further their national and ideological interests only. It is not being Muslim that these states care about; if they did, then surely they would not occupy and oppress Kurds who are vastly Muslim. It is not standing against occupation and oppression that they care about, as they claim in the case of Palestine, for if they did care about such matters, they would not inflict the same injustices on the Kurdish people. 

There is thus a clear double standard, particularly if one examines how Kurdish self-determination is treated relative to how Palestinian self-determination is treated. Look at the regional reactions to the 2017 Kurdistan Referendum held in Iraqi Kurdistan. Some 139 out of 193 UN member states have recognized Palestinian statehood since the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) declared the nationhood of Palestine in 1988. The Kurds received vocal support for their 2017 referendum from Israel alone. Even UN Secretary-General António Guterres called Kurdistan’s move for independence “destabilizing.”

The majority of Muslim states, including the State of Palestine, objected to Kurdish independence. Yet these same states vocally support Palestinian statehood. PLO Secretary General Saeb Erekat called Kurdish independence “a poisoned sword against the Arabs.” Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called the vote an act of betrayal and accused the US of seeking to create a new Israel in the region by supporting Kurdish independence — even though the US had opposed the referendum.

Many Kurds are tired of being victims of the geopolitics of the region. Countries like Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria typically view both Zionism and Kurdish nationalism as projects of Western imperialism. This is despite the fact that it was the European imperialist Sykes-Picot Plan that unjustly partitioned Kurdistan and allocated it to these states. These states often label Kurdistan a second Israel, illustrating that an extreme anti-Kurdism, similar to their anti-Jewish/Israeli sentiments, animates their outlook.

Kurds, perhaps more than most, empathize with the struggles of Palestinians and Jews. However, their own history has shown them how superficial much of the support from Muslim states for Palestine can be. This awareness allows Kurds to see through hollow and hypocritical rhetoric, making them less inclined to instinctively side with Palestine or Israel. As a result, many Kurds hold more nuanced and balanced views on the issue.

All in all, the Kurdish experience provides a unique lens through which to view the Israel-Palestine conflict. The Kurdish struggle for identity, national sovereignty and justice mirrors that of both Jews and Palestinians. Yet they understand that an international community that applies its moral principles selectively will never end the cycle of violence and oppression in the Middle East.

[Tara Yarwais edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post An Insider View on How Kurds See Israel and Palestine appeared first on Fair Observer.

Recaps of Netanyahu’s key points and reports of the volatile climate in the Capitol briefly flooded online platforms, but the energy dissipated with the dawn of a new day. News of American flags being burnt drew more attention from the American public than Netanyahu’s comparing the October 7 attack to 9/11. While the ongoing Israeli siege of Gaza has elicited significant international attention, Harris and President Joe Biden have shifted the dialogue to decenter the conflict as the November elections near. 

Biden’s approach 

Nearly 11 months have passed since the Hamas attack on Israel that sparked the war in Gaza. On the day of the attack, Biden released a statement declaring that the “Administration’s support for Israel’s security is rock solid and unwavering.” His administration followed through with this commitment in the months following, sending massive shipments of weapons and significant financial assistance to Israel, including a bill passed in April that provided Israel with over $4.4 billion. A few months prior, the US had garnered anger across the globe for vetoing a UN resolution demanding a ceasefire in Gaza, further demonstrating the administration’s commitment to Israel. 

Despite his initially supportive approach, Biden’s position faltered in May in the face of a potential attack on Rafah, a city in southern Gaza where a great number of displaced Palestinians had fled. At the time, Rafah held over one million displaced Palestinians. As Israeli forces continued their assault on the strip, the president threatened to withhold arms shipments to Israel should they “go into Rafah.”

While the administration did pause at least one shipment in response to Israel’s then-impending attack on the city, both the language and bureaucratic processes surrounding policy decisions about Israel have been confusing and unclear. Biden’s statements have revolved around a staunch commitment to stand beside Israel, while establishing vague and immeasurable benchmarks and boundaries. Consider his attempt at taking a stronger stance on the situation in Rafah. Biden stated: “I’m not supplying the weapons that have been used historically to deal with Rafah, to deal with the cities — that deal with that problem.” 

What does it mean for Israel to “go into Rafah”? At which point is the move, still ongoing, considered a violation? Additionally, what weapons specifically was Biden referring to? There is a long history of arms support between the US and Israel, with a number of varied weapons supplied. Which weapons would Biden withhold, and for how long? Biden’s approach has been incredibly muddled and ridiculously ambiguous, leaving many Americans frustrated and confused. 

In light of Biden’s ineffective move to hold Israel more accountable, Netanyahu has tried to leverage his decades-long relationship with the current US president. In his July address, Netanyahu went as far as to thank Biden for his “friendship to Israel” and for being a “proud Irish-American Zionist.”

Despite Netanyahu’s personal effort to sugarcoat US–Israel relations, over the course of the conflict, Biden has drifted from staunch support to a wishy-washy, passionately delivered yet logically confusing position. With the November elections rapidly approaching, that vaguely bipartisan-minded approach made sense as Biden faced a tough uphill battle. But Biden’s attempt to remain relevant quickly became a moot point when Harris replaced him as the Democratic candidate in late July. Depending on how Americans show up this November, it will now be she who controls the dialogue surrounding the situation in Gaza.

Harris’s approach

Since Harris became its candidate, the Democratic party has risen like Christ from the grave. Following the widespread panic tied to Biden’s performance in the first presidential debate, Harris’s arrival on the scene has suddenly revitalized the party and support is surging in. But her platform thus far has yielded next to nothing in terms of tangible plans and policies to be implemented in relation to the Israel–Gaza issue. 

On the one hand, Harris certainly had little time to prepare, entering the race with only 15 weeks until Election Day. She hit the ground running, with her platform focused primarily on the economy, healthcare and tax credits for the low to middle classes. But even on her extremely active social media platforms, there is little mention of the horrors unfolding in the Middle East — with over 40,000 Gazans now dead — despite the significant role of the US in facilitating its ally’s war effort. In fact, until the recent Democratic National Convention in Chicago, Harris has conveniently avoided seriously engaging with the topic that the world has watched with bated breath since last October.

In her 37-minute speech on the final day of the convention, it took Harris over half an hour to get to the situation in Gaza, following her mention of the war in Ukraine. While stating that she will always support Israel’s right to defend itself, echoing Biden’s approach, Harris closed with a passionate claim that she will work to ensure “the Palestinian people can realize their right to dignity, security, freedom and self-determination.” A statement more explicit and direct than anything the public has heard from Biden since October 7. 

Although she allocated just two minutes of her speech to discuss the conflict and reiterated Biden-era perspectives, Harris’s declaration of support for Palestinian self-determination signals that she may bring in a significant new approach to US-Israel relations. But context is crucial here: each and every vote matters in this election, and Harris’ balancing act of speaking in favor of both Israel and Palestine may be a strategic move to connect with a larger voter base. 

The future of Israel-Gaza in America’s political landscape

Americans have a lot on their minds going into the November elections. With an assassination attempt on Donald Trump, widespread panic after seeing Biden’s performance in the first presidential debate and overwhelming bouts of voter fatigue, Harris has a tough road ahead if she wants to emerge victorious. While her path forward is paved with the sparkling stones of America’s “future” of which she speaks so passionately, continuing to deprioritize the situation in Gaza could be crippling for Harris.

How our candidates and leaders speak of things matters, and voters are paying attention. Back in May, Biden had already lost 13% of supporters who voted for him in the 2020 elections due to his recent support of Israel — and the fighting is nowhere near over. Harris should not forget that many Americans, especially young voters, care deeply about the suffering in Gaza. Additionally, these young voters — who tend to align with Palestine — are majority-Democratic. 

Harris needs those votes. According to recent polling, Trump and Harris are currently neck-and-neck. The Democratic nominee has little room for error, and maintaining a vague, double-sided approach to the issue is a huge gamble that could cost Harris the election. 

While US engagement with Israel thus far has been largely driven by the Zionist-friendly perspectives of the Biden administration and the longstanding relationship between the two countries, America is still a democracy. The voice of the people cannot be ignored, and it is this voice that will determine what the future of US–Israel relations will look like as votes are cast this fall. Until then, it is up to the Presidential candidates to demonstratehow they plan to show up for America, and for the people of Gaza, should they be voted in as the most powerful individual in the world.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Kamala’s New Tone on Gaza Won’t Energize Her Base Yet appeared first on Fair Observer.

Erdoğan aims to maintain his international standing and address domestic pressures, both of which were bolstered by the deal’s initial success. Reviving it would also demonstrate Turkey’s diplomatic finesse as it navigates complex alliances between Russia and NATO.

The Black Sea’s fragile lifeline

Russia’s control of Ukrainian Black Sea ports during the war threatened a global food crisis. The July 2022 Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) offered a precarious solution, allowing Ukrainian grain exports to resume. In exchange, the UN pledged to facilitate Russian agricultural exports hampered by Western sanctions.

However, the deal’s fate remained precarious. Russia’s suspension shattered hopes of stability. The nation threatened the Black Sea as a potential warzone and demanded relaxed sanctions. Simultaneously, Russian forces maintained their assault on Ukrainian ports through missile and drone strikes. They escalated the threat by declaring all vessels in the Black Sea as potential military targets. In response, Ukraine established a humanitarian corridor along the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria, albeit at the cost of increased expense and travel time.

Putin’s conditional offer for revival — full removal of restrictions on Russian agricultural exports — met with skepticism. Though Western critics identify Russia’s withdrawal as a contributor to the food crisis, Putin countered them by asserting that the issue had deeper roots. Putin blames the West for the global food crisis and denies responsibility for the grain deal collapse.

Despite the cautious optimism spurred by UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ proposal, the BSGI remains entangled in an intractable impasse. His proposal, which included SWIFT access for a subsidiary of Russia’s Agricultural Bank, aimed to address Russia’s concerns. It did not suffice. Negotiations have yielded no significant breakthroughs, leaving the precarious lifeline for global food security suspended in limbo. The ramifications of this stagnation are stark: A deepening global food crisis threatens famine in vulnerable regions, while rising food prices further strain already burdened economies.

Deflecting dissent with diplomacy: Erdoğan’s high-stakes of BSGI

The BSGI garnered Erdoğan considerable international acclaim. A Pew Research Center poll conducted across 17 countries revealed that 67% viewed Turkey’s role in the deal positively. However, this past acclaim faces the countervailing pressure of recent UN Security Council criticism stemming from clashes in Cyprus. The Council highlighted rising regional tensions while condemning an assault by Turkish Cypriot security forces on UN Peacekeeping Force members. This criticism underscores the urgency for Erdoğan to secure a diplomatic win, a potential avenue offered by reviving the BSGI.

Reviving the grain deal could boost Erdoğan’s image by countering criticism and showcasing his dedication to dialogue, cooperation and global food security. This aligns perfectly with Turkey’s role as a guarantor power in Cyprus and its support for a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. It would not only solidify past success but also propel Erdoğan back into the international spotlight.

Domestically, Turkey faces economic challenges, with inflation exceeding 64% in January 2024. This has eroded the purchasing power and living standards of millions of Turks, especially the working and lower middle classes who form the core of Erdoğan’s support base. The high inflation has also come with a weak currency, a large current account deficit, a low level of foreign exchange reserves and a high level of external debt.

These economic woes have taken a toll on Erdoğan’s popularity and approval ratings, which dipped below 40%. Erdoğan, who has been in power since 2003, faces a formidable challenge from a united opposition bloc. The opposition has accused Erdoğan of mismanaging the economy, undermining democracy, violating human rights and pursuing an adventurous foreign policy. Erdoğan has dismissed these criticisms as part of a foreign-backed conspiracy to overthrow him and weaken Turkey.

A successful revival of the grain deal with Russia could deflect attention from these domestic issues and potentially boost Erdoğan’s domestic standing. He could claim that he has delivered a diplomatic victory for Turkey and its allies and secured the country’s food security and economic interests. He could also argue that he has restored Turkey’s regional role and influence. 

NATO, neutrality and the S-400: Can Erdoğan reconcile alliance commitments?

Erdoğan seeks to improve relations with Russia, which are strained by their divergent interests and interventions in Syria, Libya and the Caucasus. In these three conflicts, Russia and Turkey have backed opposing sides. Russia backs the Assad Regime in Syria, the eastern-based commander Khalifa Haftar in Libya and has a defense pact with Armenia in the Caucasus. Conversely, Turkey backs the rebel groups in Syria, the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in Libya and has close ties with Azerbaijan in the Caucasus. These rivalries create tensions and mistrust between the Turkish and Russian capitals of Ankara and Moscow, respectively, threatening to escalate into wider regional wars.

Erdoğan believes that by engaging in dialogue and cooperation with Russia, he can manage these conflicts and prevent them from spiraling out of control. He hopes to find common ground and mutual benefits with Moscow on other issues, such as trade, energy and security. Erdoğan sees Russia as a potential partner and a counterweight to the West.

However, Turkey’s delicate balancing act between its NATO commitments and its growing partnership with Russia, exemplified by the 2017 purchase of the S-400 missile system, further complicates the situation. The S-400’s incompatibility with NATO systems and possible security threats raise concerns among allies. It led to US warnings as well as potential Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) sanctions and exclusion from the F-35 program — a program that leads the international distribution of F-35 Lightning II fighter jets. Erdoğan defends the purchase as a sovereign decision and emphasizes the need for these weapons for Turkey’s defense and autonomy. At the same time, however, he seeks to maintain cordial relations with Russia despite regional differences.

A successful BSGI revival could demonstrate Turkey’s diplomatic prowess and reaffirm its neutrality in the current conflict. This would potentially ease tensions within NATO. Erdoğan could claim he has managed to balance the interests and expectations of both Russia and NATO, without compromising Turkey’s alliance loyalty or strategic autonomy. He could stress that the deal is not aimed at undermining NATO’s cohesion or credibility, but rather at enhancing its security and stability through cooperation.

Leveraging the BSGI for trade, security and global impact

The BSGI transcends its diplomatic significance for Erdoğan and Turkey, presenting a lucrative economic opportunity. By facilitating the transit of Ukrainian grain through the Turkish Straits, the BSGI unlocks new markets for Turkish goods. Particularly, this includes agricultural products that are in high demand internationally. Turkish Statistical Institute data indicates a 12% year-on-year increase in agricultural exports to $25.3 billion in 2022. 

Moreover, the BSGI strengthens Turkey’s ties with key trade partners in Africa and the Middle East. These regions are heavily reliant on Ukrainian grain for food security. International Grains Council data highlights Ukraine’s position as the world’s third-largest wheat and corn exporter; its primary markets include Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. These nations have also been among Turkey’s top trading partners, totalling $32.4 billion in 2022. The BSGI could solidify Turkey’s role as a reliable and strategic partner for these countries, even positioning them as a potential mediator for regional conflicts.

Beyond economics, the BSGI carries humanitarian significance. It potentially mitigates the global food crisis exacerbated by the Ukraine war. World Bank reports document disrupted agricultural production and distribution, leading to food shortages, price hikes and rising poverty. Their estimates warn of an additional 263 million people facing food insecurity due to the conflict, impacting not only neighboring countries but also regions across Europe, Asia and Africa. Reviving the BSGI allows Erdoğan to showcase his commitment to global food security efforts, positioning Turkey as a key player in addressing one of the 21st century’s most pressing challenges.

[Ali Omar Forozish and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The Truth About Turkey’s Interest in Russia–Ukraine Grain Trade appeared first on Fair Observer.

As we got closer, things became clearer. I could make out the map of Kurdistan — my home nation — on the protestor’s banners. Kurds are an ethnic group spread across neighboring regions in Armenia, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. Although Kurdistan has never achieved independence as a state, its borders are widely recognizable.

Via the Central Intelligence Agency.

The protest was precisely in front of the United Nations Office, whose picturesque, flag-adorned lawn was quiet aside from the few dozen protestors. The protestors accused Turkey of plotting genocide against Kurds — a claim that is not without merit.

Kurds have faced a century of tragedy. In the 1930s, the young Turkish Republic brutally put down rebellions in Kurdish areas, killing tens of thousands of civilians. More recently, Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime carried out a genocide in Iraq’s Kurdish-populated north. Today, the regime of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continues to carry out violence against Kurds in Syria while restricting their political rights at home. It is hard not to feel the desperation of a people that, even here in the world capital of diplomacy, seems to go unheard.

Who is Abdullah Öcalan?

Flags featuring Kurdistan’s borders and posters of former Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan festooned the protest in Geneva. The protestors chanted slogans calling for Öcalan’s release. The 75-year-old man has spent the last 25 years of his life in a Turkish prison.

Many Kurds adore Öcalan. They affectionately refer to him as Apo (“Uncle”). Born in 1949 to a Turkish Kurd family, Öcalan once attempted to enlist in the Turkish army. As a young man, he dropped out of Ankara University after being jailed for distributing leftist leaflets. Although he has never attained a college degree, Öcalan enjoys a reputation as a man of intelligence and education — at least according to my dad.

Öcalan took his university exposure to Marxism to heart, and he has remained a lifelong leftist. After his university experience, Öcalan became an advocate for Kurdish independence. In 1977, he and two comrades published a manifesto, “The National Road to the Kurdish Revolution,” which laid the foundation for the PKK’s philosophy. Kurdish liberation was to be attained by any means necessary, including violence.

Two years later, Öcalan and his comrades fled from Turkey to Syria. There, they began recruiting local ethnic Kurds and training them as guerrillas. These fighters became the core of the PKK. Five years later, the PKK started its armed campaign, fighting Turkish forces and assuming control of a small village in southeastern Turkey. The PKK insists that it only targets Turkish military and has never admitted to attacks against civilians.

Turkey, the US, the EU and much of the international community declared Öcalan and the PKK terrorists. Many Kurds, however, view him as a revolutionary.

Öcalan’s reign as PKK leader lasted 15 years before his imprisonment in 1999. Turkey has accused him of kidnapping Western tourists, killing civilians and even targeting his own people who dared to challenge him during this time. Ask one of his supporters, however — including my dad — and you will hear a story of Turkish intelligence fabricating narratives and creating setups.

Öcalan went on to flee successively to Lebanon, Russia, Greece and several other countries to avoid capture by Turkish authorities. All the while, he remained in charge of the PKK. In 1999, Kenya captured Öcalan and extradited him to Turkey. A Turkish court sentenced him to death for treason.

Öcalan did not get a fair trial

After the arrest, Kurds all over the world protested at Kenyan embassies, as well as Turkish, Greek and American ones, to no avail.

In 2004, Turkey — hoping to join the EU — abolished the death penalty. Thus, Öcalan’s sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled Öcalan’s trial unfair. The court pointed out that Turkey prevented Öcalan’s lawyers — including both Turkish and Dutch citizens — from seeing their client. The court recommended a retrial, which Turkey refused.

Öcalan attempted to bargain his freedom by negotiating a ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish government. Not only was the attempt unsuccessful, but the ceasefire also failed to stick. The PKK broke the first ceasefire in 2004. Another ceasefire started in 2009 and ended in 2011 and a third started in 2012 and ended in 2015. All the while, Öcalan has continued to advocate for a negotiated agreement for Kurdish autonomy in Turkey along lines similar to Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq.

This brings us to July 17. A quarter century after his arrest, Öcalan’s supporters are still protesting for him. A few dozen independent Kurds in bright yellow vests have to stand in front of the UN building in Switzerland and plead a case that the ECHR has already ruled on. Turkey still will not listen.

As I sat on the bus back to my hotel, I read about Öcalan and asked my dad questions about him, I hear two different perspectives: one from world powers (the US, the EU) and the other from a Kurdish man who insisted the plight of the Kurds should have been in the Red Cross and Red Crescent museum.

The logical side of me struggles with the inconsistency. If Öcalan is a terrorist, why didn’t Turkey simply convict him in a fair trial? If Öcalan is a hero, why does he have such a checkered story?

I decided that, at the very least, Öcalan deserves a new trial. Turkey’s refusal does not prove Öcalan innocent, but it speaks volumes on the country’s position in Kurdistan. Why are they afraid of making their case in court?

Further, when with the US and the EU finally put pressure on NATO- and Council of Europe-member Turkey to stop hiding behind “terrorism” as an excuse and end its persecution of an ethnic minority? Has the West ever been shy about prodding the Middle East before?

Yet the Kurdish diaspora seems condemned to speak out alone. This protest in Geneva has been recurring weekly since January 2021. All the while, Öcalan remains isolated on Mralı Island, a prison similar to Alcatraz, in the Sea of Marmara. Turkey emptied the prison island for Öcalan, keeping him alone for ten years from 1999 to 2009. Since then, with no visits from family or lawyers, Öcalan’s only company is a few other convicts. Even now, the old man is allowed just a few hours a week of face time with fellow human beings.

As far as we can foresee, the Kurdish diaspora will have to keep protesting.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Turkey Still Refuses Öcalan a Fair Trial After 25 Years appeared first on Fair Observer.

These events have been alarming, and there is a legitimate fear that they could spark a wider war in the region. However, all parties have expressed a desire to avoid full-scale war. While tensions are high, a regional conflict involving Hezbollah, Israel and Iran — potentially drawing in the US and other nations — may be less imminent than it appears. These offensive actions might be part of a calculated strategy to signal boundaries and demonstrate power without crossing the line to broader conflict.

Perhaps the greater issue Israel faces is its growing internal tensions, particularly the widening rift between the far right and more moderate elements of the government. An arrest of 10 Israeli soldiers on July 29 for sexually assaulting Palestinian prisoners ignited heated protests. This has heightened concerns that Israel could be on the brink of internal conflict and destabilization.

Who did Israel assassinate, and why? 

Israel’s assassination of Fouad Shukur was reportedly in retaliation for a Hezbollah rocket attack that struck the occupied Golan Heights, tragically killing 12 children. Shukur was allegedly behind this attack. He had also been wanted in the US for decades due to his involvement in the 1983 bombing of a Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon, which killed 241 American service members. 

Assasinating the Hezbollah commander thus appears to be a more or less rational move. However, the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh seems less logical from a strategic perspective.

Haniyeh was killed when an Israeli rocket hit his official residence in Tehran while he was attending the swearing-in ceremony of Iran’s new president. Iran has long used Hezbollah as a proxy in its broader strategy against Israel. Haniyeh was the the head of Hamas’s political wing and widely known for his more moderate and cosmopolitan approach, compared to his counterparts. He was a central figure in the ongoing efforts to broker a ceasefire in Gaza. The killing of Haniyeh likely silenced a moderating voice within Hamas and could push his successor toward a harder, less compromising stance against Israel. 

Domestic political pressures, rather than military necessity, may have driven the assassination. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu may have felt the need to strike Iran in order to assuage the far right and maintain domestic stability. 

There is a concern that events could escalate into a broader conflict in the Middle East, all parties have continuously expressed a desire to avoid full-scale war. Each side appears to be carefully navigating the situation, using targeted strikes and other “tit for tat” tactics to communicate their limits while avoiding escalation. For instance, when Iran launched 300 missiles and drones at Israel, they made it clear through backchannels that they were not seeking war. Israel responded in a similar manner, signaling its intent to avoid a broader conflict. 

Israel’s growing internal tensions

While external threats are significant, the growing rift between the far right and more moderate elements of the Israeli government poses a greater risk to the country’s stability. 

On July 29, Israel arrested 10 soldiers for the sexual assault and abuse of Palestinian prisoners. Following their arrest, far-right protesters stormed two military bases in Southern and Central Israel. Protests have continued into this month, with right-wing demonstrators effectively rallying for the right to rape and mistreat Palestinian detainees as they see fit. 

In this situation, Netanyahu has positioned himself as a moderate figure, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called for peace, emphasizing that no one is above the law. However, the far right remains defiant, rejecting these calls. The growing schism within Israel is becoming increasingly serious, raising concerns that the country could be on the verge of internal conflict — potentially even civil war.

The big issue for Israel may be the internal struggle between its more secular, democratic heritage and the rise of ultra-Orthodox factions. This internal struggle is harder to see than the immediate external conflicts but potentially even more destabilizing in the long run.

[Ting Cui wrote the first draft of this piece] 

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Warm Middle East Is Now Getting Boiling Hot appeared first on Fair Observer.

Israel’s leadership articulates that their immediate goals likely include securing the release of captives held by Hamas, deterring future rocket attacks from Gaza and mitigating the risk of a wider regional conflagration with Iran and Hezbollah. To achieve these objectives, Israel has a range of potential military options, each with its own set of challenges and potential consequences.

One option under consideration is a full-scale occupation of the Gaza Strip, which would necessitate a significant deployment of Israeli military forces to establish control over the territory. Alternatively, Israel may seek to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure and leadership, with the aim of deterring future attacks, and withdraw from Gaza. Finally, Israel may contemplate facilitating the emergence of a new governing body in Gaza following the removal of Hamas. All potential options present significant drawbacks, entailing high costs and risks for Israel and the surrounding region.

The occupation debate: security vs stability in Gaza

Starting in 1967, the Gaza Strip, which hosted approximately two million Palestinians, remained under Israeli governance. In 2005, after nearly 40 years, Israel executed a withdrawal of its military and settler population in accordance with the Disengagement Plan. After 2007, the governance of the territory transitioned to Hamas. This Islamist militant faction is deemed a terrorist entity by several nations, including the United States and Israel.

Advocates for the reoccupation of Gaza posit that such a measure would facilitate Israel’s management of security dangers originating from the region, notably rocket barrages and the excavation of tunnels for incursion purposes. They contend that a military campaign to disband the armed factions in Gaza would mitigate these perils, thereby bolstering the safety of Israeli nationals.

Conversely, an occupation of Gaza is likely to provoke opposition from both the local populace and militant groups, potentially precipitating an extended conflict. The prospect of serious civilian casualties, coupled with the ensuing humanitarian crisis, could further damage Israel’s international reputation.

Furthermore, occupation would compel Israel to assume the mantle of providing indispensable services to the Gazan populace. It exerts a fiscal strain on Israel. This responsibility would extend to the provision of fundamental necessities such as water, electricity, healthcare and education. Additionally, Israel would have to tackle the challenges of unemployment and impoverishment within the territory.

In a broader perspective, the occupation of Gaza could have enduring ramifications for the Israeli–Palestinian dispute. It discourages the pursuit of a consensual two-state resolution. Such an action infringes upon Palestinian self-governance and national ambitions. Occupation would intensify hostility towards Israel and escalate the cycle of bloodshed and instability across the region.

Israel’s exit and the power vacuum

Alternatively, Israel may decide to withdraw almost completely from Gaza. This proposition presumes Israel’s strategic elimination of Hamas, followed by a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip without establishing subsequent governance.

Such a departure could precipitate a descent into chaos as disparate factions contend for dominance in the absence of Hamas. Entities such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad might emerge as a more formidable threat to Israel than Gaza’s rulers. The resulting anarchy would resemble the situation in Iraq after the United States’ 2003 overthrow of the Baathist regime.

Notwithstanding its history of violent engagements with Israel, Hamas has demonstrated a propensity towards compromise. This is evidenced by its endorsement of a two-state solution along the 1967 borders within its 2017 charter. Should Hamas’s control wane, Gaza would risk becoming a sanctuary for still more dangerous extremist militias, drawing elements from North Africa, Syria and Iraq.

Shifting sands of governance in post-Hamas Gaza

Should Israel succeed in ousting Hamas and asserting control over the Gaza Strip, the strip will be incumbent upon it to identify a local partner to assist in the area’s governance.

Israel would endeavor to foster relationships with various Palestinian factions and entities within Gaza to aid in the establishment of a fresh governing coalition. Potential partners may include tribal chieftains, civil society organizations, municipal dignitaries or eminent members of Fatah, the party at the helm of the Palestinian Authority that governs the West Bank. Fatah represents the most feasible or rational option for Israel’s Tel Aviv. Prior to the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, the Palestinian Authority was Gaza’s governing body until Hamas deposed it following a coup d’etat.

The principal obstacle in this scenario is the waning support for Fatah and the Palestinian Authority amongst the Palestinian populace. In the West Bank, there is a growing perception that Fatah is collaborating with Israel’s military occupation. Palestinians regard them as corrupt, ineffectual elites lacking a coherent political strategy. This attitude paves the way for alternative narratives and forms of resistance to the occupation, such as Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

As it stands, none of these three scenarios can come to fruition unless the Israeli army completely wipes out Hamas, which is highly unlikely. The group’s extensive network of underground tunnels and the realities of urban warfare in the densely populated strip would pose enormous military challenges for any conventional army.

More fundamentally, even if Israel destroys much of Hamas’ infrastructure, its ideology will persist. Hamas is more popular now than ever. Its public support soared in both Gaza and the West Bank after the October 7, 2023 airstrikes.

Israel’s intentions for the Gaza Strip following its potential removal of Hamas are these: Israel may consider occupying Gaza post-Hamas, despite the economic and human costs and global disapproval. Leaving Gaza post-conflict could lead to a power vacuum and extremism. For now, joint governance of Gaza by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, similar to the present situation in the West Bank, seems to be the only plausible option. Achieving even this, however, would be a Herculean undertaking.

[Ali Omar Forozish and Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Israel’s Great Dilemma: Its Three Choices in the Gaza War appeared first on Fair Observer.

Hezbollah has also threatened to implicate the southwestern Greek side of Cyprus in the conflict due to an agreement Greece has with Israel. These events all come at a time when Israel is divided and many Israeli government officials have lost faith in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Israel and Hezbollah have a long history of conflict 

In 1982, Israel’s conservative leaders thought that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was creating unbearable problems. There were terrorist attacks from Lebanon. Israel invaded Lebanon to push the PLO away from the border and destroy them. The Israelis very quickly took control of southern Lebanon and they fundamentally destroyed the PLO there. Since then, for the last four decades, the Iran-backed Hezbollah has replaced it.

Approximate areas of Hezbollah influence in 2006. Via Orthuberra on Wikipedia (CC BY-SA 3.0).

In 2006, Israel thought that Hezbollah was causing too many problems and went to war with Hezbollah. This war emerged as a mixed military success, but, as states learn time and time again, a military cannot fix political and social problems on its own. The 2006 war strengthened Hezbollah, and Hezbollah’s ally Iran came to back Hamas against Israel as well.

For years now, there has been tit-for-tat testing and point-making going back and forth between the two sides. Israel strikes a Hezbollah command building, killing some of Hezbollah’s leaders; Hezbollah responds by sending a commando into Israeli territory; Israeli forces killed him. The frequency of incidents like these has increased dramatically since the October 2023 breakout of war between Israel and Hamas.

[Liam Roman wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Exclusive: Hezbollah and Israel Tensions Continue to Worsen appeared first on Fair Observer.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has dissolved his war cabinet due to the departure of two former generals, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot. The other reason why Netanyahu dissolved the war cabinet is he wants to reassert himself as number one or “supremo” who calls the shots.

Olmert speculates that the policy Netanyahu is enacting is based on his understanding of public opinion polls and expectations from his base. It is becoming apparent that Netanyahu’s base is starting to come back to him. The public opinion polls in Israel could get slightly less than an election. This is becoming a possible trend, and it shows that Netanyahu is starting to pick up votes that he lost to the right wing because he appeared weak.

Hezbollah is ready to rumble

How does all of this affect what is happening on the ground in Gaza? Israel’s assault on the southern city of Rafah is progressing, but the overall format of the situation is still the same. Time is not on Israel’s side. The more fighting goes on, the more pressures will build, and unexpected situations can develop.

Israel risks fighting a two-front war if it does not end its war with Hamas. To the north, in Lebanon, the Shia militant group Hezbollah looms over the border. Israel heavily outguns Hezbollah and defeated them in a 2006 war, but it never succeeded in destroying the group. Hezbollah has maintained its readiness to go to war with Israel. Hezbollah is a close ally of Iran, Israel’s most powerful and implacable adversary.

Israel and Hezbollah have exchanged limited attacks across the border already. Both Lebanon and Israel have had to evacuate citizens in near the border. Israel has tried to kill as many local Hezbollah commanders as possible, and has see much success, but not enough to deter the threat. They have since started to go after specific targets beyond the south of Lebanon. So far, Hezbollah has not backed down.

Iran has been building Hezbollah up in preparation for their big war with Israel. Iran’s message to Hezbollah has been, “We are building you up for the big war with Israel for another time. Don’t waste your opportunity on something that is not important.” Tehran does not seem to want Hezbollah to enter an all-out war over Gaza, but it appears willing to let Hezbollah keep up the threat of one while harassing Israel’s northern border.

Hezbollah is the most powerful armed faction in Lebanon and has long functioned as a quasi-government in the territories it controls. However, the militant group is no longer a defender of Lebanon’s territorial integrity. Instead, it appears willing to compromise Lebanon’s security in order to punish Israel. Its leaders see it as the power that will be used against Israel whenever they do something in Gaza or wherever else. So far, they have exercised this power only in limited strikes.

There may come the day when Israel says enough is enough in the north, and they have the ability to cause immeasurable destruction. 

[Liam Roman wrote the first draft of this piece.]

The views expressed in this article/video are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post FO° Talks: Divided Israel Faces New Hezbollah Threats and Rising US Tensions appeared first on Fair Observer.

Every English speaker understands that languages are living tools not regulated by governments, but created by the mass of people who speak and write the language. Professional lexicographers define words at the behest of editors seeking to sell dictionaries on the free market. The job of a dictionary is to help citizens understand how other people use the words of the language. No honest person needs an agency appointed by the government to decide what words mean. As a warning of what might come if that principle was ever forgotten, George Orwell wrote a book in 1948 describing that ignominious process: 1984!

In the context of protests on United States college campuses against Israel’s war on Gaza, The Intercept’s Natasha Lennard reported information revealed by Haaretz, an Israeli newspaper, concerning Columbia University’s task force on antisemitism. Lennard informs readers “that a definition of antisemitism will be put forward — and it will include anti-Zionism.”  More specifically, the task force’s brief “is expected to determine that statements calling for the destruction and death of Israel and Zionism can be considered antisemitic.”

“This definition is designed to inform faculty and students about what can offend Jewish people and which types of statements can cause pain and discomfort,” Haaretz stated.

This exceptional initiative to co-opt the task of professional lexicographers should impel us to think deeply not just about what the definition of “antisemitism” might be, but far more radically, about what the definition of “definition” should be.

Today’s Weekly Devil’s Dictionary definition:

Definition:

An always partial, limited, incomplete and sometimes distorted formulation found in dictionaries for the purpose of giving an idea of the sense or rather association of meaning that competent speakers of a language recognize as one of the designations that is frequently — though not necessarily — shared by other competent speakers of the language.

Contextual note

My proposed “definition” seeks to be precise by being vague, which is to say, as inclusive as possible in its account of the general public’s perception of the word. Formal dictionary definitions do not attempt to be inclusive. To be truly inclusive, every definition would require a lengthy essay.

Dictionary.com offers this definition of definition: “the formal statement of the meaning or significance of a word, phrase, idiom, etc., as found in dictionaries.” Note that the author of this definition felt obliged to include an essential allusion to context: “as found in dictionaries.” It’s a way of saying: “I’m only talking about that convention used in the kind of book we all identify as a dictionary.” The author acknowledges that in different contexts the same word will have a very different signification.

My “Shorter Oxford Dictionary” published in 1967 contains five different definitions of definition. The first entry dating from 1483 states: “The setting of bounds; limitation (rare).” It’s only the fourth entry that points us towards the practice of dictionaries, and it is divided into two meanings: “A precise statement of the essential nature of a thing” and “A declaration of the signification of a word or phrase.”

We should note this important point: A dictionary definition focuses on “the essential nature of a thing.” In the case of antisemitism, everyone spontaneously understands that what is essential is the reference to the Jewish religion or Jewish people. The attitude towards a particular national government or its policies at a moment in time is unequivocally non-essential.

Lennard acknowledges the task force’s action is limited to a specific context of use: the development of a “mandatory antisemitism orientation.” This specification of context is important, but rather than offering some useful precision about the meaning of words, the fact that it will be mandatory instruction makes the fait accompli of a definition artificially imposed even more troubling. A mandatory program that seeks to redefine a culturally loaded word with the objective of judging or constraining the freedom of thought and expression of others falls into the category of unmitigated authoritarianism. This is the contrary of the spirit of a liberal education.

The Intercept article explains that the pretext for this redefinition has nothing to do with homing in on the actual use of the word in authentic linguistic contexts. Rather, it has everything to do with anecdotal reports of the “discomfort” felt by certain individuals when exposed to other people’s speech. The whole point of branding those forms of speech “antisemitism” is to ostracize and therefore limit the way other people speak when unconstrained by official rules.

The ultimate absurdity is that to accomplish this goal of general censure requires a prestigious educational institution such as Columbia University to stretch the meaning of antisemitism to include a notion associated with a different word that remains undefined: anti-Zionism. The task force might have better spent its time defining anti-Zionism. But that would have required examining a century and a half of history, something the task force prefers to avoid. It runs the risk of getting people to think and express themselves freely.

Defenders of the task force’s imitative insist that they aren’t trying to modify the dictionary, but simply give some precision to the points made in the mandatory instruction. “Even if the only use of the definition is during mandatory orientations on antisemitism,” Lennard points out, “its deployment inscribes the dangerous antisemitism/anti-Zionism conflation into campus culture. Views of Palestinians, anti-Zionist Jews, and the many others in the community who express criticism of Israel are bound to be delegitimized.”

Historical note

The US has consistently celebrated its commitment to free speech. Just as consistently it has found ways, official and unofficial, to suppress it. A mere decade after ratifying the constitution’s Bill of Rights that enshrined the basic freedoms, Congress, fearing a war with France, passed the Alien and Sedition Acts. The second of these acts “banned the publishing of false or malicious writings against the government and the inciting of opposition to any act of Congress or the president.”

When the war with France failed to materialize, those acts were allowed to expire or were repealed. That was not the case with the much more drastic Espionage Act of 1917, passed during World War I. It is still in vigor to this day and has been used, with surreal effect, against government whistleblowers Edward Snowden, Julian Assange and others. Despite the obvious contradiction with the letter and spirit of the First Amendment, Americans easily tolerate acts that restrict speech whenever they are convinced there is a threat from a foreign enemy. Consequently, politicians set about trying to convince citizens there is a threat, even if none exists.

What made some kind of sense in World War I is difficult to understand today. The idea that the US should bend its commitment to its own basic rights in the interest of Israel, a foreign power credibly accused of genocide, stretches beyond any patriotic reasoning the logic of “national security.” But contemporary US presidents and Congress demonstrate an incorrigible knack for prioritizing the interests of an extremist government in Israel over enforcing the basic freedoms enshrined in the constitution for its own citizens. Congress is nearly unanimous in its weaponizing of the notion of antisemitism.

Linguistic manipulation is common in times of war. In 1917, sauerkraut was rechristened “liberty cabbage.” Even the quintessential US dish, the hamburger, became a “liberty steak.” Orchestras refused to perform Beethoven. In 2003, George W Bush renamed French fries “freedom fries” to spite the French who had the audacity to disbelieve the manufactured lie that Saddam Hussein was threatening the Western world with weapons of mass destruction. The tradition of redefining or even renaming words to please political interests long ago earned its title of nobility in US culture.

The real lesson we should draw from the “liberty cabbage” episode is that people in times of war twist language as a way of affirming their authority and stirring hatred against critics. When protesters today say “Free Palestine from the river to the sea” they are not attacking Jews, they are expressing their frustration with the historic policies of successive Israeli governments. They are protesting very visible war crimes being carried out before their very eyes.

Anti-Zionism is simply NOT antisemitism!

*[In the age of Oscar Wilde and Mark Twain, another American wit, the journalist Ambrose Bierce produced a series of satirical definitions of commonly used terms, throwing light on their hidden meanings in real discourse. Bierce eventually collected and published them as a book, The Devil’s Dictionary, in 1911. We have shamelessly appropriated his title in the interest of continuing his wholesome pedagogical effort to enlighten generations of readers of the news. Read more of Fair Observer Devil’s Dictionary.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.
[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Do Zionists Know the Definition of Definition? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Founded by Seleucus I Nicator, one of Alexander’s Macedonian generals, the Seleucid dynasty carved out a vast kingdom. They and Alexander’s other successors, collectively known as the Diadochi, vied for territory within the empire after Alexander’s chosen regent, Perdiccas, failed to hold onto power. When the dust settled, the Seleucids found themselves in control of the lion’s share of the empire. At its peak, the Seleucid Empire stretched from Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) to the Indus Valley in India.

Despite its geographical dominance and lasting influence, the Seleucids are often relegated to a footnote in discussions about the Middle East. They are overshadowed by their Egyptian counterparts, the Ptolemies, who are famous in the West for collecting the Library of Alexandria and for the exploits of their last member, Cleopatra. The Seleucids enter Western narratives primarily in the context of their eventual defeat by the Romans.

This neglect has resulted in a significant gap in our understanding of the region’s development. The Seleucid Empire played a crucial role in shaping the Middle East, both culturally and politically. 

Architects of the Hellenistic world

The Seleucids’ impact extended far beyond the battlefield. They played a crucial role in bridging the gap between Europe and India, fostering cultural exchange and inadvertently shaping the world through their interactions with other powerful empires.

The Seleucids were heirs to the vast Hellenistic cultural tradition. This influence manifested in their grand architectural projects, characterised by a blend of Greek, Mesopotamian and Egyptian styles. Cities like Antioch, their capital, boasted impressive public spaces, colonnaded streets, and temples adorned with statues in the Greek tradition.

Seleucid architects also played a key role in the development of urban planning, with a focus on geometric layouts and civic amenities. In philosophy, the Seleucids embraced the intellectual currents of the Hellenistic world. Epicureanism, Stoicism and Scepticism all flourished under their patronage, attracting scholars and fostering lively debates.

One of the most significant contributions came from Megasthenes, a Seleucid ambassador stationed at Pataliputra, the magnificent capital city of Indian monarch Chandragupta Maurya, in the 3rd century BCE. Credited as one of the first Europeans to write extensively about India, Megasthenes’s work, the Indica, became a cornerstone for understanding the subcontinent.

His accounts, despite potential biases inherent in any ambassador’s view, remain a valuable source of information. Megasthenes’s detailed observations on Indian society, including the complex caste system, the role of elephants in warfare, and the practice of sati (widow self-immolation), as well as politics and geography, provided a window for Europeans into a previously unknown world.

Megasthenes’s work wasn’t just a standalone account. It served as a foundation for later writers like Strabo, who used and interpreted the Indica. It shaped European perceptions of India for centuries to come. Strabo cited Megasthenes’ descriptions of outlandish creatures, likely misinterpretations of real animals or cultural practices, which fueled European fantasies about the exotic East. 

The Seleucids may not be a household name, but their enduring legacy is undeniable. They were facilitators of cultural exchange, purveyors of knowledge and patrons of art, architecture and philosophy. Their influence transcended geographical boundaries and temporal limitations, leaving an indelible mark on the ancient world.

The Jewish rebellion against the Seleucids

Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Seleucids, however, comes from their interaction with a small but ancient people in the southwestern corner of their empire: the Jews.

The Seleucids cast a long shadow over Judea in the 2nd century BCE. Under the oppressive reign of Antiochus IV Epiphanes, who earned the punning epithet “Epimanes” (the Mad) for his increasingly erratic and oppressive religious policies.

Antiochus deeply offended his Jewish subjects. He desecrated the Second Temple in Jerusalem, erected a statue of Zeus, and mandated the worship of Greek gods. He sought to hellenize Judea by promoting the Greek language, customs and religious practices. This included the suppression of traditional Jewish practices such as circumcision and Sabbath observance, a direct assault on Jewish identity and faith.

This oppression ignited a rebellion. In the small village of Modin, a Jewish priest named Mattathias Maccabaeus and his sons refused to comply with Antiochus’ decrees. Their defiance sparked a wider uprising. Skilled fighters with unwavering faith, the Maccabees adopted guerilla tactics against the Seleucid army. Their deep familiarity with the Judean terrain and religious fervour proved advantageous, leading to early victories. Judas Maccabeus, Mattathias’ most prominent son, emerged as a charismatic leader, uniting diverse Jewish factions against a common enemy. His leadership and military prowess were instrumental in the early successes of the rebellion.

The Maccabean Revolt transcended the battlefield; it was a struggle for the very essence of Judaism. This period had a profound impact on Jewish thought and identity. The trauma of the Seleucid persecution prompted the creation of apocalyptic texts such as the Book of Daniel and the Book of Enoch. These works expressed themes of divine judgement, righteous suffering, and eventual deliverance, reflecting the anxieties of the Jewish people.

The Maccabean spirit of resistance against tyranny and unwavering faith in the face of oppression continues to resonate with Jews today. Their story serves as a potent reminder of the lengths to which communities will go to defend their beliefs.

Two books, now known as 1 and 2 Maccabees, became a part of the Christian canon of the Bible and told the tale of the Maccabean revolt to subsequent generations. Likewise, the Jewish tradition of Hannukah continues to commemorate the successful resistance of the Maccabees against their Hellenistic overlords.

The repercussions of the Maccabean Revolt extended far beyond Judea’s borders. The weakened Seleucid Empire presented an opportunity for the Romans, who exploited the conflict to expand their own regional influence. By using Judea as a pawn in their power struggle, the Romans undermined the Seleucids. By the 1st century BCE, the Romans had made themselves masters of Anatolia, Syria and Palestine.

While Judea dominates the narrative of the Seleucids’ struggles in the West, the empire’s eastern borders also faced challenges. In their Iranian territories, revolts aimed at reviving Persian customs posed a significant threat. Ultimately, the Seleucids failed to maintain control of Iran, paving the way for the rise of the indigenous Parthian and Sasanian dynasties.

This set the stage for a division of the Middle East between the rival Roman and Iranian empires, a pattern which would not be altered until the Arab Muslim conquest of the Levant and Iran seven centuries later.

[Ali Omar Forozish edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Seleucids: The Valuable Architects of the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

Additionally, rooted in Twelver Shi’ism, Iran’s self-perception as the defender of oppressed Muslims globally is fueled by the anticipation of the twelfth Imam’s messianic return. This often translates into support for proxy groups and regional interventions.

Iranian ideology is deeply rooted in the nation’s historical and cultural identity. Iran sees itself as the inheritor of the longstanding Persian civilization, a proud nation with a rich heritage and a history of resisting foreign domination. This fosters a sense of exceptionalism, a conviction that Iran’s path is unique and its interests paramount, often leading to tension with other regional powers and the West. Furthermore, Anti-Zionism is deeply ingrained within the ideology, viewing Israel as an illegitimate entity occupying Palestinian land. This translates into strong support for Palestinian groups. 

In the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world Iran’s revolutionary ideology presents a destabilizing order and a direct threat to the existence of Israel.

Iran’s pivot and the shifting balance of power

The 1979 revolution in Iran, spearheaded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, marked a watershed moment in the nation’s history. Though predominantly peaceful in its initial stages, the revolution involved protests, strikes, and civil disobedience. However, the Shah’s regime responded with harsh repression, leading to a significant rise in casualties among protesters. This ultimately contributed to the gradual disintegration of the Shah’s government.

The revolution culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic based on the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih. This ideological foundation, enshrined in the 1979 constitution (amended in 1989), emphasizes principles such as justice, independence, self-reliance, resistance, and martyrdom.

Iran’s claim to legitimacy transcends the 1979 revolution, drawing its roots from millennia-long influential civilizations and empires. This rich history, encompassing the Elamites, the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids, and Safavids, has indelibly shaped Iran’s cultural identity and instilled a profound sense of national pride. As the historical seat of power for empires stretching across the Fertile Crescent and into Central Asia, Iran’s past serves as a cornerstone for its aspirations for regional leadership, both historically and in the contemporary era.

This sense of historical grandeur further shapes Iran’s foreign policy, which has often clashed with that of Western powers and their regional allies. This has led Iran to pursue a Pivot to the East strategy, aimed at countering western pressure and sanctions imposed due to its nuclear program and regional activities. This policy gained momentum following the U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA) and the perceived failure of European signatories to uphold their commitments, leaving Iran economically isolated.

Iran’s deep-seated opposition to US interventionism in the Middle East stems from a perception that such policies destabilize the region and threaten its security and interests. Consequently, a key objective of the Pivot to the East strategy is to bolster Iran’s regional influence and establish itself as a leading power in the Islamic world, a position it believes reflects its historical legacy and rightful place.

While Iran promotes a transnational Islamist model, its influence is largely confined to Shia communities, which are minorities in most Muslim-majority countries. Nonetheless, Iran’s assertive foreign policy, including its support for specific regional groups, has been a factor in destabilizing the Middle East. Former Iranian foreign minister, M. Javad Zarif called this policy ‘sacrificing diplomacy for the military field’ in an interview with Saeed Leylaz. 

The eastward gaze: Iran’s Pivot and the rise of an authoritarian Axis

Recent years have witnessed a growing convergence between Iran and other authoritarian regimes sharing a common opposition to Western influence. It describes what I call the Axis of Totalitarianism: a coalition of authoritarian regimes that challenge the democratic world order, encompassing Iran, China, and Russia. While not constituting a formal alliance, these countries exhibit strategic convergence and a shared desire to challenge the US-led unipolar world order.

This convergence manifests in various forms of cooperation. Notably, Iran and China have signed a significant 25-year strategic partnership agreement, facilitating substantial economic investment in Iran’s energy, infrastructure, and transportation sectors. This agreement underscores China’s growing economic influence in the region and its potential to provide much-needed economic support to Iran. Similarly, Iran and Russia have extended their existing 20-year cooperation agreement and engaged in joint military exercises, demonstrating their strategic coordination and willingness to collaborate on security matters. Notably, Iran has reportedly supplied Russia with ballistic missiles, further deepening their military cooperation in defiance of international sanctions.

A key driver of this convergence is the shared opposition to U.S. dominance and perceived Western interference in the region and globally. These countries view the current US-led world order as unfair and unjust, advocating for a multipolar world order that would redistribute power and influence. This shared objective fosters cooperation and strengthens their collective stance against perceived Western interventionism.

Beyond the core trio of Iran, China, and Russia, other actors with authoritarian tendencies have displayed varying degrees of alignment with this emerging axis. Notably, an Iranian official recently referred to the Taliban as part of an axis of resistance, suggesting a potential for cautious rapprochement between the two entities. 

Similarly, Iran has been a staunch supporter of the Assad regime in Syria, providing both military and financial assistance that has been crucial in helping the regime regain control of territory from rebel groups. While not directly involved in the Middle East, North Korea’s aggressive stance towards the West has fostered diplomatic ties with Iran. North Korea maintains close alliances with Russia and China. Pyongyang has vocally supported Russia’s war in Ukraine, recognizing the annexed regions and parts of Georgia. In recent years, North Korea has participated in joint naval exercises with Russia and China in the Indo-Pacific region, suggesting a trilateral partnership aimed against the US and its allies.

Historically, North Korea and Iran have cooperated in the military and nuclear fields. This alliance dates back to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s when North Korea supplied Iran with weapons and technology. Since then, North Korea has aided Iran’s ballistic missile program development. Reports suggest joint missile development projects and technology transfers between the two countries.  

The destabilizing messianic mission

Iran’s foreign policy is heavily influenced by its adherence to Twelver Shi’ism. This branch of Islam anticipates the return of the twelfth Imam, the Mahdi, to establish a global Islamic order. This eschatological belief imbues Iran with a sense of responsibility as the custodian of the Shia faith and champion of the oppressed, translating into a perceived mission to propagate Islam, defend the downtrodden, and pave the way for the Mahdi’s emergence. Furthermore, Iran views itself as the rightful successor to the Prophet Muhammad and his Ahl al-Bayt, the Prophet’s family, and claims to uphold the authentic interpretation of Islam embodied in their teachings and practices.

One prominent manifestation of Iran’s Islamic ideology in its foreign policy is the concept of resistance against perceived enemies of Islam and Iran. Iran positions itself as the leader of the axis of resistance, a network of state and non-state actors united in their opposition to the United States, Israel, and their regional allies. Proxy groups, sharing Iran’s ideological and strategic objectives of challenging the status quo and defending Shia interests, form a crucial component of this network.

These groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Palestine, the Houthis in Yemen, and various Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, receive Iranian support in the form of arms, training, financial aid, and political guidance. In return, they serve as force multipliers and instruments of deterrence for Iran, expanding its influence and leverage in the region. Often wielding significant political and social influence alongside their military capabilities, these groups maintain close ties to Iran’s Supreme Leader. They frequently coordinate their activities with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Quds Force, responsible for the country’s external security affairs.

The activities of Iran’s proxy groups have had a cascading and devastating impact on the stability and well-being of the Middle East. Their presence and involvement in regional conflicts have directly fueled humanitarian crises, such as:

— A 2021 report by the International Crisis Group documented how Hezbollah’s growing influence in Lebanon has hampered the formation of a stable government and hindered efforts to address the country’s economic crisis. In Yemen, the Houthi conflict has displaced over 4 million people internally, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), and plunged the country into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

— OCHA documented over 306,887 civilian deaths in the Syrian civil war, a conflict fueled in part by Iranian support for the Assad regime. Amnesty International has also accused various Iran-backed militias in Iraq of extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detention, further eroding respect for human rights and exacerbating sectarian divisions.

— The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that over 12.4 million people are displaced across the Middle East and North Africa due to ongoing conflicts. The destruction of infrastructure and disruption of essential services, often a consequence of proxy group activity, further compound the humanitarian suffering in the region. OCHA reports that over 2.4  million children in Yemen lack access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene due to the ongoing conflict.

The legacy of revolution: how Iran’s anti-Zionism threatens Israel

At the core of Iran’s anti-Zionism lies the fundamental rejection of Israel’s legitimacy as a Jewish state. This perspective views Israel’s establishment as a colonial project infringing upon Palestinian land and rights. Iran’s solidarity with the Palestinian cause, intertwined with both religious and moral imperatives as well as strategic and political interests, fuels its anti-Zionist stance. This manifests in Iran’s support for various Palestinian factions, particularly those advocating armed resistance against Israel, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. 

Furthermore, Iran envisions a single, democratic state encompassing historical Palestine, where diverse communities coexist, effectively calling for Israel’s dissolution. This aspiration is further emphasized through Iran’s participation in the annual International Quds Day, a symbolic display of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle.

Iran’s anti-Zionism translates into tangible security challenges for Israel. Firstly, it underpins the formation of the Axis of Resistance alliance with Syria and Hezbollah. This alliance serves as a conduit for projecting Iranian power in the Levant region, posing a direct military threat to Israel’s northern border. Iran bolsters this alliance through extensive financial, military, and political support, enabling the development of missile and rocket capabilities, intelligence networks, and military infrastructure. 

Iran’s own military presence in Syria, including bases and personnel stationed near the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, further intensifies the potential for confrontation. This alliance has demonstrably materialized in several instances, including the 2006 Lebanon War, the ongoing Syrian Civil War with its spillover effects, and the 2024 Golan Heights incident.

Secondly, Iran’s anti-Zionist ideology drives its efforts to expand its influence and presence in other regional areas, including Iraq, Yemen, and the Gaza Strip. In these regions, Iran supports and arms various groups who actively attack Israel and its strategic allies. Iran has provided the Houthis in Yemen with missiles and drones used against Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both considered strategic partners of Israel. Similarly, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip receive Iranian assistance in the form of rockets and funding, enabling them to engage in repeated cycles of violence with Israel, as exemplified by the 2024 Gaza War. Furthermore, Iran cultivates ties with various Shia militias and political parties in Iraq, some harboring animosity towards Israel and threatening potential attacks.

Thirdly, Iran’s anti-Zionism is intricately linked to its pursuit of a nuclear and missile program, raising concerns about the potential development and delivery of nuclear weapons. This program has been a focal point of intense international scrutiny. It led to negotiations, sanctions, and even sabotage attempts. Despite these pressures, Iran continues uranium enrichment beyond the limits set by the now-abandoned 2015 nuclear deal.

Furthermore, advancements in their missile program, encompassing the testing and development of various ballistic and cruise missiles with the potential to reach Israel and other regional countries, further escalate anxieties. This pursuit of nuclear capabilities, coupled with the possibility of transfer to proxies or allies, fuels fears of regional proliferation and potential military confrontations. Israel, viewing a nuclear-armed Iran as an existential threat, has repeatedly threatened preemptive strikes to prevent such an outcome and has reportedly carried out covert and overt attacks on Iran’s nuclear and missile infrastructure.

Iran’s Islamic revolution and its ambition to stand against the unipolar order, centering itself as the leader of the Islamic pillar of the multipolar world is a destabilizing order and an existential threat to Israel.

[Tara Yarwais edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Iran’s Revolutionary Ideology Is the Architect of a Destabilizing Order appeared first on Fair Observer.

“Hit Iran now. Hit them hard” was typical advice offered by Republican Senator Lindsey Graham after a drone flown by an Iran-aligned Iraqi Shiite militia killed three American servicemen in northern Jordan on January 28th. The well-heeled Iran War Lobby in Washington has, in fact, been stridently calling for nothing short of a US invasion of that country, accusing Tehran of complicity in Hamas’s October 7th terrorist attack on Israel.

No matter that the official Iranian press has vehemently denied the allegation, while American intelligence officials swiftly concluded that the attack on Israel had taken top Iranian leaders by surprise. In mid-November, Reuters reported that Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei informed a key Hamas figure, Ismail Haniya, that his country wouldn’t intervene directly in the Gaza war, since Tehran hadn’t been warned about the October 7th attack before it was launched. He actually seemed annoyed that the leadership of the Hamas paramilitary group, the Qassam Brigades, thought they could draw Tehran and its allies willy-nilly into a major conflict without the slightest consultation. Although initially caught off-guard, as the Israeli counterattack grew increasingly brutal and disproportionate, Iran’s leaders clearly began to see ways they could turn the war to their regional benefit — and they’ve done so skillfully, even as the Biden administration in its full-scale embrace of the most extreme government in Israeli history tossed democracy and international law under the bus.

The gut-wrenching Hamas attacks on civilians at a music festival and those living in left-wing, peacenik Kibbutzim near the Israeli border with Gaza on October 7th initially left Iran in an uncomfortable position. It had allegedly been slipping some $70 million a year to Hamas — though Egypt and Qatar had provided major funding to Gaza at Israel’s request through sanctioned Israeli government bank accounts. And after decades of championing the Palestinian cause, Tehran could hardly stand by and do nothing as Israel razed Gaza to the ground. On the other hand, the ayatollahs couldn’t afford to gain a reputation for being played like a fiddle by the region’s young radicals and so drawn into conventional wars their country can ill afford.

The adults in the room?

Despite their fiery rhetoric, their undeniable backing of fundamentalist militias in the region, and their depiction by inside-the-Beltway war hawks as the root of all evil in the Middle East, Iran’s leaders have long acted more like a status quo power than a force for genuine change. They have shored up the rule of the autocratic al-Assad family in Syria, while helping the Iraqi government that emerged after President George W. Bush’s invasion of that country fight off the terrorist threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In truth, not Iran but the US and Israel are the countries that have most strikingly tried to use their power to reshape the region in a Napoleonic manner. The disastrous US invasion and occupation of Iraq, and Israel’s wars on Egypt (1956, 1967), Lebanon (1982–2000, 2006) and Gaza (2008, 2012, 2014, 2024), along with its steady encouragement of large-scale squatting on the Palestinian West Bank, were clearly intended to alter the geopolitics of the region permanently through the use of military force on a massive scale.

Only recently, Ayatollah Khamenei bitterly asked, “Why don’t the leaders of Islamic countries publicly cut off their relationship with the murderous Zionist regime and stop helping this regime?” Pointing to the staggering death toll in Israel’s present campaign against Gaza, he was focusing on the Arab countries — Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates — that, as part of Trump son-in-law Jared Kushner’s “Abraham Accords,” had officially recognized Israel and established relations with it. (Egypt and Jordan had, of course, recognized Israel long before that.)

Given the anti-Israel sentiment in the region, had it, in fact, been rife with democracies, Iran’s position might have been widely implemented. Still, it was a distinct sign of terminal tone deafness on the part of Biden administration officials that they hoped to use the Gaza crisis to extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia, while sidelining the Palestinians and creating a joint Israeli–Arab front against Iran.

The region had already been moving in a somewhat different direction. Last March, after all, Iran and Saudi Arabia had begun forging a new relationship by restoring the diplomatic relations that had been suspended in 2016 and working to expand trade between their countries. And that relationship has only continued to improve as the nightmare in Israel and Gaza developed. In fact, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi first visited the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in November and, since the Gaza conflict began, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian has met twice with his Saudi counterpart. Frustrated by a markedly polarizing American policy in the region, de facto Saudi ruler Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman and Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei resorted to the good offices of Beijing to sidestep Washington and strengthen their relations further.

Although Iran is far more hostile to Israel than Saudi Arabia, their leaderships do agree that the days of marginalizing the Palestinians are over. In a remarkably unambiguous statement issued in early February, the Saudis offered the following: “The Kingdom has communicated its firm position to the US administration that there will be no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital, and that the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip stops and all the Israeli occupation forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip.” Significantly, the Saudis even refused to join a US-led naval task force created to halt attacks on Red Sea shipping by the Houthis of Yemen (no friends of theirs) in support of the Palestinians. Its leaders are clearly all too aware that the carnage still being wreaked on Gaza has infuriated most Saudis.

In late January, President Raisi also surprised regional diplomats by traveling to Ankara for talks on trade and geopolitics with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, another sign of his country’s changing role in the region. At the end of the visit, while signing various agreements to increase trade and cooperation, he announced: “We agreed to support the Palestinian cause, the axis of resistance, and to give the Palestinian people their rightful rights.” That’s no small thing. Remember that Turkey is a NATO member and considered a close ally of the United States. To have Erdoğan suddenly cozy up to Iran, while denouncing Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s war on Gaza as a Hitlerian-style genocide, was an unmistakable slap in Washington’s face.

Meanwhile, Iran, Turkey and Russia recently issued a joint communiqué that “expressed deep concern over the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and stressed the need to end the Israeli brutal onslaught against the Palestinians, [while] sending humanitarian aid to Gaza.” From the Biden administration’s point of view, Moscow’s bombing of civilian sites in Ukraine and Iran’s role in crushing Sunni Arab rebels in Syria had been the atrocities that needed attention until Netanyahu suddenly pulled the rug out from under them by upping the ante from mere atrocities to what the International Court of Justice has ruled can plausibly be labeled a genocide. One thing was clear: Washington’s long struggle to exclude Iran from regional influence has now visibly failed.

Iran’s rising popularity

At the Gulf International Forum (GIF) last November, Abdullah Baaboud, a prominent Omani academic, said that there had been a “very strong condemnation of Israel from Iran and Turkey, embarrassing some Arab countries that are not using the same language. My worry is that this conflict is leading to the empowerment of Turkey and Iran among the Arab public.” GIF’s executive director, Dania Thafer, concurred. Of that public, she said, “Grief and anger have reached unprecedented levels,” and added, “with each photo out of Gaza, Iran gains more influence across the region.” In short, at remarkably little cost, Iran is unexpectedly winning the battle for regional public opinion and its standing in the Arab world has risen strikingly. Meanwhile, the reputation of the United States has been indelibly tarnished by Washington’s full-throated support for what most in the region do indeed see as a merciless slaughter of thousands of children and other innocent civilians.

A recent opinion poll of Arabs in 16 countries, conducted jointly by the Arab Center in Washington, DC, and the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, Qatar, found that 94% of them considered the American position on Israel’s war “bad.” In contrast, a surprising 48% of them considered the Iranian position positive. To grasp just how remarkable such a finding was, consider that a Gallup poll conducted in 2022 found that Shiite Iran’s name was mud in most Sunni Arab countries and approval of its leadership fell somewhere between 10% and 20%.

In recent months, Iran has made striking use of the weakness of Washington’s case in the region. While the State Department likes to contrast Iran’s “dictatorship” with Israel’s “democratic character,” only recently foreign ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanaani observed, “The disaster in Gaza removed the mask from the face of the so-called advocates of human rights and showed the extent of vileness, brutality, and lies hidden within the nature of the Israeli regime, whose supporters used to refer to [it] as a symbol of democracy.” Although Iran has among the world’s worst human-rights records, Netanyahu has even managed to take the focus off of that.

Losing the Middle East, Washington-style

Iran’s allies in the region include Iraqi Shiite militias like the Party of God Brigades (Kata’ib Hizbullah), which first gained prominence in the struggle against the ISIL terrorist group from 2014 to 2018. Those were years when the regular Iraqi army had essentially collapsed and was only gradually being rebuilt. Washington was also focused on destroying ISIL then and so developed a wary de facto alliance with them in its campaign to crush that “caliphate.” In January 2020, however, President Trump was responsible for the drone assassination of the group’s leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, along with Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, just after their arrival by plane at Baghdad International Airport in what was evidently an attempt to prevent them, through the Iraqis, from forging an agreement with Saudi Arabia to reduce tensions with Iran.

That assassination led to a long-running, low-intensity conflict between the Shiite militias of Iraq and the 2,500 remaining American troops stationed there. With the onset of the Gaza conflict last October, the Party of God Brigades began launching mortars and drones against Iraqi military bases hosting American soldiers, as well as against small forward operating bases in southeast Syria where some 900 US military personnel are stationed, ostensibly to support the Syrian Kurds in mopping up operations against ISIL. After more than 150 such attacks, on January 28th one of their drones hit Tower 22, a support base where US troops were stationed in northern Jordan, killing three American soldiers, while wounding dozens more.

Iran’s leaders generally back those Shiite militias, but whether they had anything to do with the attack on Tower 22 remains unknown. Officials in Tehran did, however, immediately recognize the danger of escalation once American troops had actually been killed. And indeed, the Biden administration responded with dozens of air strikes on bases and facilities of the Party of God Brigades in Iraq and Syria. Iraqi and Lebanese officials told reporters for The Washington Post that Iran had actually urged caution on the militias with clear effect. Their attacks on bases hosting US troops ceased. At the same time, the Iraqi parliament and government complained bitterly about Washington’s violation of the country’s sovereignty, while heightening preparations to force the withdrawal of the last US troops from their land. In other words, President Biden’s fierce backing of Israel’s war, his decision to increase weapons shipments to that country, and his bombing of pro-Palestinian militias may have led to the achievement of a longstanding Iranian aim: seeing American troops finally leave Iraq.

Meanwhile, in southern Lebanon, where the militant group Hezbollah has been exchanging occasional fire with Israeli forces in support of Gaza, according to the Post reporters, one Hezbollah figure told them that Iran’s message was: “We are not keen on giving Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu any reason to launch a wider war on Lebanon or anywhere else.” Wars are unpredictable, and the Lebanon-Israeli border could still erupt dramatically. Moreover, Iranian pleas for restraint appear to have had far less effect on the Houthi leadership in Yemen’s capital Sanaa, leading to an ongoing American and British bombing campaign on that city and elsewhere in that country that has so far done little to stop Houthi missile and drone attacks against ships in the Red Sea.

So far, however, despite the Republican urge to devastate Iran, that country’s leaders have taken deft advantage of the butchery in Gaza (in which the Israeli military has killed more civilian noncombatants each day than belligerents have in any other conflict in this century). The ayatollahs have significantly increased their popularity even among Arab and Muslim publics that had not previously shown them much favor. They have strengthened their relationship with the Shiites of Iraq and may be on the verge of finally achieving their goal of ending the US military missions in Iraq and Syria.

They have also achieved closer ties with Turkey, while improving relations with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Arab oil states. In doing so, they have distinctly blunted the Biden administration’s aim of isolating Iran while tying the wealthier Arab states ever more firmly to Israel through arms and high-tech deals.

In addition, through its backing of and weaponizing of Israel in these last grim months, Washington has made a mockery of the human rights talking points that the US has long deployed against Iran. In the process, Joe Biden has done more than any recent president to undermine both international humanitarian law and democratic principles globally. With 94% of Arab poll respondents viewing American policy in the region as “bad,” one thing is clear: for the moment at least, Iran has won the Middle East.

[TomDispatch first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Is Tehran Now Winning the Middle East? appeared first on Fair Observer.

the US-Israeli war on the Middle East, centered on the Israeli genocide in Gaza, but already also including ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Syria, and the US and UK’s bombing of Yemen.

This latest US attack followed the US bombing of seven targets on February 2, three in Iraq and four in Syria, with 125 bombs and missiles, killing at least 39 people, which Iran called “a strategic mistake” that would bring “disastrous consequences” for the Middle East.

At the same time, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been touring the shrinking number of capitals in the region where leaders will still talk to him, playing the United States’ traditional role as a dishonest broker between Israel and its neighbors, in reality partnering with Israel to offer the Palestinians impossible, virtually suicidal terms for a ceasefire in Gaza.

What Israel and the United States have proposed, but not made public, appears to be a second temporary ceasefire, during which prisoners or hostages would be exchanged, possibly leading to the release of all the Israeli security prisoners held in Gaza, but in no way leading to the final end of the genocide. If the Palestinians in fact freed all their Israeli hostages as part of a prisoner swap, it would remove the only obstacle to a catastrophic escalation of the genocide.

When Hamas responded with a serious counter-proposal for a full ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, US President Biden dismissed it out of hand as “over the top,” and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called it “bizarre” and “delusional.” 

The position of the United States and Israel today is that ending a massacre that has already killed more than 29,000 people is not a serious option, even after the International Court of Justice has ruled it a plausible case of genocide under the Genocide Convention. Raphael Lemkin, the Polish Holocaust survivor who coined the term “genocide” and drafted the Genocide Convention from his adopted home in New York City, must be turning in his grave in Mount Hebron Cemetery.

A fraught situation in Iraq

The United States’ support for Israel’s genocidal policies now goes way beyond Palestine, with the US expansion of the war to Iraq, Syria and Yemen to punish other countries and forces in the region for intervening to defend or support the Palestinians. US officials claimed the February 2 attacks were intended to stop Iraqi resistance attacks on US bases. But the leading Iraqi resistance force had already suspended attacks against US targets on January 30 after they killed three US troops, declaring a truce at the urging of the Iranian and Iraqi governments.

A senior Iraqi military officer told BBC Persian that at least one of the Iraqi military units the US bombed on February 2nd had nothing to do with attacks on US bases. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani negotiated an agreement a year ago to clearly differentiate between Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) units that were part of the “Axis of Resistance” fighting a low-grade war with U.S. occupation forces, and other PMF units that were not involved in attacks on US bases. 

Tragically, because the US failed to coordinate its attacks with the Iraqi government, al-Sudani’s agreement failed to prevent the US from attacking the wrong Iraqi forces. It is no wonder that some analysts have dubbed al-Sudani’s valiant efforts to prevent all-out war between US forces and the Islamic resistance in his country “mission impossible.” 

Following the elaborately staged but carelessly misdirected US attacks, resistance forces in Iraq began launching new strikes on US bases, including a drone attack that killed six Kurdish troops at the largest US base in Syria. So the predictable effect of the US bombing was in fact to rebuff Iran and Iraq’s efforts to rein in resistance forces and to escalate a war that US officials keep claiming they want to deter.  

From experienced journalists and analysts to Middle Eastern governments, voices of caution are warning the United States in increasingly stark language of the dangers of its escalating bombing campaigns. “While the war rages in Gaza,” BBC’s Orla Guerin wrote on February 4, “one false move could set the region alight.” 

Three days later, Guerin would be surrounded by protesters chanting “America is the greatest devil,” as she reported from the site of the US drone assassination of Kataib Hezbollah leader Abu Baqir al-Saadi in Baghdad – which could prove to be exactly the false move she feared. 

But what Americans should be asking their government is this: Why are there still 2,500 US troops in Iraq? It is 21 years since the United States invaded Iraq and plunged the nation into seemingly endless violence, chaos and corruption; 12 years since Iraq forced US occupation forces to withdraw from Iraq at the end of 2011; and 7 years since the defeat of ISIS, which served as justification for the United States to send forces back into Iraq in 2014, and then to obliterate most of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, in 2017.

Successive Iraqi governments and parliaments have asked the United States to withdraw its forces from Iraq, and previously scheduled talks are about to begin. But the Iraqis and Americans have issued contradictory statements about the goal of the negotiations. Al-Sudani and most Iraqis hope they will bring about the immediate withdrawal of US forces, while US officials insist that troops may remain for another two to five years, kicking this explosive can further down the road despite the obvious dangers it poses to the lives of US troops and to peace in the region.

The US is losing its grip

Behind these contradictory statements, the real value of Iraqi bases to the US military does not seem to be about ISIS at all but about Iran. Although the United States has more than 40,000 troops stationed in 14 countries across the Middle East, and another 20,000 on warships in the seas surrounding them, the bases it uses in Iraq are its closest bases and airfields to Tehran and much of Iran. If the Pentagon loses these forward operating bases in Iraq, the closest bases from which it can attack Tehran will be Camp Arifjan and five other bases in Kuwait, where 13,500 US troops would be vulnerable to Iranian counter-attacks — unless, of course, the US withdraws them, too.

Toward the end of the Cold War, historian Gabriel Kolko observed in his book Confronting the Third World that the United States’ “endemic incapacity to avoid entangling, costly commitments in areas of the world that are of intrinsically secondary importance to [its] priorities has caused US foreign policy and resources to whipsaw virtually arbitrarily from one problem and region to the other. The result has been the United States’ increasing loss of control over its political priorities, budget, military strategy and tactics, and, ultimately, its original economic goals.”

After the end of the Cold War, instead of restoring realistic goals and priorities, the neocons who gained control of US foreign policy fooled themselves into believing that US military and economic power could finally triumph over the frustratingly diverse social and political evolution of hundreds of countries and cultures all over the world. In addition to wreaking pointless mass destruction on country after country, this has turned the United States into the global enemy of the principles of democracy and self-determination that most Americans believe in.

The horror Americans feel at the plight of people in Gaza and the US’s role in it is a shocking new low in this disconnect between the humanity of ordinary Americans and the insatiable ambitions of their undemocratic leaders. 

While working for an end to the US government’s support for Israel’s oppression of the Palestinian people, Americans should also be working for the long-overdue withdrawal of US occupying forces from Iraq, Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The US Chooses Genocide Over Diplomacy in the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

Iran: an enduring pillar of hegemony in the Middle East

Iran’s claim to legitimacy is deeply rooted in a history that spans millennia. The land known today as Iran has been home to a succession of influential civilizations and empires, each leaving its mark on the country’s cultural and intellectual makeup. From the Elamites, who rival the Sumerians as one of the oldest civilizations in world history, to the Achaemenids, Parthians, Sassanids and Safavids, Iran’s rich history fosters a profound sense of pride and identity in its people. Iran has often been the seat of power for empires stretching across the Fertile Crescent and into Central Asia, a heritage which serves as a foundation for Iran’s claim to leadership. 

Furthermore, Iran draws strength from its religious legitimacy as the epicenter of the Shia branch of Islam. Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution toppled the pro-Western monarchy and founded a theocratic republic. This revolution gave Iran religious authority as the hub of Shia Islam, which has many adherents in nations such as Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen. 

Beginning with the Islamic Revolution, Iran has exported its revolutionary ideology to fellow Shia communities. It has created a network of allied non-state military actors like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and various groups in Iraq and Palestine, strategically extending its influence. The Quds Force, which was led by the late General Qasem Soleimani, plays a pivotal role in coordinating these proxy militias. This force solidified Iran’s ideological foothold beyond its borders.

In addition, Iran has been a major supporter of Hamas, the Palestinian armed group that controls Gaza. Hamas carried out a sudden attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, killing 1,200 people and capturing more than 200 hostages. Iran supplied Hamas with money, arms and training, as well as operational and strategic guidance for the operation.

Iran is also a substantial military power in its own right. The Islamic Republic maintains approximately 610,000 active-duty personnel, 350,000 reserve personnel and 150,000 paramilitary personnel. The military structure comprises two main branches: the regular armed forces, encompassing the army, navy and air force, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a parallel force directly accountable to the Supreme Leader. The IRGC possesses ground, naval and aerospace units, in addition to the Quds Force and the Basij, a volunteer militia.

Iran’s military arsenal includes a spectrum of ballistic and cruise missiles, with some boasting a range of up to 1,200 miles. Drones, submarines and cyber-warfare capabilities further enhance Iran’s military capabilities.

Notably, Iran adopts a strategic approach relying on asymmetric and unconventional warfare tactics, employing swarm tactics, proxy forces, and sabotage to counterbalance adversaries’ conventional superiority. Illustrating this strategy, Iran has recently employed missile and drone attacks to target US bases in Iraq, as well as targeting Israel-linked ships. Meanwhile, Iran’s proxy forces like Hamas and Hezbollah serve to harass and deter these adversaries.

Saudi Arabia: the conservative powerhouse

If Iran is the revolutionary force in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is the conservative one.

Saudi Arabia is the cradle of Islam. It was here that the Prophet Muhammad was born and received his revelations in the 7th century CE. The two holiest sites in Islam, the Great Mosque of Mecca and the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina, are both in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, the Saudi monarch styles himself as “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” This historical and religious connection grants the nation a profound moral legitimacy to exert influence over the Middle East.

The two mosques serve as focal points of the annual pilgrimage, known as hajj. Making the pilgrimage at least once in a lifetime is a religious duty for Muslims. By hosting millions of pilgrims yearly, Saudi Arabia strategically deploys its religious influence to further its political objectives and propagate its ideological stance.

During the formative period of Islamic civilization, Saudi Arabia was the center of the Caliphate. It served as the seat of the first four caliphs who governed the expanding Muslim empire from 632 to 661 CE. Following the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the last Islamic caliphate after World War I, Saudi Arabia again asserted itself as the heart of Islam, without laying claim to the title of caliph. Saudi Arabia championed Wahhabism — a strict and conservative interpretation of Sunni Islamic teachings. This ideology, considered by its adherents the pure and authentic form of Islam, underpins Saudi Arabia’s historical and religious claims.

Saudi Arabia also enjoys the support of a major non-Islamic power, the United States. The US has emerges as Saudi Arabia’s foremost partner, providing robust military support. The roots of this alliance trace back to 1945 when the nations signed a pivotal agreement granting the US access to Saudi oil in exchange for military and economic aid. This agreement, known as the Quincy Pact, was forged by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz Al Saud aboard the USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. It marked the beginning of a long-lasting and mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries.

Over the years, this strategic partnership has deepened, encompassing cooperation on counter-terrorism, regional security and energy. The United States has supported Saudi Arabia in various conflicts, such as the Iran–Iraq War, the Persian Gulf War and the ongoing Yemen Civil War, as well as in confronting the threats posed by al-Qaeda and ISIS.

As the primary arms supplier to Saudi Arabia, the United States furnishes military training, intelligence, and logistical support, aligning its interests with Saudi policies in the region. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States accounted for 79% of the total arms imports by Saudi Arabia from 2016 to 2020. This alliance positions Saudi Arabia as a key American ally and a counterbalance to Iran’s influence in the Middle East.

Turkey: Ottoman Heritage and a unique foreign policy

The third factor in the Middle East is Turkey, a powerhouse boasting the largest economy in the region and the second-largest population.

Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East is anchored in its Ottoman heritage. The Ottoman Empire, centered in Turkey, was the dominant Islamic power and caliphate — both the religious and political leader of the Muslim world until its dissolution in 1924, following Turkey’s defeat in World War I.

The Ottoman Empire ruled the Muslim world from North Africa to Iraq and extended deep into Europe. It was a diverse and multicultural society. This environment promoted coexistence among various ethnic and religious groups through a system of relative tolerance and autonomy.

Turkey’s historical legacy not only gives its people a sense of pride and identity but a perceived right to leadership and influence in the Middle East. Viewing itself as the rightful successor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey sees itself as having a special responsibility and role within the region, encapsulated in its foreign policy vision of New Ottomanism, tempering Turkish nationalism with a pan-Islamic focus. 

Like Iran, Turkey is a sizeable military power with a large population. Turkey boasts approximately 510,000 active-duty personnel, complemented by 380,000 reserve personnel and an additional 150,000 paramilitary personnel. Turkey is also a member of NATO, which affords the nation access to the collective defense and security mechanisms of the West.

Employing its hard power, Turkey has intervened militarily involvement in various countries, notably Syria, Libya and Iraq. In these theaters, Turkey has lent support to various factions in order to counter adversaries such as the Assad regime, the Haftar forces and Kurdish militias. This military intervention serves as a tangible expression of Turkey’s commitment to shaping regional dynamics.

Turkey strategically deploys proxy forces to bolster its alliances and extend its influence. Entities like the Syrian National Army, the Government of National Accord in Libya and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt serve as instrumental proxies, trained and supported by Turkey to align with its strategic objectives.

The spirit of cold war unmistakanly pervades the current geopolitical landscape. The outcome of the struggle between Iran Saudi Arabia, and Turkey will shape the future of a new Middle East.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post The New Middle East: A Triangular Struggle for Hegemony appeared first on Fair Observer.

But if Israel persists in this genocidal war, US threats may be impotent to prevent others from intervening. From Lebanon to Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, the possibilities of the conflict spreading are enormous. Even Algeria says it is ready to fight for a free Palestine, based on a unanimous vote in its parliament on November 1.

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The US is facing a credibility crisis in the Middle East

Middle Eastern governments and their people already see the United States as a party to Israel’s massacre in Gaza. So any direct US military action will be seen as an escalation on the side of Israel. It would be more likely to provoke further escalation than to deter it.

The US already faces this predicament in Iraq. Despite years of Iraqi demands for the removal of US forces, at least 2,500 American troops remain at Al-Asad Airbase in western Anbar province, Al-Harir Airbase, north of Erbil in Iraqi Kurdistan, and another small base at the airport in Erbil. There are also “several hundred” NATO troops, including Americans, advising Iraqi forces in NATO Mission Iraq, based near Baghdad.

For many years, US forces in Iraq have been mired in a low-grade war against the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) that Iraq formed to fight ISIS, mainly from Shia militias. Despite their links to Iran, the armed groups Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and other PMFs have often ignored Iranian calls to de-escalate attacks on US forces. These Iraqi groups do not respect Iran Quds Force leader General Esmail Qaani as highly as they did General Soleimani, so Soleimani’s assassination by the United States in 2020 has further reduced Iran’s ability to restrain the militias in Iraq.

Related Reading

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After a year-long truce between US and Iraqi forces, the Israeli war on Gaza has triggered a new escalation of this conflict in both Iraq and Syria. Some militias rebranded themselves as the Islamic Resistance in Iraq and began attacking US bases on October 17. After 32 attacks on US bases in Iraq, 34 more in Syria and three US airstrikes in Syria, US forces conducted airstrikes on November 21 against two Kata’ib Hezbollah bases in Iraq, one in Anbar province and one in Jurf Al-Nasr, south of Baghdad, killing at least nine militiamen.

The US airstrikes prompted a furious response from the Iraqi government spokesman Bassam al-Awadi. “We vehemently condemn the attack on Jurf Al-Nasr, executed without the knowledge of government agencies,” al-Awadi said. “This action is a blatant violation of sovereignty and an attempt to destabilize the security situation … The recent incident represents a clear violation of the coalition’s mission to combat Daesh [ISIS] on Iraqi soil. We call on all parties to avoid unilateral actions and to respect Iraq’s sovereignty.”

As the Iraqi government feared, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq responded to the US airstrikes with two attacks on Al-Harir airbase on November 22 and several more on November 23. They attacked Al-Asad airbase with several drones and launched another drone attack on the US base at Erbil airport. Their Syrian allies attacked two US bases across the border in northeastern Syria.

Short of a ceasefire in Gaza or a full US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria, there is no decisive action the US can take that would put a stop to these attacks. So, the level of violence in Iraq and Syria is likely to keep rising as long as the war on Gaza continues.

Regional actors in Yemen, Turkey, Lebanon and Iran contemplate intervening in Gaza

Another formidable and experienced military force opposing Israel and the United States is the Houthi army in Yemen. On November 14, Abdul-Malek al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi government in Yemen, asked neighboring countries to open a corridor through their territory for his army to go and fight Israel in Gaza.

The Houthi Deputy Information Secretary Nasreddin Amer told Newsweek that, if they had a way to enter Palestine, they would not hesitate to join the fight against Israel, ”We have fighters numbering hundreds of thousands who are brave, tough, trained and experienced in fighting,” Amer said. “They have a very strong belief, and their dream in life is to fight the Zionists and the Americans.”

Transporting hundreds of thousands of Yemeni soldiers to fight in Gaza would be nearly impossible unless Saudi Arabia opened the way. That seems highly unlikely, but Iran or another ally could help to transport a smaller number by air or sea to join the fight.

The Houthis have been waging an asymmetric war against Saudi-led invaders and the internationally recognized Yemeni government for many years, and they have developed weapons and tactics that they could bring to bear against Israel. Soon after al-Houthi’s statement, Houthi forces in the Red Sea boarded a ship owned, via shell companies, by Israeli billionaire Abraham Ungar. The ship, which was on its way from Istanbul to India, was detained in a Yemeni port.

The Houthis have also launched a series of drones and missiles towards Israel. While many Western politicians and journalists try to portray the Houthis as simply puppets of Iran, the Houthis are actually an independent, unpredictable force that other actors in the region cannot control.

Even NATO member Turkey is finding it difficult to remain a bystander, given the widespread public support for Palestine. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was among the first international leaders to speak out strongly against the Israeli war on Gaza, explicitly calling it a massacre and saying that it amounted to genocide.

Turkish civil society groups are spearheading a campaign to send humanitarian aid to Gaza on cargo ships, braving a possible confrontation like the one that occurred in 2010 when the Israelis attacked the Freedom Flotilla, killing 10 people aboard the Mavi Marmara.

On the Lebanese border, Hezbollah and Israel have conducted daily exchanges of fire since October 7, killing 107 combatants and 24 civilians in Lebanon and 9 soldiers and 4 civilians in Israel. Some 55,000 Lebanese civilians and 65,000 Israelis have been displaced from the border area. On November 11, Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant warned, “What we’re doing in Gaza, we can also do in Beirut.”

How will Hezbollah react as Israel resumes its brutal massacre in Gaza after the brief pause or if Israel expands the massacre to the West Bank, where it has already killed at least 237 more Palestinians since October 7? 

In a speech on November 3, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah held back from declaring a new war on Israel, but warned that “all options are on the table” if Israel does not end its war on Gaza.

On November 23, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian said, “If Israel’s war crimes and genocide continue, a tougher and more complicated scenario of the resistance will be implemented.”

Amirabdollahian had already warned, on October 16, that “the leaders of the resistance will not allow the Zionist regime to do whatever it wants in Gaza and then go to other fronts of the resistance.” In other words, if Iran and its allies believe that Israel really intends to continue its war on Gaza until it has removed Hamas from power, and then turn its war machine loose on Lebanon or its other neighbors, they would prefer to fight a wider war now, forcing Israel to fight the Palestinians, Hezbollah and their allies at the same time, rather than waiting for Israel to attack them one by one.

The US is ignoring the warning signs

Tragically, the White House is not listening. On November 24, the day after Amirabdollahian’s speech, US President Joe Biden continued to back Israel’s vow to resume the destruction of Gaza after its “humanitarian pause,” saying that attempting to eliminate Hamas is “a legitimate objective.” On December 7, he blamed Hamas for the breakdown of the pause.

America’s unconditional support for Israel and endless supply of weapons have succeeded only in turning Israel into an out-of-control, genocidal, destabilizing force at the heart of a fragile region already shattered and traumatized by decades of US warmaking. The result is a country that refuses to recognize its own borders or those of its neighbors and rejects any and all limits on its territorial ambitions and war crimes.

If Israel’s actions lead to a wider war, the US will find itself with few allies ready to jump into the fray. Even if a regional conflict is avoided, the US support for Israel has already created tremendous damage to its reputation in the region and beyond, and direct American involvement in the war would leave it more isolated and impotent than its previous misadventures in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq did. 

The US can still avoid this fate by insisting on an immediate and permanent ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. If Israel will not agree to that, the US must back up this position with an immediate suspension of arms deliveries, military aid, Israeli access to US weapons stockpiles in Israel and diplomatic support for Israel’s war on Palestine. 

The priority of US officials must be to stop Israel’s massacre, avoid a regional war and get out of the way so that the UN and other nations can help negotiate a real solution to the occupation of Palestine.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post US Threats Aren’t Creating Peace in the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

A crisis, as we know, provides both dangers and opportunities. To refer to Israel’s situation after October 7 as a “crisis” is to belittle a reality that the English language is unable to express. We talk here about a collective national trauma that Israel and the Jewish people have not experienced since the Holocaust.

Those who know something about Israel can appreciate the significance of the comparison made between the massacre of October 7 and the slaughter of six million Jews in the Holocaust. It is not about the numbers. It is about the very fact that the very state responsible for preventing massacres of Jews failed to do so on its own territory. This fact alone makes it clear that the current war will become a turning point.

The implosion of Netanyahu’s plans

The turning point has to do with the handling of the Palestinian question and Israel’s overall situation in the Middle East. For more than 13 out of the past 15 years, Israel has had the same prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu made very clear that he had two big missions; One was to show that resolving the Palestinian issue was not the key to peace between Israel and the Arab world; the second was, that Iran was the existential danger, not only to Israel, but also to the moderate Sunni Muslim Arab countries.

In Netanyahu’s mind, these two were intertwined. Go after Iran and on the basis of the old rule, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” try to expand Israel’s reach in the Middle East beyond Egypt and Jordan. Once that is achieved, the Palestinian question would be finally demoted to a local problem between Israel and 5 million disaffected Arabs, something that will be resolved “somehow,” while Israel and the Arab states deal with the Iranians together.

The attainment of all that depended on maintaining security relations with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and keeping Hamas in control of Gaza. Yes — although Netanyahu liked to present himself as Mr. Security, he worked diligently to keep Hamas in power in Gaza. The explanation he gave to his own supporters was that Hamas in Gaza meant no Palestinian state. At the same time, he told the moderate Arab states of the Gulf as well as Morocco and Sudan that, in the absence of any full-fledged Israeli–Palestinian conflict, they have no problem uniting with Israel against Iran.

All of the above seemed logical, achievable and plausible. Then came the Abraham Accords, which seemed to give the seal over all of it. Alas, it did not last. October 7 happened, and ever since then it has seemed that the pendulum is about to swing back to the pre-Abraham Accords, perhaps even all the way to the pre-Camp David Accords situation. The Palestinian question is not going to disappear, Iran is not isolated and the entire Netanyahu strategy is collapsing like a house of cards. And with that, we come to the big Israeli dilemma.

How can Israel fight Hamas without blowing up its international situation?

Israel considers Hamas to be the reincarnation of Nazism. They are right. Hamas’s actions and ideology are Nazi-type; they are genocidal with a Jihadist envelope.

This leaves Israel no choice. When you are an Israeli leader, then the comparison to Nazis leaves you with only one possible course of action — go to the very end and make sure that Hamas is no more. That is what the Israeli leadership has been saying. This is where 2023 is not 1942. The Jews are not going to be slaughtered without a battle; in fact, they are strong enough to finish off the modern-day Nazis — not all the Palestinians, but one murderous faction. Hamas are Nazis in all but their capabilities.

Israel can do the job, and the photos coming out of Gaza say it so vividly. But can Israel really pull it off, considering the potential prices to pay? The longer the war goes on, the more kidnapped Israelis, among them babies and the elderly, will die. Beyond this, the war has become a public relations disaster with piles of Palestinian bodies in the streets, rising global antisemitism, receding diplomatic support, a rift with the US and above all the reversal of the Israeli–Arab normalization process. Suspension or complete rupture of relations with a few of the Arab states may result, a major victory for Iran. This is now the dilemma of Israel.

Israel can go all the way. Hamas never anticipated, never expected the firepower of the Israeli Defense Forces when unleashed as ferociously as now. They misread the internal situation in Israel prior to October 7, the strength of Jewish nationalism and of Israeli civic society. They are paying a huge and mounting price for it. Israel, however, needs to decide. Do they take all the above risks and lose a lot in the short term? Or do they have the stamina to sustain the immediate losses in order to gain for the longer term?

Here is what Israel can win in the longer term — the respect and support of none other than all the Arab participants of the Abraham Accords. Why? Because all these countries are afraid of a Hamas victory, or a perceived Hamas victory, which will be an Iranian victory. They know it could undermine their own domestic stability. If Israel does not finish the job against Hamas, Middle East stability will be jeopardized, very likely irreversibly. If Israel can present a real victory, the forces of instability will be defeated, hopefully for some time to come.

Israel should do everything it can to minimize civilian casualties as much as operationally possible, but do what it takes to defeat the enemies of stability and peace.

Does Netanyahu have it in him as the last great effort of his career? A big question, but he is no longer the all-mighty Netanyahu of the past. There are others in his emergency cabinet, in the Israeli Defense Forces and above all in the Israeli public who want this campaign to be the decisive one.

Easier said and done, and easy for me to say from the relative comfort of Columbia, South Carolina. There is nothing comfortable, though, writing about war — but October 7 is a transformative event, and so are its implications.

[Anton Schauble edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post Should Israel Make Full Use of its Powerful Military, or Is the Cost Too High? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Once again, the Israel and Palestine conflict has come into focus, not by light flare but uncontrolled fire, which has pushed the Middle East back into its old days of heightened tensions, possibly snowballing into full-fledged regional war. After the Russia–Ukraine war in Europe, another war frontier has opened in the Middle East. This conflict will alter the regional geopolitical balance.

However, Hamas pulling off an attack of such magnitude has raised serious questions over its sterling intel agencies, the foreign intelligence agency Mossad and the domestic intelligence agency Shin Bet. Didn’t they see it coming? Or did they underestimate it?

In my view, the changing dynamics of Middle East geopolitics in the wider region played some role in misting Israel’s intelligence glass.

Changing power balance in the Middle East 

The thaw between Israel and the Arab World began with a series of agreements and accords from Camp David in 1978, to the Oslo Accords in 1993 and 1995, and the more recent Abraham Accords. This has allowed the powers of the Middle East to a somewhat more comfortable position. By taking the focus off of the Israel-Palestine hotspot, the normalization process has given way for regional forces to converge for their regional and national interests. For example, Saudi Arabia has shifted its focus to economic development, namely with its Saudi Vision 2030 project.

More distant powers interested in the region — such as the quartet of China, Pakistan, India and the US — also got some breathing space in the region. Operation Sankalp, India’s maritime engagement to ensure the security of Indian vessels in Middle Eastern waters, got some breathing time when the Abraham Accords happened becuase the accords eased the risks along trade routes in the Persian Gulf where ships off the Emirati coast were previously trapped in crosshairs of Israel and Iran covert warfare as the rival powers targeted each others vessels. Similarly, New Delhi’s Look West Policy got a fillip from the visit of former Army Chief General M. M. Narvane to United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in December 2020 (Narvane was the first Indian army chief to do so).

Similarly, China’s brokering peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia has prepared a base for its economic ingressions in the region. 

The so-called West Asian Quad or I2U2, which is an informal cooperation between the US, Israel, India, and the Emirates, has likewise increased its geopolitical relevance in the Middle East amid the cold war with Iran, aiming to block Chinese and Russian inroads. From time to time, these geopolitical configurations are able to exert enough control in the region to prevent conflict and increase stability. At least, that is the hope.

At the same time, the thawing of relations antagonises the Arab players sitting at the extreme ends of the spectrum such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and other Arab proxies of Iran. So, in spite of better relations between most of the state actors, the region is still a tinderbox. Recent various initiatives such as the Middle East Corridor at the G20 and the much-talked about potential normalization of ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel have stirred the extremist hornet nest. So, while on the surface the situation appeared more amenable to Israeli interests and safer, it also created the potential for an explosive reaction, which we have unfortunately seen on October 7.

Israel’s vengeance

Now, the situation is much different. War has broken out again in the Levant, and Hamas’s deadliest terror strike on Israel has triggered a spine-chilling Israel’s massive retaliation. Dubbed Operation Iron Sword, the counterattack involves heavily striking Hamas locations across Gaza. Continued pounding bombs, air strikes, targeting banks, media houses and the like have paralysed the Gaza strip. There is little doubt that Israel will continue its assault with determination.

It wouldn’t be correct now to say that the balance of power or the geopolitical force of the Middle East is at risk; it is on the verge of collapse. Israel won’t stop; many forces in the Arab world, including Syria along with Hezbollah and other extremists groups, would mobilize, backed by Iran. War, or even the risk of war, will give a strategic shock the world again if not controlled as it did in 1973 oil crisis.

Interestingly, Israel’s vengeance mode will provide the US a small opening to establish its hard power relevance in Middle East after decades which will to some extent revive its security architecture which came under heavy storm during Russia–Ukraine war. The US has flexed its military muscles by sending two carrier strike groups to the Mediterannean waters off of the Israeli coast. The purpose of this is not to aid the Israeli military in Gaza directly, but to serve as a warning to neighboring countries. With Israel distracted, its hostile neighbors might see the moment as an opportunity to strike. So, the US is using its hard power to deter Iran and its proxies.

This tactic may help rebuild the US’s image as a nation able to project power in the region. This image has been weakened by the ongoing war in Ukraine, as well as by tense relations between the US and Saudi Arabia. China recently stimied the US by pulling off a partial rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Still, the US is taking some risks in employing its hard power influence vis-à-vis Israel. By doing so it may exacerbate tensions with its Arab partners, especially Saudi Arabia, won’t let a conflict in Palestine go without protest.

How many power alterations will the Middle East see, especially the conflict of territories, with a bright chance to see some makeovers in a few days? Perhaps its answer requires some patience and tight observance in the coming days.

Mossad’s colossal miss

Israel has been caught off guard vis-à-vis Hamas, something which brings back the memories of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Then, too, Israel failed to rightly assess its opponents’ intentions.

Although tensions between the two countries had been rising to that point, Israel did not expect Egypt and Syria to launch an attack on October 6, 1973. The Mossad had not been left completely without warning, however, and at almost the last moment, a Mossad asset codenamed “Angel” communicated that Egypt and Syria were about to launch an offensive. The Mossad ignored the information, however, as it it ran counter to its assessment of Egypt. The institute did not believe that Egypt could attack Israel because it believed they did not posses the necessary technology to counter Israeli airpower. They were wrong. Egypt was able to carry out an effective and complex offensive against Israel using Soviet SAM-6 missiles for air defense.

The 1973 failure contributed to the fall of Golda Meir’s government and the sacking of its military intelligence chief, Eli Ziera, after the Agranant Commission investigated the failure of Israel’s defence forces and intelligence. 

A close examination of the Mossad’s intelligence misses shows that, then as well as now, the real problem in Israel’s famed intelligence agency does not lie in intelligence gathering or awareness of the threat; the real problem lies in the assessment and feedback part, which is an integral part of the intelligence cycle.

Nations often pay a heavy price for biased or half-baked assessments and underestimated feedback. Israel falters, not in raw intelligence but in intelligence management, either by assesing intelligence through a prejudiced or biased perspective or by underestimating the policy response warranted by the intel in hand.

Although we cannot say so with certainty, Mossad may well have received some prior intelligence on the October 7 attack, but they underestimated Hamas’s capability of carrying out a well-coordinated three-pronged attack. Four possible reasons why they thought this are:

1. Overconfidence in Israel’s technology — Iron Dome, border security, surveillance capabilities, etc.

2. Normalization of ties between Israel and Arab nations, which perhaps led Mossad to believe that the situation with Palestine too was thawing.

3. Divided Israeli attention in the West Bank and domestic politics. Israel feared that the recent surge in unrest in the West Bank would lead to widespread violence. Israeli citizens, too, were restless. Security establishments were therefore focused on the West Bank and domestic fronts and distracted from Gaza.

4. Iran’s nuclear obsession, which kept Mossad under the impression that Iran would not wish to stir the pot because it was engaged in delicate negotiations regarding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action via backchannels with the US. Israel might have been under the valid impression that Iran would not sabotage the nuclear deal by encouraging an offensive action by its ally Hamas, at least for a time. At the time, Iran was lowering the pace of its nuclear stockpiling. The action of lowering stockpiling can be seen as a deception to shift Mossad’s attention and make them believe that Iran was still strongly pursuing the deal via backchannels. If, as per some reports, Iran was behind the attack, it succeeded in carrying out a cladestine proxy attack where Iran can excercise clean denaiblity and play safe. Even if not, the appearance of detente may have contributed to catching Israel off guard.

As strategic affairs expert and national security analyst Praveen Swami notes, “successful conduct of war demands endless intellectual creativity.” A senior Israeli journalist notes that intelligence failure is attributed to “sinful arrogance of the Israeli defence establishment.”

From a purely military standpoint, the three-pronged attack was a feat in intellectual creativity that defeated famed Israeli technologies at the borders. It is time for Israel’s intelligence community to recognize its own failure of imagination, to build strategic foresight, and to avoid misting their intelligence glass with complacent assesments in the future. For now, Hamas has sabotaged any further attempts at Israeli normalization with the Arab world, and what lies ahead is anybody’s guess.

[Erica Beinlich edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The Roots of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

This Is Not an “Ordinary” Israel–Hamas Conflict

How International Companies Profit From Palestinian Oppression

The post The Mossad’s Startling Miss In the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

Sure, the Palestinians have international law, the United Nations, and a large swath of public opinion on their side. That and $3 will get you a latte.

The latest outbreak of horrendous violence—the slaughter of Israeli citizens by Hamas, the slaughter of Palestinian citizens by Israeli forces—has frequently been linked to the specific suffering in the Gaza strip. Nominally governed by the militants of Hamas, Gaza has been rightly compared to an open-air prison where Israel subjects the residents to all the indignities of the incarcerated. The environment is tightly controlled. There is terrible overcrowding. Only a designated number of Palestinians are allowed out on work release. These intolerable conditions have nurtured dreams of resistance: the more intolerable the conditions, the more violent the resistance.

But there is another desperation at work here, fueled by a fury at being sidelined by geopolitics. Even as they lose more and more land to Israeli settlers, Palestinians have had to listen to promises that this agreement or this pact or this set of negotiations will accord them something approximating a state or a secure homeland or some measure of dignity. And it just hasn’t happened.

The most recent deal, which would result in Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic recognition of Israel, has also included some sops thrown at the Palestinians. According to murderous Saudi prince Mohammed bin Salman, the deal would “reach a place that will ease the life of the Palestinians.”

Say what?!

Forget about an independent state, which had long been the Saudi demand. This time around, Riyadh would settle for some unspecified version of prison reform: better meals, more exercise in the yard outside, perhaps conjugal visits. As if Palestinians don’t merit even an asterisk in the agreement, Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu refused to enumerate even these minor concessions.

Disrupting this imminent deal seems to have been at least one motivation for the attacks launched last week. But if it’s true that Hamas had been planning this assault for one or even two years, then it’s necessary to look at the other geopolitical conditions that have pushed Palestinian militants to act and the Israeli government, equally militant under Netanyahu’s extremist reign, to wage war in return.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

As befits a country obsessed with power politics, American presidents have long been focused on the very sources of power in the Middle East—namely, fossil fuels. Oil undergirded the longstanding U.S. alliance with Saudi Arabia, a regressive, authoritarian state that has nevertheless thumbed its nose at the United States by funding anti-Western extremism throughout the world. Securing access to oil was one reason the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 and unseated Saddam Hussein. If the Middle East consisted of nothing but sand and date palms, the United States would have expended as much geopolitical capital there as it has in Patagonia and Mauritania.

The other locus of U.S. interest in the region has been Israel. Over the years, Israel has been the top recipient of U.S. military assistance. In 2021, for instance, it received $3.3 billion, 11% of the entire U.S. foreign assistance budget. To make this alliance more secure, successive U.S. administrations have dreamed of ending the nearly 80-year-long conflict between Arab countries and the Zionist state. Beginning in the 1990s, the road to that rapprochement ran through the Occupied Territories. If the United States could push the Israelis and Palestinians toward a two-state solution, so the thinking went, Arab-Israeli peace would follow.

Beginning with the Trump administration, however, the United States reversed the equation, focusing more on negotiating agreements between Israel and the Arab states that secondarily dealt with Palestinians. Through the Abraham Accords, the brainchild of Trump’s son-in-law and foreign policy neophyte Jared Kushner, the United States brokered a deal between Israel and both the UAE and Bahrain. Then came normalization between Morocco and Israel, at the expense of U.S. recognition of Moroccan claims to Western Sahara. In one of its last acts, the Trump administration presided over an agreement between Sudan and Israel, which has so far stopped short of full normalization.

Not only has the Biden administration adopted the Abraham Accords as part of its own foreign policy in the Middle East, it has attempted to build on them by pushing the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. If it can make the bed for these strange bedfellows, the United States can accomplish a task started during the Obama administration: refocusing U.S. attention away from the Middle East and toward Asia in particular. Because of its need for heavy crude, the United States still imports some oil from the Persian Gulf — 12% of total imports in 2022. But beginning in 2019, America began to produce more energy than it consumes. No longer dependent on Middle Eastern oil and having brought Israel in from the cold, the United States is poised to downgrade the Middle East in geopolitical importance.

Israel and oil are not the only pull factors for the United States in the Middle East. Since the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the United States has also sought to contain Iran and its partners, including Hezbollah and Hamas. The progress made during the Obama administration to secure a nuclear agreement with Tehran was unraveled by Trump, which also led to the discrediting of the political pragmatists in Iran and their loss in the 2021 elections. A sign of the erosion of U.S. influence in the region could be measured recently when China negotiated a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Less animosity between the leading Shia (Iran) and Sunni (Saudi Arabia) countries in the region should be good news for Palestinians. Despite much rhetorical support, however, the major states in the Middle East have largely failed to stand up for the Palestinian cause, beginning with Egypt’s involvement in the Camp David Accords in 1979. “Seeking to maintain good relations with the superpower, Arab regimes allowed Washington — Israel’s main supplier of weapons and military support — to take control of peace efforts in the region,” writes Imad Harb of the Arab Center Washington DC. “This left no space for Arab leaders to positively impact decision-making regarding the Palestinians. Slowly but surely, the rights of the Palestinian people dropped down the priority list of Arab governments which saw the US as the main guarantor of their political survival and narrow economic interests.”

This high-level abandonment of the Palestinians has proven unpopular with folks on the street in the Middle East, who have taken a very dim view of the Abraham Accords and their successors. Demonstrations in support of Palestinians have spread rapidly throughout the region in the wake of Israel’s blockade of Gaza and preparations for a ground invasion. But if the United States is unable to influence Israeli policy — and several administrations indeed attempted to push back on Israeli occupation policy and its treatment of Gaza — then these public protests won’t have much impact either.

The Russia Factor

Hamas has counted on both Iranian and Russian support over the years. Iran has provided military support and, through Hezbollah, training as well. Despite much work by intelligence agencies, however, no Iranian fingerprints have been found on the latest attack by Hamas.

Russia, meanwhile, adopted the Soviet foreign policy of supporting the Palestinian cause. Although some Russian weapons have ended up in the hands of Hamas, it’s not likely that there has been a direct military relationship. Indeed, Russia has tried hard to maintain good relations with Israel, and it thinks of itself as a potential arbiter of conflict in the region.

At the same time, the Hamas attacks fit comfortably into the Kremlin narrative that the tide is turning against Ukraine because now the West’s attention is divided. As far as Russian President Vladimir Putin is concerned, U.S. and European governments are experiencing donor fatigue, which is accentuated by the new demands for assistance from Israel.

But the Biden administration is likely to use the Hamas attacks to bundle assistance to Ukraine with support for Israel, making it that much more difficult for Republican lawmakers, who are currently hamstrung by their inability to choose a House speaker, to vote down the package.

Putin, meanwhile, has placed calls to various leaders in the region. The Kremlin has its own version of the Abraham Accords: the Authoritarian Accords. The Russian leader has good relations with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, Iran’s Ebrahim Raisi, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, not to mention Benjamin Netanyahu and Hamas. If he weren’t saddled with the conflict in Ukraine, Putin might actually be able to bring everyone to the table. But a leader’s convening power is undercut when he has broken international law by invading a neighboring country and helped to drive up the global prices of food and energy. In such an environment — Russia down, United States on the way out — Israel acts without meaningful constraints.

What’s Next

The situation in the region is indeed bleak. An Israeli ground assault on Gaza will have horrendous consequences — for Palestinians, probably for Israel, and for the prospects of regional peace. Israel will try to eliminate Hamas, an entity it once helped to create in order to undercut the authority of the more secular PLO. But Israel has never been able to eradicate any of its adversaries in the past. So, should it proceed with an invasion, Israel will face an occupation of Gaza as difficult to maintain as Russia’s seizure of a part of Ukraine.

It might seem that any kind of rapprochement between Israel and Palestine is off the table for another generation. But some analysts harbor hopes, however slender. According to Steven Simon, a former Obama national-security adviser, “The U.S. should establish a small contact group of important players, including Saudi Arabia, to validate and sell a post-conflict plan. This would entail the handoff of Gaza to the U.N., once the guns have cooled, pending the invigoration of the Palestinian Authority and commitment to Palestinian national rights.” Perhaps, under cover of providing public solidarity with Israel, Biden quietly pursued such an option during his recent trip to the region.

The key point here, though, is “once the guns have cooled.” The sooner the guns cool, the better. That means an immediate ceasefire.

Israel should learn the lessons of the past, including the ones that the United States learned after September 11. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq might have satisfied, in whatever misguided fashion, an immediate desire for revenge. But keeping the guns hot ended up killing more than twice as many Americans as died on that day in 2001. The costs—in shattered lives, in outlays for the military campaigns—continue to negatively affect the United States. And those costs are dwarfed by the impacts on the people of Afghanistan and Iraq.

What should Israel do instead? It’s certainly easy to preach restraint from a distance. But here’s the reality that Israel needs to face: even if it somehow eliminates Hamas, it won’t eliminate the conditions that brought Hamas to power in Gaza. Israel has to grapple with the reality of Palestinians. They can’t be wished away.

The dispossession of the Palestinians has been a non-stop tragedy — for the dispossessed obviously but also for the occupiers, who have known no real security. An independent Palestinian state at first might only externalize the risks that Israelis face. Over time, though, the two historically stateless peoples, who have both been used as pawns for centuries, can find common cause as neighboring states — like Germany and France after World War II or Indonesia and East Timor today. Fratricide, as the latest events have proven once again, only benefits the one percent of extremists on both sides.

[Foreign Policy in Focus first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post How to Cool the Guns in the Middle East appeared first on Fair Observer.

That was true for Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization and Israeli leaders before the PLO’s 1988 recognition of Israel and the 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords. Palestinian airline hijackings and attacks on Israeli towns, Israeli retaliatory military actions and the assassinations by renegade Palestinian commander Abu Nidal in the 1980s of senior PLO officials engaged in unofficial talks with Israeli activists served hardliner purposes. So did tacit Israeli support for Hamas, born under Israeli occupation in opposition to the occupation of Palestinian lands, as an imaginary anti-dote to Palestinian nationalism.

Unprecedented disregard for human life

If anything, the reinforcement of hardline positions reinforced by the latest war, together with the unnecessary brutality and harshness of the occupation, has produced a conflict with an unprecedented disregard for the lives of the other. Mounting resistance to the Israeli occupation was inevitable without any possibility of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but Hamas and Israel had choices in how to conduct hostilities.

Hamas did itself no favors with the wanton and random killing of Israeli civilians in its unprecedented October 7 attack on Israel that shattered perceptions of Israeli military and intelligence superiority, demonstrated the unsustainability of the occupation and rallied degrees of support for Israel, not only from its traditional US and European allies but also influential Global South countries like Kenya and India.

Instead of embarking on an Islamic State-style killing spree, Hamas could have achieved its objectives by restricting its offensive to targeting Israeli military installations and personnel. The presence of an unknown number of Israeli soldiers among the more than 100 hostages kidnapped by Hamas proves the point.

By the same token, rather than bombing Gaza back to the Stone Age, Israel could have opted for targeted killings of the Hamas senior and mid-level leadership. With a different government, it could have coupled its retaliation with a credible proposal to solve the conflict.

Granted, past targeted killings didn’t produce the desired outcome, and Israel is in no mood to talk about peace. But similarly, the current sledgehammer violence by both parties in violation of international law, too, will not achieve preferred results, at least in the short term, and likely only harden positions, much like the Second Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, against Israeli occupation in the late 1980s and early 1990s failed to prevent escalating violence.

A lone Israeli military voice, retired Major General Itzhak Brik warned that “should a regional war break out and we are not prepared for it, the catastrophe will be hundreds of times greater … A military operation in Gaza can degenerate into an all-out war on five fronts.”

In Brik’s counting, it would be a multi-front war involving not just Hezbollah and Lebanon, the West Bank, Syria and Iran, but also Israeli cities and towns. “The next war will feature both very difficult battles on land and very difficult attacks from the air. The Israeli home front will be hit by thousands of missiles every day, and along the border, we will be facing thousands of fighters who want to come across,” the former military officer said. “But we’ll face the biggest catastrophe inside the country, as tens of thousands of armed Arab rioters will run throughout the country, and we hadn’t prepared for this.”

There are still some cooler heads around

To be sure, neither Hamas nor Israel are what they were in the 1980s. Now gone are the days when the Israeli military told then-Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin during the Intifada: “We can resolve this, but not at a price that either you or we find morally acceptable. You solve this.”

What may not be lost and will likely regain prominence are attitudes underlying ceasefire talks in 2014 to end that year’s military conflagration between Israel and Hamas.

Senior Hamas official Mousa Abu Marzouk noted at the time that “the charter is not the Quran. It can be amended.” Abu Marzouk was referring to Hamas’ charter, which calls for the destruction of Israel.

His words echoed the words of the late Israeli Defence Minister Ezer Weizman who, in the 1980s, stood in front of his Likud Party emblem that showed Jordan as part of Israel and said, concerning the Palestine Liberation Organization charter that at the time called for Israel’s demise, “We can dream, so can they.”

For now, the Hamas attack and Israel’s response leave hardly any flexibility. Overall, the Israeli carpet bombing of Gaza and the cutoff of food, fuel and medical supplies to the Strip has stiffened Arab public opinion’s rejection of relations with Israel without a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The silver lining is that a minority of voices on both sides of the divide are distancing themselves from the atrocities committed in the fighting and the bombings. That was always true for Israel, even if moderate voices have been pushed to the margins over the years.

What is new is that moderate voices elsewhere in the Middle East have emerged at a time of heightened emotions and rallying around the flag. In some cases, like that of Iran, Israel, rather than being the punching bag and boogeyman, has become a sword wielded against an unpopular and repressive regime.

Over the weekend as Hamas invaded Israel, Iranian soccer fans denounced the presence of a Palestinian flag at a match in Tehran’s Azadi Stadium between Persepolis and Gol Gohar. “The Palestinian flag — shove it up your ass!” the fans chanted.

By the same token, an “IraniansStandWithIsrael” trended on Twitter, seemingly dominated by the Iranian Diaspora rather than Iranians in Iran. It was not clear whether this represented a demographic divide or increased caution among segments of society in the Islamic republic.

Similarly, breaking taboos, Arab voices on social media are taking Hamas to task for its unwarranted brutality and sparking a rare discussion in the Arab world. “I am a Kuwaiti and I stand with Israel. Any Kuwaiti who has forgotten the treachery of the Palestinian leadership is ignorant. My solidarity is with the Palestinian and Israeli people. We want to uproot Hamas and the PLO. These people have lost their competence to manage the interests of the Palestinians,” tweeted prominent Kuwaiti journalist Jasem Aljuraid, who has 86,000 followers on Twitter.

Opposed to autocratic rule, Aljuraid has left his native Kuwait but remains a voice in social media discussion. His tweet sparked thousands of contradictory and mixed responses, including more than 2,000 likes. “They killed an Israeli woman, took off her clothes, smashed her, and marched her around in victory…but victory for what?! Are these the principles of Islam?!” Aljuraid asked in a separate tweet featuring the Israeli flag.

London-based Kuwaiti Shiite Muslim religious scholar Yasser al-Habib with 22,000 followers tweeted: “Who among us does not enjoy retaliation from the Zionist enemy? We were all excited by this news when it first arrived. But as the hours passed, my feelings deteriorated after these atrocities committed by the Hamas group, including mutilation, rape of women, random killing, and similar atrocities. Where did the ethics of war go in Islam?!”

(To be fair, there is no independent confirmation, at time of writing, of reports that Hamas has raped captives.)

Adding his voice, Bahraini activist Shaheen Aljenaid charged, “This is a terrorist act and a distortion of the image of Islam and Muslims… Watch how they trade in photographing a dead woman without clothing, without morals or humanity. This is clear evidence that they have no connection to Arabism and religion.”

The importance of voices like Aljuraid, Al-Habib and Aljenaid is less their denunciation of Hamas and more the suggestion that the historic Pavlov reflex to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, long challenged by Israeli doves — even if they currently threaten to be drowned out in the cacophony of anger, shock and a desire for revenge among Israelis — is for the first time being questioned in other parts of the Middle East.

[The Turbulent World first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

The post In the Middle East, History Repeats Itself … Right? appeared first on Fair Observer.

Hamas’ unprecedented attack on Israel, described by some analysts as the Jewish state’s 9/11, changes the dynamics of Middle Eastern geopolitics. The brutal attack involved prolonged fighting with the Israeli military in Israeli towns and cities, the firing of thousands of rockets at Israeli population centers, the random killing of innocent civilians in Israeli homes and the kidnapping of scores of Israeli soldiers and civilians.

BBC foreign correspondent Secunder Kermani described sirens sounding off and multiple explosions as he disembarked at Tel Aviv airport on Saturday.

Like the Turkish assault on Kurdish positions in Syria and Iraq in the wake of the October 1 suicide bombing in Ankara, the Hamas attack and Israel’s retaliatory pounding of Gaza call into question the sustainability of a regional de-escalation that freezes rather than tackles perennial conflicts.

Similarly, the attack pours cold water on the notion of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ultra-nationalist and ultra-conservative coalition partners that Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands can be sustained indefinitely.

On Hamas’ tailcoat, Iran, long opposed to Arab normalization of relations with Israel, sees the Palestinian offensive as vindication of its position. Only days before the hostilities, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cautioned that normalization of relations with Israel amounted to “gambling” that was “doomed to failure.” He warned that countries establishing relations with the Jewish state would be “in harm’s way.”

Raising the specter of a wider regional conflict, Hamas spokesman Ghazi Hamad told the BBC that the group had direct backing for the attack from Iran. Hamad did not specify what support entailed.

Even if suggestions prove correct that Iran helped Hamas plan and prepare for the attack, the group would have launched its assault because it served its purposes, rather than serving Iranian interests.

Reactions across the Middle East

Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Lebanese Shiite militia, bolstered the threat of a regional conflagration by firing rockets at the Israeli-occupied Shebaa Farms in southern Lebanon. Israel retaliated with armed drones. The Hezbollah attack came after Israeli soldiers opened fire on pro-Hamas demonstrators carrying the group’s flag on the Lebanese side of the border. There were no reported casualties.

Meanwhile, a Saudi statement suggested that the Hamas attack had complicated US-led efforts to engineer Saudi recognition of Israel. The Saudi foreign ministry recalled the kingdom’s “repeated warning of the dangers of the explosion of the situation as a result of the occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights and the repetition of systematic provocations against its sanctities.” The statement indicated that the fighting reinforced Saudi conditioning of diplomatic relations with Israel on viable steps toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Already, the fighting will stop Environmental Protection Minister Idit Silman from becoming the third Cabinet-level Israeli official to visit Saudi Arabia in less than two weeks. Ms. Silman was expected to attend this week’s MENACW 2023, the Middle East and North Africa Climate Week conference in the kingdom, one of four Regional Climate Weeks held worldwide ahead of next month’s COP28 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Dubai.

In what diplomats described as an indication of the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) predicament, Emirati officials insisted that Sunday’s United Nations Security Council discussion of the fighting would be a closed session rather than a private meeting. The UAE called for the meeting alongside Malta. Unlike a private meeting, the closed session excluded Israeli and Palestinian representatives. It ended without a Council statement.

The UAE was one of four Arab states to recognize Israel in 2020. At the same time, UAE officials describe Hamas as a terrorist organization.

Had there been a Palestinian representation, the Palestinian voice would have been President Mahmoud Abbas’s Palestine Authority, dominated by Al Fatah, Hamas’ archrival, further marginalized by the fighting. This weekend, Abbas was reduced to issuing a statement insisting that Palestinians had the right to defend themselves against the “terror of settlers and occupation troops.” With the perennial potential collapse of the Palestine Authority, Hamas’ attack strengthens the group in a likely struggle to succeed 87-year-old Abbas, who has lost public support.

While the Israeli-Palestinian fighting was likely to boost popular Arab rejection of relations with Israel, social media responses in Turkey indicated a different sentiment among one segment of Turkish public opinion. “Israel is probably more popular than ever among Turks,” said Turkish Middle East scholar Karabekir Akkoyunlu. Akkoyunlu attributed Israel’s popularity to Israeli support for Azerbaijan against Armenia, rising anti-Arab sentiment in Turkey and Arab countries normalizing relations with the Jewish state.

That did not stop many Turks from marching in Istanbul this weekend to support the Hamas attack.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hosted Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in July and has allowed the group to operate. However, unlike Arab statements that blamed Israel for the violence, Erdoğan offered to mediate between Israel and Hamas.

What will the political fallout of the fighting be for Israel?

The fighting risks, at least in the short-term, stiffening Israel’s refusal to entertain steps that would enable the creation of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel or a viable one-state solution, even if the Netanyahu government, the most ultra-conservative and ultra-nationalist in Israeli history, becomes a victim of renewed violence.

Israeli reticence will be further reinforced by likely increased violence on the West Bank, where Palestinian militants resisting Israeli occupation are certain to be emboldened. Militants called this weekend on Palestinians to fight Israelis in their West Bank towns.

Some Israeli sources suggested that Israel’s focus in the last year on Palestinian resistance in the West Bank had led Israel to pay less attention to Gaza. More than 50 years after initial Egyptian-Syrian advances in the early days of the 1973 Middle East caught Israel by surprise, the Hamas attack has put a dent in Israel’s image of military superiority and prowess.

In addition, perceptions of Israeli weakness may be reinforced once the guns fall silent, with the country likely to be wracked by assertions that the Hamas attack was an intelligence and operational failure.

Nevertheless, Israel would likely benefit from an international community breathing a sigh of relief should the Netanyahu government, too, pay a high price with its possible demise. No Israeli government has survived longer than six months in the aftermath of a major war like the 1973 war or the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Even so, the Hamas attack is likely to impact Israeli public opinion. On the one hand, it is expected to harden attitudes towards Palestinians, reinforced by Hamas’ brutal attacks on innocent civilians and abuse of soldiers. On the other hand, Israelis will probably have less confidence in Israeli security. “I’m worried. I can’t believe what happened. I’ve lost confidence,” said an Israeli woman in a text message.

Netanyahu has sought to capitalize on the hostilities and unprecedented losses suffered by Israel at the hands of Palestinians — now over a thousand, with thousands more wounded — by inviting opposition leaders Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz to join an emergency government. Lapid said in a statement that Netanyahu would have to ditch his far-right and ultra-conservative coalition partners in forming an emergency government. The prime minister “knows that with the current extreme and dysfunctional security cabinet, he can’t manage a war. Israel needs to be led by a professional, experienced and responsible government.”

Netanyahu’s invitation came as the fighting temporarily eased the prime minister’s immediate domestic concerns. The rocket attacks and fighting in Israeli towns and settlements close to Gaza ended, at least temporarily, nine months of mass protests against Netanyahu’s judicial changes. It also halted protests by military reservists, including fighter jet pilots currently striking Gaza, who had earlier refused to report for duty because of the judicial changes. Israeli ultra-nationalists and military commanders warned that the reservists’ protest would weaken Israeli military readiness.

On Saturday, Israel called up reservists for a possible ground invasion of Gaza after Hamas took scores of Israeli soldiers and civilians hostage and transferred them from Israel to Gaza.

Israel may take heart from the unconditional US and European support, fueled by Hamas’ Islamic State-style brutality, in public statements after the Hamas attack. However, reality is very different behind the scenes, according to US and European diplomats.

Netanyahu has not endeared himself to Western leaders by heading a government that has expanded Israeli settlements in the West Bank; tacitly endorsed increased anti-Palestinian violence by Israeli settlers; violated fragile understandings on the Temple Mount or Haram-ash-Sharif, a site in Jerusalem holy to Jews and Muslims; and responded brutally to Palestinian resistance.

In addition, Netanyahu has embraced nationalist and far-right European leaders, who look more favorably at his policies than Western Europeans, the European Union and US President Joe Biden. Forming an emergency government would ease Western criticism of Israeli policies.

Distressing images from Gaza could counter that as Israel continues with its devastating bombing of Gaza, which killed at least 300 Palestinians and wounded nearly 2,000 others before the first 24 hours were over.

Nevertheless, Hamas may have miscalculated by counting on Netanyahu’s strained relations with his Western partners, leading them to take a more even-handed approach to renewed violence. Selfies of Hamas fighters lynching the corpses of killed Israeli soldiers, reports of killings of Israeli civilians in their homes in towns near Gaza, and the parade of the dead body of a German tattoo artist buried the slim chance of a more nuanced Western attitude.

Even so, a Middle Eastern diplomat argued, “The Middle Eastern paradigm has changed. Everyone is forced to recalibrate. Hamas shattered perceptions. The Middle East may never be the same.”

[The Turbulent World first published this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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